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ABSTRACT
PREESTABLISHED HARMONY AND CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ
SEPTEMBER, 1992
JOSE R. SILVA, BA, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Dr. Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.
This dissertation originates from the problem suggested by the view that Leibniz is
an idealist whose theory of preestablished harmony purports to solve a problem of
dualism: incommunication between body and mind. It is an inquiry into the meaning of
"preestablished harmony" and "corporeal substance," aimed at obtaining a definite
answer to the question. Is Leibniz an idealist?
Our historical approach to "preestablished harmony" suggests a basic affinity
between Leibniz and Malebranche, manifested in their rejection of Descartes's causal
account of the mind-body relation and the recognition that concomitance between mind
and body occurrences requires another explanation. Leibniz's insatisfaction with
occasionalism is examined as indicative of: his rejection of philosophies which disregard
"essences" as explanatory principles: his acceptance of mechanicism and rejection of
materialism, on the basis of hylemorphism; his conception of metaphysics as the
elucidation of the consequences for creation of God's nature.
The features of Leibniz's philosophy that suggests a dualist interpretation are
contrasted with those which seem favorable to idealism. The question about the origin of
the problem of incommunication between body and mind is treated as crucial to this
issue, as either metaphysical incommensurability between body and mind excludes
interaction, or the "substantial spontaneity" which originates from Leibniz's conception
of truth seem its basis.
V
Leibniz's conception of corporeal substance is examined, initially in the context of
the Discou rse and the Correspondence with Arnauld in order to refute Stuart Brown's
idealistic interpretation. Leibniz's dynamics, his hylemorphic conception of corporeal
substance, and his account of bodies as aggregates are presented as evidence that he
asserts the existence of corporeal substances. His mature views on dynamics and his
conception of transubstantiation prove confirmatory of this interpretation.
Finally, the significance of "essentialism" and "hylemorphism" are stressed as
crucial to Leibniz's thinking. Essentialism is the basis of Leibniz's methodological
outlook. Hylemorphism is Leibniz's basic ontological notion. It enables him to profess a
non-Cartesian type of dualism and to avoid the defects of Scholasticism and excesses of
the moderns. The dissertation concludes by establishing that preestablished harmony
conflicts with hylemorphism, and that there are inconsistencies in Leibniz's treatment
of substantial form and matter.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. No Room for Corporeal Substances
The view that Leibniz's mature philosophy exclusively affirms the existence of
immaterial substances and has no room for corporeal substances is not unusual among
Leibniz's commentators. It is a central thesis for Stuart Brown, who holds that Leibniz,
having defended the existence of corporeal substances at the time of the Discourse on
Metaphysics , will abandon this position and turn towards a phenomenalistic account of
bodies. Brown claims that this change is already present at the end of the Correspondence
with Arnauld (1690) and that the new position represents Leibniz's definitive view. "I
1 . Idealism: George Berkeley
An ontology with no room for corporeal substances is typical of what in modern
philosophy is known as "idealism." To affirm that only minds or spirits exist
substantially has characteristically meant, as in Berkeley for example, that reality
contains only two kinds of substantial entities: an absolute one, God, and created ones,
human spirits. These are both immaterial substances. Since substance is that which
really is, this view would make us infer that if by the expression "the physical world"
we mean a world of corporeal substances, then, there is no such a world. But, though this
is, indeed, the characteristic conclusion of idealists, their philosophical efforts have
historically been centered around the problem posed by the following questions: Why is
it that some, either common sense people or philosophers, think otherwise? i.e.. Why do
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some people believe that there are corporeal substances? Philosophically, what is most
interesting is their effort to show that the reasons materialist and dualists offer for
upholding their ontological positions are not acceptable, that, rather, very convincing,
or even certain, reasons can be produced in defense of idealism.
The conceptual schema whereby appearances in consciousness are distinguished
from a reality in some way external to consciousness is basic to the characteristic
treatment, in modern philosophy, of perception. It is fundamental to both idealism and
materialism. Materialists treat the external world as existent, and as the point of
departure for any clarification of what is significant and distinctive of this world. They
look upon the issue of the knowledge of the world as a problem that must be posed against
their metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions —that the material world exists
and that it is somehow known by a perceiver, possessed of consciousness, the human
individual. Idealism, by contrast, takes consciousness as point of departure, and is led to
what thinkers like Berkeley believed to be a momentous philosophical discovery, that we
can never transcend consciousness, i.e., that all we may know, and hence assert to be
real, are contents of consciousness. There is no reality independent of consciousness, the
idealist will say, and the world must be recognized to be phenomenal. Things that
materialists consider substantial are not substances but modalities of substances for the
idealist. They are not truly real, that is, not real in themselves, and whatever degree of
reality they may have is relative and dependent. This conception is quite clear in
Berkeley. For him the world that materialists consider a conglomerate of corporeal
substances depends upon being thought, for it is known by us through our ideas, and the
being of an idea is being perceived (esse est percipi). "Corporeal substances" are not,
Berkeley contends, external, ontologically independent, entities: they are not substances
but only aggregates of ideas whose being is relative to the mind that thinks them.
John Locke's view, that our apprehension of reality starts out with our contents of
consciousness, all of which he calls "ideas," and may not go beyond what the combination
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of simple ideas permits, is at the basis of Berkeley's claim that there are no substances
independent of the mind, such as material substances are said to be. If ideas are our point
of departure, and ultimately what we may know is made up of ideas, it seems to Berkeley
that what is known is ontologically of the nature of an idea. The things of external reality
are, therefore, either ideas or constructs of ideas. The world as a conglomerate of things
is ideal in this way, and never an ontologically mind-independent realm.
Berkeley believes that his phenomenalism is not in conflict with the ordinary
man's view of reality, since presumably he would not contest the claim that the being of
ideas consists in being perceived and would accept the metaphysical consequences,
relative to what may be considered external reality, that follow from this. A little
reflection, Berkeley suggests, in passages like the one below, will enable us to recognize
that ideas of perception are as mind dependent as those of imagination or our passions;
hence, we should realize that all we are able to know are mental contents whose
combinations can never lead to the positing of independent substantial entities;
[That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist
without the mind, is what every body will allow.] And (to me) it seems no less
evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the senses, however blended
or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist
otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.
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Ideas of sensation, which are usually believed to provide access to external
substantial reality (the physical world), are mind dependent, as are all objects which
result from the way these ideas may be combined. Berkeley claims, then, that since what
we traditionally conceive as "external reality" is the product of how ideas of sensation
are combined and related, there is no possibility of attaining anything but evidence about
ideas, or the existence of ideas, in our so-called "apprehension of the external world."
Berkeley's account of perceptual experience is clearly at the basis of his
metaphysics. For him, once the nature of conscious contents is understood, and
consciousness is seen as the only means by which we may gain access to whatever we may
consider real, the only coherent type of metaphysics is idealism, i.e., the view that the
3
world of things is phenomenal, and that we human beings relate to this world of things in
a dual fashion: as phenomenal things in it, and as the mind-substances that perceive it.
It is important to note that the appearance-reality schema is basic to the common
sense distinction between dream contents and perceptions. Descartes used it in this
fashion, and initiated the tendency in modern philosophy towards considering ideas mind
contents. Even though Descartes will change his position claiming that there is no
definitive criterion by which to distinguish subjective mental contents from perceptual
contents of consciousness, which represent truthfully external entities (and presumably
are caused by them), his initial position enables him to say that all we are immediately
aware of are mind contents. Mind-presentations or ideas are, hence, for Descartes, the
immediate objects of consciousness and therefore intermediaries in gaining access to
whatever reality there may be independent of consciousness. The physical world or
material reality must be reached through ideas, and the question. How can this be? is, in
Descartes and after him, one of the most basic and challenging philosophical issues.
It is this view of consciousness, as immediately in possession of ideas and without
direct access to external things, that becomes the fundamental conception of the human
mind in modern philosophy. It stands at the basis of Locke’s conception of consciousness
and ideas, and will also be taken over by Berkeley. The latter's idealism is the coherent
outcome of the view that consciousness thus conceived cannot transcend its own domain.
2. Solipsism; Berkeley's Solution
Berkeley's point of departure is basically the Cartesian introspective turn which
discovers the subject's consciousness as the indubitable and immediate realm known. The
fundamental question that originates with the introspective turn and the certainty of
one's own existence as subject of consciousness is. Can I ever know about the existence of
anything other than myself? Now, if consciousness has immediately only ideas available.
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and ideas are metaphysically dependent on one’s own mind, and are, in an ontological
sense, "modalities" of our mind, it would seem that all one may ever know is oneself
(solipsism). Berkeley, avoids this conclusion through the use of an argument based on
two principles; that ideas cannot be caused by ideas,^ and that some ideas are not caused
by oneself (for they do not respond to one's will)4. Since many ideas are not of our own
making, and ideas have causes, which may not be ideas, Berkeley concludes that there
must be another mind producing such ideas in me.^ In this way the existence of
something other than myself, God, is presumably demonstrated. But the question
remains. Can we speak of the existence of an external physical reality?
We may remember now that Descartes had recourse to God in order to explain our
access to the external world. In Berkeley too, the metaphysical account of how we may
know so-called "external reality" involves the use of God. Once both philosophers situate
themselves within consciousness, as a result of what I have called an "introspective
turn," their first step, one that enables them to surpass solipsism, results from
evincing the existence of God. Thereafter, for both philosophers, this knowledge will be
the point of departure for a proof of the existence of the world.
In Berkeley's case the recognition of the existence of ideas that are independent of
one's own will not only points to the existence of another mind, but makes possible the
distinction between subjective and objective ideas. Indeed, the ideas which suggest the
existence of God as their cause, are, insofar as not of our own making, not subjective,
according to Berkeley. We may speak, then, of objective ideas, namely, those that
originate in God and are, therefore, fundamentally different from ideas which are
produced by oneself. With this distinction we may delimit what is real, as objective,
from what is subjective and fictitious. For Berkeley, objective ideas are a possible
source of knowledge about external reality: subjective ideas are not a source of
knowledge about anything external to us.
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Objectivity in Berkeley reinstates the possibility of speaking about an external
reality which, however, is not substantial. It is a mind-dependent reality made up of
idea-constructs, for such are things, whose objectivity lies on being dependent upon
God's mind rather than upon human minds. The "externality" of the world is objectivity:
it is still phenomenal, however, and not the externality of a material conglomerate
whose existence is absolutely independent of the minds which know it. Things may still
be considered "objects" and not subjective fictions, but may not be considered
substances. This is, indeed, an ontology which discards corporeal substances.
If we attribute to Leibniz an ontology with no room for corporeal substances, we
might be inclined to consider his position similar to that of Berkeley. If we say with
Stuart Brown that phenomenalism is the answer to the question about the ontological
status of what before was considered a corporeal substance, it would seem that, if these
phenomena are to be salvaged for reality, their mind-dependent being must somehow be
proven objective. Thus understood, the philosophy of Leibniz must provide criteria by
which to distinguish phenomenal contents that are objective from phenomenal contents
strictly subjective. We might suspect that either God will play a role in the solution of
the problem, or that some criteria intrinsic to consciousness may do the trick. In any
case there would be no corporeal substances and we would be left with a world whose
externality to consciousness would not originate from its own right as substantial.
3. A Problem: Benson Mates's Remark
The above way of interpreting Leibniz's philosophy leads to several problems. One
of them, I believe, underlies the following statements of Benson Mates with regard to
Leibniz's conception of bodies:
Since bodies are only phenomena, whereas minds are real, one would suppose that the
mind-body problem, the problem of how the mind can act causally on the body, would
simply disappear. But Leibniz does not seem to be content to leave it at that.®
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What the statement suggests is an anomaly, or even an inconsistency, in Leibniz's
philosophy. It starts out with what is presumably Leibniz's ontological position, one that
does not include corporeal substances, where bodies are phenomena and only minds are
substantial. It then suggests that a philosophy with such an ontology has by this very fact
dissolved "the problem of how the mind can act causally on the body." I take it that the
resolution of the problem must be that of an idealism a la Berkeley: a body is an
idea-construct, an entity whose being is being thought, a phenomenom; and the relation
between the mind-substance and its body is sufficiently explained by indicating that a
body is a thought or a series of thoughts of the mind. Since such a body is not a substance,
its relation to the mind would not be intersubstantial. So Mates's point is that a theory as
ambitious as preestablished harmony, which furnishes an explanation of how two
heterogeneous substances relate, is surely uncalled for were we to consider Leibniz a
consistent idealist.
In the section (five, chapter ten) where Mates addresses this issue he is not as
clear as one could wish in explaining his remark, "since bodies are only phenomena
whereas minds are real, one would suppose that the mind-body problem, the problem of
how the mind can act causally on the body, would simply disappear." The remark is
presented in a matter of fact way, sort of incidentally, in a context where the main
purpose is to explain Leibniz's views on the mind-body relation. The point that Mates
stresses is that for Leibniz the mind is independent of the body, that there is no causal
interaction between them, i.e., as he puts it, that "the body goes its way in accord with
the 'physicomechanical' laws, and the mind develops according to laws described as
'ethicological.'"^ This is indeed a position Leibniz constantly emphasizes while stressing
that the occurrences determined by these two sets of laws exhibit ordered concomitance.
And this is the theory of preestablished harmony. Mates refers to it in the passage we
have been examining by adding to the sentence last quoted what follows:
7
Any appGarance of causal interaction must arise from the preestablished harmony
between the states of a monad and those of "its" body. In other words, Leibniz
subscribes to the view now called "psychophysical parallelism.’’^
The remark that caught our attention, then, is not offered in order to make an
issue of the anomaly it suggests, it is just incidental in an exposition aimed at providing
Leibniz’s views about the mind-body relation. Mates describes this relation in the
commonplace fashion, by stressing the independence that Leibniz grants to the
occurrences belonging to the domain of mind versus those which make up the domain of
physical reality, and does not address the problem that the remark points to.
In spite of Mates’s incomplete treatment of the topic suggested by his remark, we
find in section five clear evidence for the interpretation I am suggesting. Before reaching
the part where he offers what he considers Leibniz’s definitive view on the mind-body
relation, along the lines we have explained above, he examines a passage of Leibniz which
he finds puzzling insofar as it does not accord with what would be expected from a
coherent phenomenalism. Mates starts out by affirming the view that statements about
bodies are about phenomena; he goes on to say, "since phenomena do not really exist, all
such statements should somehow be analyzable into statements about the perceptions of
monads.’’^ But he suggests that Leibniz "gives no clue as to how such reductions could be
accomplished." And even worse, Leibniz, according to Mates, pursues another direction
when he is explicitly treating the topic of the mind-body relation; "At any rate, when he
considers the mind-body problem explicitly, he goes off in another direction.’’^ 0
Leibniz’s puzzling passage is produced to substantiate this last statement. It says:
Therefore, if per impossibile all minds were destroyed but the laws of nature
continued to hold, everything would remain the same as if there were minds, and
books would be written and read by human machines which would not understand
anything. Of course we know it is impossible that the laws of mechanics should
continue to hold in the absence of minds. For the laws of mechanics are the decrees of
the divine will, and the special laws governing each body (which follow from the
general laws) are decrees of its soul or form, directed towards its good or to
perfection. Therefore, God is the mind that leads everything to general perfectiori.
And the soul is the sentient force which in each individual tends towards its special
perfection. For souls came into being when God impressed on each thing a tendency
[con3 tus] towards its special perfection, in order that from the resulting conflict the
maximum possible perfection should arise. Everything that occurs in nature can be
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dGmonstratod both by final causes and by efficient causes. Nature does nothing in
vain; nature acts by the shortest routes, provided that they are regular.... Souls do
not act in bodies extra ordinem. Nor does God so act in nature, even though some
things do appear to occur extra ordinem, since from the beginning reality was so
constituted that the general order will involve something extraordinary in the
particular case."* "I
This text is found "unsatisfactory" and "puzzling" by Mates because: "First, we are
invited to consider what would happen if the realm of bodies remained as it is but there
were no minds. Given that bodies are only phenomena, so that statements purporting to
be about bodies will be only compendia loquendi for statements about how things appear
to minds, the hypothesis seems so self-contradictory that there is no nontrivial
criterion for deciding whether this or that follows from it."'' 2 Mates's point is that the
supposition we are asked to make is nonsensical for there cannot be bodies without minds
if the being of bodies is their being perceived. He is clearly using the term "phenomena"
with respect to bodies in the Berkeleian sense of a being whose existence is mind-
dependent and not substantial. He believes, like Stuart Brown, that there are no
corporeal substances for Leibniz, and that our statements about the physical world are
ultimately statements about presentations in a mind-substance, without which one
cannot possibly speak of bodies. It is puzzling, therefore, for Mates, that Leibniz asks us
to suppose the existence of bodies without minds, and even more puzzling that when, in
the passage above, he seems to acknowledge that it is impossible that there be bodies
without minds ("Of course we know it is impossible that the laws of mechanics should
continue to hold in the absence of minds."), instead of explaining this as a result of the
fact that bodies are phenomena he leaves out this point altogether. In Mates’s words: "he
ignores this aspect of the matter and offers as his reason a claim that the laws governing
bodies are decrees of a mind, a mind that found it best so to arrange things that the
physical world proceeds in a completely regular way (though occasionally, to one who
sees only a part of the whole there may appear to be irregularities)."''
3
It is clear that Mates's suggestion, that Leibniz's ontology makes his theory of
preestablished harmony unnecessary, is grounded upon an idealistic interpretation of
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Leibniz. This view raises a very important question about consistency and even
profundity with regard to Leibniz's philosophy. The hypothesis of preestablished
harmony is frequently presented as fundamental to his philosophical system by Leibniz.
It is his answer to the problem of the mind-body relation. It presumably enables him to
accept the principles of the new physical science and the determinism that follows from
physical laws in the realm of external reality, while at the same time allowing a
treatment of minds —conceived in terms of the two faculties, understanding and will— as
free and unhindered by physical determinism. In this fashion it seems basic to the view
that minds are immortal, and not subject to the disintegration of bodies. The hypothesis
plays a role in the general explanation of how created substances relate to each other, in
the context of showing why the world must be harmonious insofar as it is the product of
an absolutely perfect creator. Also, preestablished harmony is used by Leibniz as the
basis for a proof of the existence of God. An argument that we may summarize as follows
serves this purpose; there is harmony among all substances, but there is no causal
relation between them that may account for this harmony, hence, it must have been
impressed upon them by a general cause, capable of grasping and ordering the whole, a
wise mind, appreciative of harmony, acting in order to obtain it as a desired end. And
this mind is God.^ ^
Preestablished harmony is presented by Leibniz as the distinctive feature of his
philosophy against the views of Malebranche, Descartes, the Scholastics, Common Sense,
and those he calls "the Hylarchic Philosophers" (More, Scaliger, etc.). It even serves at
times as the basis for naming Leibniz's philosophy and even Leibniz himself ("the author
of the system of pre-established harmony"^ ^). If it is unnecessary, insofar as it is
inconsistent with Leibniz's ontology, this is no small fault in his thinking.
Mates's incidental remark contains, then, a serious indictment against Leibniz's
philosophical acuity and profundity. It entails that Leibniz's reiterated efforts to clarify
the role of preestablished harmony in his philosophy are really superfluous, and that
his frequent boasts, that this is the best solution to fundamental problems that other
philosophers had tried to solve, is empty. To say the least, if Mates is right, Leibniz's
metaphysics is rendered shallow, if not frankly inconsistent. Of course, it may be that
Mates is wrong, that his interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist, with no room in his
mature philosophy for corporeal substances, is incorrect.
Preestablished harmony, as Mates's remark has underlined, seems couched in
dualism and unnecessary in an idealist monism. No doubt, idealism in Berkeley would not
be consistent with such an hypothesis and the supposition that Leibniz is an idealist in
the same vein certainly leads to a problem. But, Is Leibniz really an idealist a la
Berkeley? Does not the problem aroused by such a view with respect to preestablished
harmony cautions us against its acceptance? Not only did I find upon reading Brown some
aspects that did not fit my interpretation of Leibniz, but Mates's remark made it evident
that a careful examination of Leibniz's ontology and of preestablished harmony had to be
undertaken. The question about the status of corporeal substances has to be posed, and the
meaning of preestablished harmony, against the answer to that question must be
reexamined. These are two objectives that we will pursue in this work. Our task entails
a good deal of clarification of Leibniz's metaphysics: this will include his notions of
"substance," "phenomena," "beings by aggregation," "substantial forms," and "matter."
That almost three centuries after Leibniz's death we still disagree about
fundamental issues indicates that there is a lot of exegetical work to be done here. This
dissertation is mainly a work of this sort. It attempts a clarification of Leibniz's thought
against the interpretations of Stuart Brown, Benson Mates and other students of Leibniz.
At the end of this dissertation, however, I will treat Leibniz's thought critically and
establish what I consider some of its shortcomings.
Our work will progress in the following fashion:
1 . The problem suggested by Mates's remark will be more fully examined. To do
this we will inquire first into the historico-philosophical background of preestablished
harmony. The questions that arise from this inquiry will serve to identify some of the
issues that will be considered central in our work. Our task will include examining
Leibnizs reasons for rejecting occasionalism. There are fundamental epistemological and
metaphysical implications in Leibniz's opposition to Malebranche that deserve our
attention. These historical topics make up the second chapter of this dissertation.
2. The possible answers to the question, Is Leibniz's ontology dualistic or
idealistic? that appear to follow from his treatment of preestablished harmony will be
the topic of our third chapter. We will examine two different lines of thinking in
Leibniz's writings, each of which seems favorable to one of these interpretations.
Emphasis, at this stage, will be placed on the theoretical bases for these interpretational
alternatives: our view on Leibniz's definitive position will not yet be offered.
3. The next chapter will address Stuart Brown's contention about corporeal
substances. Brown treats the issue in the context of the Discourse on Metaphysics and the
Correspondence with Arnauld . Our own treatment will center upon these works so that
we may attain a twofold objective; to refute Brown's interpretation, and to situate
ourselves at the time of these works before Leibniz's conception of corporeal substance.
Afterwards we shall examine writings on dynamics and transubstantiation which appear
to express Leibniz's mature views on corporeal substance, and will compare the findings
of this inquiry with the conclusions previously obtained.
4. In the last chapter we shall consider the relation between preestablished
harmony and corporeal substance within Leibniz's philosophical system in order to
present our definitive interpretation. Our exposition of Leibniz's thinking here will be
critical, first, insofar as its dependence upon the philosophical tradition and upon
problems that were current in the seventeenth century will now be more fully treated;
and secondly, insofar as its internal systematic nature will be addressed. Our evaluation
and criticism of Leibniz's thinking may herefrom ensue. The shortcomings which seem
most important in Leibniz's philosophy will be identified and explained.
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CHAPTER II
PREESTABUSHED HARMONY: THE HISTORICaPHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
A. Dualism
In philosophy, perhaps more than in any other intellectual endeavour, an
appreciation of the historical antecedents, and of the historical development, of a line of
thought is especially significant for understanding it. In our introduction we referred to
George Berkeley's idealism, as the type of monism that is frequently ascribed to Leibniz.
We were interested in it because several commentators, whose interpretation we
question, clearly have Berkeley in mind when interpreting Leibniz's ontological
position. But an even more valuable historical reference can be obtained from the
traditional approach which asks how a philosophy fits within its time and is related to
the different currents of thought that antecede it or are contemporary to it. We shall now
approach the historical period surrounding Leibniz's philosophical development in this
fashion, in order to stress the aspects which seem meaningful for an adequate
interpretation of the topics and the problems significant to Leibniz's thinking. We shall
attempt to gain, at least in a general manner, an insight into the philosophical
framework against which Leibniz's philosophy develops. In this context modern dualism
stands out as preeminently important, for it is the ontological position of a school of
thought to which Leibniz constantly refers, and it appears to be the source of the
problems that Leibniz's preestablished harmony seems intent in resolving.
That Leibniz's is a philosophy couched in dualism, aiming at a solution to a
problem originating from dualism is a point that Leibniz himself often suggests, insofar
as he offers his philosophy as a better alternative than those offered by Cartesian
dualists and by Rene Descartes himself. Cartesianism was the most influential form of
dualism in early modern philosophy: its ontological position and the problems that
emanate from it constitute a central part of the philosophical concerns dominating the
seventeenth century. Attention to Cartesian dualism appears as perhaps the best point of
departure of a historical elucidation of the influences which shaped Leibniz's thinking.
Let us pursue, then, this inquiry, beginning with a brief reference to Descartes's
ontology in order to see some of the problems it aroused; especially those which seemed
important to Leibniz.
1 . Descartes's Ontology
a. Mind-Presentations and the External World
Descartes's philosophy is guided by his programme in pursuit of unquestionable
knowledge, which in turn, as his letter to the deans of the Sorbonne in the Meditations on
First Philosophy suggests, is motivated by a desire to substantiate definitively the belief
in God and in immaterial substances.^ This desire we must consider amply satisfied by
his achievements in the Meditations : a first certitude consisting in the awareness of
himself as an immaterial substance, whose existence is the basis for all knowledge: and a
subsequent second certitude, that of God's existence. Descartes's epistemological
programme is grounded upon an implicit metaphysical dualism which will enable him to
distinguish between the ontological nature of external existents as material and spatial,
and his own being as that of an entity none of whose modes of existence are spatial. His
recognition of thinking as unquestionably evident, in his inquiry in search of definitive
knowledge, and as indicative of the being of a substance different from external entities,
is the product of evincing his own thinking in reflection after having denied existence to
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all material substances. But this line of thinking is based on the distinction between
mind presentations as that which is immediately available to a mind and the external
entities that may be known through objective mind presentations, which are yet not the
mind presentations themselves, but external physical things.
To envisage some of the mind presentations as representations of physical things,
which somehow provide information about an external substantial world, is a basic
feature of a conceptual schema grounded upon the distinction between that which belongs
to the mind and that which is characteristic of material entities. That the latter are only
"represented" in consciousness entails the recognition that external things cannot
themselves be present in the mind, for they are of a nature different from that which
belongs in the mind. Descartes's discovery of himself as an immaterial substance is the
product of the development of this conceptual schema, for, once the contrast between
representations in the mind and external entities is emphasized and we situate
ourselves, reflectively, within the domain of representations, we are bound to discover
ourselves as the thinking subject of these representations, even while questioning the
existence of material things, our own body included. Indeed, if the independence of
representations from external entities is stressed, to the point of suggesting, as
Descartes does, that we may suppose the external world non-existent without forfeiting
in any way our domain of consciousness, then, our substantial independence as a thinking
ego is made evident. The ontological independence of external substances is correlatively
enhanced in contrasting their nature to that of mind presentations, even at the risk of
arousing a fundamental question regarding the means by which we, thinkers, are able to
know such substances.
In the Meditations , although Descartes, after his first two certitudes, still has to
face the epistemological twofold problem of explaining how he may assert the existence
of an external substantial world and attest to the trustworthiness of our apprehension of
the things in this world, the stage of facing these issues in the last meditation is reached
against the background made up by the ontological contrast between material substances
and the subject of a domain of consciousness, immaterial and yet substantial. Reality
contains then two types of substances, different and independent of each other. This is
Descartes s basic ontological stance, wherefrom additional epistemological questions may
arise, and under the conditions of which they must be answered. This is modern dualism
in its most explicit form.
No doubt a philosophical programme interested in showing the immortality of the
human mind is well served by dualism. For Descartes, as for Plato before, the view that
the mind is a substance, unextended, immaterial, whose essence is thinking, when
complemented by a conception of death as the disintegration of the body leads to positing
the immortality of the mind. The mind's independence of matter in a human individual is
further enhanced in Descartes's philosophy by his emphasis on the epistemological
features that characterize the manner in which reality is presented to us. That our
awareness of any object entails positing ourselves as the thinking subject of such an
awareness implies, for him, that we cannot obtain evidence of the existence of anything,
material entities preeminently, without at the same time affording evidence of the
existence of the immaterial subject doing the thinking. Psycho-phenomenological
reasons, we may say, show the foundational relation which obtains between the thinking
immaterial substance and the material world in Descartes's philosophy. And emphasis is
thereby placed upon an ontology that starts out with the existence of the philosopher as
the thinking subject, before which every external thing is ontologically derivative
insofar as it can only be known to exist through him, if yet must not be considered
ontologically dependent, for it possesses substantial existence independently of being
known. The external world for Descartes is made up of corporeal substances, and is not
mind-dependent in the fashion of Berkeley, but its existence warrants the existence of
that which makes it possible that it be known, the res cogitans one discovers oneself to
be in introspection.
^
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As we have seen, there are two poles to Descartes's ontology, a material
substantial world and at least one immaterial substance, the object of immediate
existential evidence, the subject whose essence is thinking. In fact it is an ontology with
three types of substances, the third type including only one individual: God. But if we
stress the spiritual character of God and include him within the general category
"immaterial substances" we can still speak of dualism. In any case created substances,
for Descartes, are either immaterial or corporeal.
Descartes's dualism is linked to two philosophical concerns which played a central
role in his thinking: modern natural science and Christian natural theology. With regard
to the first, Descartes stands at the forefront of the innovative intellectual currents of
his time. The second is a more traditional philosophical concern, to which, however, the
French philosopher believed that he could provide a new and fruitful methodological
approach.
Natural science —physics, that is— based upon mathematics, became from the end
of the sixteenth century onwards a decisive intellectual influence upon European culture.
Its method was fertile in epistemological implications, and its characterization and
explanation of physical phenomena seemed full of metaphysical consequences which could
not be eluded and rather had to be understood appropriately, for the growing prestige of
science intimated that any claim to truth from a theory or a doctrine incompatible with
science's fundamental suppositions would hardly be tenable. But it was not that science
had in some forceful way to exert itself in order to prevail as knowledge. The fascination
it produced among many —preeminently among mathematicians, whose bend for science,
in many cases, ran parallel to their rationalistic inclinations towards metaphysics and
natural theology— led to its cultivation and warranted enthusiasm for its conceptual
approach to nature. Rationalistic thought, in thinkers like Descartes, is clearly
influenced by modern science. And modern dualism cannot be understood without
stressing its dependence on the new science's view of the external world.
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An adequate understanding of modern dualism requires that we pay some attention
to the influence natural science exercised upon early modern philosophy. Its importance
is decisive with respect to Descartes and his followers, but also with respect to Leibniz,
not only because Cartesianism was influential upon his thinking, but because of his own
awareness of the importance of this new style of thinking, so promising in so many ways.
Natural science's influence and importance for early modern philosophy is such an
ambitious topic that we must avoid arousing expectations greater than we may satisfy. At
this juncture our interest in the topic is limited; we shall pay attention to some of the
metaphysical and epistemological considerations that it motivated, guided primarily by
our central concern, dualism. In this manner our brief exposition of the distinctive
features of Descartes's ontology will be completed.
b. The Influence of Natural Science
In scientists, like Galileo, and philosophers, like Descartes, we find a new
conception of things which results from the view that only geometrical attributes really
or essentially characterize things. This is a view of external reality which could be
succinctly described by saying that "things" became "bodies," i.e., that the sensuous
entity of our ordinary experience was divested of its sensual facade and recognized to be
essentially, and thus exclusively, corporeal, in the geometrical sense of the word.
Indeed, under the persuasion that only what is rational is real, and that only what is a
geometrical attribute in a thing is rational, Descartes deprived the external world of
sensible qualities and felt that he had an appropriate criterion by which to say that
external reality is a conglomerate of extended entities whose essential attributes are
only magnitude, figure, number and motion.
It is clear that Descartes shared with Galileo the view that the application of
geometry to the conceptualization of change in the external world was the appropriate
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route to take in order to obtain knowledge about physical reality. Like Galileo,
Copernicus, Kepler, and other mathematicians which set the pace for the creation of
modern science, Descartes envisaged mathematics, and specially geometry, as sciences
that provide definitive and reliable knowledge about the spatial structure of external
reality, and also as disciplines which exemplify the epistemological virtues of true
knowledge. Once the quest of modern physics was clearly identified by Galileo as the
explanation of change in the physical world, and change was conceived in terms of local
motion, the mathematical theoretical basis for the treatment of this subject led to the
geometrization of external reality. And the turn toward physics with mathematics as its
basis entailed a change in metaphysics that had as one of its early manifestations the
distinction between "primary" (geometrical) and "secondary" (sensible) qualities.
Since only individual bodies with magnitude, figure, number and motion as
qualities made up external reality in the new conception of modern science, no other
characteristics were to be attributed to things themselves. The sensible qualities of a
thing, ordinarily understood, which include color, sound, warmth, hardness and all that
Aristotle had called the "special objects of sense," were no longer to be considered real
attributes of the thing itself, the body in the external world. Qualities really in the body
were called "primary;" others present in the thing of ordinary experience but not
geometric were considered non-intelligible and hence not real. These were called
"secondary qualities." The terms "body" and "thing," as I am using them here, suggest the
contrast that resulted from the new outlook where the "thing itself" was the body of
geometry, while the thing of common sense or ordinary experience included non-
geometrical features. The thing itself belonged in external reality while the thing of
experience resulted from the way the thing itself affected human sensibility. The sensual
facade of things was therefore considered an effect in consciousness of body-substances
having in themselves no such attributes, but only the capacity of producing in human
perceivers the presentation of a thing with sensible qualities.
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A parallel metaphysical consequence of the geometrization of nature by modern
science was the view that physical causality only involves the modification of the
geometrical modalities of being that essentially characterize things, the most
fundamental of which is motion. But from this view of interaction in the world several
problems arose in philosophy. A very important one resulted from the prevalent view of
perception. Perception was considered a causal process involving the things of the
external world and the perceiver. This process became a problem in the context of the
new view of nature of modern science, for if the interaction between external reality and
the human perceiver could only make use, on the part of external reality, of motion, as
the basic modality of being of corporeal substance, out of which only changes in figure,
magnitude, number and situation could arise, this could hardly serve to explain the
appearance in consciousness of thoughts and representations. The relation between the
"nature" of modern physics and the mind conceived in the Cartesian fashion, as
something immaterial, with no spatial attributes, became therefore a prima facie
unfathomable problem.
The world of corporeal substances of natural science certainly contrasted with a
world accessible through introspection; the domain of a substance whose modalities of
being were entirely relative to consciousness, conceived in terms of thinking functions
and thought contents. The dualism that was evident in the contrast between these two
domains, and that Descartes had so emphatically stressed, for it served so well his
concern with human immortality, entailed a causal breach between motion as cause and
ideas as effects, which though not emphasized by Descartes, was certainly evident to
some of his followers. These realized that the philosophical heritage they had been left
was not without difficulties. For most of them, it was not a question of abandoning
Descartes's basic ideas. The option of abandoning the view of external reality of modern
science was not even considered by most. Science was already too prestigious for that. It
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was rather a question of furthering Cartesianism by fulfilling its philosophical
programme through attempting a solution of the problems it left unsolved.
Descartes's followers's originality and philosophical importance would mostly be
the result of how well they identified the problems contained in his philosophy and how
appropriate the solution they offered to these problems seemed. Even if we may
contemporarily deny them originality, it is clear that they felt that philosophical work
of importance had to be done beyond Descartes and that it was a significant endeavour to
pursue the route he had initiated. The Cartesians constituted an important school of
thought in the seventeenth century throughout Europe, especially so for Leibniz. Like
them, he saw clearly that there were limitations to Descartes's philosophy, perhaps
aided and influenced by what they said in this respect. Unlike them, Leibniz felt that the
limitations and shortcomings were fundamental. But it is clear that Leibniz shared a
significant amount of philosophical baggage with the Cartesians, even beyond what he
shared with Descartes himself. It is important therefore to mention briefly this school
of thought in our historical review, in order to point out how it impressed Leibniz, with
regard to the mind-body problem especially. Among the Cartesians, besides, there is one
philosopher whose relation to Leibniz is of extreme importance; Malebranche, hence,
will be singled out by us as a topic which inevitably requires elucidation in any attempt
to understand Leibniz's philosophy.
2. The Cartesians
Descartes wanted an explanation of the relation between the body and the mind in a
human being. He certainly felt that this was a question that needed to be addressed. But
the answers he gives are far from clear. In the Meditations , for example he writes;
By means of these feelings of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, nature also teaches that I
am present to my body not merely in the way a seaman is present to his ship, but
that I am tightly joined and, so to speak, mingled together with it, so much so that I
make up one single thing with it.^
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The mind is "mingled" with the body, "tightly joined" to it; What do these
expression really mean? and, How can Descartes claim that the res extensa and the res
cogitans are different substances which yet in a man "make up one single thing"?
For Descartes's followers dualism included several metaphysical problems, the
most important of which turned around the question about the substantial nature of the
human individual. If the point of departure for Cartesians is the acceptance of dualism,
the question must be raised. What type of substance is the human individual? If he is an
immaterial substance fundamentally. What then is his body? Dualism answers that it is
also a substance, but then. How is it that an entity metaphysically made up of two
substances may be said to be an individual? And, even if the conjunction of the res
extensa and the res cogitans in a man is accepted as comprehensible in a way that enables
one to admit the individuality of this entity, the question arising from the causal breach
entailed by dualism is unavoidable: How do these two "aspects" of the human individual
relate?
Among the Cartesians several saw these problems. Cordemoy, La forge,
Malebranche and Spinoza are thinkers which unquestionably realized that dualism
entails the problems which arouse the questions above. Leibniz sees them in this
manner, and though he grants more originality to Malebranche and Spinoza, he sees the
Cartesians as a whole as incapable of solving the problems arising from Descartes's
views and mostly valuable for uncovering these problems. Malebranche especially, but
also Spinoza, are considered by Leibniz thinkers who fail at continuing Descartes's
philosophy, and in doing so show its feebleness. A significant part of what is defective in
their work, for Leibniz, is the product of being too subservient to the master's views, in
a manner that makes them share some very fundamental flaws of his.
The central problems addressed by the Cartesians resulted from two aspect of
Descartes's thought which seemed difficult to accommodate with dualism; his causal
account of perception, and the view that we are able to command our voluntary behavior.
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This twofold issue was readily recognized as problematic by several thinkers in the
seventeenth century. It was clearly presented by Malebranche in a manner that we may
paraphrase as follows; we have the impression of reciprocal causal interaction between
our mind and our body. On the one hand, perception seems to us the result of actions
originating in the external world that causally affect one of the bodies in that world, my
own, and thus give rise to presentations in my consciousness, as effects. On the other
hand, I believe myself to be able, insofar as I am a mind, through mental willing, to
arouse movements in that particular physical entity that happens to be my body. But
these impressions must be false, for metaphysically a causal interchange must result
from the capacity of the agent of producing a change in the patient. And substances which
share no metaphysical modalities, such as bodies and minds, cannot interact.
The issue is clearly metaphysical in Malebranche; it has to do with the causal
relation that both in perception and willing is presumed to exist between the body and
the mind. For traditional metaphysics, action was a mode of substances and causality was
the capacity of a substance of initiating a change in another substance or in itself. For
Malebranche, causal interaction was possible between substances with modalities of the
same sort; i.e., an agent as cause must have modalities of being like those which are
present or may be present in the substance that suffers the causal action. The effect is
simply the change of such modalities in the patient.
Malebranche, in the seventeenth century, Cartesian that he was, took external
reality to be made up of body-substances whose basic modality of being was motion, and
mind he viewed as the immaterial substance whose modalities of being were neither
spatial nor material. Since the entities of the external world and the mind cannot
interact, our belief that they do, still present in Descartes, must be surrendered and a
explanation offered rather for the basis of such a belief. Malebranche's originality turns
around this concern. His philosophy centers around the problem of the causal
incommunication between the two heterogeneous realms of created substances, which
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apparently coexist together in that exceptional individual, the human being. It is this
aspect of Malebranche’s thought that constitutes the most important feature of
Cartesianism for Leibniz. Malebranche is, for Leibniz, the Cartesian par Bxcallence, i.e.,
the philosopher who recognizes the shortcomings of Descartes's thought, and is original
enough to denounce them but not sufficiently original nor philosophically as powerful as
to be able to solve or surpass them. It is this type of Cartesianism which Leibniz
constantly mentions in order to recriminate and to suggest that his own thought is the
appropriate answer to the questions it raised and failed to answer adequately.
Malebranche, hence, must now obtain our attention.
3. The Philosophy of Malebranche
a. Relations of Distance versus Perceptions
Malebranche, with Descartes, identifies matter and extension. It is Malebranche's
mouthpiece in the Dialogues on Metaphysics who says;
I proved to you, Aristes, that matter and extension are but one and the same thing."^
For Malebranche all physical change involves only modifications of magnitude,
figure and motion in bodies; these, he includes under the general category, "relations of
distance." The properties of bodies are either static or kinematic relations of distance, as
the passages below indicate:
The properties of extension can consist only in its different states {mani^res d'etre).
These are just relations of distance.
^
Then the properties or possible modalities of extension are simply shape —relations
of distance which are stable and fixed— and motions —relations of distance which are
successive and always changing.
^
Motion is for Malebranche the basic modality of being of corporeal substances,
since he claims that magnitude, figure and number change as the result of motion. All
change in the physical domain reduces to motion. In order to render physical interaction
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comprehensible one must clarify the laws of motion and the laws of impact, the latter
understood as the immediate and only way bodies affect their motions reciprocally.
Malebranche also shares with Descartes the concern with one's own soul or mind
as a topic of fundamental interest in the Christian metaphysical tradition. Like
Descartes, he believes that introspective evidence shows that one exists as an immaterial
substance, and that evidence for the existence of oneself as a thinking substance is more
immediate and epistemologically sounder than all the evidence for the existence of
external reality. The characterization of external reality as essentially spatial, and in
this manner material, is the background against which Malebranche discovers his own
nature. While Descartes had emphasized his capacity for thinking himself as existent,
having denied the existence of all material entities, as evidence of his immaterial nature,
Malebranche places his attention upon the contrast between the modalities of being he
shows himself to have through introspection and those of bodies. He writes:
Nothing has no properties. I think. Hence I am. But what am I, the I that thinks at the
time I am thinking? Am I a body, a mind, a man? As yet I know nothing of all this. I
know only that, at the time I think, I am something that thinks. But lets us see. Can a
body think? Can something extended in length, breath, and depth reason, desire,
sense? Certainly not, for all states (manieres d'etre) of such an extended something
consist solely in relations of distance; and it is evident that these relations are not
perceptions, reasonings, pleasures, desires, sensations: in a word, thoughts. Since
my perceptions, which certainly belong to me, are something entirely different from
relations of distance, it follows that this / that thinks, my very substance, is not a
body.^
Descartes's dualism is clearly at the basis of the argument above that serves
Malebranche to answer the question about his nature. He is a thinking substance, none of
whose modalities of being is a relation of distance. And for him, like for Descartes, the
contrast between the nature of material entities and that of immaterial substances
warrants the independence and integrity of the latter. Bodies are corruptible, and it
would seem that they may affect each other in a way that brings about disintegration and
death, but no such eventuality may affect immaterial substances, for these are simple
and indivisible. The metaphysical heterogeneity of the two substantial domains warrants
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that what occurs in one does not affect the other. The disintegration of the body entails
not the death of the soul.
Malebranche emphasizes the distance between the two domains of reality which
make up the created universe, and in doing so he stresses that dualism entails a causal
gap between these domains which presents a problem to the prevalent view of perception
and to the belief that we are able to command our body's actions. Motion and relations of
distance in bodies are not metaphysically commensurate with perceptions, desires, and
thoughts in general, which are the modification of minds. In Malebranche's own words:
Modifications of extension consist entirely in relations of distance. Now, it is evident
that my pleasure, my desire, and all my thoughts are not relations of distance. For
relations of distance can be compared, measured, exactly determined by principles of
geometry: and we can neither compare nor measure in this way our perceptions and
our sensations.^
That the domains of bodies and minds somehow relate, though not through
interaction, is a view that Malebranche shares with a considerable number of
Cartesians, along with the recognition that there is a philosophical task to be undertaken
in explaining this relation. The view that these domains relate is suggested by the
experience of every human individual, who is at the same time a mind that knows the
external material world, and a body in it. How is it that the material world may be
known by an immaterial mind? and. How is it that such a mind may affect its material
body, are the questions that must be raised at this juncture, and which become the
fundamental questions in Malebranche's philosophy.
Before addressing Malebranche's treatment of these questions, it is appropriate
that we pay attention to another manifestation of modern thought where this issue is
relevant. A brief incursion into the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes will confront us with a
a conception of external reality where the issue of our knowledge of corporeal substances
presents significant problems. This digression will enable us to place the topic of
dualism in early modern philosophy in a broader context.
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b. A Digression: Hobbes
Hobbes shares many of the metaphysical views of the Cartesians with regard to the
physical world. That he does not share all and is quite different in some respects makes
him an interesting subject of comparison. Hobbes's thought seems to me more
independent of traditional metaphysical influences than Descartes's or Malebranche's. I
consider his views a clearer instance of a line of thinking predominantly influenced by
modern science. It contains many of the features that were considered dangerous
implications of science for philosophy by Christian thinkers of the seventeenth century.
These feared the materialistic implications contained in the view —attributed by many to
modern science— of nature as a self-sufficient and mechanically thoroughly
comprehensible order. If man was to be considered an entity among others in such a
nature, where only corporeal entities exist, there would be no such a thing as an
immaterial soul; and, if everything is ruled by deterministic laws of motion. What could
be considered human freedom? Indeed, we find in Hobbes a frank attempt to deal with
these implications and to accept them when philosophical consistency seems to demand it.
Hobbes was one of the early seventeen century philosophers who saw the
implication for causality of the new conception of external entities of modern science. He
clearly states that the fundamental modality of being of bodies is motion and that "motion
produceth nothing but motion."^ Yet, Hobbes, who will characterize external reality as
material, and describe the human individual as if exclusively a body, all of whose
features may be accounted for in mechanistic terms, will not follow through the
programme that such a view can allow. Instead of settling for an account of man in terms
of his bodily features and explaining all change in him as change in motion (of the whole
body or of its corporeal constituents), he will, without providing any metaphysical basis
for it, affirm a sort of consciousness. He speaks of it as a "fancy" or "appearance"
arising as the last product of the motion which originates in the perceived object, affects
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the organs of perception, and terminates either in the brain or the heart of the
perceiver.^ 0
We do not find in Hobbes any attempt to deal with the question, How can motion
produce fancy? He does not outright identify the problem that is present here, but
rather elusively wants to reduce fancy to motion and speaks of a reaction in the heart, a
"resistance," a motion outward or "endeavour,""' "I as that which fancy really is. I
suppose that we may call this an epiphenomenal conception of consciousness. But even if
this term may be appropriate to Hobbes's conception, as suggesting that consciousness
arises as something secondary and dependent upon what substantially underlies it
(physical occurrences in a human body), it does not help in any way to solve the
problem that the question. How can motion produce fancy? poses. Either we have some
way of accounting for this apparent effect of motion which is consistent with our
metaphysics and our view of causality or we find ourselves with no philosophical
explanation and an unbreachable causal gap between what is physical, motion, and what
is not physical, fancy, i.e., consciousness.
I believe it is appropriate to call Hobbes a monist; at least in intention I take him
to be a materialist. But he stands too close to a dualist philosophical tradition for which
there is a world of things known by us, conscious entities. Perhaps, I should better say
that he stands too close to the common sense interpretation of reality and our knowledge
of reality, which involves things, and knowers which are somehow different from
ordinary things. In any case we find in Hobbes the dichotomy between the world of
material things and the knower, and even the clear distinction between the substance of
external reality and its representation in consciousness, a "phantasm."^ 2 And yet,
Hobbes admits the existence of material things only. In this fashion some of the most
interesting problems raised by dualism are avoided, but in a quite unsatisfactory
manner. The question. How is it that the material world may be known by an immaterial
mind? need not be posed for there is no immaterial mind. There is no domain of mental
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phenomena clearly recognized as substantial and different in nature from what is
corporeal. All that such a philosophy may do, in its attempt to know reality, is to
characterize it as a whole and in all its parts as made up of physical entities describable
in terms of their spatial attributes and comprehensible in terms of changes of motion. A
programme of this sort starts out with the negation of the domain that for dualist is
discoverable through introspection, and affirmed as a different ontological realm.
In Malebranche the situation is quite different from Hobbes's. Hobbes saves
himself the problems raised by dualism, but he must face some questions about
knowledge, which he is not even capable of posing. Knowledge, it would seem, is no
different from ordinary physical interaction. Malebranche's dualisms accords with the
traditional distinction between an object known and the subject which knows it. But at
center stage, in the context of dualism, stands the problem suggested by the question.
How is it that the material world may be known by an immaterial mind? and the broader
question. How do body and mind relate? His answers to these questions is the basis for
his claim to originality; it bears the name "occasionalism".
c. Malebranche's Occasionalism
Malebranche, let us recapitulate, has a metaphysical basis for speaking of
consciousness. But there are also corporeal substances. The modalities of being of bodies
are changes in their relations of distance, i.e., changes resulting from motion of sensible
bodies relative to each other, or changes within such bodies, of their insensible bodily
parts relative to each other. The activity of a mind, on the other hand, does not include
motion; its modalities of being are not spatial.
It is essential to note that since in the conceptual context Malebranche places
himself the question. How can a body affect a mind? comes down to the question. How can
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motion produce consciousness? we are before the same puzzle that Hobbes would not face.
Malebranche, however, unhesitantly answers that it cannot:
There is no relation of causality between body and mind.^ ^
There is no necessary relation between the two substances of which we are composed.
Modalities of our bodies cannot through their own efficacy change those of our
minds. ^ ^
Motion in the Brain cannot be changed into light or color. Since modalities are simply
the bodies themselves in some particular condition {de telle & telle fagon), they
cannot be transformed into modalities of minds."' ^
Body and mind, however, exhibit constant and ordered concomitance between each
other occurrences, as our individual experience suggests. Concomitance must have a
reason; it cannot be influence or interaction. It must be, Malebranche argues,
occasionalism.
Occasionalism, in its most comprehensive form, not only explains the relation
between the body and the mind, but accounts also for the erroneous impression of causal
interaction among bodies themselves. That bodies do not interact results not from a
metaphysical gap but from the fact that the geometrical substances of Cartesianism are
inert, and, therefore, for Malebranche, incapable of initiating action and playing the
role of cause relative to each other. This feature calls forth the need for a causal agent
capable of explaining how bodies may be put into action and leads in the same direction
the mind-body problem does.
The appearance of causal interaction between the body and the mind in a human
individual results from the observable constant concomitance between certain
occurrences in the body and certain presentations in the mind, and viceversa, the
observable concomitance between certain occurrences in the mind (volitions) and
movements in the body. Malebranche explains that since it is not as one presumes, that
body and mind are interacting, it must be that the only substance which is capable of
affecting both body and mind (out of its omnipotence) is intervening to cause the
concomitance that is observable between the two series of occurrences. This substance is
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God and he has so created the universe that he works metaphysically as the cause of the
movement of one s body on the occasion of one's volitions, and, viceversa, he performs as
cause of one's conscious presentations with the occasion of certain movements in the body
we consider our own. God is the universal cause of everything that occurs, the perpetual
creator of all change in the realm of creation. God is the general cause of effects in the
mind and effects on bodies, the only entity that can act upon the two domains of creation,
and who, consequent with his attributes, which follow from his perfection, acts
according to law. As Malebranche puts it:
Modalities of our bodies cannot through their own efficacy change those of our minds.
Nonetheless modalities of a certain part of the brain which I shall not characterize
here, are always followed by modalities or sensations of our soul; and this happens
entirely as the result of laws, invariably efficacious, of the union of these two
substances, that is, to speak more clearly, as a result of the uniform and invariably
efficacious volitions of the Author of our being."'
6
Thus it is clear that, in the union of body and soul, there is no linkage other than the
efficacy of divine decrees, decrees which are immutable and efficacious and never
without their effects. God has so willed, and He wills unceasingly, that various
movements in the brain are uniformly followed by various thoughts in the mind
which is united to it. And it is this constant and efficacious will of the Creator that
properly constitutes the union of the two substances."'^
In the domain of material substances, which considered by itself is absolutely
static, God is the source of all the power and therefore the only real cause operating in it.
Bodies, too, according to Malebranche, serve as occasional causes relative to each other
for the intervention of God as the general or universal cause of everything that occurs in
the world. The point is clearly stated in the passage that follows:
One Body could not move another without communicating to it some of its moving
force (lui communique de sa force mouvante). Now, the moving force of a body in
motion is simply the volition of the Creator who conserves it successively in
different places. It is not a quality which belongs to the body. Nothing belongs to it
other than its modalities: and modalities are inseparable from substances. Hence,
bodies cannot move one another, and their encounter or impact is only an occasional
cause of the distribution of their motion.^ ^
The causality that operates in the two created realms is "continuous creation" for
Malebranche. It originates and substantiates two continuous series of effects, or two
ontological series, that relate to each other through God as causal intermediary. They are
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metaphysically independent of each other but they coincide through the interaction that
the Universal Cause makes possible when a factor belonging to one of the series prompts
his causal intervention so to produce effects in the other series. This is a reciprocal
function by which occurrences in our minds, volitions, affect our behaviour; and
movements that will reach our brain arouse God's causal intervention and bring about
effects in the mind which are representations, sensations, pains, and all the modes of
thinking for which a concomitant occurrence takes place in our body.
One can detect in Malebranche a degree of satisfaction over the mind-body
problem. He seems to welcome the radical breach between the body-substance and the
mind-substance that results from the contrast between the external reality of modern
science and the domain of consciousness which Descartes discovered through his
reflective turn. He welcomes, too, the recognition that neither through the conceptual
resources of common sense nor those of science can a solution be found to the causal gap
problem of dualism. Of course, this sets the stage for the introduction of theologico-
metaphysical conceptions, as the only way out of the problem.
The view that the mind-body problem should be solved and that it cannot be solved
with the conceptual resources of either science or common sense enables Malebranche to
say that a thoroughly materialistic philosophy is not feasible. The "nature" of
materialists —a self-sufficient and mechanically thoroughly accountable realm— is
incomplete, and, if presented as a complete account of reality, it is false for
Malebranche. It leaves out the mental dimension of human beings which must obtain a
place in any account of reality. Moreover, since evidence for the existence of mind-
substances is more immediate than evidence for the existence of things, a materialist
explanation of reality, is, according to Malebranche, simply untenable.
Malebranche uses God as a legitimate and necessary explanatory principle in his
philosophy. He introduces the theological dimension into his explanations as something
which rationally fits into and complements a scientific conception of reality that without
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theology would remain incomplete. Malebranche is still far from a conception of
knowledge, such as that of positivism, where only the method and the criteria of evidence
of modern science are considered appropriate to a rigorous knowledge of reality. For him
there is no problem in blending metaphysics and physical science into a system that will
afford what he considers a coherent and exhaustive picture of reality. In this synthesis
his respect and enthusiasm for modern science blends naturally with his doctrinal
beliefs.
It is not difficult in the seventeenth century to find thinkers, like Malebranche,
enthusiastic about the new science and yet loyal to the basic tenets of traditional natural
theology. Dualism, we have seen, lends itself quite well to the confluence of these two
currents of thought by keeping apart the domain of natural science and the domain of
consciousness. Materialism is also part of the historical context that surrounds Leibniz,
as evinced by the work of thinkers like Hobbes, and seems closely linked to atheistic
positions unpalatable to those for whom Christian theology was a cherished possession.
How does Leibniz's thinking, and specially preestablished harmony, fit into the
historical context we have been considering? This is our next topic.
4. Preestablished Harmony in the Historical Context
Leibniz often claims that preestablished harmony is a better solution to the
mind-body problem than occasionalism. It is also claimed to be better than Descartes's
belief in causal interaction and the Scholastics' account of perception in terms of the
transmission of "species" from things to mind. The problem is the incommunication of
body and mind; and it seems to originate from the causal gap that results from
"incommensurability" between the two domains of created substances, that Cartesians
and especially Malebranche recognized as inherent to dualism. Leibniz, then, it would
seem, finds around him, at the time he begins philosophizing, the philosophical
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conditions and suppositions that give rise to the mind-body problem; and, we might say
that, like other contemporary dualistic philosophers he accepts or constructs an
interpretation of reality in terms of material and immaterial substances, and hence
finds himself in the predicament that has called forth theories like occasionalism. There
are many passages which show that both the body and the soul are considered substances
by Leibniz, in a fashion similar to that of dualists. In his "Second Explanation of The New
System" (Postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval, January 3/13
,
1696), for
example, Leibniz writes:
You say that you do not understand how I can prove what I have suggested about the
communication or harmony of two substances as different as the soul and the body. It
is true that I thought I provided a way to do so. And this is how I propose to satisfy
you.1 9
The alternative solutions that Leibniz goes on to examine appear to have been
conceived within the dualistic framework where the problem posed is the communication
between two heterogeneous substances. He first refers to the solutions he will reject:
"natural influence," which he describes as "the way". .."of common philosophy" (that of
Scholasticism) and rejects on the basis that "it is impossible to conceive of material
particles or of species or immaterial qualities which can pass from one of these
substances into the other,..."; and "the way of assistance," which he clearly identifies as
the way of "the system of occasional causes" and considers defective insofar as it "makes
a deus ex machina intervene in a natural and ordinary matter where reason requires that
God should help only in the way in which he concurs in all other natural things."20
Leibniz finally presents preestablished harmony as the appropriate solution to a
problem involving two different substances:
Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is the way of preestablished harmony,
according to which God has made each of the two substances from the beginning in
such a way that though each follows only its own laws which it has received with its
being, each agrees throughout with the other, entirely as if they were mutually
influenced or as if God were always putting forth his hand, beyond his general
concurrence.21
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Were we to approach Leibniz's thought through the issue that preestablished
harmony is supposed to address, it would seem inevitable that we consider him a dualist.
From this perspective a claim like Brown's and Mates's would make no sense. In no way
could we accept the view that his ontology has no room for corporeal substances. It
seems, then, that we must face the uneasy predicament of interpreting Leibniz either as
a dualist, situated clearly in the tradition of Cartesianism —an interpretation which
would give rise to the question. Why have so many commentators considered him an
idealist?— or, if the idealist alternative has any basis to it, as a monist, which in a
puzzling fashion presents as central to his philosophy a theory that conflicts with its
ontological stance.
I have looked upon the inquiry into the historico-philosophical background of
preestablished harmony as a first stage in our attempt to understand the meaning of this
theory. We have seen how the confluence of the view of external reality of modern
science and Descartes's conception of the mind brings about the modern version of
dualism and gives rise in it to the mind-body problem. We have seen also that Leibniz's
affinity with Malebranche's causal gap conception suggests that he be included among
dualistic metaphysicians. The question, basic to our inquiry, regarding an interpretation
of his ontology along dualistic or monistic lines, appears to be answerable, on the
evidence of the historical context which seems most influential upon Leibniz, in terms of
the first alternative. But there are still many facets of Leibniz's thought which we must
explore in order to obtain a reasonably clear answer to our question. There are,
moreover, additional reasons for continuing our historical inquiry into some of the
influences which stand out as important for Leibniz. Throughout his works, he will
highlight some of these so emphatically and continuously that we still stand to gain
additional knowledge about his philosophy if we pursue our historical analysis a bit
further.
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Specifically, the relation between Leibniz and Malebranche offers an opportunity
for understanding some basic features of Leibniz's thinking relative to what he considers
an appropriate philosophical treatment of the problems he shares with the Cartesians.
Leibniz's constantly criticizes Malebranche for failing to do philosophy correctly. His
criticism turns mostly around his insatisfaction with occasionalism, and it provides an
important clue for understanding why preestablished harmony is so boastfully offered as
the appropriate alternative to problems that presumably were not tendered
satisfactorily by other contemporary philosophers.
Leibniz's rejection of occasionalism seems to me an appropriate second stage in
our effort to understand the significance of preestablished harmony. We may now, hence,
postpone for a while attention to the questions regarding the contrast between a dualistic
and a monistic interpretation of Leibniz and consider the manner in which Leibniz's
reacts to Malebranche's solution of the mind-body problem. Our previous discussion of
the philosophy of Malebranche has placed us in the position of readily understanding
what aspect of the French philosopher's account are being addressed by Leibniz's
criticisms.
B. Leibniz's Rejection of Occasionalism
One might be surprised by the intensity of Leibniz's attack against occasionalism
if one stresses his affinity with Malebranche's philosophical motives. Both thinkers are
metaphysicians concerned with a tendency they feel is too extended among their
contemporaries and should be countered, for it leads to a debasement of human life and to
immorality, besides being incorrect. It is materialism that Leibniz has in mind when he
says:
For through the admirable improvement of mathematics and the approaches which
chemistry and anatomy have opened into the nature of things, it has become apparent
that mechanical explanations —reasons from the figure and motions of bodies, as it
v^ere— can be given for most of the things which the ancients referred only to the
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creator or to some kind (I know not what) of incorporeal forms. The result was that
truly capable men for the first time began to try to save or to explain natural
phenomena, or those which appear in bodies, without assuming God or taking Him
into their reasoning.22
A completely mechanistic account of nature seemed feasible in the seventeenth
century, and was leading to thinkers —"innovators," according to Leibniz— of which
Leibniz writes; "they proclaimed,... that they could find neither God nor the immortality
of the soul by natural reason."23 This "nature" of materialist in which God had no role to
play was felt as a menace, not only by Malebranche, but in a very personal manner by
Leibniz. Both philosophers, motivated as they were by religious convictions, which they
considered philosophically sound inasmuch as appropriately warranted by the exercise
of reason in natural theology, could share the concern Leibniz expresses in the passage
that follows:
I began therefore myself to undertake an investigation, and all the more vigorously
as I became more impatient at being dispossessed by the subtleties of these
innovators of my life's greatest good, the certainty of an eternity after death and the
hope that divine benevolence would sometime be made manifest toward the good and
the innocent.2"^
The affinity in the philosophical motives of Malebranche and Leibniz does not
inhibit Leibniz's criticism of Malebranche. Agreement between both thinkers is hardly
obtainable beyond the initial stages of the problems and a significant difference is found
in the solutions they propose. There is a difference too, which Leibniz wants very much
to point out, in their manner of philosophizing. This difference in their philosophical
outlook and method is presented by Leibniz as one of three reasons that he offers for
rejecting occasionalism. The second reason has to do with Malebranche's conception of
God, which, on account of what it explicitly includes and implicitly entails, seems to
Leibniz, untenable. The third reason relates to a metaphysical consequence of
occasionalism which Leibniz considers incompatible with the true conception of
substance. Let us, in what follows, treat the whole topic, subdividing it according to the
reason at the basis of Leibniz's insatisfaction.
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1
. Occasionalism Is Not a Philosophical Explanation
a. Untying versus Cuttinn thn Knnt
The first reason that Leibniz offers for rejecting occasionalism is, perhaps, his
most straightforward. I mean, it is offered quite explicitly and very frequently in the
suggestion that occasionalism is not a philosophical solution of the mind-body problem.
The issue here is methodological and epistemological, for there is a basic insatisfaction
on the part of Leibniz with the explanatory value of occasionalism as a philosophical
account. This is a theory or a hypothesis that does not —as Leibniz is fond of saying when
a philosophical problem is not treated philosophically— untie the knot that the issue
contains, for it does not provide an explanation that would show what is the relation
between the body and the mind through the use of natural, or rational, principles. The
philosophical task is to untie the knot, but occasionalism, Leibniz contends, rather cuts
the knot through introducing a magical solution, one which is not grounded on the nature
of the substances involved: instead it is contrary to what may be said of these substances
and their modalities of being on the basis of their nature. The problem is not solved, not
even really addressed philosophically, but avoided through the notion of miracle. What
Malebranche, according to Leibniz, does is to introduce God ex machina, in a fashion that
makes God's omnipotence the instrument for the solution of the problem. But all
problems can be solved in this manner, and Leibniz contends that such a solution should
not be offered for problems where a natural explanation may be available.
We must remember that the problem arises from the rejection of the ordinary
philosophy's view which interprets the observable concomitance between occurrences in
the mind and occurrences in the body as indicative of reciprocal influence. That this view
is untenable becomes evident once the problem of incommensurability is made clear.
With interaction rejected what needs explanation is concomitance. Occasionalism is an
39
attempt to somehow maintain the notion of interaction, but to displace it from the
physical to the metaphysical realm through using God as causal intermediary. Leibniz
rejects the use of a principle which transcends nature to explain ordinary natural
phenomena. This is suggested in a quotation above showing his criticism of "the way of
assistance," or the way of "the system of occasional causes."(Supra p. 35) There, we
saw, he denounces occasionalism in the following terms:
[it] makes a deus ex machina intervene in a natural and ordinary matter where
reason requires that God should help only in the way in which he concurs in all other
natural things. (Supra footnote 20)
Leibniz is contrasting in the passage above his own conception of God's relation to
the substances in the created domains to Malebranche's. Like Malebranche he speaks of
God's "concurrence" relative to the world —what at other times he calls "continuous
creation"— but we must avoid interpreting the term as signifying what Malebranche
suggest by his own usage. For Leibniz God's concurrence is not in conflict with natural
occurrences and rather confirms them, while Malebranche's notion, according to
Leibniz, entails a disruption of what is natural, a deus ex machina intervention. The
contrast between the two explanations is presented clearly in the account of the
occurrences of the mind, that follows;
Although our mind depends continuously on God in its existence and action, as does
every other creature, I do not think that it needs his particular concourse over and
above the laws of nature for its perceptions, but rather it deduces its later thoughts
from its earlier ones by its internal force and in an order prescribed by God, as
Roelius, whom you quote, rightly says. I extend this also to the perceptions of
sensible things, for since they are not miraculously induced by God, and cannot be
imparted naturally by the body, it follows that they arise within the soul by a
definite law, as through a harmony divinely pre-established in the beginning. This is
more worthy of the most wise creator than the perpetual violation, by new
impressions, of laws which he has given to the body or the soul.25
It is clear that perception is not, according to Leibniz, the product of causal
interaction between things in the world and a mind, just as Malebranche contends. But it
is not the product of a relation where God intervenes miraculously between the two
factors, the world and the knowing mind. Everything that occurs in the mind originates
from within its own being without a particular intervention of God, but with his general
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concurrence or continuous creation, which obtains from his substantiation of everything
that is and occurs in the universe. Continuous creation is therefore compatible with the
natural individuality and independence of created substances.
There is, for Leibniz, a fundamental difference between occasionalism and
preestablished harmony as philosophical accounts. It results from what Leibniz
considers the gratuitous nature of occasionalism versus the rational or intelligible
nature of his own account. Both theories are prompted by the recognition that
"influence" cannot be the explanation of concomitance, and both are related to the
traditional theological position in which God was understood to have a continuous
substantiating relation to created reality But while occasionalism makes use of God in
what seems to Leibniz a manner that does not accord with what is natural, for
occurrences in the created world respond to God’s will as cause, preestablished harmony
is respectful of the natural order. And this is necessary to a good philosophical
explanation.
Preestablished harmony is a rational account because it explains the occurrences
in the domain of bodies and those in the domain of minds in consonance with what agrees
with the natural way of being of the substances in each of these domains: it accords with
the nature of bodies and the natures of minds and with the sets of laws which naturally
rule over each of these realms of being, and it does so without impeding God's continuous
creation of contingent reality. It is an account that stems from the recognition that
"natures" are in philosophy indispensable and appropriate explanatory principles.
Natures are, besides, instrumental in understanding the "powers" of substances which
may serve to explain occurrences, phenomena, and the different modalities of being of
substances.
That preestablished harmony is rational in the manner we have just emphasized
and satisfies the conditions of "good" philosophy while accounts that introduce
extranatural powers do not, is the point of the passage below:
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In good philosophy and sound theology we ought to distinguish between what is
explicable by the natures and powers of creatures and what is explicable only by the
powers of the infinite substance. We ought to make an infinite difference between the
operation of God which goes beyond the extent of natural powers, and the operations
of things which follow the law which God has given them, and which he has enabled
them to follow by their natural powers, though not without his assistance.^^
The intelligibility of preestablished harmony versus the arbitrariness of
occasionalism is also emphasized by Leibniz in the following passage:
Therefore souls or vital principles, according to my system, change nothing in the
ordinary course of bodies and do not even give God the occasion for doing so. The souls
follow their laws, which consist in a definite developments of perceptions according
to goods and evils, and the bodies follows theirs, which consist in the laws of motion;
nevertheless, these two beings of entirely different kinds meet together and
correspond to each other like two clocks perfectly regulated to the same time. It is
this that I call the theory of pre-established harmony, which excludes every concept
of miracle from purely natural actions and makes things run their course regulated
in an intelligible manner. Instead of this, the common system has recourse to
absolutely inexplainable influences, while in the system of occasional causes God is
compelled at every moment, by a kind of general law and as if by compact, to change
the natural course of the thoughts of the soul to adapt them to the impressions of the
body and to interfere with the natural course of bodily movements in accordance with
the volitions of the soul. This can only be explained by a perpetual miracle, whereas
I explain the whole intelligently by the natures which God has established in
things.28
The "common system" above is Scholasticism. Its explanation disregards the
natures of material and immaterial substances, and proclaims that interaction or
influence through the transmission of "species" from things to mind is possible.
Occasionalism avoids the mistake of interaction but it shares with Scholasticism its
disregard of the natures of the substances involved. It is not, hence, for Leibniz, a
rational account, i.e., it fails as a philosophical explanation because it makes use of a
"perpetual miracle."
The observance of the laws that govern the domain of bodies (laws of motion) and
those that rule the domain of souls (teleological laws resulting from the significance of
ends and means for moral conduct and also for the organization of perceptual experience)
in independence of each other is central to preestablished harmony as a natural and
rational account. The point is explicitly presented in the passage quoted above and also
suggested in the passage below, where we find a very clear exposition of Leibniz s
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rejection of interaction along the lines of the incommensurability between what is
material and what is immaterial. That he shares Malebranche's position with regard to
this point is here unquestionably stated. That the Cartesians see the problem but fail in
solving it, so that he must provide the solution is suggested quite frankly:
I don't assent to the vulgar notions that the images of things are conveyed by the
organs of sense to the soul. For it is not conceivable by what passage, or by what
means of conveyance, these images can be carried from the organ to the soul. This
vulgar notion in philosophy is not intelligible, as the new Cartesians have
sufficiently shown. It cannot be explained how immaterial substance is affected by
matter, and to maintain an unintelligible notion thereupon is having recourse to the
Scholastic chimerical notion of I know not what inexplicable species intentionales
passing from the organ to the soul. Those Cartesians saw the difficulty, but they could
not explain it. They had recourse to a certain wholly special concourse of God, which
would really be miraculous. But I think I have given the true solution of that
enigma.29
It is only ordered and consistent concomitance that obtains between what occurs in
the domain of bodies and the domain of minds and more specifically between a particular
body and a particular mind in a human individual. This concomitance parallels an
agreement between the laws that rule over bodies and those that govern minds. For
Leibniz, the two sets of laws result from God's act of creation and are established from
the beginning of creation as part of the natural order. Only what is natural is
intelligible, and only preestablished harmony is based on the recognition of the natures
of substances, thus, it is a feasible explanation and not arbitrary nor miraculous in the
manner of occasionalism. It is not miraculous in spite of the role God plays in it because
this role is not disturbing of the laws of nature, and belongs at the moment when God's
intervention is theologically indispensable and when philosophically, according to
Leibniz, it makes sense: at the moment of creation. If all acts of God were to be called
"miraculous," creation would be a miracle, but one different from those that disrupt
nature and come about after creation. With this distinction Leibniz can argue that
preestablished harmony does not entail a "perpetual miracle" and that a criticism of his
hypothesis along the lines of his attack of occasionalism is unacceptable:
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The harmony or correspondence between the soul and the body is not a perpetual
miracle but the effect or consequence of an original miracle worked at the creation of
things, as all natural things are.30
It is important to realize that the difference between occasionalism and
preestablished harmony is linked to the way Malebranche and Leibniz reacted to the
mechanical view of nature. Though this topic is part of what we have been explaining
about Leibniz’s conception of philosophy, it deserves special attention. The clarification
of the significance mechanicism has for Leibniz and Malebranche, along with an
elucidation of the meaning miracles have for Leibniz, in an additional subsection, will
enable us to treat the first reason that makes occasionalism objectionable to Leibniz
sufficiently.
b. Mechanicism and the Mind-Bodv Relation
The issue of God's relation to the created world posed several challenges to theistic
philosophers in the seventeenth century. To proclaim that natural occurrences took
place as determined by physical laws, without God's intervention, seemed to many, and
specifically to Malebranche, equivalent to positing the "nature" of materialists.
Occasionalism works on the supposition that no such "nature" is tenable, for God is a
necessary hypothesis in the explanation of physical occurrences. But, this solution
entailed problems for Leibniz. To attempt an account of nature such as occasionalism, or,
for that matter, like that of other philosophers which introduce immaterial principles
in their explanation of occurrences in the physical world, is to go back to pre-scientific
views, non-rigourous and ultimately self-defeating. Notorious among these, according to
Leibniz, was the Scholastics' use of forms in the explanation of physical phenomena.
Henry More's "hylarchich principle," Josef Scaliger's "plastic virtue," and even
Newton's "gravity" were for Leibniz explanatory principles of this same sort, for they
did not derive from the nature of bodies.
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The use of "substantial forms," "faculties," and "sympathies," in the explanations
of physical phenomena seems to Leibniz gratuitous and not useful. It belongs within an
empty conception of knowledge that has mostly served to disguise ignorance. Such
explanatory principles are ad hoc and not natural. Leibniz considers them very inferior
to mechanical explanations. It is the Scholastics that he primarily has in mind when he
says:
But, in my opinion, it is not a very good explanation of a phenomenom to assign to it
an ad hoc principle; to evil, a principium maleficum, to cold, a primum frigidum;
there is nothing so easy and nothing so dull. It is well-nigh as if someone were to say
that the Peripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of the
phenomena of the stars, by giving them ad hoc intelligences to guide them.31
Leibniz frequently suggests that the only correct account of physical phenomena is
one based on mathematics and on a conception of physical interaction as resulting from
impact. Early in his career, he asserts his solidarity with a principle of modern
thinkers which excludes the use of God and immaterial principles in explanations of
nature, and requires that mechanical explanations rather be given. He affirms this
position as follows:
I maintain the rule which is common to all these renovators of philosophy, that only
magnitude, figure, and motion are to be used in explaining corporeal properties.32
This will consistently be Leibniz's view. In a work of around 1712, where he
decries a too extended inclination towards "occult qualities" and "Scholastic faculties," he
writes:
That physics which explains everything in the nature of body through number,
measure, weight, or size, shape, and motion, which teaches that nothing is moved
naturally except through contact and motion, and so teaches that, in physics,
everything happens mechanically, that is, intelligibly, this physics seems
excessively clear and easy.^^
There are many statements throughout Leibniz’s writings where this view is
expressed. The one that follows contrasts mechanical accounts, as rational, with those
that make use of "forms" and "faculties:"
I recognize nothing in the world but bodies and minds, and nothing in minds but
intellect and will, nor anything in bodies insofar as they are separated from mind but
magnitude, figure, situation, and changes in these, either partial or total .... Nor can
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anything in the world be understood clearly unless it is reduced to these. Suppose
that sorne angel wishes to explain the nature of color to me distinctly. He will
accomplish nothing by chattering about forms and faculties. But if he shows that a
certain rectilinear pressure is exerted at every sensible point and is propagated in a
circuit through certain regular permeable or diaphanous bodies, and then teaches me
exactly the cause and the mode of this pressure, and deduces the laws of reflection and
refraction from it, thus explaining everything in such a way that it is clear that it
could not even happen otherwise, then at last he will have increased my knowledge,
since he has treated physics mathematically.34
Leibniz shares the view of modern science of how the explanations of physical
phenomena should proceed. It seems to him that there are aspects of modern philosophy
and modern science which are clearly an advancement over the past. Any theological
concern, like that he himself has about the "nature" of physics, must not conduce to an
arbitrary rejection of an explanation of natural science. To incur in this, he tells us, is
self-defeating, for a capricious position in defense of a theological doctrine, if it
ultimately antagonizes what is rational, is simply philosophically unacceptable. Leibniz
believes that he avoids this pitfall, into which most of his theistically inclined
contemporaries fall, through preestablished harmony. The point is central to the
following passage:
This system [preestablished harmony] also has the advantage of conserving, in its
full rigor and generality, the great principle of physics that a body never receives a
change in motion except through another body in motion which pushes it: corpus non
moveri nisi impulsum a corpora contiguo et moto. This law has until now been
violated by all those who accept souls or other immaterial principles, including here
even all of the Cartesians. The Democriteans, Hobbes and certain other outright
materialists who have rejected every immaterial substance have heretofore been
alone in preserving this law and think they have found a ground for abusing other
philosophers, whom they believe to uphold an unreasonable opinion in this.^^
For Leibniz, the accounts of physical phenomena of modern science are, in
general, conscientious and reliable, the product of the effort of capable men like Galileo
and Huygens, to name just two, whose work he unquestionably admires. But it is clear to
Leibniz that the domain of physics has become, in the eyes of many, very disturbing to
theological truths, and that some of the attempts to defend these truths are
manifestations of poor philosophy. These then are quite vulnerable to atheistic attacks
(such as Hobbes’s) and ultimately do a disservice to natural theology and religion. The
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introduction of explanatory principles that magically alter natural phenomena (such is
the position of the Scholastics, the Hylarchic Philosophers, and the Occasionalists,
according to Leibniz) is completely unwarranted, and a clear trait distinguishing bad
from good philosophy. A much stronger position may be obtained in defense of the truths
of natural theology if the evidently true contentions of natural science are shown
compatible with theology. This is what Leibniz attempts to do by assuming a non-
defensive attitude and accepting the mechanical explanation of phenomena. Beyond this,
he feels that he can even strengthen his position by showing that mechanicism relies on
metaphysico-theological principles. He frequently explains this position; the passage
that follows seems to me especially clear and to the point:
I believe ... and that those who have battled for truth, ordinarily have defended it
badly, by denying what they should not deny, namely, that everything is done
mechanically, for by doing this they risk disdain, as if they wanted to explain the
particulars in nature through general and vague notions, by forms, qualities,
faculties, sympathies, etc. But, as in the human body the knowledge of the soul does
not dispense us of going into the details of the parts of our body appropriate to a
distinct explanation of our functions, it is like that, proportionately, in all of
nature; and though everything is done mechanically, this should not alarm us, for the
principle of mechanics themselves (that is, the laws which nature observes with
respect to motion) could not be explained only through the principles of the science
of extension (that is, of geometry), and I have demonstrated that one must have
recourse to a superior cause in order to provide reasons for them.36
Leibniz's adoption of mechanicism as the appropriate way of explaining the
occurrences in the domain of physical reality made him liable to accusations of
materialism. Some philosophers, unable to grasp Leibniz's subtle distinction between
materialism and mechanicism, considered his preestablished harmony too close to
materialism. A case in point is Samuel Clarke, whose defense of Newtonian physics,
against Leibniz, led to the suggestion that ultimately God's role in Leibniz's hypothesis
demeans the importance of the creator for nature.
Clarke's approval of Newton's view that the decay of force in the universe requires
the periodic intervention of God suggested to him that Leibniz's position —contending that
the mechanical laws of motion govern the domain of external reality without exception
and without any intervention by God, other than a continuous creation— was theologically
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suspicious. In the famous correspondence between the two, after reading Leibniz's second
letter, in which he expresses his position about continuous creation and preestablished
harmony, Clarke reacts to Leibniz's views as follows;
If God's conserving all things means his actual operation and government in
preserving and continuing the beings, powers, orders, dispositions, and motions of
all things, this is all that is contended for. But if his conserving things means no
more that a king creating such subjects as shall be able to act well enough without
his intermeddling or ordering anything among them ever after, this is making him,
indeed, a real creator, but a governor only nominal.^^
That God is a governor of the world is Newton's conception of continuous creation
as expressed by Clarke. Newton's "nature," necessitated of God's periodic intervention,
seems to him more the correct theistic view than Leibniz's preestablished harmony. In
the latter account, he claims, everything occurs in the world as if there were no God. The
divinity's role is diminished insofar as he is only significant as creator, but "a governor
only nominal." The ultimate suggestion is that the role God plays relative to nature in
preestablished harmony is not very far from that it plays in materialism.
God has a role to play in Leibniz's conception of created reality: it has to do with
"continuous creation". This means that he created and conserves all existents. Also, he
substantiates the laws of nature and all real occurrences. This substantiating and
conserving function is the outcome of the relation that must obtain between a necessary
being and contingent entities. The latter essentially lack ontological sufficiency according
to Leibniz, and as the argument from contingency for demonstrating the existence of God
shows, it must be that they obtain support from a necessary being. This is sometimes
described by Leibniz as a supporting action whereby God continuously produces finite
substances:
There is only one case of one substance acting immediately upon another; the action,
namely, of infinite substance upon finite substances —an action which consists in
continuously producing or constituting them. For there must necessarily be a cause
why these finite substances exist and correspond with each other, and this must
necessarily arise from the infinite substance which is necessary per se.
Continuous creation does not involve any willing by God, other than the initial
creative decree. That God need not intervene after creation in any way is the result of his
48
perfection. Were it otherwise it would point to defects in the initial work. Leibniz can
therefore answer Clarke as follows;
If active force should diminish in the universe by the natural laws which God has
established, so that there should be need for him to give a new impression in order to
restore that force, like an artist's mending the imperfections of his machine, the
disorder would not only be with respect to us but also with respect to God himself. He
might have prevented it and taken better measures to avoid such an inconvenience,
and therefore, indeed, he has actually done it.39
Clarke's criticism of preestablished harmony rests, according to Leibniz, on an
anthropomorphic appraisal of God, based on the supposition that he must continuously
intervene in the world as if his initial perspective and plan were not the product of an
all encompassing and absolutely wise intellect.
Newton's conception of God's intervention to rectify the decay of force in the
universe seems to Leibniz defective in the fashion of occasionalism. As in the case of
attraction at a distance, Newton's view, with respect to this point of explanation, is for
Leibniz disruptive of what is natural and miraculous in resorting to God's will, in the
manner of poor hypotheses. Preestablished harmony by contrast is a good intelligible
philosophical account in which physics and metaphysics function complementarily.
It is important, in order to appreciate the force and originality of Leibniz's
position, to underline that he is as concerned as Malebranche, or for that matter, Clarke,
with the implications of a view of the external world where God has no role to play. If
such a view of nature seems the necessary outcome of the new conceptions of physics, the
growing prestige of the new science would be put to the service of atheism. The
characteristic reaction of theists, alarmed as they were, was to either deny the veracity
of science's contentions, or to introduce arbitrarily (without any metaphysical basis)
immaterial entities into the accounts of natural occurrences. Leibniz's solution is to
suggests that God is necessary to a complete account of nature, but for metaphysical, not
physical, reasons. A mechanistic explanation of natural occurrences is the only rational
one, as evinced by the works of Galileo and other modern scientists: but such an
explanation, is not incompatible, according to Leibniz, with the recognition that nature
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depends on God, insofar as physical principles ultimately depend upon metaphysical
principles, which include a reference to an intelligent and willful omnipotent cause as
the source of the laws of physics.
Leibniz rejects materialism as a metaphysical account. He, however, accepts
mechanicism as an account of phenomenal occurrences. As before other problems where
the alternatives seem exclusive and exhaustive, he reacts to the opposition between
materialism and the use of immaterial principles in the explanation of natural
occurrences by showing that these are not unavoidable alternatives, that there is a
middle way. He tells us:
The true middle term for satisfying truth and piety is this: all natural phenomena
could be explained mechanically if we understood them well enough, but the
principles of mechanics themselves cannot be explained geometrically, since they
depend on more sublime principles which show the wisdom of the Author in the order
and perfection of his work.^0
The point is basic to Leibniz's conception of dynamics, a science that cannot, he
claims, be fully and correctly elucidated without a reference to metaphysics, and even
theology. In a work of 1687 we read:
I agree that the particular effects of nature can and ought to be explained
mechanically, though without forgetting their admirable ends and uses,which
providence has known how to contrive. But the general principles of physics and
mechanics themselves depend upon the action of a sovereign intelligence and cannot
be explained without taking it into consideration. It is in this way that we must
reconcile piety and reason and that we can satisfy those good people who fear the
result of the mechanistic or corpuscular philosophy, as if it could alienate us from
God and from immaterial substances, whereas in truth, with the necessary
corrections and rightly understood, it ought rather to lead us to them."^"*
It is clear that Leibniz believes he can reconcile piety and science through the
reunion of mechanicism and metaphysical principles having to do with God and
immaterial substances, presumably indispensable in order to provide a correct account
of reality and of mechanicism itself. That his is not a materialist conception of nature
though a mechanistic one, is a point that may be difficult to grasp and yet one which
Leibniz consistently reiterates.
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An account of physical phenomena is correct in terms of laws of motion and
interaction through impact, hence mechanicism is acceptable: but motion, as an
attribute of bodies cannot fully be understood through the principles of geometry. Since
the latter, for Leibniz, are distinctive of corporeal natures as understood by
materialism, that they are not sufficient shows that ultimately an account of nature
requires immaterial principles, and that materialism is not feasible. The full import of
this view is especially clear in the passage below. In it, Leibniz contrast his own initial
adoption of corpuscular philosophy to his eventual more cautious and qualified
acceptance of this theory. He says:
There was a time when I believed that all the phenomena of motion could be explained
on purely geometrical principles, assuming no metaphysical propositions, and that
the laws of impact depend only on the composition of motions. But through more
profound meditation, I discovered that this is impossible, and I learned a truth
higher than all mechanics, namely, that everything in nature can indeed be explained
mechanically, but that the principles of mechanics themselves depend on
metaphysical and, in a sense, moral principles, that is, on the contemplation of the
most perfectly effectual [operans], efficient and final cause, namely, God, and cannot
in any way be deduced from the blind composition of motions. And thus, I learned that
it is impossible for there to be nothing in the world except matter and its variations,
as the Epicureans held.^2
Descartes had attempted a physics relying exclusively upon mathematics,
geometry preeminently, on the metaphysical supposition that corporeal substances,
since essentially extended, could be understood through the same principles that afford
an understanding of the modalities of extension. This approach also included the explicit
rejection of the use of final causes in the explanations of physics. That such a programme
cannot work, for mathematical principles are not sufficient for explaining corporeal
substances and the laws of motion is Leibniz's basic contention.
We may say, in passing, that though Descartes was not a monistic materialist
interested in defending atheism, his conception of physics as exclusively dependent upon
mathematical principles seems problematic for theological reasons to Leibniz. And the
arguments against the atheistic implications of materialism he offers are mainly
addressed to a conception of external reality like Descartes's.
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Leibniz's contention, that mechanicism and metaphysics are complementary can
better be appreciated if we recognize that these two disciplines do not belong at the same
level, hence, mechanical explanations should not be substituted by metaphysical ones,
nor viceversa. They belong at different levels, and complement rather than oppose each
other. It is not the case, for Leibniz, that the introduction, for example, of God and final
causes relative to the laws of motion makes mechanical explanations dispensable. The
latter treat the details, as the former do not, and are in this way still required. It is this
view that Leibniz wants to present in the passage below. He adds at the end of it a point he
frequently also suggests: that though final causes are primarily meaningful in
metaphysics they can be useful as general principles that facilitate discoveries in
physics:
The effect is never well understood except through its cause. This is why it would be
a great error to attempt to explain the first principles of nature without including
No\)v, the divine wisdom, the consideration of the best and of the most perfect, the
final causes. It is true that one may explain the details of nature, without having
recourse to the first and sovereign cause, through only the well established laws of
nature or of mechanics. But one would not know how to give the ultimate reason of
these laws except through resorting to the wisdom of the legislator. I have
nevertheless found that the consideration of ends can also serve in particular physics
and provides sometimes an easier way of making discoveries than the consideration of
efficient causes.^^^
Leibniz's integration of physics and metaphysics in his explanation of natural
phenomena constitutes an ambitious topic to which we shall return in the fourth chapter
of this dissertation. At the moment, let us stress that he defends the claim that
preestablished harmony is superior to occasionalism and all other philosophical
alternatives available, in that it is part of a mature philosophical explanation where due
regard is given to the method and the discoveries of modern science.
I anticipated that an elucidation of another contrast between Leibniz and
Malebranche would also occupy us as part of our effort at understanding the first reason
Leibniz has for rejecting occasionalism. Let us proceed now to treat this topic. It has to
do with miracles and requires that an aspect already referred to be further elucidated,
that of the laws of nature.
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c. The Laws o f Nature and Miracles
Leibniz's indictment of occasionalism as a philosophical account is frequently
expressed in terms of the discrepancy between a conception of reality where change is
governed by natural laws, and one in which change responds only to God's causal decrees.
The former, Leibniz presents as his own conception, while occasionalism he
characterizes as an instance of the latter view. The acts of will of God that explain what
regularly occurs between bodies, and between bodies and minds, in Malebranche's
explanation, are not, according to Leibniz, an expression of the laws that naturally rule
over what happens in the world. They introduce a miracle into what otherwise would be
natural occurrences. Thus Leibniz writes:
Nevertheless, the hypothesis of occasional causes is not satisfactory, it seems to me,
to a philosopher, because it introduces a sort of continuous miracle as though God at
every moment was changing the laws of bodies on the occasions when minds had
thoughts, or was changing the regular course of the thinking of the soul by exciting
in it other thoughts on the occasion of a bodily movement; and in general as though
God was interfering otherwise for the ordinary events of life than in preserving each
substance in its course and in the laws established for it.'^'^
Actions and occurrences are either natural or extraordinary according to Leibniz.
The former originate out of the nature of individual substances; the latter are the result
of God's intervention after his creative decree, or the result of an initiative by an agent
with no relation to the natures of created substances. God's will is in occasionalism the
only source of actions. Therefore, the distinction between what is natural and what is
miraculous cannot be established in Malebranche's philosophy in terms such as
Leibniz's. He has only an account of what occurs in the created domains of a miraculous
or unnatural sort.
Leibniz has consistently emphasized the importance of "essences" or "natures" for
understanding substances. The claim that an appropriate philosophical account must
resort to them simply means that philosophical knowledge is construed, by Leibniz,
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along very traditional lines as the apprehension of essences. Their significance for
Leibniz's conception of what amounts to good philosophy can further be stressed if we
realize that for him the "miraculous" may be ordered and lawful, so that the distinction
between the natural and the miraculous does not depend upon these features but has to do
with the meaning of essences. Leibniz contends that everything that exists and occurs is
the product of God's creation, and that since God does everything wisely, everything is
ordered. A miracle is part of a lawful order and need not be considered a disruption or a
manifestation of disorder. Another criterion than disorder or exception must serve,
then, to distinguish what is miraculous from what is natural. This criterion is essence
for Leibniz. When a substance performs as determined by its essence it performs
naturally. It performs miraculously when what occurs does not conform to, or results
from, its essence. It is in this sense that the miraculous is exceptional:
The miracle is an exception to those laws [natural] because it is not explicable from
the nature of things.^^
In occasionalism, Leibniz contends, God's relation to the physical world and to the
mental realm is miraculous in spite of certain features of God's intervention which have
mistakenly led to consider the account natural. There is no doubt that Malebranche
considers God's intervention in the two series of creation and the concomitance that
results from it, ordered and lawful. Leibniz is quite aware of this. But the popular
tendency, present in some philosophers, of equating what is natural with what is regular
(and is hence considered lawful) is not acceptable to Leibniz. He distinguishes between
what is lawful and natural, and what is lawful and miraculous. The fact that God's causal
intervention in the world may be constant and even consistent (and on account of these
features, lawful) does not mean that it is natural. It is miraculous in the case of
occasionalism because it does not respond to the nature of created substances. This view
can be seen clearly in the two passages that follow. In the first Leibniz offers a rebuttal
of Arnauld's defense of occasionalism. In the second he answers Bayle's claim that
occasionalism is not a miraculous account:
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If I properly understand the position of the authors of occasional causes, they
introduce a miracle which is not less miraculous for being continual, for it seems to
me that infrequency does not constitute the conception of miracle. It will be said that
God acts in that, only according to a general rule and consequently without miracle,
but I do not grant this consequence and I think that God could make general rules with
regard to the miracles themselves.'^®
But let us see whether the system of occasional causes does not in fact imply a
perpetual miracle. Here it is said that it does not, because God would act only through
general laws according to this system. I agree, but in my opinion that does not suffice
to remove the miracles. Even if God should do this continuously, they would not cease
being miracles, if we take this term, not in the popular sense of a rare and wonderful
thing, but in the philosophical sense of that which exceeds the powers of created
beings. It is not enough to say that God has made a general law, for besides the decree
there is also necessary a natural means of carrying it out, that is, all that happens
must also be explained through the nature which God gives to things.'^^
All of creation, since produced by God, must be ordered, according to Leibniz.
Miraculous occurrences belong within the most encompassing order of creation, but they
belong not in a subordinate order governed by the laws of nature. This distinction,
between a higher and a subordinate order, is crucial to Leibniz's explanation of the
meaning of mysteries in Christianity, as something that is not contrary to reason and yet
stands over finite reason. It serves also to distinguish what belongs in the nature of
created substances and determines natural laws, from what is not natural insofar as it
transcends what is included in the nature of substances. The latter is miraculous, but
miracles are not a chaotic manifestation of an arbitrary will. They belong in the highest
order of creation. Leibniz writes:
Me,... I would believe rather that everything that is done by wisdom is done through
general laws, that is, by rules or principles: and that God acts always wisely.
Therefore miracles themselves are in the general order, that is, in the general
laws.'^®
Everything, therefore, is in order, even including miracles, although these latter
are contrary to certain subordinate regulations or laws of nature.^®
Miracles, since not included in the order prescribed by the natures of finite
substances, are not knowable through an intellectual apprehension of these natures. The
latter type of knowledge is in principle accessible to finite intellects while the
knowledge of the greater order is not. Leibniz explains:
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That which makes them miracles, is that they do not follow the intelligible notions of
subjects and could not be foreknown by the greatest of the finite spirits that one
could imagine.50
The natures or essences of created substances are, for Leibniz, the clue to their
phenomenal manifestations and modalities of being. As such they enable us to understand
the powers of substances. Miracles go beyond the natural power of substances: they do
not accord with the natural laws —included in a corporeal substance's individual
nature— that govern their phenomenal manifestations in time. Thus Leibniz writes;
properly speaking, God performs a miracle when he does anything which surpasses
the powers which he has given to created things and which he maintains in them; for
example, if God could make a body, which was put in circular motion by means of a
sling, to go on freely in a circular line even when it was released from the
attachment, this, when it was neither pushed nor retained by anything would be a
miracle, for, according to the laws of Nature the body should travel along the line of
the tangent
Leibniz subscribes to the law of inertia, therefore he shares the view that a body
in motion will travel in a straight line with uniform speed, if no external force affects
it. Changes of direction or acceleration require a force operating on the body. In the case
of a body moving with circular motion, Leibniz contends, that if released from a line
holding it, its natural tendency is to travel in the direction of the tangent, and it would do
so if so released. Were we to observe something different in such a case we must conclude
that an extraneous and unnatural factor is intervening. Were we to consider this factor
God the unnatural occurrence would need be considered miraculous.
Occasionalism is an account where God's will plays the role of the unnatural factor
that continuously alters the laws of motion of corporeal substances and the teleological
laws that govern mind-substances, according to Leibniz. This does not mean that
Malebranche has God playing a role where he constantly opposes the laws of motion of
modern physics. But even when opposition to natural laws may be Malebranche's own
version of the miraculous, in Leibniz's interpretation of his position, the use of God's
will as an explanatory principle of what occurs is by itself unnatural and a perpetual
miracle that results from disregarding essences in the account of phenomena.
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In our exposition of the contrast between Malebranche's and Leibniz's account of
nature, in the previous subsection, we saw that, according to Leibniz, Newton's
conception of continuous creation has God intervening in nature in a manner less
frequent than Malebranche's but not less miraculous. The point is specifically presented
to Clarke by Leibniz in a passage where the claim that Newton's conception is not
miraculous for it is ordered, is rejected with the arguments that we have seen directed
against Malebranche:
I maintained that an operation of God by which he should mend the machine of the
material world, tending in its nature, as this author pretends, to lose all its motion,
would be a miracle. His answer was that it would not be a miraculous operation
because it would be usual and must frequently happen. I replied that 'tis not
usualness or unusualness that makes a miracle properly so called, or a miracle of
the highest sort, but its surpassing the powers of creatures, and that this is the
general opinion of divines and philosophers; and that therefore the author
acknowledges at least that the thing he introduces and I disallow is, according to the
received notion, a miracle of the highest sort, that is, one which surpasses all
created powers, and that this is the very thing which all men endeavor to avoid in
philosophy.... Otherwise nothing will be easier than to account for anything by
bringing in the deity, deus ex machina, without minding the natures of things.^^
Leibniz frequently attacks Newton's conception of gravity suggesting that it is not
based on the nature of bodies, very much like "sympathies", "occult qualities" and the
substantial forms of the Scholastics. He even suggests that it is part of a tendency
towards "barbarism in physics" that "threatens to give us other occult qualities of this
sort [attraction at a distance] and, thus, in the end, they may lead us back to the kingdom
of darkness."53 It is Newtonian attraction that Leibniz has in mind when he writes:
If the means which causes an attraction properly so called be constant and at the same
time inexplicable by the powers of creatures, and yet be true, it must be a perpetual
miracle and if its not miraculous it is false. 'Tis a chimerical thing, a Scholastic
occult quality.5'^
It is clear that Leibniz considers gravity an instance of "perpetual miracle." There
are passages where he explicitly argues against gravity by suggesting that it is like
occasionalism in this respect. The one that follows is especially interesting for it is
produced to provide the "distinguishing mark of miracles" and it denounces "attraction at
a distance" as defective in the manner of occasionalism:
57
The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in the strictest sense) is that they cannot
be accounted for by the natures of created things. That is why, should God make a
general law causing bodies to be attracted the one to the other, he could only achieve
its operation by perpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the organs of
humari bodies should conform to the will of the soul, according to the system of
occasionel causes, this law also would come into operation only through perpetual
miracles.55
In Bertrand Russell's criticism of Leibniz's philosophy we are surprised by the
claim that Leibniz offers no reason for rejecting gravity.55 We have seen that he has one
specific and clear reason, originating from a trait Newtonian gravity presumably shares
with other very disreputable hypotheses. This is a point that appears in the works
known to Russell and very frequently throughout Leibniz's writings. That Leibniz has
and wants to communicate a very important metaphysical reason for rejecting gravity
can quite clearly be appreciated in a reaction to contemporary Newtonians (found in a
letter of 1715), who affectedly, Leibniz believed, disdained his position on the grounds
that it does not offer reasons in opposition to gravity:
As far as I and my friends are concerned, whom they [the Newtonians] also had in
mind, they are angry because their alleged 'attractive force' was criticized in the
Leipzig Acts, though with much restraint, as being merely a revival of chimeras
which had already been banned. They commit a shrewd sophism to give themselves an
air of reasonableness and to make us appear in the wrong, as if we were opposing
those who assume gravity, without giving a reason for it. This is not at all true; we
rather disapprove of the method of those who assume irrational qualities, as the
Scholastics once did, that is, primary qualities which have no natural reasons, to be
explained by the nature of the subject to which the quality must belong.57
We might note, in closing this subsection that, Leibniz's criticism of other
philosophers who introduce immaterial explanatory principles when explaining natural
occurrences is not always a recrimination based on the charge that it entails a
miraculous account. Strictly speaking, if the extranatural principle is not God's will,
the explanation is not miraculous. But a philosophy that makes use of immaterial
explanatory principles (not God) for the account of natural occurrences would be poor,
and though not "miraculous" it could appropriately be called "magical." Insofar as
unnatural, such an account would be arbitrary and unintelligible and, for these reasons,
it would be, Leibniz contends, very inferior to preestablished harmony.
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2. Occasionalism Involves a Defective Conception of God
a. A_Role Unworthy of God
The second reason for Leibniz's opposition to occasionalism is closely linked to the
first point already discussed, for it has to do with the role God plays in creation and with
regard to existent substances. God's miraculous intervention in the created realms in the
philosophy of Malebranche had to be mentioned, in our previous analysis, in order to
understand what is an appropriate philosophical explanation for Leibniz. The crucial
issue with respect to this point was the contrast between the use of natural reasons
versus resorting to God, ex machina fashion. But what we now want to stress is that
occasionalism is a defective explanation according to Leibniz, not only because it is not
truly philosophical but because it makes God play a role that must be considered
unworthy of Him.
The linkage between these two defects of occasionalism is so close that some of the
passages which served us to substantiate the first reason are also pertinent to this
second reason. A case in point is a passage we quoted above (footnote 25) where at the end
Leibniz writes:
I extend this also to the perceptions of sensible things, for since they are not
miraculously induced by God, and cannot be imparted naturally by the body, it
follows that they arise within the soul by a definite law, as through a harmony
divinely preestablished in the beginning. This is more worthy of the most wise
creator than the perpetual violation, by new impressions, of laws which he has given
to the body or the soul.
The same idea, with respect to what is becoming to God, is expressed in the passage
below, where in the context of explaining preestablished harmony Leibniz stresses that
the laws of nature cannot be arbitrarily violated by God. To think otherwise would be to
conceive of God inappropriately:
It is therefore much more ... reasonable and more worthy of God to suppose that he
has created the machinery of the world in such a fashion from the very start that
without doing violence at every moment to the two great laws of nature, that of force
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and that of direction, but rather by following them exactly, (except in the case of
miracles,) it so comes about that the internal springs of bodies are ready to act of
themselves, as they should, at the very moment when the soul has a conforming
desire or thought.58
An explanation which disregards the nature of the substances whose relation must
be explained has no philosophical stature: and an explanation where God plays a role
unworthy of him is defective on this account also. The suggestion that God interferes in
the world in the unnatural manner of occasionalism entails a view of God which distorts
his relation to created substances and leads to several hypotheses, having to do with
creation and man, incompatible with what Leibniz considers true theology.
In the Correspondence with Arnauld we also find a passage that suggests this same
line of thinking. In it Leibniz first explains that, "the hypothesis of occasional causes is
not satisfactory,... to a philosopher, because it introduces a sort of continuous miracle as
though God at every moment was changing the laws of bodies on the occasions when minds
had thoughts, or was changing the regular course of the thinking of the soul by exciting
in it other thoughts on the occasion of a bodily movement: and in general as though God
was interfering otherwise for the ordinary events of life than in preserving each
substance in its course and in the laws established for it." He then adds;
Only the hypothesis of the concomitance or the agreement of substances among
themselves therefore is able to explain these things in a manner conceivable and
worthy of God.^^
The appropriate conception of God, according to Leibniz, involves the view that he
is a perfect, necessary, personal, free, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and absolutely
wise, being. A significant part of his philosophy has to do with this conception of God and
with the consequences for creation that follow from it. Its is only in preestablished
harmony, for Leibniz, that God is conceived in the terms enumerated above. Other
philosophers, Spinoza and Hobbes preeminently, but also Descartes and Malebranche,
refuse God some of these attributes and therefore distort his nature, whence that of
created reality too.
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Occasionalism, as well as Descartes's account of the external world and of
creation, Spinoza's philosophy in general, and several other contemporary philosophies
(Newton's included) seem inappropriate to Leibniz because they contain either an
express rejection of the true conception of God, or else make use of explanatory
hypotheses with consequences incompatible with such a conception. An account, in what
follows, that shows how the problem comes down to Spinozism will enable us to
understand why, for Leibniz, only preestablished harmony has God playing a role worthy
of him.
b. The Risk of Soinozism
Of Spinoza Leibniz writes:
... he was truly an atheist, that is to say, that he did not admit at all a Providence
dispenser of goods and evils according to justice ...; the God which he parades is not
like ours, he does not have understanding nor will.^O
Hobbes and Spinoza are considered atheist by Leibniz. He consistently attacks
Spinoza's conception of God and of created substances as unchristian and full of dangerous
consequences. Spinoza's famous assertion establishing that things emanate from God as
geometrical relations originate from the essence of geometrical entities, entails, for
Leibniz, a view of creation as necessary, where no choice is involved, and where hence
God acts as if divested of will and understanding. This necessitarism characterizes
Hobbes's philosophy too, and results, in his case, according to Leibniz, from an
erroneous conception of what is possible in which possibility and actuality are equated in
a way that leaves no room for possibles that will not ever be real. Both philosophers
have a conception of God as an impersonal entity and of creation as necessary which
cannot afford a view of God's actions as the product of choice and intelligence. Thus,
Leibniz consistently treats them as the philosophers "who have extended furthest the
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doctrine of the necessity of things," from which the negation of God's personal nature
follows:
I have not neglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended
furthest the doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes and Spinoza, of
whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in his Physical Elements
and elsewhere, but also in a special book against Bishop Bramhall. And Spinoza
insists more or less (like an ancient Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all
has come from the first cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical
necessity, with complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for
understanding in this first source of things.®^
In Leibniz's own conception, creation is not necessary, and God chooses the best
among infinitely many possible worlds. Intellect and will are essential attributes of God
that in Spinoza's and Hobbes's conceptions are disregarded, to the point of entailing an
intolerable distortion of God's nature.
Spinoza's conception of God seemed to many Christian philosophers of the
seventeenth century unacceptable. Attacks poured on him and on any philosopher which
seemed inclined in his presumably atheistic direction. Leibniz is part of the group that
energically reacted against his doctrines. Other currents of philosophy whose tenets or
basic suppositions approximate those of Spinoza, or seemed to do so, were considered
suspicious by members of this group, and quite explicitly by Leibniz. Many of his
attacks against other philosophers are based on the suggestion that their thinking suffers
from this defect, i.e., that they, even without realizing or wanting it, are Spinozist of a
sort. A careful study of Leibniz's arguments against Descartes and the Cartesians shows
us that he consistently attacks them in this fashion. Whether they realize it or not,
Leibniz believes, fundamental aspects of their thinking incline them unescapably in the
direction of Spinozism.
Leibniz's attack against Descartes and Malebranche emphasizes what he considers
the shortcomings of their philosophical positions. He basically recognizes, (though he
sometimes speaks as if this were not the case) that they are not intentionally
antichristian, and that both rather intend the opposite. The shortcomings of their
philosophies, however, seem so serious that they are said to entail consequences similar
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to, and as dangerous as, those of Spinozism. The fact that these philosophers are not
aware of this points to their lack of rigor, and in the case of Descartes, suggests to
Leibniz, that he has been greatly overestimated.
Malebranche and occasionalism are expressly mentioned by Leibniz, when
attacking the Cartesians on the basis of the anti-religious consequences entailed by their
views. But Descartes is primarily his goal. There are several commentaries about
Descartes and Spinoza where Leibniz suggests that Spinoza simply develops to its most
absurd consequences ideas contained in Descartes's philosophy:
Therefore, one can say that Spinoza has just cultivated certain seeds of the
philosophy of M. Descartes, so that that I believe that it is important for religion and
for piety that this philosophy be polished [corrected] by the suppression of the
errors that are mixed with the truth.6
2
And Leibniz goes as far as to suggests that,
Descartes thinks lowly [in a low voice] what Spinoza says loudly.
These reflections are motivated by the view that Descartes's conceptions of the
possible, his view of the meaning of final causes for the order of nature, and his account
of God's freedom, all entail a God deprived of understanding and will, not a God proper,
definitively not the God of Christianism as Leibniz understands him, but one very much
like Spinoza's. Therefore, we read in Leibniz:
Descartes's God, or perfect being, is not a God like the one we imagine or hope for,
that is, a God just and wise, doing everything possible for the good of the creatures.
Rather, Descartes God is something approaching the God of Spinoza, namely, the
principle of things and a certain supreme power or primitive nature that puts
everything into motion [action] and does everything that can be done. Descartes's God
has neither will nor understanding, since according to Descartes he does not have the
good as object of the will, nor the true as object of the understanding.®"^
It is the conjunction of the several factors of Descartes's thinking, which I
mentioned above that brings about Leibniz's conclusion. Perhaps none is as important as
the view that Descartes identifies the possibles and the existents thereby making
creation necessary. This is the view that Leibniz recriminates to both Hobbes and
Spinoza. He attributes it to Descartes on the basis of his interpretation of a sentence
63
—that he treats as "one of two dangerous propositions" in the Princir^le?; of Philnt^nphy—
that says:
For due to these laws [of nature], matter takes on successively, all the forms of
which it is capable.
From here Leibniz argues that,
if matter takes on successively, all possible forms, it follows that nothing can be
imagined so absurd, so bizarre, so contrary to what we call justice, that it would not
have happened and will not some day happen. These are precisely the opinions which
Spinoza has expounded more clearly, namely, that justice, beauty, and order are
things merely relative to us but that the perfection of God consists in that magnitude
of his activity by virtue of which nothing is possible or conceivable which he does
not actually produce.®®
In "On Freedom," in the context of explaining how he himself was able to avoid
necessitarism with regard to creation, Leibniz refers to Descartes's views about
possibles in terms like the passage's above. He indicates that,
if certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary;
otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all
things that never exist would be impossible.®^
Leibniz affirms this view —that possibles are different and more in number than
existents, wherefrom God had more possibles to choose from than were actualized— as
fundamental to his rejection of necessitarism. Choosing, he explains, requires
alternatives; if only that which were to exist were possible there would not be in
creation any real choosing. Descartes's position, then, entails necessitarism. Thus, we
read in "On Freedom":
A certain distinguished philosopher of our century seems to have been close to this
opinion [necessitarism], for he says expressly somewhere that matter takes on
successively all the forms of which it is capable (Principles of Philosophy, Part III,
art 47). This view is indefensible, for it would remove all the beauty of the universe
and all choice, to say nothing here of other arguments by which the contrary can be
shown.®®
Another argument against Descartes follows from Leibniz's rejection of the second
of the "two dangerous propositions" in the Principles , namely, the one by which
Descartes presumably rejects final causes in nature. Leibniz refers to these two
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propositions
—claiming that Descartes "says some things which I, who have studied him
thoroughly, strongly suspect"— as follows:
For example, the two passages to the effect that one should not consider final causes
in physics and that matter takes on, successively, all the forms of which it is
capable.
Leibniz contends that a significant aspect of our appreciation of nature should
result from the recognition that God has ordered nature guided by the principle of
obtaining the greatest good. To claim, as Descartes presumably does, that final causes
have no bearing in nature, leads again to a conception of creation as a process where
God's intellect and will had no significance. On this point Leibniz writes:
For my part, I hold that far from excluding final cause from physics, as Mr.
Descartes tries to do in part I, article 28, it is rather by means of then that
everything must be determined, since the efficient cause of things is intelligent,
having a will and therefore striving for the good. But this too differs from
Descartes's opinion, since goodness, truth, and justice are such, according to him,
only because God has established them by a free act of his will —a most strange thing.
For if things are good or evil only as the result of God's will, the good cannot be a
motive of his will, being posterior to his will. His will, then, would be a certain
absolute decree without any reason
God as creator is the efficient cause of things. But one that is guided in his efficient
causal activity by final causes. The rejection of this feature of God would entail that ends,
like the good or the beautiful, have no importance for his causal activity. This is also
entailed by the view that the good is that which God wills rather than that which
motivates his will as an objective end. It is this view of the good that Leibniz attributes
to Descartes in the last part of the passage above. It makes Descartes's God capable of
acting without a reason, in what Leibniz often describes as the manner of a capricious,
irrational, despot.
For Leibniz, God's intellect is the region of ideas which motivate his will, and to
suggest otherwise is to deny a principle that rules universally over spirits, that of
sufficient reason. A characterization of a spirit as if capable of acting independently of
reasons is absurd for it contradicts, according to Leibniz, the nature or essence of
spirits. To say that God acts necessarily, or that he acts independently of final causes, or
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that his will preponderates over the intellect, entails this same conception. Descartes,
then, holds several views that demean the significance of alternatives for God's actions.
These also imply that God's actions are not influenced by the merits or moral value of the
alternatives he faces. Leibniz therefore claims that this conception approximates
Spinoza's distorted conception of God.
The true conception of God, grounded on the recognition of his personal nature, and
resulting from an elucidation of the meaning intellect and will have for his actions, is
basic to Leibniz's view of creation as free. Moreover, everything in the created world,
and specifically the laws of nature, responds to the ends that have presided over God's
creative decree. This conception enables us, now, to understand better the meaning of
Leibniz's position with regard to mechanicism as the appropriate account of phenomenal
occurrences, which yet depends on higher metaphysico-theological principles.
Leibniz's position with respect to the laws of nature, includes, we saw a while
back, a defense of mechanicism conditioned by the view that this account of nature cannot
stand by itself but points to the existence of an intelligent being and also to metaphysical
principles underlying it. We can see now that this means that mechanicism governs
nature because it is part of the order that results from a creation by a willful God ruled
by the principle of the best. The contents in God's intellect included the mechanical laws
of nature, and teleologically determined his will in creation. As part of the best possible
world, the laws of motion which rule over existing nature, performed as final causes
relative to God's creative decree. Thus, Leibniz asserts, against Descartes:
For my part, I believe that the laws of mechanics which serve as foundation for the
whole system depend on final causes, that is to say, on the will of God determined to
do what is most perfect, and that matter takes on not all possible forms but only the
most perfect ones.^"*
With respect to occasionalism, we also find commentaries of Leibniz, where he
suggests that it approximates Spinozism in the unintended fashion of Descartes; and that
it contains some philosophical seeds which show themselves problematic when they are
fully developed by Spinoza:
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[The doctrine of occasionalists] is fraught with dangerous consequences, even if its
learned defenders do not, as is undoubtedly true, intend them. So far is this doctrine
from increasing the glory of God by removing the idol of nature that it seems rather,
like Spinoza, to make out of God the nature of the world itself, by causing created
things to disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance, since that
which does not act, which lacks active force, and which is despoiled of all
distinctiveness and even of all reason and ground for subsistence can in no way be a
substance.^2
It does not seem necessary to me to deny action or force to creatures on the pretext
that they would be creators if they produced their modifications. For it is God who
conserves and continuously creates their forces, that is, who establishes a source of
changing modifications in the creatures, or a state by which we can conclude that
there will be a change of their modifications. Otherwise 1 find, as I have shown in the
work cited above, that God would produce nothing and that there would be no
substances beyond his own —a view which would lead us back into all the absurdities
of Spinoza's God. It also seems to me that Spinoza's error comes entirely from his
having pushed too far the consequences of the doctrine which denies force and action
to creatures.
Leibniz believes that both Descartes and Malebranche conceive of God in a manner
that ultimately leads in a direction that they would not welcome. In the case of
Malebranche, the accusation is that he has placed himself in a philosophical position that
entails Spinozism because the denial of action or force to creatures is equivalent to a
conception of God as the only substance, and of creatures as its modalities of being. While
the emphasis is placed on Malebranche's defective conception of substance, it is correct
to say, and seems clearly suggested by Leibniz, that this parallels a defective conception
of God. It is, in Leibniz's words, "a view which would lead us back into all the absurdities
of Spinoza's God." This seems, then, an important aspect of the manner in which Leibniz
wants us to understand that occasionalism is an hypothesis where God is conceived in a
way unworthy of him.
Let us mention incidentally that Leibniz refers to an assessment of Bayle of the
merits of preestablished harmony to defend the claim that it is the account that best
conceives of God. The two passages below, from different works, serve Leibniz to
establish this point.
this cause [God] must have infinite power and wisdom to pre-establish all these
agreements. Even Mr Bayle has expressed his judgment that no other hypothesis has
ever given so much help to our knowledge of the divine wisdom.
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He [Bayle] says, most honorably, that my replies have strengthened my position, and
that if the possibility of the hypothesis of pre-established harmony were well
established, he would find no difficulty in preferring it to the Cartesian hypothesis,
because it gives a noble idea of the Author of things and removes every concept of
miraculous guidance in the ordinary course of nature/^
The central point of the claim which Bayle seems willing to accept is the view that
God is absolutely wise and benevolent, as must be a perfect Spirit. This is Leibniz's
contention, following from his conception of a spirit as essentially possessed of
understanding and will, and from the view that God is a perfect, necessary, spiritual
being. Other philosophers, willingly or not, place themselves in a position where this
conception of God cannot be consistently upheld. Their view of nature, or their
conception of substance, or some other fundamental tenet of their metaphysics is
incompatible with what Leibniz considers the true nature of God.
Malebranche's occasionalism contains several additional aspects with consequences
that, if assessed from Leibniz's perspective, deserve that the hypothesis be accused of
entailing a distorted and unworthy conception of God. Interestingly enough, I do not find
the issue I have in mind now clearly expounded by Leibniz, or identified as, perhaps, the
most important reason making occasionalism defective inasmuch as it does no justice to
God. Nonetheless, I believe that the topic is central to Leibniz's second reason for
rejecting occasionalism, and that it is suggested, at least indirectly, in many parts of his
writings. It, therefore, deserves our attention.
c. An Untenable Conception of God's Will
Occasionalism, we learned, is a poor philosophical account because it makes use of
God's will when explaining interaction between material and immaterial substances and
disregards the natures of the substances involved. But this must mean that the contents
of God's understanding, which should work as the reasons for God's decrees according to
Leibniz, pl3y no such a role. It would seem, then, that the role ascribed to God s will by
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Malebranche is as capricious as that it plays in Descartos's account, as denounced by
Leibniz. Such a view of God's willing, Leibniz energically rejects with respect to
Descartes and Spinoza. We must conclude that, if it is entailed by occasionalism, it
merits Leibniz's opposition just as energically.
A fairly complete treatment of the point that now interests us involves a
comparison of Malebranche and Leibniz based upon an elucidation of several topics
central to Leibniz's thinking: we need to clarify Leibniz's conception of creation; this, in
turn, requires that we elucidate better his conception of God and the notions
"possibility," "necessity," and "contingency." Leibniz's views on freedom and
determinism must also be further clarified. Only if we gain some knowledge of the
significance of these topics in Leibniz's characterization of God's actions, can we
understand the point I want to make now: that there are consequences in the role God's
will plays in occasionalism which evince what, by Leibniz's standards, must be
considered a defective conception of God.
It will be appropriate to divide our exposition into the following three parts:
"Creation" (with several subtopics); "Freedom and Determinism"; and finally, for this
is our main concern, "Malebranche's Distorted Conception of God." A small observation is
in place here: the first two of these topics are so important in Leibniz's philosophy that
an exhaustive treatment of them would not only be very lengthy but would include more
than what is necessary for the clarification of the point that now interests us. We would
like to keep our discussion within the limits of what is significant for our purpose. But
we want to avoid superficiality. In this predicament we will incline towards our last
concern: many of the issues that are pertinent to our main consideration are central to
Leibniz's philosophy and it is worthwhile to address them now, for they will enable us to
grasp better the overall meaning of his philosophical system and the role of both
preestablished harmony and corporeal substance in it.
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i. Creation
In order to elucidate the meaning of creation in Leibniz's philosophy there are
three topics that we must addressi 1.) the significance of God and his act of creation for
Leibniz's conception of metaphysics; 2.) the metaphysical principles and notions which
make up the conceptual framework against which creation must be understood: 3.)
Leibniz's conception of God's nature and its bearing upon the act of creation.
(a) God and Metaphysics. Metaphysics is conceived by Leibniz as an a priori
knowledge which provides general notions about reality and existents. As a priori, it is
characterized frequently as demonstrative, as independent of experience, and therefore
as ultimately based on principles and definitions which, it would seem, must be known
through some kind of intellectual intuition.^® The possibility of obtaining a science
about being that will thoroughly satisfy the expectations of demonstrative knowledge is
asserted as a desideratum by Leibniz, which he, however, suggests may not be fully
attainable to human beings. In a manner that reminds us of Plato, the desired
metaphysics seems a project that, though clearly envisaged, may in fact be unrealizable.
Nonetheless, the basis for what may be accessible to us as metaphysics is frequently
explained by Leibniz in terms of the significance of sundry metaphysical principles and
through the role the notion of God plays in the appreciation of reality in general. In this
fashion, Leibniz speaks as if a modicum of metaphysics were attainable, even though
initially it might include a considerable part that is just hypothetical knowledge, along
with demonstrations that may truly be considered contents of an a priori science.
Leibniz speaks of principles, such as the principle of plenitude and the principle
of order, as important to metaphysics and uses them to clarify some general aspects
concerning the existence and nature of created substances. He also defines the modalities
of being, "possibility," "necessity" and "contingency" in order to elucidate the process
whereby possibles become actual in creation. But it is, perhaps, the notion of God that
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plays the most significant role in his metaphysics. As the necessary being, who creates
and substantiates continuously the being of every existent, God is for Leibniz the most
fundamental ontological principle. Indeed, I believe that it is fair to say that Leibniz
squarely belongs in the Christian metaphysical tradition which considers God the central
topic of metaphysics, whose elucidation should be the main concern of this discipline, for
from it a significant amount of knowledge about reality in general and about the nature of
existents may be obtained. The notion is so central to Leibniz's thought that he frequently
speaks of metaphysical inquiry as a task that proceeds from the a priori knowledge of
God's nature to the principles that determine creation and provide an insight into the
general features of created reality. In 1682, for example, Leibniz writes:
The a priori method is certain if we can demonstrate from the known nature of God
that structure of the world which is in agreement with the divine reasons, and from
this structure, can finally arrive at the principles of sensible things.^^
Of course, the basis for the view that knowledge of God is instrumental for the
knowledge of created reality is the relation between the former as cause or reason and
the latter as effect, as the two passages below attest:
It is God who is the ultimate reason of things, and the knowledge of God is no less the
beginning of science than his essence and his will are the beginnings of beings.^®
I nevertheless think that the true knowledge of God is the principle of higher
wisdom,... For God is the first cause no less than the ultimate reason of things, and
there is no better knowledge of things than through their causes and reasons.^®
This view of Leibniz makes the attention of questions concerning God's existence
and nature fundamental to his metaphysics along lines of thought similar to those of
medieval thinkers. A good deal of what is called metaphysics in the seventeenth century
is conceived in this manner. A significant part of Leibniz's philosophical efforts is
directed to the analysis of traditional proofs of the existence of God, to recent
modifications of such proofs, especially those of Descartes, and to the formulation of his
own modifications in an attempt to provide definite proof.
In order to understand the general features of created reality, Leibniz initiates an
elucidation of the process of creation which begins with the clarification of those
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features of God pertinent to the creative decree. Such an elucidation cannot give us a very
detailed knowlodge of created reality, but, that which we may know this way may be
known a priori according to Leibniz, and seems to him quite important for piety and not
insignificant in extent. It makes up the main thrust of what he considers metaphysics.
The role of the notion, "God," in Leibniz's metaphysics is complemented by several
other notions and principles which were part of the metaphysical tradition. Among these,
"modalities of being" and what Leibniz specifically characterizes as the basic principles
of metaphysics: "the principle of contradiction" and "the principle of sufficient reason,"
have the highest importance. These principles are instrumental in several of the proofs
of the existence of God, and are basic to the elucidation of the modalities of being. They
must be recognized as theoretically fundamental and considered the point of departure of
Leibniz's metaphysical reflection. We must, hence, grant them special attention and
treat them as topics of elucidation before elaborating further on Leibniz's views about
creation. Since this is a relatively separable topic we may briefly address it now.
(b) Modalities of Being and Two Basic Metaphysical Principles. There are several
aspects having to do with reality in general that, according to Leibniz, need to be
understood in order to provide the metaphysical framework against which an elucidation
of the nature of God and creation may take place. Among these, the role the principle of
contradiction plays in thinking and with respect to reality is of foremost importance.
This is not, however, the only principle that must be considered basic to our a priori
appreciation of reality: the principle of sufficient reason is almost as important. Leibniz
frequently refers to both jointly to emphasize their fundamental role, as in the passage
that follows, from the Theodicy , where he refers to them as the "two great principles of
our arguments":
The one is the principle of contradiction, stating that of two contradictory
propositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is that of the
determinant reason: it states that nothing ever comes to pass without there being a
cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, something to give an a priori reason
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why it is existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any
other. This great principle holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be
supplied ...®0
The principle of contradiction is, for Leibniz, more encompassing and fundamental
than the principle of sufficient reason. It presides over thinking in general insofar as it
is the basic principle of logic, without which we could not make any sense of truth or
falsity. As an innate truth it is an eternal verity, susceptible of being discovered and
made explicit through reflecting on our intellectual functions. As a rule governing our
thinking it is a sine qua non condition of truth. Leibniz frequently presents this
principle as part of what he calls "the nature of truth." He claims that it is equivalent to
the principle of identity, and also that it entails the principle of excluded middle. These
views are expressed in the two passages below:
The primary truth of reason is the principle of contradiction, or, what amounts to
the same thing, that of identity, as Aristotle has rightly observed.®^
Stated generally the principle of contradiction is: a proposition is either true or
false. This contains two assertions: first, that truth and falsity are incompatible in a
single proposition, i.e. that a proposition cannot be both true and false at once; and
second, that the contradictories or negations of the true and the false are not
compatible, i.e. that there is nothing intermediate between the true and the false, or
better that it cannot happen that a proposition is neither true nor false.
The same views are presented by Leibniz in an article entitled, "The Nature of
Truth." He calls the principle of contradiction there the "fixed point" on which "we can
safely rest and from which we can set out without fear," in order to obtain knowledge. He
also stresses the axiomatic nature of this principle, which is fundamental as no other,
insofar as all proof relies on it:
We are to hold to this above all: every proposition is either true or false. That is
false which is the contradictory of the true; those propositions are contradictory
which differ only in that one of them is affirmative and the other negative. These
principles are such that it is vain to demand a proof of them. For since one can only
bring forward as proof other propositions, it would be vain to bring them forward if
it were at the same time both granted and denied that they are true or false, and all
inquiry into truth would cease at the very outset.®^
The very possibility of intelligibility rests upon the principle of contradiction for
Leibniz, and we could not make sense if a proposition could both be true and false; no
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argument would be possible, (for or against any proposition) without this principle,
since to start out, that which is to be defended must be understood as having a definite
truth value. Any attempt to construct an argument in defense of a thesis would need the
principle of contradiction to assert the thesis (as a true statement) first, and further,
in order to present propositions (other true statements) from which a demonstration
could proceed. In this manner any thesis to be defended requires the principle of
contradiction, so that if the thesis in question were the principle itself, its defense as a
true thesis would require that it be assumed. From this it should be evident, Leibniz
contends, that it is not demonstrable, but a principle in the strictest sense.
The principle of contradiction has ontological importance also for Leibniz. It
obtains from its significance for the modalities of being, "possibility," "necessity," and
"contingency." These are basic concepts in Leibniz’s ontology, which play an essential
role in his account of creation. Since everything that may be called real must first be
possible, and Leibniz defines possibility as non-contradiction, ("possibles things are
those which do not imply a contradiction"®^) the principle of contradiction plays the
most basic ontological role. Moreover, all other modalities of reality relate to this
principle. "Necessity" is that (itself possible) whose contrary is impossible or
contradictory;®® and "contingency" is the modality of being of an existent that is not
necessary, i.e., one whose contrary is not impossible.®® Since Leibniz, in the tradition
of St. Anselm's ontological argument, conceives God as the necessary being —the being
whose essence contains existence— he will also define contingence as follows:
I use the term 'contingent,' as do others, for that whose essence does not involve
existence.®^
All of created reality is contingent. And Leibniz contends —in his version of the
argument from contingency to prove the existence of God— that created entities need,
insofar as contingent, ontological support, that can only be obtained from a being itself
not in such a need, a necessary being. It is this support that Leibniz has called
"continuous creation" and consistently characterizes as the only correct way of
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understanding God's "presence in," "influence over," and "governance of," the world;
wherefrom he tells us,
we must bear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual immediate
influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependence attaches not
only to the substance but also to the action, and one can perhaps not explain it better
than by saying, with theologians and philosophers in general, that it is a continued
creation.88
We have seen that Leibniz defines possibility as non-contradiction. This means for
him that a possible existent may be fully conceived without contradiction, i.e., it may be
the object of what he calls "a complete concept," which includes everything that
characterizes the possible existent in question. If the latter were not completely
conceivable, it would have to be that the notes which characterize it as an individual
existent are not all compatible. Thus, Leibniz writes:
I call possible anything which is perfectly conceivable and which, as a result, has an
essence or idea, without raising the question of whether the rest of the world permits
it to be existent.88
It is important to note that in the last part of the sentence quoted the point is
suggested that while the possibility of a thing depends on its concept, the question about
its compatibility with the rest of the world goes beyond its initial possibility. This
question too, however, depends on the principle of contradiction, for the compatibility of
a possible substance with another possible substance obtains if they relate in a way that
does not involve a contradiction, i.e., if there is nothing in the one which contradicts
something in the other. Substances that relate in this fashion are said, by Leibniz, to be
"compossible." They belong in the same possible world.
The principle of sufficient reason has, like the principle of contradiction,
ontological and logical connotations in Leibniz's philosophy. It is essential to the modality
of being, "contingent existence," and in this manner it is ontologically fundamental. It is
important for contingent reality in several ways, but first of all, insofar as that which
has no reason for being in its essence must have a reason for being extrinsic to it.
Second, that which is contingently, must have a reason for being in the determined way it
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is. Thes0 two aspects of determination from reasons are usually mentioned as the
connotations of the principle of sufficient reason in passages that contrast the
preeminently logical meaning of the principles of contradiction to the factual
significance of "sufficient reason." The one below is typical:
Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of Contradiction, by
means of which we decide that to be false which involves a contradiction and that to be
true which contradicts or is opposed to the false.
And second, the principle of Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that
no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason
why it should be thus and not otherwise.
Leibniz frequently suggests that the principle of sufficient reason is, like that of
contradiction, axiomatic. At times, however, he offers a demonstration of it. In The
Profession of Faith of the Philosopher he presents a proof based on the following
definition of "sufficient reason: "all the requisites for the existence (of a thing) taken
together."91 The argument can be summarized as follows:
Every thing that exists has all the requisites for its existence.
All the requisites for the existence (of a thing) taken together are its sufficient
reason.
Every thing that exists has its sufficient reason.
The fact that everything has a reason to be, and to be in the determinate way it is,
warrants that whatever exists and occurs can be explained through these reasons. This
means that the totality of reality is intelligible. For Leibniz, hence, all of reality is
intellectually transparent, at least for an omniscient mind.
The intellectual transparency of substances entailed by the principle of sufficient
reason links this principle to Leibniz's epistemological concerns. The passage just quoted
(footnote 90), from the Monadoloav . is quite clear with respect to this point. The
principle of sufficient reason, it tells us, is that "in virtue of which we believe that no
fact can be real or existing unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not
otherwise," but also the principle that shows why no statement is true unless it has a
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sufficiont reason. The latter feature is stressed in works where Leibniz's main concern
is the nature of truth. In such works he presents "sufficient reason" as a corollary of the
nature of truth. It is too early to attempt to address the questions which arise from the
relation truth has to sufficient reason. This topic will become central in our third
chapter, where we will examine an approach to metaphysics by Leibniz which seems
grounded on logic.
The principle of sufficient reason is also important according to Leibniz with
respect to spirits, insofar as it is essential to a spirit that it exercise his will as
motivated by the reasons his intellect provides. Hence, there is no will without a reason.
Thus construed, the principle of sufficient reason again holds universally. The point is
clear in the passages below, first in general terms, and afterwards with regard to God,
the perfect spirit:
In things absolutely indifferent, there is no (foundation for) choice: and
consequently no election, nor will; since choice must be founded on some reason, or
principle.92
A mere will without any motive is a fiction, not only contrary to God's perfection but
also chimerical and contradictory, inconsistent with the definition of a will and
sufficiently confuted in my Theodicy.
Having explained the metaphysical significance the principle of contradiction and
the principle of sufficient reason have for Leibniz, we can now concentrate our attention
upon Leibniz's treatment of creation, as the central concern of his metaphysics. Since
the clue to understanding creation is the elucidation of God's nature, this must become
our last topic of discussion.
(c) God's Nature. It is a commonplace that Leibniz, throughout his writings,
explicates the perfection of God in terms of the attributes: omnipotence, omniscience and
omnibenevolence. In the Discourse on Metaphysics , for example, he starts out with the
statement which, for him, best succinctly characterizes God: "God is an absolutely
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perfect being, and thereafter he identifies and explains God's fundamental attributes
in order to establish the basis for an understanding of creation and created reality.
That omnipotence and omniscience belong to God is explained here by arguing that
these are superlatives that do not entail a contradiction. All such attributes qualify God.
Supreme wisdom, moreover, leads to perfect actions, because, according to Leibniz,
God who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom acts in the most perfect manner not
only metaphysically, but also from the moral standpoint.^^
It is also the case that God's will, considered by itself, is perfect, and this ensures that
he be morally flawless and such that he always chooses the best.
Leibniz consistently explains God's knowledge of possible substances before
creation in terms of possessing the complete concept or individual essence of every
possible substance. These belong in God's intellect. As such they are eternal truths. This
means, Leibniz frequently explains, that they are "consubstantial" with God. This
relation endows essences with "being" whence according to Leibniz, they "are." But
"being" is not the same as "existence." Essences, specific and individual, do not exist;
they obtain the degree of being they posses from God, as the substance that thinks them.
God's will has no part in this. It is indispensable to contingent existence, but the being of
eternal truths just depends upon being thought by God, or being coeternal with God.
Leibniz explains:
For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which gives reality to the
eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein. All reality must be founded
on something existent. It is true that an atheist may be a geometrician: but if there
were no God geometry would have no object. And without God, not only would there be
nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible.^®
Creation is described by Leibniz as starting out from the knowledge of all possible
individual substances —individual essences, that is— and also from the knowledge
entailed by sorting out possible worlds. There is not, for Leibniz, one collection of
possible substances, but many different possible worlds. A world as the collection of all
possibles, or what amounts to the same, an universe which would contain all possible
worlds, is not feasible; it.
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would be true if the universe were a collection of all possibles, but it is not, since all
possibles are not compossible.®^
Creation is a process that beyond the knowledge of possibles requires God's will.
Since the object of creation is a world, what directly and ultimately motivates God are
the sets of compossible substances that make up different possible worlds. Each possible
world, Leibniz contends, includes all the possibles that it can accommodate, and only
excludes non-compossibles. This ensures that it be a maximum world. We might say that
it contains as much as it is possible for it to contain. But a non-compossible may stand to
other possible substances in a relation of compossibility; it thus determines a different
possible world. There are, according to Leibniz, an infinite number of possible worlds
from which God can choose in order to create.
Our actual world, for Leibniz, is the outcome of a creative decree that is triggered
by the conjunction of the three central features of God's nature; God's inclination towards
the best, his knowledge of all possible worlds, and his power of creating any of the
possible worlds. These three essential features of God articulate themselves in a way that
enables Leibniz to underline God's goodness as a determining factor of his actions, which
when conjoined with infinite wisdom and absolute power determines that the best
possible world be created.
For Leibniz the process of creation starts out from God's goodness (which incline
the creator towards actualizing all possible existents), is then tempered and conditioned
by his intellect, (which compares and sorts out all particular possibles, for not
everything possible can exist), and is actualized by his power, wherefrom the best
possible set of compossibles is selected and decreed to exist. We read in Leibniz:
Nevertheless, when one says that goodness alone determined God to create this
universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESS prompted him antecedently to create and
to produce all possible good, but that his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to
select the best consequently; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry
out actually the great design which he had formed.^^
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Our summary of Leibniz's account of creation, above, is not limited to the contents
of the Discourse- It follows, however, the same theoretical line of development, which
posits God as point of departure, as this accords with Leibniz's basic metaphysical
outlook and method. In the writings where he proceeds in this fashion, Leibniz
characteristically assumes God's existence, thereafter to construct his metaphysics. But
we can find in Leibniz's writings a different procedure, beginning, a posteriori, from
contingent reality, and, after demonstrating God's existence, proceeding on to an
elucidation of his nature. Certainly, the latter approach might seem appropriate to a
natural theology interested in providing a demonstration of God's existence, rather than
asserting it dogmatically.^^ This is, indeed, how Leibniz proceeds in the Theodicy .
Though this line of thinking will conduce to the same basic metaphysical tenets of
Leibniz, it affords an emphasis upon somewhat different issues which merit our
attention.
Leibniz, in the Theodicy , begins from created existents in the construction of the
argument from contingency, which besides enabling him to demonstrate the existence of
God will serve to show that: 1.) there is only one necessary being; 2.) this being is
intelligent: 3.) it must have a will, and 4.) it is absolutely powerful. That the necessary
being or God possesses understanding and will follows from the fact that the things that
exist make up one particular world that had to be chosen among an infinite number of
others. The task requires a will guided by an intellect, capable of knowing all the sets of
compossible substances that make up different possible worlds. That God is a powerful
spirit follows from having created the world of substances, since these exist as the
result of a transit from possibility to actuality and this requires power. And that God is
one, necessary, and infinite in power, wisdom and will, is evident because he relates to
an infinity of possibles and to contingent existents, all connected together. The necessary
being creates and supports contingents; its power relates to being, its understanding or
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wisdom to truth (the essences in God's understanding), and its will—the source of
existence—to goodness.
The text of the argument, which we summarized above, says:
God is the first reason of things: for such things as are bounded, as all that which we
see and experience, are contingent and have nothing in them to render their existence
necessary, it being plain that time, space and matter, united and uniform in
themselves and indifferent to everything, might have received entirely other motions
and shapes and in another order. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence
of the world, which is the whole assemblage of contingent things, and seek it in the
substance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in
consequence is necessary and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be intelligent; for
this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally
possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to existence with it, the cause of the
world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order
to fix upon one of them. This regard or relation of an existent substance to simple
possibilities can be nothing other than the understanding which has the ideas of
them, while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the will
which chooses. It is the power of this substance that renders its will efficacious.
Power relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good. And this
intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in
wisdom and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Furthermore,
since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. Its
understanding is the source of essences, and its will is the origin of existences. There
in a few words is the proof of one only God with his perfections, and through him of
the origin of things.^®®
Leibniz defines absolute power in the perfect being as entailing action if the will
is determined. This means that once something is known as desirable by God, i.e., known
to be the best, it is willed and actualized. Creation is God's actualization of existence, and
hence existence is good, or better than non-existence. The possibles worlds, being many
and such that they are incompossible among themselves, present a situation where choice
is unavoidable. God must select in order to bring about created reality. His knowledge of
the possibles provides the background for his selection. Intellect and will are hence
necessary to creation, and, Leibniz consistently suggests that since there is a contingent
created world its cause must be necessary, willful, and intelligent. The argument from
contingency, we must note, has become in Leibniz's hands a very powerful metaphysical
instrument.
The view that a will that wants and can, does, which we attributed to Leibniz above
is quite clearly expressed in the Theodicy , as well as in several other writings of
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Leibniz. It results from his distinction between an antecedent and a consequent will in
God, which plays a central role in the exculpation of the creator for the evil found in
created reality. It is therefore an important aspect of Leibniz’s account of creation, and
merits our attention.
For Leibniz, God's antecedent or particular will relates to all particular possible
substances and events; it inclines towards each of these according to its particular
goodness value. Leibniz explains:
Taking it in the general sense, one may say that will consists in the inclination to do
something in proportion to the good it contains. This will is called antocedent when it
is detached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. In this sense
it may be said that God tends to all good, as good, ad perfectionem simpliciter
simplicem, to speak like the Schoolmen, and that by an antecedent will. He is
earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all men, to exclude sin, and to prevent
damnation."' 01
God cannot do all that he is disposed to do, for all that is good and possible is not
compatible (compossible). That which he decrees results from his "consequent" or
"decisive" will, of which Leibniz says:
Now this consequent will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all the
antecedent wills, of those which tend towards good, even as of those which repel evil;
and from the concurrence of all these particular wills comes the total will."' 02
A consequent will is a general will that results from the accommodation of all
particular wills to each other. God's creative decree is the product of his consequent
will, and though he cannot create each and all the possibles to which his antecedent will
inclines, he still can create the best possible world. For, as Leibniz explains, "if the
effects of all these antecedent wills cannot be realized jointly, from it results the
greatest effect that can be obtained from wisdom and power.""' 03 while the antecedent
will inclines, the consequent will is decisive, it is the will that cannot be in conflict with
any other, for it is not a particular will among many such others. An antecedent will may
be not be decreed, for it may conflict with other antecedent wills. But there is only one
consequent will, therefore it is decreed. Clearly, then, when Leibniz says that he who can
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and wants does, he has in mind the consequent will. The point is explicitly suggested in
the passage below:
Nevertheless the decisive will, resulting from all the inclining wills, always
produces its full effect every time that power is not lacking from him who wants, and
surely it is not lacking to God. It is certain that the decisive will is the only one for
which the following axiom is valid: him who can and wants, does that which he
wants. 1 04
God's decretory will involves choosing, according to Leibniz. And, as I suggested,
when writing about "The Risk of Spinozism", choosing makes no sense if there are no
alternatives, which, in the case of a perfect spirit, must be the intellectual contents by
which he knows possibles. Now, God's knowledge of a possible before creation is not the
concept of an existent qua existent but qua possible. Insofar as it is the notion of a
possible, it is considered by Leibniz an essence, and insofar as it belongs in God's
intellect previous to the creation of time and the world it is considered an eternal truth.
We might say that this is a notion that originates from the traditional view of essences,
where these were conceived as what is necessary and distinctive to a type of being, but
that Leibniz modifies this traditional conception, and changes from the consideration of
the concept of a species to the consideration of what is necessary and distinctive to the
being of an individual qua individual. While in the case of a species the essential was
opposed to the particular in that the essential included only the general necessary notes
of a type of being, in the case of individual essences it is the totality of the notes that
qualify an existent as such which make up its distinctive and necessary features.
Necessity as the distinctive note of the essential is changed, by Leibniz, from its meaning
relative to what is universal in the many, to a new meaning founded on what is
indispensable to the existence of an individual. Existence is the basis of Leibniz's
conception of individual substances's essences, but existence sub species possibilitatis.
Creation, according to Leibniz, is triggered by the best possible world; which is
known along with all other possible worlds, and wanted by God, as it is better than all
others and better too than nothing. The role of God's will in creation has been described.
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but its appropriate treatment requires that God's moral nature be better elucidated. Our
examination of Malebranche's distorted conception of God also depends on this topic.
Leibniz's central concern with regard to God's moral nature is "freedom," for he argues
that it is meaningless to speak of morality without freedom. His criticism of
necessitarism, as it appears in the philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza, is grounded upon
the meaning freedom has for moral responsibility. "Necessity," Leibniz tells us,
would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to the morality of action: for
justice and injustice, praise and blame, punishment and reward cannot attach to
necessary actions, and nobody will be under obligation to do the impossible or to
abstain from doing what is absolutely necessary.105
A moral being must be responsible according to Leibniz. And creation has to be
free for, as we learned before, only thus can it be attributed to the spiritual God of
Christianism. The topic, the moral nature of God, is hence an unavoidable part of
Leibniz's account of creation. Since freedom plays a fundamental role here, it must
become the object of our exposition.
ii. Freedom and Determinism
We have seen Leibniz's definition of necessity: the necessary is that whose
opposite is impossible. Leibniz sticks to this characterization of necessity and defends
the position that only thus understood the necessary is incompatible with freedom. A
close scrutiny of the passage we last quoted shows that indeed it is necessity as what
obtains from that whose contrary is impossible which is here presented as contrary to
freedom.
We are speaking of the freedom of a spirit invested with a will. Such a spirit is
free, for Leibniz, if his choosing takes place before many possible options, even when he
may be inclined towards one of the options decisively. In the case of creation, God does
incline decisively towards the best possible world. But this does not diminishes the
possibilities available, and thus it does not render his option necessary. Leibniz often
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makes this point; it is part of a line of thinking, relative to spirits in general, which
includes a reference to the principle of sufficient reason and to the principle of
perfection or of the best. We can summarize it by saying that a will, since obliged by a
sufficient reason, cannot act capriciously, and, since ruled by the the principle of the
best, always inclines towards what seems best. That this is valid, insofar as it belongs to
the nature of spirits —humans, angels, and God— and that it is compatible with freedom
is what Leibniz explains below:
There is always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for the
maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should incline
without necessitating. That is also the opinion of all the ancients, of Plato, of
Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is never prompted to action save by the
representation of the good, which prevails over the opposite representations. This is
admitted even in relation to God, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is
acknowledged that they are none the less free in consequence of that. God fails not to
choose the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no necessity in
the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is equally possible. For that
very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity, and the will is
determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object."' ^6
The freedom of God, is presented by Leibniz, as crucial for the defense of piety and
true religion: absence of freedom is equivalent to the negation of will and involves also
demeaning the importance of the intellect in the perfect spiritual substance. Such a view
of God is entailed by the necessity of creation. It is the view that Leibniz attributes to
Spinoza, where power only is pertinent as an attribute of God to creation. Such a
conception of creation would deprive us of reasons for admiring God, because admiration,
according to Leibniz, must be founded on the recognition of intention and intelligence on
the part of the cause in question, which hence must be considered an "author."
Intelligence involves the capacity, on God's part, of appreciating the good and the
beauty present in the options he has available, without which the principle of goodness
or of the best would be, according to Leibniz, meaningless. Leibniz therefore rejects the
position of "those who maintain that there are no principles of goodness or perfection in
the nature of things or in the ideas which God has about them, and who say that the works
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of God are good only through the formal reason that God has made them.""' 07 of this
opinion, contrary to his own, Leibniz says:
I confess that the contrary opinion seems to me extremely dangerous and closely
approaches that of recent innovators who hold that the beauty of the universe and the
goodness which we attribute to the works of God are chimeras of human beings who
think of God in human terms. In saying, therefore, that things are not good according
to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one
destroys, without realizing it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise
him for vvhat he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary?
Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if
arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the definition
of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the most powerful?^
This same conception, which above seems presented with Spinoza preeminently in
mind, is offered in reaction to Hobbes's view of God's actions. Leibniz believes that, like
Spinoza, Hobbes bases his characterization of God's actions upon power exclusively;
therefore he accuses Hobbes of defending a view that,
despoils God of all goodness and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant,
wielding an absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity and creating
millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without any other aim than
that of displaying his power,..."'
This is not, according to Leibniz, a conception worthy of God, at least not worthy of
a God like Christianism's which deserves to be loved, and in order to merit love must
evince in some way admirable moral features:
After all, if God does not intend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other
principles of justice than his power alone, which makes him produce either
arbitrarily that which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is
possible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he make himself
worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind power or of arbitrary
power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the intelligent principle or the
providence of God, the other attributes to him actions which are appropriate to the
evil principle.^
®
Leibniz's God is absolutely rational. His understanding is an intellect. Reasons,
then, are God's only motives. This does not, however, means that God selects without
moral considerations involving the appreciation of the good. Leibniz very explicitly
qualifies the possibles that motivate God's creative decree as invested with moral value.
Possible existents have different degrees of essence and also different intensity of
goodness. These features are parallel and qualify the individual essences and their
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combinations into sets of possible worlds in a way that enables the divine intellect to
sort possible worlds out according to their goodness value. Hence, among the many
possible worlds one is unquestionably best and God is obliged to select it.
If God's will were not inclined infallibly towards the best possible world, it would
either be that his will needs no reason to be exercised, or else that it could be moved by
something that is not best. Neither alternative seems rational to Leibniz. Accepting the
first alternative is equivalent to negating what is essential to any spirit: that its will be
ruled by the principle of sufficient reason. God's willing is rational and intelligible
because it is not unprincipled as it would be if his will were exercised independently of
reasons. Even in the case of dispensing his grace, Leibniz contends, reasons must incline
his will. He writes:
Finally, I hold that God cannot act as if at random by an absolutely absolute decree, or
by a will independent of reasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always
actuated, in the dispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the
objects participates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. ^ ^ ^
The acceptance of the second alternative —that God inclines not towards the best
—
entails opposing another essential trait of spirits. Among spirits there are some which
may not know the best, and must settle for what appears to be best. But all, according to
Leibniz, incline one way or another toward the best. God is able to know the best and
infallibly selects it. We may say, that he is determined from the sheer fact that he must
have a reason for exercising his will, but, in addition, he is determined towards the best,
for his wisdom must agree with his absolute goodness. This determination, however,
though it warrants infallibility, should not be confused, Leibniz tells us, with the type
of necessity incompatible with freedom, which results from what he calls either
"absolute," "logical," or "metaphysical" necessity:
It may be said in a certain sense that it is necessary that ... God himself should choose
the best;... But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind called
logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies contradiction."' ^2
It may be hard to understand, for some, but it is quite clear in Leibniz, that God's
actions, and specifically, his creative decree, are determined and yet are free. A will by
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its own essential features needs reasons to act, whence it may be said that it is
determined by reasons. However, the fact that many reasons stand in the relation of
possible alternatives to a will could serve to qualify this way of understanding
determination as compatible with freedom. For one may stress that a will must have a
reason but not necessarily any particular one. Determinism, nevertheless, would seem
strengthened in the case of God by the fact that a perfect spirit essentially knows, and
opts, the best. Only one particular alternative among others can be selected by a perfect
spirit when it acts.
Several commentators of Leibniz have pressed this feature in order to claim that
his defense of God's freedom in creation fails on account of it. But, as Leibniz never tires
of explaining, even here we are not before an instance of a necessity incompatible with
freedom, because many possibilities were available and it was not the case that other
worlds, different from the morally best, were contradictory. The reason that determines
God's creative will is moral; the "necessity" in question, hence, is "moral" and not an
absolute or metaphysical necessity. Leibniz explains:
The decree to create is free: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best,
inclines him to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates no
impossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes no implication of
contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. There is therefore in God a
freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity. I mean this
in respect of metaphysical necessity: for it is a moral necessity that the wisest
should be bound to choose the best.^
The determinism that results from moral necessity is not only compatible with
freedom, according to Leibniz, it is optimal freedom,
for it is the highest freedom to be impelled to the best by a right reason. Whoever
desires any other freedom is a fool. Hence it follows that whatever has happened, is
happening, or will happen is ... necessary, but as I have said, with a necessity which
takes nothing away from freedom
Freedom, moreover, for Leibniz, may be predicated of a spirit by the mere fact
that it is endowed with a will, for a will essentially requires freedom, since, as Leibniz
puts it.
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to ask whether our will is endowed with freedom is the same as to ask whether our
will is endowed with will. Free and voluntary signify the same thing.llS
It is clear that Leibniz believes that God's freedom can be demonstrated from the
elucidation of his essential attributes. He considers freedom a necessary or essential
trait of a spirit, wherefrom this is an entity capable of choosing. Once this is recognized,
all that needs to be added to understand God's creative decree follows from the elucidation
of the bearing wisdom and power have with respect to choosing. That all three attributes
of God, wisdom, power and freedom, interrelate in a way that makes creation and the best
world morally necessary, and yet free, we have sufficiently explained.
There is another point that I believe should be mentioned in our account of
Leibniz's conception of freedom. We suggested before, in the case of the opposition,
mechanicism versus substantial forms in the account of physical phenomena, that
Leibniz rejects a traditional dichotomy where these two alternatives are considered
unavoidable by showing that another alternative is possible. There is an aspect of his
treatment of freedom that is offered in an analogous manner, as addressing an opposition
which is usually presented as exhaustive without being so. Leibniz argues that
traditionally philosophers have opposed absolute freedom to absolute necessity when
reflecting upon God's actions. Absolute freedom is understood as complete indifference,
or what is usually called by Leibniz, "indifference of equipoise." This is a conception of
freedom as what obtains from exercising the will in complete independence of influences
or inclining reasons. It seems to many that this condition affords the greatest degree of
freedom, and that thus it should be attributed to God. Leibniz contests this position. He
writes:
This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say, divested of the
aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the great privilege of God and of
intelligent substances, and as the source of their freedom, their satisfaction, their
morality and their good or evil. The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence,
not only of inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is
sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the most excellent
thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow fantasy, a suppression of the
reasons for the caprice of which one boasts. What is asserted is impossible, but if it
came to pass it would be harmful.This fantastic character might be attributed to some
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Don Juan in a St. Peter’s Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect
the outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality. But in
Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted by the previous
representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by reasons; and I have always
challenged the supporters of this absolute indifference to show an example
thereof. 1 "• 6
Of course, the view of freedom as indifference of equipoise is exactly opposite to
Leibniz's, for whom without a sufficient reason a will would be inconceivable. It is a
view that simply denies to a will one essential aspect of it, and is hence, basically,
contradictory.^ This is what the passage above suggests in the sentence that states,
"what is asserted is impossible." In the passage below Leibniz compares "complete
indifference" to a position he ascribes to the Cartesians; the view that God may do the
impossible. Just as it is absurd to claim that what is contradictory is possible and may
be done, Leibniz contends that it is basically contradictory to conceive of a will without
a sufficient reason. He therefore writes;
This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content with exempting it, I do
not say from constraint, but from necessity itself, who would also exempt it from
certainty and determination, that is, from reason and perfection, nevertheless
pleased some Schoolmen, people who often become entangled in their own subtleties,
and take the straw of terms for the grain of things. They assume some chimerical
notion, whence they think to derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain
by quibblings. Complete indifference is of this nature; to concede it to the will is to
grant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some mystics find in the
divine nature of being able to do the impossible, to produce absurdities, to cause two
contradictory propositions to be true simultaneously.^ 1 ®
That God may not do the impossible follows from the significance of the principle
of contradiction for possibility, and from the relation the nature of things bear to God's
power in Leibniz's philosophy. Leibniz accuses Descartes of denying this position as a
result of his view concerning the relation between God's will and his intellect. Descartes,
he claims, contends that eternal truths are eternal and true because God wills that they
be so. As such God's will preponderates over the intellect and it is reasonable to say that
he may do whatever he wants to do without any restriction whatsoever. This position
then is pushed to the point of claiming that God may do the contradictory. Leibniz reacts
to this view of Descartes (as he interprets him) and to the hypothesis of indifference of
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equipoise in the same manner: he considers both serious deviation from what belongs
under the jurisdiction of the principle of contradiction.
Neither indifference of equipoise nor necessity are acceptable, as
characterizations of the manner God's will is exercised, for Leibniz. And this is not a
matter that requires that we opt for one of these options. Necessity destroys choosing and
ultimately deprives of all meaning the notion of will. Indifference entails the negation of
the principle of sufficient reason, which along with the principle of the best provide
intelligibility and determination to willing. It therefore also entails the negation of the
principle of the best. The negation of these two principles is contradictory, for they
essentially rule over spirits. Moreover, it leads to Spinoza’s conception of God as
deprived of intelligence and goodness. The passage below expresses these views, and the
contention, which Leibniz never tires of repeating, that the determinism that follows
from the conjunction of the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the best
does not detract from freedom:
There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the pretext of freeing the
divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to regard it as altogether
indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise. They did not take into account that just
as metaphysical necessity is preposterous in relation to God's actions ad extra, so
moral necessity is worthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do
good, whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of
goodness or of wisdom. And besides, the indifference which would keep the will in
perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been already shown: it would
offend against the great principle of the determinant reason."' "I ^
Leibniz's conception of freedom as moral determinism is offered as a solution to a
dichotomy, whose alternatives seem untenable. But the options necessity versus
indifference of equipoise should not be considered exhaustive. There is another
alternative for Leibniz, freedom and determinism, of a will that infallibly acts motivated
by the best reason, but is not necessitated, since other alternatives were possible.
We have now reached a position where we can ask ourselves several questions
about the adequacy of Malebranche's conception of God. Where does Malebranche fits,
according to Leibniz, within these different versions of God's freedom? Which
91
interpretation of creation is suggested by his basic metaphysical tenets? And, very
specifically, What are the implications for God's nature of occasionalism? These are
some of the questions we shall address in the last part of the subsection in which our
concern has been Leibniz's second reason for rejecting occasionalism.
iii. Malebranche's Distorted Conception of God
Occasionalism is an account where God's intervention in the world is not explained
in terms of the significance of individual essences or "complete concepts" for his actions.
But all that occurs in the world accords, for Leibniz, with the complete concepts of the
substances in the best possible world. God created the existent world through a decree
which brought about the actualization of all the possible substances in one particular set
of compossibles. God was determined by this set morally, for not to choose it would have
been morally imperfect. But in this conceptual schema it is not only God's will that is
determined. Determinism also qualifies the existence of substances. All the occurrences
in the created world will unfold as prescribed by the contents of the individual essence of
every substance which sub specie possibilitatis belongs in the best possible world.
The role which according to Leibniz God plays in occasionalism, since it involves a
perpetual miracle insofar as it is not grounded on the natures of the substances of the
created world, entails the view that God acts independently of the contents of his
intellect. This means that God's will preponderates over his intellect, for he either
chooses without reasons or acts only out of power without intellect or will. Malebranche,
then, is very far from the correct appreciation of God's faculties; and distorts the
relation between the intellect and will in the act of creation, and in the conservation of
the created domains.
Occasionalism entails a conception of God, very much like Spinoza's and Hobbes's,
where God stands much closer, according to Leibniz, in his capriciousness, to an evil
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principle than to the rational and omnibenevolent perfect God of Christianism.
Malebranche s philosophy is akin then to a philosophical position that Leibniz constantly
criticizes, and describes as a "false idea" that his own philosophy is out to banish:
Our end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an
absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and unworthy of
being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to God inasmuch as the
essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love him above all things ...‘'20
The mistake of believing that, in God, intellect is subservient to will is a major
defect of Descartes's philosophy, denounced by Leibniz. Malebranche's position in
occasionalism depends on this same view which, consciously or not, he must have
accepted from Descartes without a clear awareness of its consequences. That Malebranche
has such a view of God is suggested by Leibniz in a passage whose main topic are the laws
of motion. Leibniz argues against Malebranche's laws of motion by claiming that they are
contrary to the principle of order, a defect which must have originated from Descartes's
influence. He also suggests, that Malebranche wants to explain away this problem by
claiming that these laws "depend on the good pleasure of God:"
There are many other inconsistencies like this which result from the Cartesian rules
and which an attentive observer using our principle [principle of order] will easily
detect. That which I have found in the rules of the Recherche de la Vdritd comes from
the same source. The Rev, Father Malebranche admits in a way that there is some
difficulty in them, but he continues to believe that since the laws of motion depend on
the good pleasure of God, God could therefore have established laws as irregular as
these. ^21
Since "the good pleasure" of God must be construed as capricious willing, there is
no doubt that Leibniz ascribes to Malebranche here the view that God's will
preponderates over his intellect. And if we emphasize that this view of God is pertinent
to all of Malebranche's metaphysics, inasmuch as it must stand at the basis of
occasionalism, we can conclude that this is a philosophy which must be interpreted by
Leibniz as involving a defective conception of God. Malebranche's view of God's freedom
must be considered an instance of indifference of equipoise, for to claim that his will
preponderates over his intellect is to deny that there are objective reasons that condition
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his willing. Occasionalisrn, hancG, is a thGory whGrG God plays thG rolG of an irrational
dGspot, in thG mannGr so VGry frsquGntly donouncGd by Loibniz.
WgII considGrGd, Leibniz attack against Malebranche's occasionalism shows that
here is a philosophy whose attempts to provide an explanation of reality are defeated by
its conception of the highest metaphysical principle to be used in explaining reality. God
must be understood, according to Leibniz, in the terms that his own philosophical system
requires, and not because this happens to be his particular philosophical conception, but
because only as there conceived can a perfect spirit be rationally understood. From the
correct conception of God and creation, Leibniz believes that preestablished harmony
follows, as a hypothesis that explains the relation between two different domains of
substances without resorting to miraculous or unfounded explanations. In this fashion it
is the most reasonable hypothesis available: the only one consistent with rigorous
philosophical reflection. Occasionalism, by contrast, by denying the true principles of
metaphysics and distorting the nature of God is, according to Leibniz, a clear example of
a poor untenable philosophical hypothesis.
3. Unacceptable Implications for Substantiality
Occasionalism involves, for Leibniz, a third problem. It is an account where
bodies are considered corporeal substances and yet characterized as inactive. Indeed,
Malebranche, like Descartes, considers a body to be a substance and defines it along
geometrical lines as an inert entity that occupies space, whose essential attributes are
figure, magnitude, number and mobility. I have used the word "mobility" and not
"motion", though Descartes and the Cartesians will refer to motion as an essential
attribute of body. But in all strictness they should have spoken only of "mobility," for
only that is consistent with the inertness they attribute to body and matter, and the role
that God plays as the source of action. In Malebranche, force is extraneous to bodies, and
is identified with God's decrees, which are the source of actions in both series of created
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substances. Leibniz is quite aware of this, and he denounces this conception of bodies as
substances as untenable. The problem is that, according to Leibniz, a substance must be
active in order to posses identity in time, just as it is necessary that it be unitary.'' 22
But an inert body cannot have identity in time; it would be metaphysically discontinuous
in time without any intrinsic principle of activity whereby the future, present and past
would be connected. We could not even attribute to such an entity its apparent subsequent
stages through time if this were the case. Even worse, we could not even say that they are
the subsequent stages of one unitary identical substance. There would be no real
substance involved.
Leibniz believes, that even the minds in occasionalism must be construed as not
really active, for this is what God's role as causal intermediary entails. Therefore, the
claim that minds are substances also presents a problem. Corporeal substances,
however, are worse off than minds, since their essence for Malebranche is extension,
and they suffer, according to Leibniz, from infinite indivisibility. But an extended
entity, essentially divisible without limit, should not be considered a unit but rather an
aggregate. It lacks substantial unity: it is not, hence, a substance. It is not only then that
bodies lack identity, but they lack also unity, and both identity and unity are for Leibniz
necessary features of substances. We can see that the two so-called "substances" in the
mind-body relation of occasionalism present serious metaphysical problems, which
again suggests to Leibniz that this is a poor philosophical explanation.
The substances of Malebranche, inert and obtaining their activity from God, are
not really substances, but rather modes. In this manner Malebranche approximates
Spinozism. We mentioned this in the previous subsection (Supra p. 67), but there the
point we wanted to make was that this view entailed a distorted conception of God and of
the necessary substance's relation to its creatures. Now, we want to emphasize that
occasionalism is objectionable to Leibniz because it is built upon an incorrect conception
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of substsnce, which rnanifcsts itSGif ciGarly in thG viGw that a substancG may bG inGrt,
and also maroly GxtGndGd. Thus Lsibniz writGs:
ThGSG considGrations makG it claar, furthar, that tha doctrina of occasional causes
which some defend is fraught with dangerous consequences, even if its learned
defenders do not, as is undoubtedly true, intend them. So far is this doctrine from
increasing the glory of God by removing the idol of nature that it seems rather, like
Spinoza, to make out of God the nature of the world itself, by causing created things to
disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance, since that which does
not act, which lacks active force, and which is despoiled of all distinctiveness and
even of all reason and ground for subsistence can in no way be a substance.^ 23
This affinity between Malebranche's and Spinoza's conceptions of substance makes
both, in the eyes of Leibniz, upholders of a sort of Averroism. The negation of created
substances, he claims, leaves only the universal spirit as substantial, in a way that
accords with Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle. Leibniz explains:
Spinoza, who recognizes only one single substance, is not far from the doctrine of a
single universal spirit, and even the Neo-Cartesians, who hold that only God acts,
affirm it seemingly unawares.^ 24
Since Averroism "destroys the immortality of souls and degrades the human
race,""' 25 \[ jg not only that an erroneous conception of substance is entailed by
Malebranche's proximity to Spinoza. The defect in his conception of substantiality
entails a distortion of the nature of the human soul to the point of entailing its mortality.
The nature of substance is central to this dissertation, as it is central to Leibniz's
metaphysics.The topic of the meaning of corporeal substances in Leibniz will be our
main concern in the fourth chapter of this work. We will soon, hence, treat this topic
more fully. Above we have just mentioned it in order to explain what we have called
Leibniz's third objection to occasionalism.
Having underlined the metaphysical and methodological problems that are raised
by occasionalism according to Leibniz, we can now understand why he offers
preestablished harmony as the best of the alternatives available. It is a hypothesis which
meets the conditions of what is appropriate to a philosophical explanation: it is also an
account that accords with true metaphysics, in which the meaning of substantial
existence is understood on the basis of the principles that condition possibility and
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existence, the features that essentially characterize substances, and the nature of God
and his act of creation.
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volonte decisive est la seule pou la quelle vaille cet axiome: qui peut et veut, fait ce qu'il
veut." [Leibniz, Opuscules , p. 118.]
lOSLeibniz, Theodicy
, p. 57. lOOLeibniz, Thepdicy. P- 148.
lO^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 4. lO^Leibniz, Piscpursa. P- 4
109Leibniz, Theodicy , p. 402. HOLeibniz, Theodicy., P- 403.
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, p. 300. I ^ ^Leibniz, Theodicy , p. 299.
^^^Leibniz, Theodicy
, p. 270. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 147.
"I
'•^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, pp. 388-389.
^^^Leibniz, Theodicy
, p. 406.
1
^"And to attribute to things that which is contrary to their essence is a
contradiction." My translation. "... et d'attribuer aux choses ce qui rdpugne k leur
essence, c'est une contradiction." [Leibniz, Oeuyres
. p. 228.]
"I
^Leibniz, Theodicy
, p. 319. "I "I^Leibniz, Theodicy , p. 236.
1 20i_eibniz, Theodicy
, p. 127. "'21 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 352.
"'22"...eyery substance is actiye." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 528.] In
chapter four we offer ample textual eyidence for the yiew that substances are actiye and
unitary according to Leibniz.
"1 23i_eibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 506.
^2"^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 554.
‘'25Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 555.
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CHAPTER III
PREESTABUSHED HARMONY: ONTOLOGICAL IMPUCATIONS
A. Is the Basis for Rejecting Influence the Same for Both Philosophers?
Causal interaction between things was, in the seventeenth century, a basic
conception in the account of how things in the world relate to each other; and was used
unhesitantly in physics to explain interchange of motion between colliding bodies. The
view that individual things relate to each other causally, when extended to the mind-body
relation, suggested to modern thinkers that perception admitted a similar account. The
causal interpretation of perception was, doubtless, favored by the belief that it involved,
initially at least, the body of the perceiver and the bodies which surround it, the objects
of its perceptual experience. But, as was explained in our account of Malebranche's
philosophy, this explanation of perception broke down once it was realized that the
causal relation here ultimately involves the immaterial substance which does the
perceiving, the mind, and the material substances perceived. That there cannot be
interaction appeared unquestionable to many Cartesians, when what we have called the
"metaphysical incommensurability" between the two domains of creation, which
originates from dualism, was recognized.
We frequently find, in Leibniz, suggestions about his affinity with Malebranche on
the point of the incommunication between body and mind. We have seen passages, in the
previous sections, where this problem appears to be, for Leibniz, metaphysical in the
manner of Malebranche —that two substances ontologically incommensurate cannot
interact (Supra chapter II, footnote 29). From several such passages, it is clear that
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Leibniz is willing to recognize the strength of Malebranche’s position in its negative
side, and even to extend his rejection of "influence" beyond Descartes to the notion of
transmission of species" of the Scholastics. The view that Leibniz's rejection of
influence between body and mind is based on dualism was also strengthened by the
agreement we observed between Malebranche's and Leibniz's philosophical motives. The
inclination to oppose body and mind in the manner of dualism accords with the emphasis
upon the immaterial nature of the soul, which lends itself so well to Christian concerns
with salvation and immortality, that both philosophers clearly share. We may, however,
raise the following questions. Is the basis for the rejection of influence really the same
for both philosophers? Is it that Leibniz, as we have been inclined to believe, accepts the
dualistic ontological conception of Malebranche, from which the causal gap problem
arises, which then brings about the need for an explanation of concomitance?
Whatever specific answers may be given to the questions above, several things
seem at this moment unquestionable: Leibniz rejects "influence" and sees the problem
that his own hypothesis is out to solve as metaphysical, insofar as causality is for him a
metaphysical notion closely linked to the notion of substance, which in the the mind-
body relation cannot escape the consequences of a dualist or a monist ontological position;
and there is an entity that stands at the center of the issue, the human individual, whose
ontological status is crucial to the problem, since it is only through the view that he
possesses mental contents which enable him to apprehend external existents, among
which his own body is included, that the problem arises. The individual man (the
philosopher) who somehow is possessed of a mind and a body, within his perhaps unitary
being, looks for an explanation that will render the observable relations between these
two dimensions of his being comprehensible. Leibniz looks upon himself as the
philosopher in question, whose task is both epistemological and metaphysical, for,
ultimately, the ontological clarification of the entity a man is, is the clue to the
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metaphysical elucidation of reality in general, and must be the basis for an answer to the
question about the relation between knower and known.
The historical meditations we have gone into —of antecedents and contemporary
conditions of Leibniz's philosophy— and our analysis of Leibniz's rejection of
occasionalism have all taken place against a background where dualism seems the
prevalent ontological position from which the mind-body problem arises. These
meditations could be considered evidence for the view that Leibniz accepts dualism and
sets out his own explanatory hypothesis, preestablished harmony, with little originality
against the Cartesian background. His claim to originality, one may believe, is simply
the product of the ingeniousness and sufficiency of his own solution as compared to those
of Descartes, Malebranche, and the Scholastics.
In spite of the seductive coherence of the interpretation suggested above, there is a
curious feature in Leibniz's writings which points in another direction. There are some
basic features of Leibniz's thought that suggest that the causal gap between body and mind
results from metaphysical notions that do not entail dualism. Were we to emphasize this
aspect of Leibniz's philosophy we could explain the rejection of "influence" in a manner
that is compatible with idealistic monism. It would seem, then, that we have here an
aspect of Leibniz's thought the clarification of which is significant to our questions about
his ontological position. Since an appropriate rendering of what must be said of
preestablished harmony requires that these two contrasting aspects of his thinking be
elucidated, let us now advance the clarification of the meaning of preestablished harmony
with these two possible interpretations as leit motif: the one where the causal gap
between body and mind in Leibniz's philosophy is based upon metaphysical dualism; and
the interpretation where the gap may be asserted without precluding monism. Though the
first part of this twofold topic has already been addressed in our analysis of the
historical background of Leibniz's philosophy and our presentation of his reasons for
rejecting occasionalism, there is still something more to be said in the context of
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further elucidating the meaning of preestablished harmony; the other part of our task
lies mostly before us.
B. Dualism as the Basis for Incommunication
1. Affinity with Malebranche
It appeared to us, in our previous consideration of topics linked to preestablished
harmony, that Malebranche and Leibniz share a significant amount of philosophical
suppositions and conceptions that are fundamental to their rejection of what Leibniz
calls "the way of common philosophy." Like Malebranche, Leibniz seems to conclude that
body and mind cannot interact because they are ontologically incommensurable. This
appears to be the point of a passage we quoted already, which includes the following
statement: "it is impossible to conceive of material particles or of species or immaterial
qualities which can pass from one of these substances into another ..." (Supra P. 35).
The reference to the material particles suggests the problem denounced by Malebranche,
the impossibility of having a material entity affect an immaterial one. The reference to
"species" suggests the rejection of the Scholastic position. And it would seem that in both
cases it is claimed that the notion rejected is unacceptable for it amounts to a
metaphysical absurdity, whose recognition enables Leibniz to conclude that this
"passing" from one substance to another is not intelligible. The species, whatever they
may be, cannot travel from a material thing to a mind for the same reason that motion
cannot affect an immaterial substance.
The Monadoloav contains passages that suggest this line of interpretation. We find
in this work some assertions regarding the impossibility of explaining perception in
terms of mechanical causes that suggest that the basis of the problem is the metaphysical
heterogeneity between body and mind. The following passage is a case in point:
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It must be confessed, however, that Perception, and that which depends upon it, are
inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing
that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and
perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions
until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going
into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find
anything to explain Perception."'
The message seems clear, there is nothing in what is mechanical different from
figure and motion, nothing therefore through which sensation, thought, and perception
might be explained. Figure and motion are modalities of being of material substances,
while thought and sensation are modalities of being of spirits and souls. The absolute
difference between these modalities of being precludes that the heterogeneous substances
in question may relate to each other causally. Motion can never produce thought.
The very same view is expounded in the New Essays , in the context of rejecting
Locke’s position admitting the possibility that matter might think. To Locke's claim that
"God can give thought, reason and volition to matter" as something that he "adds to the
essence of matter,"^ Leibniz responds by saying: "matter cannot mechanically produce
sense, any more than it can reason."^ And he adds a little afterwards;
As for thought, it is certain, as our author more than once acknowledges, that it
cannot be an intelligible modification of matter and be comprehensible and explicable
in terms of it. That is, a sentient or thinking being is not a mechanical thing like a
watch or a mill; one cannot conceive of sizes and shapes and motions combining
mechanically to produce something which thinks, and senses too, in a mass where
[formerly] there was nothing of a kind —something which would likewise be
extinguished by the machine's going out of order.^
The emphasis on the unintelligibility of thinking as an attribute of matter above
points to the view that only what belongs to the nature of a substance is intelligible, and
that to attribute something to it not derivable from its nature would be to affirm an
occult quality. There is nothing in the nature of matter that directly relates or could be
translated into perception or thinking; hence, it would be arbitrary to assert such a
relation. If God is used, as Locke indeed does, to explain how something is added to what is
natural, then, the problem from Leibniz's perspective would be to provide a reason for
such an intervention into nature by God; unless such an action is attributed to God
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without a reason, which again raises fundamental problems. But even if an attempt is
made to explain why matter is invested by God with unnatural features, these would need
to be considered miraculous, and Locke's explanation would be defective in the manner
we saw denounced with respect to occasionalism. In any case, the heterogeneity, entailed
by dualism, between the modalities natural to matter and those characteristic of
immaterial substances seems clearly, in the passage above, the basis for Leibniz's
rejection of thinking as an attribute of matter.
There is a passage in the Discourse on Metaphysics , that seem to me quite
pertinent to our present concern. It has to do with a criticism of a position that Leibniz
often attributes to Descartes: the view that a will may alter the motions of a man's body
—though it cannot alter the quantity of motion, which is constant in the universe-
through affecting the direction of motion of the particles in certain parts of the body (the
motion in the nerves, the animal spirits). That this position is arbitrary, for it has no
metaphysical basis, is the point Leibniz stresses, and to do so he suggests that it is an
unfounded position in the same fashion of occasionalism and the Scholastics' notion of
influence. There is no reason that can make us understand any of these relations: they
are gratuitous. Matter has no modality of being that can influence mind, just as direction
of motion has nothing about it that may affect or be affected by an immaterial substance.
Leibniz explains:
The same difficulty is found with regard to the hypothesis of occasional causes which
there is in the hypothesis of a real influence of the soul upon the body and viceversa;
because we see no relation or basis for such a rule. If one were to say, as M.
Descartes seems to, that the soul, or God on the occasion of its acting, changes merely
the direction or determination of the motion and not the force which is in bodies,... I
would reply that it will be quite difficult to explain what connection there can be
between the thoughts of the soul and the sides or the angle of direction of bodies ...5
Now, it is not only that Leibniz presents an opposition between matter and mind
that makes interaction impossible along the lines of what we have seen in Malebranche.
There are passages in Leibniz where he speaks quite explicitly as if his own thought took
Malebranche's diagnosis of the mind-body problem as point of departure and thereafter
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the main difficulty became the explanation of concomitance as an observable feature of a
two-sided sort of reality. In a letter to Malebranche himself, Leibniz says;
As for his [Descartes's] metaphysics, you yourself have shown its imperfection, and
I am entirely of your opinion concerning the impossibility of conceiving that a
substance which has nothing but extension without thought can act upon a substance
which has nothing but thought without extension.®
Leibniz is speaking unquestionably of two substances here, and admitting as his
own Malebranche's thesis, that two substances, immaterial and material, cannot
interact. Descartes's attempt to allow for interaction, at least with regard to the
direction of motion, represents a defect in metaphysics that Malebranche has adequately
denounced. Even though Leibniz, in this letter, will suggest other defects of Descartes's
metaphysics, apparently not noticed by Malebranche, he shares unquestionably the
latter's view with regard to the impossibility of interaction, and it appears that he
situates himself in a dualistic ontological position. Further explanatory tasks, one must
suppose, would need to be undertaken from a dualistic position as a fundamental stance
and point of departure.
There is another interesting passage suggesting Leibniz's theoretical dependence
upon Malebranche and the Cartesians in an article of 1695 entitled "Nature and the
Communication of Substances." The article seems to me quite significant with regard to
this point, for overall it stresses the dichotomy mind-body that is basic to dualism. The
passage goes as follows:
Having established these things, I thought I had reached port. But when I began to
think about the union of the soul with the body, it was like casting me back into the
open sea, for I found no way to explain how the body causes anything to take place in
the soul, or vice versa, or how one substance can communicate with another created
substance. So far as we can know from his writings, Descartes gave up the struggle
over this problem. But seeing that the common opinion is inconceivable, his disciples
concluded that we sense the qualities of bodies because God causes thoughts to arise in
our souls on the occasion of material movements and that, when our soul in its turn
wishes to move the body, God moves the body for it. This they call the System of
Occasional Causes; it has had great vogue as a result of the beautiful reflections of the
author of the Recherche de la Veritd.
It must be admitted that this has definitively penetrated the difficulty in showing
us what cannot take place.^
Th© r©f©r©nc0 to both Dsscartes and MaiGbranch© abov© suQg©sts th© int©rpr©tation
w© hav© b©©n str©ssing wh©n consid©ring th© background of pr©©stablish©d harmony as
dualistic. Th© s©nt©nc© wh©r© L©ibniz acknowl©dg©s that th© d©f©nd©rs of occasionalism
hav© "p©n©trat©d th© difficulty" is quit© ©xplicit in sugg©sting that th© n©gativ© asp©ct of
th©ir position is acc©ptabl©. Th©y ar© corr©ct in d©nouncing th© notion of influonc©, for
th©r© is no possibi© communication b©tw©©n th© mind-substanc© (immat©rial) and th©
body-substanc© (mat©rial). L©ibniz, it would app©ar, posits th© ©xist©nc© of corpor©al
substancGS and of immat©rial substanc©s, (paradigmatically on©'s own body and mind)
and acc©pts th© vi©w that th©s© ar© two radically different types of substances, with no
modalities of being in common on th© basis of which interaction would b© intelligible.
In th© article with th© passage abov© w© find additional evidence for this
interpretation, Leibniz continues in it with an explanation of how th© recognition of th©
fact that interaction is impossible led him to th© view that whatever occurs to a
substance originates from itself, from its own nature. He offers an argument for this
conclusion that seems a sort of generalization of the problem of communication which
originated as one involving a body and a mind. It may be summarized as follows; since a
substance cannot be affected by any other created substance all that happens to it, and
was previously thought to be the effect of an action of another substance upon it, must be
recognized as having no external cause but as originating internally, from the
substance's own spontaneity. In Leibniz's words:
Being constrained, then, to admit that it is impossible for the soul or any other true
substance to receive something from without, except by divine omnipotence, I was
led insensibly to an opinion which surprised me, but which seems inevitable, and
which has in fact very great advantages and very significant beauties. This is that we
must say that God has originally created the soul, and every other real unity, in such
a way that everything in it must arise from its own nature by a perfect spontaneity
with regard to itself, yet by a perfect conformity to things without.^
Though the passage above singles out the soul as a substance with perfect
spontaneity, and hence emphasizes the independence and sufficiency of the soul, it seems
clear that this view of the soul has been conceived against the traditional problem of the
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relation between the soul and the body. Indeed, the last sentence in the passage contains a
reference to the "conformity" between what spontaneously occurs in the soul and the
"things without." This surely suggests the traditional dichotomy, mind-external reality.
But additional evidence for the interpretation of a dualistic conception which would
include corporeal substances and mind-substances is even more specifically found in the
assertions that follow the passage last cited. Leibniz goes on to say:
And thus, since our internal sensations, that is, those which are in the soul itself and
not in the brain or in the subtle parts of the body, are merely phenomena which
follow upon external events or, better are really appearances or like well-ordered
dreams, it follows that these perceptions internal to the soul itself come to it through
its own original constitution, that is to say, through its representative nature, which
is capable of expressing entities outside of itself in agreement with its organs —this
nature having been given it from its creation and constituting its individual
character.
9
This passage suggests that there are sensations in the soul (mind) that are merely
phenomena which are different from what belongs to the brain and the "subtle parts of
the body." The latter must be motions, physical occurrences. That these sensations
somehow relate to ("follow upon") "external events" and are "appearances" gives the
same impression we get from Malebranche's way of presenting the metaphysical
dichotomy between what belongs in consciousness, and is therefore phenomenal, and what
belongs in the external world and has corporeal substantiality. Here, as in Malebranche,
there is no suggestion leading us to believe that the world represented belongs only in
consciousness. Rather, emphasis seems placed upon the distinction between the realm of
consciousness and that which through representations appears in it, but is external to
consciousness. External reality is said to relate to phenomena in a way that must be now
recognized as non-causal, but which entails strict correspondence or "conformity," for
it is of the nature of the soul that it be "capable of expressing entities outside of itself in
agreement with its organs."
The reference to the organs in the sentence above, part of the passage we quoted,
must be to the perceptual organs of the body to which a particular soul relates through
expressing it. And it would seem that the point Leibniz wants to make, with a rather
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unfortunate expression (for souls do no have organs, as bodies do), is that the organs
relate to the rest of the bodies in the world, and a mind immediately expresses what
occurs in the organs of its particular body. Indeed, Leibniz makes this point in different
writings; and stresses that a soul immediately relates to its particular body, and, only
through it, to the rest of the universe. The passages below suggest this view:
I have said that the soul naturally expresses the whole universe in a particular sense
and according to the relation which other bodies have to its own,.. .10
Thus although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more
distinctly the body which specially pertains to it and of which it constitutes the
entelechy. And as the body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of
all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in
representing this body which belongs to it in a particular way.1
1
Let us advance that the term "monad" in the last passage signifies what Leibniz
also calls "a simple substance," which may be instanced by either a soul or a mind. The
body that is the particular body of a soul or a mind is part of external reality and relates
physically to other bodies. These bodies are able to interact with each other, and, since
the universe is a plenum for Leibniz, he contends that even the slightest movement by a
body will be communicated to every part of the material universe. Correspondence
between the soul and its particular body therefore ensures that a soul in some way also
represent the universe in its entirety. The point is suggested in the last passage above
and even clearer in the one that follows;
All substances sympathize with one another and receive some proportional change
corresponding to the slightest motion which occurs in the whole universe.... I think
that M. Descartes would have agreed with this himself, for he would doubtless grant
that because of the continuity and divisibility of all matter the slightest movement
would have its effect upon neighboring bodies and consequently from body to body to
infinity, but in diminishing proportion. Thus, our bodies ought to be affected in some
sort by the changes of all others. Now, to all these movements of our bodies certain
perceptions or thoughts of our souls, more or less confused, correspond; therefore,
the soul also will have some thought of all the movements of the universe,...
1 ^
The notions of "correspondence" and "representations" which serve Leibniz to
explain the relation between the contents of the mind and the occurrences in the physical
universe seem based on a dualistic ontological schema, where the "correspondents are of
the same ontological rank: substances. That they merely correspond to each other in
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their occurrences seems an alternative explanation of what at first sight appeared to be
interaction, but is recognized not to be so.
As in Malebranche's explanation concerning the relation between the body and the
mind, in Leibniz's, the brain is considered the last part in the body to be agitated by the
motions that originate in the perceived object, are continued through a medium, and
eventually reach the periphery of the body. Leibniz's passage above, suggesting the
distinction between movements in the brain and appearances in the mind (Supra footnote
9), is similar to some, found in Malebranche, that present the brain as the last part
affected in a perceiver's body. The translation of brain motions into appearances (mind
contents) is the main problem of a causal account of perception, as seen by Malebranche
and by Leibniz. For it is clear to both that it is at this point in the process that we are
confronted with the causal gap entailed by dualism. That a causal explanation is not
feasible, for the metaphysical heterogeneity between brain and mind makes it
impossible, is a fundamental point which both philosophers seem to share. From this
basic accordance what is left is to provide alternative explanations of concomitance:
occasionalism in the case of Malebranche, preestablished harmony in Leibniz's case.
The above line of interpretation seems substantiated by passages where Leibniz
explains how membranes of the body, like the eyes and other organs of perception, are
better qualified than other grosser parts of the body for receiving the impressions of
external reality that will eventually reach the brain and will have a corresponding
perception. This is very much the manner in which Malebranche expresses himself. The
conscious content is a translation —not from a causal or immediate relation, however
—
of the movements in the eyes and the brain, and Leibniz is able to say that we see the
universe "in accordance" with such movements. That this is a way of understanding
perception which he shares with the Cartesians he explicitly suggests in a passage, found
in the Correspondence with Arnauld. where he is interested in explaining to Arnauld his
reasons for claiming that, "the soul expresses better what belongs to its own body and
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knows the satellites of Jupiter and Saturn only in accordance with a motion which is
produced within the eye."^^ Leibniz says:
Now, since we perceive other bodies only by the relation which they have to our own,
I had reason for saying that the soul expresses better what belongs to its own body
and knows the satellites of Jupiter and Saturn only in accordance with a motion
which is produced within the eye. In all this 1 think the Cartesians would agree with
me, excepting that I suppose that there are around us other souls besides our own to
which I attribute a lower expression or perception than thought.^ ^
There is another aspect of Leibniz's treatment of the mind body relation that we
might now explore as additional evidence favorable to the dualistic interpretation of his
ontology. Since it need not be construed as a result of his conceptual affinity with
Malebranche it can be treated independently. What I have in mind is Leibniz's
description of the mind-body relation in terms of what he calls "expression". We have
already seen passages where he speaks of minds as expressing or representing bodies
(footnotes 9, 11, 14), and have emphasized that, for Leibniz, it is natural for a mind to
relate more immediately to its particular body than to the rest of the universe. But there
is more to be said of "expression." And this "more" relates to another notion we recently
mentioned, "spontaneity." It is worthwhile, hence, to treat the two together as a new
topic.
2. The Notions of Spontaneity and Expression
Leibniz characterizes a substance's spontaneity in terms that suggest that
phenomena in consciousness "come to it through its own original constitution, that is to
say, through its representative nature." (Supra footnote 9) This conception of a
substance as naturally representative of all other substances seems instrumental in
explaining how substances that do not interact relate to each other in a way that
conforms an universe. It also serves to explain how a soul "knows external reality.
Leibniz writes:
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Souls know things because God has placed in them a principle representative of that
which is outside them."'
5
There are, it would seem, mind-substances, and also the constituents of the
external world, corporeal substances: and these two type of substances relate thanks to a
metaphysical feature of minds: it is their nature to represent what occurs in other
substances, preeminently what occurs in each mind's particular body. Now, we have
been stressing that the representations in the mind depict a world of corporeal
substances or bodies, whose fundamental modalities of being are magnitude, figure and
motion. It would seem, that insofar as external reality can be conceived in terms of
corporeal substances there is some degree of adequacy between the representations in the
mind and the substances as things themselves. But this is not always suggested by
Leibniz.
Though the word "representation" is frequently used by Leibniz in his account of
how body and mind relate, he makes it very clear that the relation between the domain
represented and the representation need not entail anything beyond isomorphic
correspondence. It is of the nature of a mind-substance, therefore, to be a spontaneous
substance, all of whose modalities of being are intrinsic to it and yet they are also
expressions of substances different from it, which make up another substantial domain.
Indeed, the term "expression" is used by Leibniz when he wants to be precise on this
subject. It is found in several of the passages we have quoted along with the word
"representation" in a manner that suggests that they are synonymous. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the term "expression" is introduced in order to avoid the traditional
connotation of "representation:" a faithful copy or image. "Expression," then, is a
technical term that aims to explain the relation between the body and the mind that
preestablished harmony affirms. Its technical sense, however, is grounded on its general
linguistic sense, which Leibniz explains as follows:
That is said to express a thing in which there are relations [habitudines] which
correspond to the relations of the thing expressed. But there are various kinds of
expressions; for example the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, the
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projective delineation on a plane expresses a solid, speech expresses thoughts and
truths, characters express numbers, and an algebraic equation expresses a circle or
some other figure. What is common to all these expressions is that we can pass from
a consideration in the relation in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding
properties of the thing expressed. Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which
expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is
maintained between the relations.^ 6
Leibniz's account of the meaning of expression appears to involve the contrast
between the mind, which expresses, and a different external reality, which is expressed;
but now with the rejection of the hypothesis of interaction, the view that the phenomena
that correspond to whatever external reality there is are likeness of that external
reality seems to be abandoned. When emphasizing the meaning of the soul's
representative nature through the notion of "expression," Leibniz stresses only the
point that there is a relation of correspondence involved, and that in order to be a strict
one, a one to one correspondence between the occurrences in the two series that relate
must obtain. Similarity, however, is not necessary:
It is not necessary that that which we conceive about things external to us, be
perfectly similar to them, but that it express them as an ellipse expresses a circle,
viewed from across, so that to every point of the circle corresponds one of the ellipse
and viceversa, according to a certain law of relation."'^
"Expression," conceived as has been explained above, is consistent with dualism
and with the supposition that a substance external to consciousness relates to
presentations that manifest it in consciousness, even if what is now represented may
have no attribute similar to those found in the objects of its mental appearances. But the
relation has a reliable metaphysical basis, for expression, according to Leibniz, is
ultimately based on God.
Preestablished harmony is the relation that we see now characterized through the
notion of "expression." It originates from the creative causality of God, since, as Leibniz
explains, in every causal relation the effect always in some way expresses its cause.
Created substances, therefore, according to Leibniz, express God; but since the whole of
created reality involves two different domains, in that each domain expresses its cause
they also express each other. The "expression" of its own body by the mind is possible in
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this fashion; the mind expresses its creator, and in doing so it correspond in a strict
isomorphic manner with the modalities of being of its body, which in turn also expresses
God, their common creator. The two created substances do not relate causally to each
other, but do so to their common cause, and hence naturally correspond in the fashion
that Leibniz explains with the notion "expression." This is in a precise manner the
metaphysical basis of preestablished harmony, for as Leibniz says,
in the last analysis, the agreement of all the phenomena of different substances comes
about only because they are productions of the same cause, that is to say, of God.^®
And:
This independence however does not prevent the inter-activity of substances among
themselves, for, as all created substances are a continual production of the same
sovereign Being according to the same designs and express the same universe or the
same phenomena, they agree with one another exactly,...^®
A mind expresses a body, without disturbing it laws or its own laws,
harmoniously, in a way that warrants that the universe is expressed by it. But what is
really and ultimately expressed by all substances is the creator of the universe, one,
intelligent, omnibenevolent, and inclined consistently towards what is ordered and best.
Thus Leibniz explains:
Mathematicians represent the movement of the heavens by means of machines, (as
when
jura poli rerumque fidem legesque deorum
Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte senex,
a thing which we can do much better to-day than Archimedes could in his time), and
why cannot God, who infinitely surpasses these mathematicians, create from the
start representative substances in such a way that they shall express by their own
laws, in accordance with the natural changes of their thoughts or representations,
whatever is to happen to all bodies. This appears to me not only easy to conceive, but
also worthy of God and of the beauty of the universe, and in a way a necessary
conception, since all substances must have a harmony and union among themselves,
and all must express in themselves the same universe and the universal cause, which
is the will of their Creator, and the decrees or laws which He has so established that
they fit together in the best possible way.20
Leibniz's view of expression may give rise to the question. How is it that
knowledge of external reality should be understood, and how reliable should we consider
such knowledge? But, by the same token, it appears consistent with the view that Leibniz
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affirms th© ©xistenc© of two radically different domains, incapable of interacting, and
yet corresponding in a strict fashion. And this conception seems inevitably dualistic.
There are several aspects of Leibniz's characterization of physical reality that
seem only compatible with dualism. These include his view of bodies as active, and his
characterization of the relation between efficient and final causes in the created world.
Let us treat these topics now in order to complete our examination of textual evidence
favorable to a dualistic interpretation of Leibniz's ontology.
3. Substantial Activity
We are not going to make the point now that Leibniz conceives of a substance as
essentially invested with activity. We mentioned this already, along with the view that a
substance must be unitary. And both features of substantiality will be central to
Leibniz's elucidation of the nature of corporeal substances, to which we shall turn in the
fourth chapter of this work. What we want now to stress is that Leibniz's contention
against Malebranche, that a substance is active, is at the basis of his claim that bodies,
and not only minds, are active. And this point seems clearly dualistic.
Leibniz argues that the true concept of substantiality shows untenable the
traditional conception of bodies as inert; and emphasizes that while it has been common
to accept that minds are active, it has not been noticed that this is the case of bodies too.
This way of thinking enables him to reject an argument by Locke on behalf of the view
that it is not necessary that a mind be always thinking. Locke contends that just as
movement is an attribute of body that is not essential, so that a body need not always be
moving, a mind need not always be thinking. Leibniz turns this argument against Locke
by saying that not only minds, insofar as substantial, must always be active (and hence
always thinking), but bodies also are essentially active. On this point in the N6W Essays,
we read:
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I doubt If It will be so easy to make him agree with us and with the Cartesians when
he maintains that the mind does not think all the time, and in particular that it has no
perceptions during dreamless sleep, arguing that since bodies can be without
movernent souls can just as well be without thought. But my response to this is a
little different from the usual one. For I maintain that in the natural course of things
no substance can lack activity, and indeed that there is never a body without
movement.21
On the basis of the metaphysical principles and notions which enables us to
understand the nature of substance, Leibniz construct a view of external reality which
will be significant to his characterization of the laws of nature and dynamics, a basic
point of which is the claim that bodies, because substantial, are always active. Since he
treats parallely minds as active for the same reason, we have here what would seem
almost incontestable evidence for the claim that both bodies and minds are substances in
the manner of dualism.
4. Two Types of Causes
In the context of clarifying the relation between physical reality and minds,
Leibniz usually stresses that while the first domain is governed by laws of efficient
causality, the latter is ruled by laws of final causality. The passage below is quite clear
with regard to this point:
I believe that everything really happens mechanically in nature, and can be
explained by efficient causes, but that at the same time everything also takes place
morally, so to speak, and can be explained by final causes. These two kingdoms, the
moral one of minds and souls and the mechanical one of bodies penetrate each other
and are in perfect accord through the agency of the Author of things, who is at the
same time the first efficient cause and the last end.22
Two domain of substances —both active, each expressing the other through its
particular modalities of being, one ruled by efficient laws of causality whereby it
unfolds in time as connected by these laws, and another ruled by laws of final causality
whereby the train of consciousness unfolds through connections that give meaning to
perceptions and provide order to the designs of a willful mind— make up created reality
according to Leibniz. No direct relation exists between the two, but a correspondence
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harmoniously disposed —the expression of one and the same will (acting as efficient
cause) and one and the same intention (from the best as final cause)— warrants that
occurrences resulting in one domain out of efficient causes accord in a one to one relation
with occurrences in the other domain that are internally the outcome of final causes.
Leibniz thus claims that,
it is therefore much more reasonable and more worthy of God to suppose that he has
created the machinery of the world in such a fashion from the very start, that
without doing violence at every moment to the two great laws of nature, that of force
and that of direction, but rather by following them exactly, (except in the case of
miracles,) it so comes about that the internal springs of bodies are ready to act of
themselves, as they should, at the very moment when the soul has a conforming
desire or thought. The soul, in turn, has had this desire or thought only conformably
to preceding states of the body and thus the union of the soul with the machinery of
the body and with the parts which compose it, and the action of the one upon the other
consists only in this concomitance, which betokens the wonderful wisdom of the
Creator much more than any other hypothesis.23
The contrast between the efficient causes of the physical realm, which have no
immediate bearing over the domain of consciousness, and the moral laws that govern the
thinking of the most important immaterial substances, expresses dramatically the
metaphysical incommensurability that separates bodies and minds. In the case of human
beings, behaviour is frequently the product of moral concerns to which our body
responds without sharing ontologically the modalities of being that makes a spirit a free
moral agent, and without causally responding to it. Causal heterogeneity which yet
exhibits harmony seems consistent with the line of interpretation based on dualism we
have been examining, for two different types of substances are required as the subjects
of action of efficient and final causality. This feature of Leibniz's thought can hence be
considered consistent with the view that he is a dualist.
C. Monism and the Incommunication of Created Substances
That Leibniz's ontology is dualistic may be questioned once we recognize that
Leibniz's writings include a different approach to the explanation of the origin of
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preestablished harmony. This approach is based on the issue of substantial spontaneity,
and is preeminently suggested by works of the period 1680-1690. in which Leibniz is
mainly concerned with what he calls the "complete concept of an individual substance"
and with the general topic: the nature of truth. We find, in these logical works.
a
series of metaphysical contentions about the nature of created existents that are
presented as the outcome of metaphysical principles whose ultimate basis is the nature
of truth. Characteristically, these works proceed from an elucidation of what is essential
to truth to the discovery of several of Leibniz's most important metaphysical principles,
and on to the clarification of the complete concept of an individual substance. This then
leads, in some of these works, to the definition of substance in general, from which
additional metaphysical insights are obtained, among which substantial spontaneity is
included. Preestablished harmony follows herefrom, as the natural explanation of the
relation individual substances bear to each other.
Leibniz's rejection of mind-body interaction, in texts where it does not seem to be
the product of ontological dualism, is presented frequently in a way that gives the
impression that Leibniz wants to stress the difference between his own approach and that
of the Cartesians. Where this is emphasized what seems fundamental is a consideration of
substances in general, centered around the question. What is a substance? In early
efforts of this type we find the notion of "the complete concept of an individual
substance" playing a central role. We referred before to this notion, when explaining the
role God's intellect plays in creation. In that context, a "complete concept" was
characterized as the individual essence through which God thinks an individual substance
as possible anterior to creation. Relative to the nature of truth, a complete concept is an
individual essence, but what is most important here is that its origin is explained
through the relation it bears to true propositions. Having previously dealt with Leibniz's
account of creation let us now examine this new context in order to appreciate how. in it.
a complete concept relates to metaphysics. There are two topics that are central to our
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concern here; I believe they may be appropriately distinguished in terms of the
following titles: "The Nature of Truth and the Complete Concept" and "The Complete
Concept and Preestablished Harmony." Though the first title contains what is most basic
of these topics, since, we are mainly interested in the manner Leibniz's conception of a
complete concept leads to the rejection of influence and to preestablished harmony, we
shall begin with an exposition of the last topic we have distinguished above. A clear
understanding of how Leibniz provides, on the basis of his notion of "the complete
concept of an individual substance," an explanation of preestablished harmony that seems
independent of ontological dualism will prompt our interest in the direction of
elucidating further the basis of this way of thinking and will lead us back to the first
title.
1 . The Complete Concept and Preestablished Harmony
There are several works which belong to the period 1680-1690 which are
pertinent to our task. It is worthwhile to mention them, and to underline that they
contain an approach to metaphysical issues where logical considerations having to do
with the nature of truth are fundamental. These works include the papers entitled, "A
Specimen of Discoveries About Marvelous Secrets"; "Necessary and Contingent Truths";
"First Truths"; "The Nature of Truth"; "On Freedom"; and "A Letter on Freedom." The
more extense works, the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with
Arnauld. cannot be included among the first group I have mentioned, for though they
express Leibniz's view on the relation between truth and metaphysics, they cannot be
said to address the issue of substantiality and preestablished harmony from logical
considerations preeminently, for in them God and creation play a very important role.
Nonetheless, they deserve to be mentioned among the works of the period 1680-90
where Leibniz defines a substance in general through the notion of its complete concept
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and where his metaphysics relies on the consequences that follow from the elucidation of
the nature of truth. In all of these works one finds a consistent and rather clear picture
of the meaning of Leibniz's "complete concept" and of its implications leading to the
theory that Leibniz calls here the "hypothesis of concomitance" and afterwards, "the
hypothesis of pre-established harmony."
In "First Truths," a work which is quite complete in the treatment of the
metaphysical consequences of the nature of truth, and which can serve us as point of
departure for our inquiry, there is a very explicit reference to the relation between
"the hypothesis of concomitance" and the complete concept of an individual substance. It
is found in the passage that follows:
It can be said that, speaking with metaphysical rigor, no created substance exerts a
metaphysical action or influence upon another. For to say nothing of the fact that it
cannot be explained how anything can pass over from one thing into the substance of
another, it has already been shown that all the future states of each thing follow from
its own concept. What we call causes are in metaphysical rigor only concomitant
requisites....
If the diversity of soul and body be assumed, their union can be explained from
this without the common hypothesis of an influx, which is unintelligible, and without
the hypothesis of occasional causes, which calls upon a God ex machine. For God has
equiped both soul and body from the beginning with such great wisdom and
workmanship that through the original constitution and essence of each, everything
which happens in one corresponds perfectly and automatically to whatever happens
in the other, just as if something had passed over from the one into the other. 1 call
this the hypothesis of concomitance. This is true of all the substances in the whole
universe but is not perceptible in all as it is in the soul and the body.^S
It seems clear that Leibniz's main topic here is the relation substances bear to
each other. As usual he presents his own view in the context of what historically has
been suggested about this relation, and he refers to the two versions he customarily
rejects, occasionalism and the view of the common philosophy (Scholasticism). Leibniz
presents his view, the hypothesis of concomitance, after suggesting that influence is not
possible because —and this is the central feature of his argument— substances are all
individually independent and self-sufficient since each has a complete concept. He has
defined his notion of the complete concept before this passage in the following terms:
"The complete or perfect concept of an individual substance involves all its predicates.
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past, present, and future
. In the passage above the reference to the complete concept,
thus understood, appears in the second sentence of the first paragraph, in the phrase,
"its own concept." Leibniz is suggesting here that from the concept of a substance, which
is its individual essence, all its future states follow, and that hence it must be that there
is no metaphysical interaction between substances.
It is interesting that Leibniz distinguishes above between this way of reaching this
conclusion and the argument based on the recognition of "the fact that it cannot be
explained how anything can pass over from one thing into the substance of another."27
The latter argument, when the heterogeneous character of the substances involved plays
a basic role, is the typical dualistic argument against the possibility of communication of
body and mind, the argument of Malebranche. We must note that Leibniz is not suggesting
anything contrary to this argument, but he is clearly indicating that he will not make
use of it. It is in this fashion that one gets the impression that Leibniz is interested in
presenting this approach to "influence" and "spontaneity" differently from the
Cartesians.
Leibniz's statements above constitute a new approach to the topic of interaction. It
is obvious that a reason is offered here which by itself, and without reference to the
problem that results from the heterogeneity of body and mind, explains why these cannot
communicate. In this manner of presenting the problem the fundamental factor is that
substances all have a complete concept, wherefrom it can be concluded that their future
states are determined. This factor, as an essential feature of every substance, seems
sufficient to proclaim that a substance is ontologically spontaneous, i.e., that it develops
in its existence in a way that originates from itself, from its intrinsic nature. What
occurs to a substance, therefore, cannot be explained as an effect externally caused. One
cannot speak of interaction between substances.
This same line of thinking is very specifically suggested in another work, almost
contemporary to "First Truths," where topics having to do with logic and the nature of
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truth are treated in order to elucidate how they relate to metaphysics. In it "spontaneity"
is clearly explained as the outcome of the fact that all substances have a complete notion.
Leibniz writes:
From the notion of an individual substance it also follows in metaphysical rigour that
all the operations of substances, both actions and passions, are spontaneous, and that
with the exception of the dependence of creatures on God, no real influx from one to
the other is intelligible. For whatever happens to each one of them would flow from
its nature and its notion even if the rest were supposed to be absent, for each one
expresses the entire universe.28
It is clear that this manner of rejecting interaction between substances is not
based upon asserting a causal gap as the inevitable result of ontological dualism. So one
need not argue that Leibniz's treatment of the mind-body problem seems unquestionably
linked to a dualistic ontology. We might add that though the latter position need not be
discarded on the basis of what this approach to spontaneity entails, it is no longer
defensible as the one preeminently implied in it.
In Leibniz's new way of presenting the issue of communication, or rather absence
of it, one need not even concern oneself with the distinction between material and
immaterial substances. The incommunication between substances is universal on account
of the fact that it results from an essential trait of substances (spontaneity) that follows
from another essential feature of substances generally considered (having a complete
concept). The distinction —which before seemed so central to questions about the
communication of substances— between material and immaterial substances, is now
marginal, and if the question about the relation between body and mind in a human
individual still persists, it would seem that it can fully be answered on the basis of the
more general consideration of the problem of the incommunication of substances.
In the work that contains the passage last quoted, we find, as expected, that Leibniz
treats the mind-body relation as a special case of the more general issue of the
communication between substances, all substances considered. Leibniz adds, after some
explanations having to with physics, to the line of thinking initiated in the passage we
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examined, another passage that specifically addresses the mind-body problem. He
writes:
Sirriilarly, the very union of soul and body receives a full explanation from our
notion of substance. For some have believed that something or other passes from the
soul to the body, arid conversely; this is the 'hypothesis of real influx'. It seemed to
others that God excites thoughts in the soul corresponding to the motion of the body
and, conversely, motions in the body corresponding to the thoughts of the soul; this is
the 'hypothesis of the occasional cause'. But there is no need to summon a deus ex
machina in a matter which clearly follows from our principles. For each individual
substance, which expresses the same universe in its own measure according to the
laws of its own nature, is such that its changes and states correspond perfectly to the
changes and states of other substances, but the soul and the body correspond to one
another most, and their intimate union consists in the most perfect agreement.^9
All substances are part of an order where they correspond with one another
without influx. But there are substances which bear a special relation to each other: the
degree of correspondence between them is more immediate (more intimate, we might
also say) than that they bear to other substances. These are a mind and its particular
body, for as we learned when explaining Leibniz's way of understanding "expression,"
and is suggested above, "the soul and the body correspond to one another most." We have
here, then, that the basis for rejecting influx is general and consists in Leibniz's notion
of substance as that which has a complete concept. But this account of the relation
substances have among themselves is not incompatible with a differentiation of this
relation in terms of degrees of proximity or immediacy. Even though a soul relates to all
substances, that is, it expresses all the substances in the universe, it does so on account
of the more immediate relation it has with its own body.
The second paragraph of the passage in "First Truths" we started out examining
deserves also our attention with regard to this point. In it too, like in the one just
examined from "A Specimen of Discoveries About Marvelous Secrets," Leibniz is mostly
interested in the mind-body relation, which is now addressed within a context where the
general affirmation of a substance's self sufficiency has first been established.
Therefore, Leibniz starts out the second paragraph in the following manner:
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If the diversity of soul and body be assumed, their union can be explained from this
without the common hypothesis of an influx, which is unintelligible, and without the
hypothesis of occasional causes, which calls upon a Deus ex machina. 30
We find here Leibniz’s characteristic rejection of influence and occasionalism. The
central concern is the mind-body relation, as addressed by these two hypotheses. We can
abandon the hypothesis of "influence," we are told, which after all had no metaphysical
basis, and we can also do without occasionalism, a magical account. For a substance, all of
whose occurrences unfold as determined by its complete concept independently of the
existence of every other created substance does not communicate directly with any of
them (influence), nor through an intermediary cause (occasionalism).
The basic reason for the rejection of both theories is the spontaneity that follows
from a substance having a complete concept. Preestablished harmony here is the outcome
of Leibniz's general conception of a substance, even though the intersubstantial relation
that is being explained refers specifically to the substances, body and mind. The relation
between body and mind is not treated now starting out with an emphasis on the problem
resulting from the confluence of two heterogeneous substances in a human individual:
rather, from the nature of substances the negation of influence leads in general to
preestablished harmony, which harmony may be best appreciated in the entity where
soul and body are conjoined.
Preestablished harmony, in the context that starts out with the elucidation of the
metaphysical significance of the complete concept, is the conclusion that follows from
the recognition that interaction is not real because all that occurs to an individual
substance results from that individual substance's essential spontaneity. Spontaneity, in
turn, is essential to an entity that affords a complete concept, insofar as it will exist as
determined by this concept. And the elucidation of what is a complete concept and how it
is pertinent to the way of being of an individual substance depends on the clarification of
the nature of truth. This line of thinking —from the nature of truth to spontaneity and to
the denial of interaction, which then suggests preestablished harmony to explain
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concomitance— is quite different from the one we emphasized in the previous subsection,
where we saw passages which seemed to suggest that dualism led Leibniz to the
recognition of the impossibility of interaction between material and immaterial
substances, and therefrom it led to the recognition that a soul-substance must be
spontaneous and that a harmony preestablished between heterogeneous substances
explains concomitance.
The Correspondence with Arnauld provides a good piece of evidence in favor of the
view that the negation of intersubstantial influence need not be considered the result of
dualism in Leibniz's philosophy. In attempting to answer the following question of
Arnauld: "The first is as to what you mean by 'the hypothesis of the concomitance and of
the agreement of substances among themselves?'"31 Leibniz explains:
The hypothesis of concomitance is a consequence of the conception which I have of
substance, for, in my opinion, the individual concept of a substance involves all that
will ever happen to it, and it is in this that the complete being differs from those
which are not complete.32
It is clear above that preestablished harmony ("concomitance") follows from
Leibniz's conception of a substance as "affording a" as he sometimes says, or, being the
object of, a complete concept. Having a complete concept, is distinctive of a complete
being, which is above contrasted with an "incomplete being", namely, the object of a
concept that does not include all the existential attributes of its object. An incomplete
being lacks the determinations whereby it would be an individual. The distinction
between a complete and an incomplete being appears frequently in Leibniz's writings and
it parallels the distinction between complete and incomplete concepts.^^
The origin of spontaneity and self-sufficiency is explained by Leibniz in this
context, with regard to the soul, by adding,
since the soul is an individual substance it must be that its concept, idea, essence or
nature involves all that will happen to it, and God, who sees it perfectly, sees there
what it will do or endure forever and all the thoughts which it will have. Therefore,
since our ideas are only the consequence of the nature of the soul and are born in it
by virtue of its concept, it is useless to ask regarding the influence of another
particular substance upon it. This aside from the fact that this influence would be
absolutely inexplicable.^^
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We have here, it seem clear, Leibniz’s characteristic negation of influence, but as
something that follows from a substance being conceivable through a complete concept.
The complete concept is the substance's essence or nature, and serves to account for the
substance's existential unfolding, for its existence in time must accord with the being of
the substance in question as defined by its individual essence. What occurs to it, may be
said to occur from its concept. And, nothing is an effect externally caused.
It is interesting that in the passage above Leibniz also suggests the point he had
mentioned in "First Truths," when he states that this way of negating "influx" is "aside
from the fact that this influence is absolutely inexplicable." This account, then, is
independent of those where the argument against influence rests on the claim that it is
inexplicable that material and immaterial substances may interact reciprocally or on
the view that modalities of substances are intransmissible.^S it seems unquestionable
that here the issue is based on the elucidation of the nature of substances generally
considered, where the distinction between material and immaterial substances is
secondary, and where spontaneity results from an essential trait of all substances, that
each is as determined by its complete concept. Preestablished harmony among
substances, however obtains, for it is also essential to substances that they be
expressive of each other. Hence, Leibniz adds to what we have quoted already, in his
explanation to Arnauld:
It is true that certain thoughts come to us when there are certain bodily movements
and that certain bodily movements take place when we have certain thoughts, but this
is because each substance expresses the whole universe in its fashion and this
expression of the universe which bring about a movement in the body is perhaps a
pain in regard to the soul.36
We are now ready to direct our attention to Leibniz's logical considerations at the
basis of his new way of rejecting interaction. In "First Truths," the passage we analyzed
(Supra footnote 25) appears after an explanation by Leibniz of the nature of truth which
leads to the discovery of several metaphysical principles, the most important of which is
the principle of sufficient reason. The complete concept also follows in this context from
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metaphysical implications of the nature of truth, and it is itself basic to an elucidation of
substantiality. And the elucidation of substantiality leads to "spontaneity" and
preestablished harmony in the manner we have examined. Clearly, then, the task ahead
is an exposition of Leibniz's treatment of the nature of truth and how it relates to the
complete concept of an individual substance.
2. The Nature of Truth and the Complete Concept
a. Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact
Leibniz's line of reasoning, leading from the nature of truth to the notion of the
complete concept of an individual substance, seems quite clear. It depends upon an initial
examination of what it is to be true, where truth is explained as if characteristically
expressed in propositions. Among propositions those he calls "identities" or "first
truths" play a fundamental role for understanding the nature of truth. These are
propositions in which the predicate is identical to the subject, and the copula asserts
this relation. In "First Truths" Leibniz describes them as follows:
First truths are those which predicate something of itself or deny the opposite of its
opposite. For example, A is A, or A is not non-A;... These and other truths of this
kind,... can ... all be grouped under the one name of identities.
That identities are true is evident from the principle of identity, which according
to Leibniz, is equivalent to the principle of contradiction, the fundamental principle of
logic. We saw this when discussing Leibniz's second reason for rejecting occasionalism.
Starting from the principle of contradiction, as the first condition of truth, we can
assert that express identity is the nexus of propositions that are true absolutely. It is in
this fashion that we must understand Leibniz's view of what he calls "truths of reason;"
these, he tells us, are solely dependent on the principle of contradiction. As such, Leibniz
claims that these are a priori truths, wholly independent of experience, hence, eternal.
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necessary, knowledge. But Leibniz argues that it is not only in explicitly identical
propositions (express identities) that the nexus or connection between predicate and
subject is identity: rather, he contends that it is of the nature of truth that identity holds
between predicate and subject in all true propositions. He states this position often. In
"First Truths," for example, he says;
The predicate or consequent, therefore always inheres in the subject or antecedent.
And as Aristotle, too, observed, the nature of truth in general or the connection
between the terms of a proposition consists in this fact.38
In another contemporary work we find this view expressed as follows:
But absolutely and in itself, that proposition is true which is either identical or is
reducible to identical propositions: that is, which can be demonstrated a priori, or
the connexion of whose predicate with its subject can be exhibited in such a way that
its reason always appears.39
The same conception is expressed in "The Nature of Truth": Leibniz writes in it:
A true proposition is one whose predicate is contained in its subject, or, more
generally, whose consequent is contained in its antecedent,.
Leibniz frequently emphasizes the universal extension of his
subject-containment-of-its predicate conception of truth by claiming that his account
includes universal or particular, necessary or contingent, true propositions. All such
propositions are said to be true insofar as the predicate concept is contained in the
subject concept. Leibniz's elucidation of the nature of truth, in "First Truths," hence,
continues as follows:
In identities this connection and the inclusion of the predicate in the subject are
explicit: in all other propositions they are implied and must be revealed through the
analysis of the concepts, which constitutes a demonstration. This is true, moreover,
in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent, whether
its terms are intrinsic or extrinsic denominations.^^
The point is unequivocally asserted in several other works, as the passages below attest:
In every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or
particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way contained in the notion of the
subject, in such a way that if anyone were to understand perfectly, each of the two
notions, just as God understands it, he would by that very fact perceive that the
predicate is in the subject."^
2
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In every universal affirmative truth the predicate is in the subject: expressly in the
case of prirnitive or identical truths, which are the only truths which are known per
se, but implicitly in the case of all the rest. This implicit inclusion is shown by the
analysis of terms, by substituting by one another definitions and what is defined.^3
The two passages above are interesting, for the first mentions the manner in
which God is able to think the relation between the two concepts (or notions) which play
the role of subject and predicate in true propositions, while in the second passage there
is a reference to the contrast between propositions where the inclusion of the predicate
in the subject is express and propositions where it is not manifest but only implicit. We
will go back to these two points further on. Now, however, in order to further emphasize
the significance for Leibniz's conception of the nature of truth of his subject-
containment-of-the-predicate view of true propositions it is worthwhile to quote a
passage from the Correspondence with Arnauld . In it, that the predicate must be in the
subject is clearly presented as the relation at the basis of truth:
Finally, I have given a decisive reason, which in my opinion, takes the place of a
demonstration; this is, that always in every affirmative proposition whether
veritable, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the concept of the
predicate is comprised in some sort in that of the subject. Either the predicate is in
the subject or else I do not know what truth is.'*'^
Identities or identical propositions are first truths, according to Leibniz, because
they need no demonstration, since, as we have seen, their truth value is immediately
evident on the basis of the principle of identity. Other propositions could be shown true
if reducible to identity. Some of the passages above refer to this when speaking of
"analysis" (Supra footnotes 41 and 43). Leibniz explains that one may show that
identity holds between subject and predicate in a proposition if through the analysis of
the subject and predicate concepts one finds the same concept in the subject that the
predicate attributes to it. He refers to this process of demonstration in "First Truths" as
follows:
All other truths are reduced to primary truths by the aid of definitions or by the
analysis of concepts; in this consists a priori proof, which is independent of
experience.^^
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"On Freedom" contains a very straightforward and clear definition of
demonstration. Leibniz has distinguished between "original" (primary) and "derivative"
truths in it through the contrast between "those [truths] of which a reason cannot be
given; [for] such truths are identical or immediate, and they affirm a term of itself or
deny a contradictory of its contradictory," and those (derivative truths) that are either
"analyzed into original truths" or are such that "they admit an infinite process of
analysis."46 Derivative truths, then, are in principle the subject of analysis or
demonstration: primary truths are indemonstrable. And of demonstration Leibniz says:
Demonstration consists simply in this: by the analysis of the terms of a proposition,
and by substituting for a defined term a definition or part of a definition, one shows a
certain equation or coincidence of predicate with subject in a reciprocal proposition,
or in other cases at least the inclusion of the predicate in the subject, in such a way
that what was latent in the proposition and as it were contained in it virtually is
rendered evident and express by the demonstration.^^
In "The Nature of Truth" Leibniz presents a characterization of demonstration or
proof in perhaps its most general form. He writes:
Now that we have understood that every proposition is either true or false, and that
every proposition which is not true of itself, or immediate, can be proved a priori,
it follows that we should state the method of proof. This is contained above all in the
axiom: without loss of truth, the predicate can be put in place of the subject of a
universal affirmative proposition, or the consequent in place of the antecedent of an
affirmative proposition, in another proposition where the subject of the former
proposition is the predicate
,
or where the antecedent of the former is the
consequents^
Leibniz claims that truths of reason are either express identities or propositions
which may be analyzed into identity by a finite intellect in the manner suggested by his
characterization of demonstration. True propositions that through a finite number of
steps in which the subject concept or the predicate concept, or both, are broken down
into its constituents so that they eventually yield a manifest identity are truths of
reason. Both types of truths of reason —identities and demonstrable derivative truths
—
are evinced true on the basis of the principle of identity (or contradiction), and are,
therefore, for Leibniz, eternal, a priori, necessary truths. There are, however, Leibniz
contends, true propositions, which cannot be reduced to identity, and in this way
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demonstrated. These are, like every other true proposition, such that their predicate is
contained in the subject, for this is the nature of truth, but they, though in principle
demonstrable, cannot actually be shown true. In their case analysis proceeds ad
infinitum without ever yielding identity. This is the distinctive feature of contingent
truths against necessary ones. Leibniz frequently explains this point, as in the passage
below:
There is an essential distinction between necessary or eternal truths, and truths of
fact or contingent truths; they differ from one another very much in the way that
rational numbers and surds differ. For necessary truths can be reduced to identical
truths, just as commensurable quantities can be reduced to a common measure; but
in the case of contingent truths, as in the case of surds, the reduction proceeds to
infinity and is never terminated. So the certitude and perfect reason of contingent
truths is known only to God, who grasps the infinite with one intuition.^9
This same contrast, resulting from the way the truth of necessary propositions
may be demonstrated through the use of the principle of contradiction or identity
exclusively, while contingent truths afford no demonstration, insofar as analysis in
their case proceeds indefinitely, is clearly expressed in another work of around 1686
entitled, "Necessary and Contingent Truths." It is important to notice that in the passage
below, as in that above, the analogy that obtains from the relation between surds and
commensurable numbers and that between contingent and necessary truths is used, and
that God's capacity to appreciate the nexus of identity between predicate and subject in
contingent propositions is explained trough a distinctive feature of divine knowledge:
that all is known by God intuitively and nothing discursively,^® he therefore grasps
intuitively the nexus between predicate and subject in all true propositions, necessary
or contingent:
An absolutely necessary proposition is one which can be resolved into identical
propositions, or whose opposite implies a contradiction.... This type of necessity,
therefore, I call metaphysical or geometrical. That which lacks such necessity I call
contingent,...
In the case of a contingent truth, even though the predicate is really in the subject,
yet one never arrives at a demonstration or an identity, even though the resolution of
each term is continued indefinitely. In such cases it is only God, who comprehends the
infinite at once, who can see how the one is in the other, and can understand a priori
the perfect reason for contingency; in creatures this is supplied a posteriori, by
experience. So the relation of contingent to necessary truths is somewhat like the
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relation of surds ratios (namely the ratios of incommensurable numbers) to the
expressible ratios of commensurable numbers. 51
God has no need of analysis to know all true propositions. In his case the
appreciation of the truth of a contingent proposition is never the outcome of a
demonstration. Analysis, for Leibniz, is an intellectual capability of finite intellects
whereby truths of reason that are not express identities may be shown true, and which
also evinces infinite progression with regard to contingent truths. The contrast between
the manner in which truths of reason and truths of fact respond to analysis is basic for
Leibniz's distinction between necessity and contingence. These points are again quite
clear in "On Freedom," from which we have taken the passage that follows:
But in the case of contingent truths, even though the predicate is in the subject, this
can never be demonstrated of it, nor can the proposition ever be reduced to an
equation or an identity. Instead the analysis proceeds to infinity, God alone seeing
—not, indeed the end of the analysis, since it has no end— but the connexion of terms
or the inclusion of the predicate in the subject, for he sees whatever is in the
series;. ..52
It should be clear, from the distinction between necessary and contingent truths
examined above, that we have in Leibniz two ways of understanding the nexus of identity
between predicate and subject in true propositions. The first one obtains in true
propositions that are express identities or may be turned into such. The second is a
nexus of identity that does not admit demonstration. If we keep the expression "analytical
truths" for true propositions that are express identities or demonstrable, "analytical
truths" are Leibniz's "truths of reason." This usage would keep us from calling all
propositions having some sort of underlying identity between subject and predicate
concepts, "analytical." It would enable us to recognize that Leibniz's conception of truth
should not be construed as asserting that all true propositions are analytical and
necessary. Rather, in all true propositions the predicate is contained in the subject, but
in true contingent propositions this takes place in a way that precludes demonstration,
and we may not say, as Leibniz often emphasizes, that in such cases the truth of the
propositions rests exclusively on the principle of contradiction.
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Leibniz is aware of the risk entailed by his conception of truth, insofar as it may
be construed in the erroneous fashion I have adverted against above. In order to avoid
such an interpretation he asks us to keep the distinction between demonstrable and
non-demonstrable true propositions very much in mind. He offers it as a fundamental
criterion by which to distinguish necessary from contingent truths. He claims that other
principles complement the principle of contradiction in true propositions where the
predicate relates to the subject contingently —true propositions of fact, that is. We shall
see, further on, that an additional criterion for distinguishing between necessary and
contingent truths is offered by Leibniz on the basis of the meaning of God's will for one
and the other type of proposition.
It is probably evident, from our discussion of Leibniz's characterization of
demonstration that his conception of truth is linked to a view of concepts as either
simple or composite. In fact to speak, as he does, of breaking down or analyzing the
concepts that play the role of subject or predicate in propositions, in order to
demonstrate them, points to the Leibnizian view that most of our propositions make use
of composite concepts, analyzable and thus reducible, at the most to non-reducible or
simple concepts, for which Leibniz has the technical term, "primitive concept." The
contrast and relation between primitive and composite (or derivative) concepts can be
clearly appreciated in the following assertion:
All derivative concepts arise from a combination of primitive ones, and those which
are composite in a higher degree arise from a combination of composite concepts.^^
True propositions that are not express identities must be such that the concepts
that make up either subject or predicate, or perhaps both, are composite and liable to be
broken down into constituent concepts. Ultimately, reduction must lead to simple
concepts. But we do not need always to reach these to show identity. It is, however, clear
that Leibniz's subject-containment-of-the predicate view of truth entails that the
simple concepts in the predicate concept must, if the proposition is true, be among the
simple concepts contained in the subject concept.
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Once we comprehend Leibniz's conception of truth it is not difficult to understand
how he arrives to the complete concept of an individual substance, and to several of his
basic metaphysical principles. Truth bears a relation to metaphysics in Leibniz's
philosophy, which has aroused the attention of many commentators. It must now obtain
ours.
b. Truth and Metaphysics
Leibniz, in "First Truths," asserts the first consequence of the nature of truth as
follows:
At once then [these matters relative to the nature of truth] give rise to the accepted
axiom that there is nothing without a reason, or no effect without a cause. Otherwise
there would be truth which could not be proved a priori or resolved into identities
—contrary to the nature of truth, which is always either expressly or implicitly
identical.54
It is clear that Leibniz presents the view that all propositions are true insofar as
the predicate concept is included in the subject concept as equivalent to saying that there
is a reason for everything. His frequent assertions stating that the principle of sufficient
reason is a corollary of his conception of truth means this.55 it immediately follows
from this conception, for to say that all true propositions about a subject result from
the manner in which the predicate concept is found in the subject concept amounts to
saying that for everything that pertains to the subject there is a reason in the concept of
the subject. To deny this conception of truth is equivalent to denying that everything has
a reason. The predicate-in-subject conception of truth and the principle of sufficient
reason are therefore, according to Leibniz, two parallel manifestations of the logical and
metaphysical structures of reality in general.
This equivalence between Leibniz's conception of truth and the principle of
sufficient reason is clearly expressed in a letter to Arnauld, where Leibniz refers to
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"sufficient reason" as the second of the principles upon which his metaphysical
demonstrations are founded, as follows:
And secondly, the principle that nothing is without a reason, or that every truth has
its proof a priori, drawn from the meaning of the terms, although we have not always
the power to attain this analysis.56
We saw a similar reference to the parallelism between the logical and ontological
meaning of the principle of sufficient reason when we first mentioned this principle in
the section of this work that dealt with Leibniz's second reason for rejecting
occasionalism. There, in a passage from the Monadoloov fSupra part II, footnote 90)
"sufficient reason" was described as one of two basic metaphysical principles in the
manner that the passage just quoted stresses, and was characterized as that "in virtue of
which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a
sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise."
It is clear that Leibniz's characterization of the principle of sufficient reason as a
consequence of the nature of truth results from the view that when we speak of
knowledge we mean knowledge of reality, and that hence one may consider the totality of
true propositions as a complete account of reality. To say, then, that there is a reason for
the truth of every proposition that stems from the relation the predicate has to the
subject amounts to saying that there is a reason for everything in reality, which results
from the manner the nexuses between real existents and their attributes and relations
parallel the logical nexus between subject and predicate in true propositions.
In "First Truths" the principle of sufficient reason is the initial step of a process
where metaphysics seems to follow preeminently from logical considerations. After the
principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz states two other consequences that follow from his
conception of truth that will immediately be relevant to the complete concept of an
individual substance. The first is "the principle of indiscernibles," the second, the
assertion that "there are no purely extrinsic denominations." The principle of
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indiscernibles is obtained by Leibniz as an immediate derivation from the principle of
sufficient reason, since he says:
It follows also that there cannot be two individual things in nature that differ only
numerically. For surely it must be possible to give a reason why they are different,
and this must be sought in some differences within themselves. 57
To speak of two things, as to speak of anything in a determinate manner, requires,
for Leibniz, a reference to the principle of sufficient reason, for if something is
determinate there must be a reason for it, just as if two things may be said to be
different there must be a basis or reason for this. It follows then that no two things are
exactly alike, for if so no reason would serve to distinguish them, and they would not be
two but one thing.
Leibniz consistently expresses the significance of the principle of sufficient
reason in terms of the need for an explanation of the existence of every existent, and also
in terms of the need of a reason for its determinate way of being. An individual substance
has therefore a reason for all its features that results from all the true propositions
which may be affirmed about it. The totality of these reasons for each individual
substance is the totality of the predicates in all the true propositions about it. Were
there two different substances about which the same totality of predicates obtain, a
reason could not be found for distinguishing between them, and if the criterion for the
existential individuation of the substance is the totality of its predicates, as Leibniz
contends, then it would be absurd to maintain that two different substances have the same
qualifying existential predicates. And this is what the principle of indiscernibles states.
It is easy from here to understand that there are no purely extrinsic
denominations according to Leibniz. For all predicates relate to the subject in true
propositions in a manner warranted by the nature of truth. Hence, all that may be known
about an individual substance belongs in a true proposition about it, and there is nothing
extrinsic to a substance in the sense of not forming part of the set of all truths about it.
If the concept that includes the predicates in all true propositions about a particular
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subject is its essence, then, there are no predicates outside this concept and, if all the
predicates it contains, insofar as part of an individual essence, are intrinsic
denominations, then, there are no extrinsic denominations. Leibniz can, therefore,
affirm, in "First Truths," that, from the nature of truth,
it follows further that there are no purely extrinsic denominations, which have no
basis at all in the thing denominated. For the concept of the denominated subject
necessarily involves the concept of the predicate. Likewise, whenever the
denomination of a thing is changed, some variation has to occur in the thing itself.^^
Of course, we have now reached the notion of a complete concept of an individual
substance. Leibniz has made use of it in explaining his position with regard to extrinsic
denominations ("the notion of the subject denominated"), and he continues after the
passage above as follows:
The complete or perfect concept of an individual substance involves all its predicates
—past, present and future. For that a future predicate is future is true now, and so is
contained in the notion of the thing.59
The complete concept or notion of an individual substance is the concept that
results from the combination into a unitary concept of all the predicates in all the true
propositions about this substance. This concept contains everything that qualifies the
substance in question. This includes true future predicates, for Leibniz defends the view
that the truth value of propositions about the future may be ascertained previously to
the occurrence of the event. A proposition that affirms something that will be true in the
future is true now, and true independently of any reference to time.^^ The event will
take place in the future, but the proposition that asserts the relation between subject
and predicate that obtains from that event is true, for Leibniz, timelessly. The complete
concept, therefore, exhaustively and timelessly describes the individual substance
existentially. But such a concept may be conceived independently of the existence of its
substance. As such it is the concept of an individual substance sub species possibilitatis.
Of course, the first condition this concept must satisfy is non-contradiction. This entails
full conceivability, which when exercised through the apprehension of all the simple
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concepts in the concept of a possible substance, involves what Leibniz call a "perfect" or
"essential" definitional
The first consequence that Leibniz derives from a substance having a complete
concept we have already discussed, for it is at this point that he asserts that created
substances do not interact since everything unfolds in them from their own nature, from
their complete concept. The point, then, that stands at the basis of Leibniz’s conception of
spontaneity is that, since, as suggested by the philosophical tradition, an essence
determines the being of a substance, the individual essence or complete concept of a
substance metaphysically determines the way an individual substance unfolds
existentially in time.
In "First Truths" from the fact that a substance has a complete concept a series of
metaphysical consequences follow; namely: that an individual substance is unitary as
characterized by the totality of its predicates; that everything that occurs to it results
from its complete concept, as determined by it; that a substance is hence metaphysically
spontaneous, and nothing occurs to it as a result of an external influence (except God's
continuous creation); that there is nothing without a reason in the universe, for all that
may be predicated of an individual substance has a reason in its complete concept; that,
in Leibniz's words, "corporeal substance can neither come into being nor perish except
through creation or annihilation, 3nd that the appearance of interaction and order
between substances must result from each substance's intrinsic order and capacity for
expressing the universe in accordance with the expression of every other substance.
If we stress that these consequences originate from the elucidation of the nature of
truth, it would seem that many of the basic metaphysical contentions of Leibniz are the
outcome of his subject-containment-of-the- predicate conception of truth. And this, of
course, must suggest to us the question. How does this accord with the emphasis in many
of his writings on the significance of God and creation for metaphysics? We shall attempt
to answer this question, but not immediately. At this moment our aim has been to show
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that preestablished harmony in the context of Leibniz’s works where the nature of truth
seems basic to metaphysics appears as a theory that need not be grounded on dualism.
This point has been amply substantiated. There is, however, one last topic that belongs in
this context which I believe we still need to treat. It has been present in our discussion,
but since we have concentrated our attention on logico-metaphysical works like "First
Truths" and "The Nature of Truth" where this issue is almost taken for granted, we have
not fully explained it. I mean Leibniz's conception of substantiality. It is preeminently in
the Discourse on Metaphysics that Leibniz will explicitly delve into the question. What
is a substance? and provide an answer to this question that amounts to a clear definition
of substantiality. By elucidating this last topic our explanation of the relation between
Leibniz's conception of truth and his conception of substance will be treated more fully.
Besides, additional evidence for the thesis that there are features of Leibniz's thought
that seem compatible with idealistic monism seems available from this consideration,
for there is one aspect of his conception of substance relevant to this point.
3. The Complete Concept and Substantiality
In "First Truths" Leibniz treats the complete concept of an individual substance as
the intellectual mean by which, if not us, at least an infinite intellect, may fully
apprehend the being of an individual substance as possible. I have explained above that
this manner of conceiving the complete concept with regard to an individual is equivalent
to making it this substance's essence. Of course, the essence in question here is not
specific but individual, and it serves to distinguish an individual from every other
possible individual through the totality of its existential attributes considered sub
species possibilitatis.
The individual essence of a substance, just like the specific essence, is that
whereby the question. What is it? is answered. But now the "what" refers to its
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individual being. In the Discourse on Metaphysics we find, perhaps, the clearest
explanation of how an individual essence can be attributed to a substance, and an account
of what this entails for substantiality. There, Leibniz joins his conception of truth to the
Aristotelian definition of a substance as the subject of predicates which is not itself a
predicate, in order to yield the answer to the general question. What is a substance?
Many of the features relative to the complete concept and the nature of individual
substances that were examined in the previous subsection, and not fully explained,
obtain, from the clarification of substantiality in the Discourse , further elucidation.
It is important to realize that the question. What is a substance? is fundamental to
metaphysicians, and seemed particularly urgent to many philosophers in the seventeenth
century. Leibniz, rather than attempting an answer to this question, along the lines
followed by Descartes and Spinoza, stressing the view that a substance is that which does
not depend on anything else to exist, (a view that had led to positing only the necessary
being as a substance) rests his case on the logical notion of subject of predication, in the
tradition of Aristotle, but complements this characterization of substance with the
introduction of the meaning complete concepts have for substantiality. In this manner
his treatment of substantiality appears as preeminently grounded upon logical
considerations, for the full explanation of what it means to be a subject of predication
entails the clarification of the relation a predicate has to a subject in true propositions.
Leibniz, thus makes his views about the nature of truth basic to his account of the nature
of substances in general. His exposition in the Discourse deserves our attention.
Leibniz starts out in chapter eight of the Discourse with the claim that it is
important to be able to know who or what is a subject of action. He approaches this topic
in the context of addressing the moral problem of responsibility with regard to human
individuals. The problem arises mainly from the the relation created substances bear to
God, since it is presented by Leibniz in the following terms,
it is quite difficult to distinguish God's actions from those of his creatures. Some
think that God does everything: others imagine that he only conserves the force that
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he has given to created things. How far can we say either of these opinions is
right?® 3
The basic question that Leibniz wants to address is, Are human individuals such
that acts may be metaphysically attributable to them, in a manner that enables us to
recognize them as morally responsible? The clue to the answer to this question,
according to Leibniz, must be a clarification of the notion of substance, for, he explains,
"activity and passivity pertain properly to individual substances (actiones sunt
suppositorum)”^^ Hence, if moral individuals exist, substances must exist, and
human-moral individuals must be substances.
A turn towards the Aristotelian answer to the question. What is a substance? leads
Leibniz only to its conditional acceptance, for in spite of its merits he finds it
insufficient. Leibniz writes;
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributes of a single subject and
this subject is not an attribute of another, we speak of it as an individual substance,
but this is not enough, and such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore
inquire what it is to be an attribute in reality of a certain subject.®®
In order to make the relation between the subject and its attributes clear, Leibniz
refers to the nature of truth, for he contends that the clue for understanding how an
attribute pertains to a subject —attributes belong to substances, which are subjects of
propositions— is the relation which enables us to say that in true propositions the
predicate is contained in the subject. Therefore Leibniz continues as follows;
This being so, we are able to say that this is the nature of an individual substance or
of a complete being, namely, to afford a conception so complete that the concept shall
be sufficient for the understanding of it and for the deduction of all the predicates of
which the substance is or may become the subject.®®
What we have here is Leibniz's definition of a substance, his general definition of
substantiality. A substance is "a complete being," that which affords a complete concept.
Interestingly, it turns out to be a definition of substance in general in terms of
individual substantiality. A substance, Leibniz is telling us, is that which is an
individual or that which may be thought through a complete concept or individual
essence. It is the subject of predicates which can be fully thought out in terms of all the
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predicates in all the true propositions about it, that is, it is the subject of a complete
concept.
Leibniz's use of the complete concept in the elucidation of substantiality involves
contrasting the manner an individual substance may be conceived with the conception of
abstractions and modalities. He frequently affirms that neither abstractions, nor modes,
nor relations afford a complete concept. In the context of chapter eight of the PiscourRe
we have a typical instance of this view. Here he contrasts the complete concept of a
substance, such as Alexander the Great, to the quality of king, which is not a substance
but a mode of being of a substance. He explains:
Thus the quality of king, which belonged to Alexander the Great, an abstraction from
the subject, is not sufficiently determined to constitute an individual, and does not
contain the other qualities of the same subject, nor everything which the idea of this
prince includes.®^
For Leibniz, subjects of predication that may also be predicates are not
determined by a complete series of predicates exhaustively. A predicate that as such
relates to a subject of predication, may be made a subject itself. Nonetheless, it is not
the subject of concrete predicates in the manner of a complete being; that is, it is not a
concept which includes all the predicates whereby a complete substance would be
determined.
The clarification of the nature of a substance that Leibniz presents in chapter
eight of the Discourse will enable him to answer the question about moral responsibility
by stressing that individual substances, in spite of their continuous ontological
dependence upon God, are capable of action. They are hence, supposita, whose actions, he
will explain further on, flow from their own individuality as the outcome of their
spontaneity. As in the arguments found in what I have called his "preeminently logico-
metaphysical works," the clue to the recognition of activity in substances is here the
elucidation of the consequences that follow from having a nature or individual essence.
Everything in a substance is a consequences of its own being, and follows spontaneously
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from this essential feature of an individual, and this makes a substance intrinsically
active, but never externally interactive. Thus, Leibniz writes in the Discourse !
In a way, then, we might properly say, although it seems strange, that a particular
substance never acts upon another particular substance nor is it acted upon by it.
That which happens to each one is only the consequence of its complete idea or
concept, since this idea already includes all the predicates and expresses the whole
universe.68
And:
Now, we have said before, and it follows from what we have just said that each
substance is a world by itself, independent of everything else excepting God;
therefore, all our phenomena, that is, all things which are ever able to happen to us,
are only consequences of our being.69
Spontaneity warrants the activity of a substance as an individual in time, the
unfolding of whose modalities of being results from its individual essence. It is a
consequence as Leibniz is fond to say, of his conception of substance, which is pregnant
with consequences beyond and complementary to spontaneity. Leibniz dedicates chapter
nine of the Discourse to these. He presents them as "paradoxes," no doubt because at the
stage of chapter nine he has still not fully expounded his view of a substance as
spontaneous and self sufficient, and hence, the reader may be somewhat unprepared for
the metaphysical consequences that follow from the definition, in chapter eight, of a
substance as that which affords a complete concept. The paradoxical consequences are
several essential characteristics of substances, namely, unity, discernibility,
immortality, and expressiveness of all others.
In a manner similar to the one we described before, Leibniz in the Discourse
derives these metaphysical consequences for all individual substances from the complete
concept and the nature of truth. He will, however, in this work be interested in an
exposition where this issue is linked to a metaphysics that takes as its point of departure
the existence of a perfect God. I must say again that it is too soon to attempt to address
this whole topic, but we have attained part of the purpose that motivated us in this
subsection. We have now a good idea of the meaning of Leibniz's conception of substance.
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and will not be surprised by his frequent assertion: that his metaphysics follows from
his conception of substance.
We may now remind ourselves that we were prompted in the direction of
understanding Leibniz's works of 1680-90 by the impression that they contained a
treatment of the problem of communication between substances which could be
accommodated with an idealistic ontological position. It is convenient, hence, that we
close our examination of the meaning of Leibniz's account of substantiality on the basis of
his conception of truth by pointing towards another feature of his thinking in this
context which can be interpreted as favoring an idealistic interpretation of his ontology.
In the Discourse . Leibniz speaks of substances as capable of expression and
perception in a way that suggests that he consider what at times he calls a "soul," but
more precisely a "mind" or a "spirit," the model after which he conceives of individual
substances. Actions in their case are perceptions and appetitions, and Leibniz suggests,
not only that the paradigmatic and intuitive model of substances is one's own mind, but
that ultimately there are features of substances which somehow makes them in imitation
of God, and that they are hence invested with something analogous to infinite knowledge
and power. Substances it would seem are modelled after human spirits which in turn are
modelled after the immaterial substance, God, a spirit omniscient an omnipotent, in a
way that enables Leibniz to say:
It can indeed be said that every substance bears in some sort the character of God's
infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as much as it is able to; for it
expresses, although confusedly, all that happens in the universe, past, present and
future, deriving thus a certain resemblance to an infinite perception or power of
knowing. And since all other substances express this particular substance and
accommodate themselves to it, we can say that it exerts its power upon all the others
in imitation of the omnipotence of the creator.^^
It would seem that "expression" in Leibniz is a notion that originates from the
modalities of being characteristic of an immaterial substance, such as those we, insofar
as minds, recognize in ourselves (perceptions and appetitions). So, if all substances, and
not only minds, as Leibniz often suggests, have an expressive nature, their being must
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be construed as analogous to minds'. And if this analogy is stressed and interpreted as
ontological similarity we are tempted to conclude that all substances are for Leibniz of
the nature of immaterial substances.
Even when it is clear that Leibniz distinguishes between manners of expression,
whence the distinction between immaterial substances ("substantial forms," "souls,"
and "spirits,") is obtained, this very same point —that the expressions of substances can
all be considered as analogous manifestations of one and the same type of reality—
suggests that substances are all expressive in the manner of thinking entities. There is a
passage where Leibniz clearly makes this point when attempting a clarification of the
meaning of "expression." In it "perception, animal feeling and intellectual knowledge"
are explained as instances of one and the same class: expression:
One thing expresses another, in my use of the term, when there is a constant and
regulated relation between what can be said of the one and of the other. It is thus that
a projection in perspective expresses a structure. Expression is common to all
forms, and is a class of which ordinary perception, animal feeling and intellectual
knowledge are species. In ordinary perception and in feeling it is enough that what is
divisible and material and what is found common to several beings should be
expressed or represented in a single indivisible being, or in the substance which is
endowed with a true unity. We cannot at all doubt the possibility of such a
representation of several things in a single one, since our own souls furnish us
examples: this representation, however, is accompanied by consciousness in a
rational soul and becomes then what is called thought.^^
No doubt, Leibniz's emphasis upon the affinity between substances that results
from their expressive nature and brings about preestablished harmony, seems not only
compatible with idealistic monism on the basis of the passage above, but also contrary to
dualism. Any attempt to defend the view that Leibniz's definitive position is dualism
must, hence, provide an adequate explanation of how "expression" is an universal feature
of substances which is yet compatible with the existence of corporeal substances.
Preestablished Harmony and Leibniz's ontological position have been the
considerations that have brought us this far. We shall find in what follows that not all
has been said about these two topics. Indeed we must still grapple with the fundamental
questions about how these two aspects of Leibniz's philosophy should be definitively
construed and related. Nonetheless, we are ready now for the examination of Leibniz's
views about corporeal substances. This is the next and fourth chapter of this work.
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CHAPTER IV
LEIBNIZ'S VIEW OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES
A. A Reaction to Stuart Brown
One can envisage several methods as appropriate to an inquiry into the
significance "corporeal substances" have in Leibniz's philosophy: and it would seem that
a direct approach to the passages, in contexts having to do with physics or metaphysics,
where the notion of corporeal substance is important is the appropriate way of
addressing the issue. There is, however, in my appreciation of Leibniz's position a
reference to what Stuart Brown suggests in his book regarding this topic, insofar as
Brown's contentions awakened the reaction which prompted me to make corporeal
substance a central concern in my study of Leibniz's philosophy. I believe that though I
reject Brown's interpretation, I am indebted to him in that his views induced an effort
directed at fully understanding Leibniz's position on corporeal substances. For this
reason I am convinced that I can present my interpretation of Leibniz in opposition to
Brown's, at least initially, in a manner that will make it clearer and perhaps more
interesting. I will therefore do so. I will first explain Brown's interpretation, and
afterwards will present my own views on Leibniz's conception of bodies, matter, and
corporeal substance. My interpretation will concentrate first on the Discourse on
Metaphysics and the Correspondence with Arnauld . in order to establish that the correct
reading of these works does not warrant Brown's interpretation. Afterwards, in the next
section, I shall examine other writings of Leibniz, from different periods, and compare
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what these suggest to our previous findings from the Discourse and the Corresnonrience
with Arnauld .
1. Brown's Interpretation of Leibniz
There is, according to Stuart Brown, a shift in Leibniz's position concerning the
existence of material (corporeal) substances from the Discourse on Metaphysics to the
last part of the Correspondence with Arnauld . At the stage of the Discourse
,
partly
motivated by what Brown calls his tendency "to regard established opinion as
presumptively true,"^ Leibniz is said to uphold the view that there are corporeal
substances. This position, then current in what Brown describes as the acceptable
philosophical tradition for Leibniz (Scholasticism), must be surrendered as the result
of a tension between two different conceptions of substantial unity which, according to
Brown, underlie Leibniz's efforts at clarifying the meaning of substantiality. Leibniz's
mature position —which Brown believes is already present at the end of the
correspondence with Arnauld— is that there are no corporeal substances:
For whereas the author of the Discourse attempted to explain how there could be
material substances, Leibniz later came to believe that, strictly speaking at least,
there were no such substances.^
Brown refers to Leibniz's letter of 1690, the last to Arnauld, as evidence of this
change, which represents, in his view, "a significant modification of Leibniz's system."^
In it. Brown suggests, "Leibniz roundly declares: 'a body is an aggregation, and is not a
substance properly speaking (BW 244, Gii 135).""*
There is, according to Brown, a motive for Leibniz's change. It originates from a
tension that is present in the Discourse , which is itself the product of what Brown
considers a fusion —which he suggests may be a "confusion, — of two different
traditional approaches in Leibniz to the concept of substantial unity. One is the view,
which Brown attributes to Plato, of a substance as that which is incorporeal, and thus
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indivisiblo, 3 boing that has tharafora trua unity. Tha othar is tha Aristotalian
concaption of substancas as organic unitias, whara substantial forms, concaivad as souls
or soul-lika baings, mataphysically complamant mattar in bringing about a living
substanca.
For Brown, thasa two concaptions of substantial unity ara tha solutions Laibniz
attampts bafora two problams that originata from tha machanistic account of corporaal
substancas of modarn philosophy. Brown calls tham, "tha Aristotalian" and "Platonic,"
problams and says:
Tha two problams coma togathar as problams posad by tha machanical philosophy for
baliaf in corporaal substances. For, if bodias ara mara machinas, than thair unity
consists in nothing mora than thair parts baing intarralatad with ona anothar to a
much graatar axtant than thay ara intarralatad with othar bodias.^
Machanical unity. Brown explains, cannot satisfy Leibniz with regard to living
substances, nor meet his conception of unity for substances in general. For Leibniz "a
substance," Brown tells us, "must be a genuine unity and not a merely accidental one. It
must, in the Scholastic jargon, be an unum per se and not an unum per accidens, as a
collection of things is."^
Two different challenges are presented to Leibniz, according to Brown, by the view
of corporeal substances of the mechanical philosophy. The two problems move Leibniz,
in Brown's interpretation, towards both the Aristotelian and the Platonic conceptions of
substantial unity. The former is used to address the problem of organic unity, while the
latter serves to deal with the problem of infinite divisibility in extended substances. The
issues are not clearly sorted out by Leibniz, Brown explains, and hence we can detect a
tension between one and the other conception in the Discourse and the Correspondence-
This tension moves Leibniz's thought in the direction of making preeminent the Platonic
view while abandoning what was initially dominant, the Aristotelian conception of
substance. This is the shift whereby corporeal substances are lost.
Brown believes that in the Discourse the Aristotelian conception, via the influence
of the Scholastic tradition, prevails, and represents the established view which Leibniz
treats as presumably true and defends. This position is said to be persuasive because it
enables Leibniz, against the Cartesians, to "accommodate the fact that living things
generally are regarded as having an essential unity which cannot be explained on the
assumption that the essence of corporeal substances consists of extension alone."® At this
stage. Brown explains, Leibniz's view is not dualistic, it is a view where neither souls
nor bodies by themselves are substances. He writes:
The view which Leibniz sought to defend in the Discourse was that the sorts of thing
we should think of as substances were people, animals, and, perhaps, plants as
well....
This is, in a way, a theory about the relation of souls and bodies. But it is a
monistic theory. Souls are not substances as such. Nor are bodies. What makes a body
a substance is its being 'endowed with' a substantial form.®
Substantial forms play an essential role in this account, and, according to Brown,
Leibniz was interested in defending their metaphysical importance, at least up to the
Discourse , for one other reason beyond explaining organic unity along Scholastic lines:
Leibniz wanted to find common grounds of interests between Protestants and Catholics,
and believed that the Christian ritual of the Eucharist required substantial forms to be
explained and was one point over which Christian factions could agree.
Now, in spite of the strength of the factors which incline Leibniz in favor of the
Aristotelian conception of substantial unity, we find, according to Brown, a turn, in
Leibniz, away from this position. Brown writes:
Leibniz's attempt to address the 'Aristotelian' problem and the 'Platonic' problem [of
substantial unity] simultaneously did not work and, although he continued to give
some thought to the 'Aristotelian' problem, he evidently found the 'Platonic' problem
both more urgent and more tractable. The view, suppressed in the Discourse, that
perhaps in metaphysical strictness there are no corporeal substances as such
became, by 1690, his acknowledged opinion. But his thoughts about the composition
of the continuum were taking him even further in the direction of making his
ultimate entities not merely non-material but non-spatial also.^ ^
Leibniz's concern with organic unities gradually became secondary to physical
considerations for which. Brown contends, substantial forms were not relevant. The
Aristotelian schema for solving the problem of substantial unity gave way to the Platonic
conception under the influence of questions of mechanics and dynamics. For Brown,
159
though both the Aristotelian and Platonic problems subsist through the correspondence
with Arnauld, it is clear that:
Leibniz seems to have given the second problem [unity of matter] a priority over the
first [unity of living things]
—partly, perhaps, because he became more interested
in questions of mechanics and what he called 'dynamics’ than in biology. 1
2
The change that left out substantial forms resulted, ultimately, according to
Brown, from the inadequacy of the Aristotelian schema before the general problem of
substantial unity. The trend that Leibniz's thought follows with regard to corporeal
substance, as interpreted by Brown, is the outcome of the strength of Leibniz's basic
criterion of substantiality, unity, which was not adequately met, after all, by the
Aristotelian conception. Motivated by the problem of infinite divisibility of extended
entities, Leibniz is led towards the recognition that his initial position is not tenable. It
cannot solve that problem, which needs also to be addressed in the case of the bodies of
living organisms. Whatever individual substances there may be, inanimate or animate,
must fully satisfy all the conditions of substantiality, and preeminently that of true
unity. If there are corporeal substances, living or not, these must somehow be shown to
be an unum per se and not merely an unum per accidens. Brown explains:
The transition in his [Leibniz's] view of material substances corresponds to other
changes and can be seen largely as an attempt to make his theory of what true
substances are fully consistent with the implications of his requirements for
substantiality.^ 3
This effort towards consistency involved a cost, according to Brown: "The cost of
doing so was to reduce material substances to the status of 'well-founded phenomena.'"^
For Brown the change whereby what was before considered a substance became a
"well-founded phenomenom" is clearly illustrated by a change in a comparison between
rainbows and bodies or matter which Leibniz customarily used to present his views.
While in the Discourse , bodies (being substantial) were distinguished from rainbows,
insofar as the latter were "phenomena," Leibniz, Brown tells us, later considered bodies
and matter merely aggregates, and "they became like rainbows instead of being
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contrasted with them."15 jhe change in meaning of the comparison marks for Brown the
turn away from the initial acceptance of corporeal substances: he tells us:
The comparison with the rainbow is significant in another way. For it marks the
extent to which Leibniz retreated from his assumptions about matter in the
Discourse and for a few years later. At that time he presented rainbows as mere
phenomena from which bodies must sharply be distinguished if they are to be
regarded as substances (see, for instance, BW 135, G ii 58). It seems as if he then
believed that corporeal substances could meet the conditions of substantiality.
Whereas a rainbow had only an apparent unity, 'the reality of a corporeal substance
consists in a certain individual nature; that is, not in mass, but in a power of acting
and being acted on' (PW 81, G vii 314). Not only could material body have unity,
identity and agency. It could also enjoy relative autonomy: 'A corporeal substance can
neither arise nor perish except by creation or annihilation' (PW 92, C 523).'' ®
Leibniz's turn towards consistency, we have seen, eventually led, according to
Brown, to the recognition that the conception of organic substance is laden with
problems, resulting from spatiality, it cannot surmount. The basic problem. Brown
believes, is that positing the existence of living corporeal substances always involves
asserting that they are spatial, and this makes the problem of infinite divisibility
unavoidable. This is the point of the passage below:
The belief that there are material substances has the consequence that substances can
be spatial. But, if this is so, there arises the old problem concerning the composition
of the continuum. For whatever is spatially extended seems to be infinitely divisible
and the 'Platonic' requirement for something being a real being —namely, that it be a
true unity (unum per se)— is not met. If that requirement is not met, then there is
nothing substantial in the visible world. ^ ^
The problem, thus posed by Brown, indeed, suggests that spatiality is totally
incompatible with unity, and leads in the direction of concluding that the only way out is
discarding corporeal substances altogether. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Leibniz's attempt at answering the question. How can there be corporeal substances
which satisfy the conditions of substantiality? in the Discourse , is said to fail. Indeed,
we find that Brown will not consider Leibniz's reiterated emphasis upon the value of the
Aristotelian conception of substance for the solution of the problem of spatial
divisibility convincing. He will not even interpret this conception of substantial unity as
addressing that problem. The main thrust of Leibniz's efforts to make infinite
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divisibility compatible with unity is rather found in his position with regard to an
infinite number of actual parts in corporeal substances. Brown, therefore, suggests;
Leibniz sought to meet this problem [infinite divisibility] by saying that 'there is no
portion of matter which is not actually subdivided: so the parts of any body are
actually infinite' (PW 98, C 19). Hence 'there is no portion of matter so small that
there does not exist in it a world of creatures, infinite in number' (PW 108, F de C
1 80).
That answer, however, gives rise to two quite different problems. In the first
place it does not help with the 'Aristotelian' problem about how living things like
man, animals and plants are substances. For on this account living things will
themselves contain 'a world of creatures, infinite in number' and its is not clear how
the macroscopic things will have a substantial unity. In the second place, even if
there is a world of true substances to be found in every particle of matter, this is
just as true of rainbows and the non-living world as of organisms.^ ®
Brown's first criticism of the solution he attributes to Leibniz to the problem of
substantial unity is that the view that matter is made up of an actually infinite number
of parts is incapable of explaining the unity of the organic entity, since such unity is
incompatible with an infinite number of parts; the second criticism regards the problem
of infinite divisibility specifically. With respect to it. Brown explains that matter
understood as made up of a plurality of true substances would be like a rainbow, so it
would be what Leibniz calls "a being by aggregation," not a unitary being, hence, not a
substance. Evidently, Leibniz's attempt to provide through his account of an actual
infinity a solution to the problem of unity in the corporeal substance has to solve one
basic problem according to Brown, that of the infinite divisibility of matter; and it
simply fails to do so.
It is clear that Brown does not accept the Leibnizian claim in the Discourse that
substantial forms serve to substantiate bodies insofar as they make unitary the
composite being that results from the metaphysical "confluence," —for a lack of a better
expression— of matter and form in a corporeal substance. An infinite number of parts
still subsisting in this corporeal substance leaves open the question. How can such an
entity be unitary if that which is infinitely divisible is not? As Arnauld and several
others. Brown believes that the substantial forms do not achieve their purported end of
providing unity to what, being material, is infinitely divisible. The attempted solution.
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for Brown, is a very defective one, and such that Leibniz himself will find it
unsatisfactory. The outcome of this situation is described as one in which Leibniz, after
hesitation and various views, takes a "phenomenalistic direction," in his accounts of
matter, space and time. These, Brown explains, will be progressively accounted for, "in
terms of the perceptions of monads."^ ^ Accordingly, Brown says;
Material substances are reduced to well-founded phenomena as also are space and
time. The tendency is brought out succinctly in his [Leibniz’s] review of Berkeley’s
Principles quoted earlier (Chapter 4 and Note 4):
Many things that are here seem right to me. But they are expressed rather
paradoxically. For there is no need for us to say that matter is nothing. It is
sufficient to say that it is a phenomenom like a rainbow. Nor need we say that it
is substantial; rather that it is the result of substances. Nor need we say that
space is more real than time; It is sufficient to say that space is nothing but the
order of co-existing things and time the order of successive things. The true
substances are monads, or things that perceive.20
Brown reads the above remarks of Leibniz on Berkeley as a clear indication of his
rejection of corporeal substances. He had referred in previous paragraphs to this same
passage as indicative of Leibniz’s definitive view, as follows; "Leibniz’s later view is
brought out well in the way he contrasts his position with that of Berkeley .’’2 1 His point
is that we are being told here clearly that matter is a phenomenom, like the rainbow. No
longer is matter as corporeal substance contrasted to rainbows as phenomenal. Only
monads, i.e., subjects of perception, are substances.
Phenomenalism, for Brown, is Leibniz’s answer to the problems involved in
spatiality; infinite divisibility and the impossibility of motion which Zeno had
discovered as evidence for Parmenides’s views. Leibniz’s solution is conceiving matter
and bodies to be "well-founded phenomena," while abandoning the defense of corporeal
substances. A well-founded phenomenom, however. Brown explains, is not for Leibniz a
"mere" phenomenom as something entirely subjective. Rather, like the rainbow, it has
substances underlying it, from which it "results." Brown says;
Space, time and matter are what, in Leibniz’s later theory, are called ’well-founded
phenomena’. They are ’well-founded’ in that, unlike mere phenomena, they result
from substances. A ’corporeal substance’ is a phenomenom produced by monads and is
not to be understood simply in terms of my perceptions. Some of the properties
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commonly ascribed to corporeal substances, such as color and even size, figure and
motion are at least partly 'imaginary and relative to our perceptions' {Discourse
§ 12). But corporeal bodies also posses properties, like resistance to change, which
need to be understood, according to Leibniz, in terms of underlying substances.22
The main thrust of what Brown claims here is that we should understand the
"phenomenalistic turn" in Leibniz in a way that makes room for "well-founded
phenomena" as that which is objectively real insofar as substances underlie it. While a
body has qualities (e.g. sensible) that are merely subjective it also possesses an other
(resistance) that should be considered real, from the relation it bears to underlying
substances. The sentence that says, "A 'corporeal substance' is a phenomenom produced
by monads and is not to be understood simply in terms of my perceptions," stresses this
point. It also suggests that sometimes Leibniz expresses himself in this manner and
speaks of a corporeal substance as a "phenomenom." Presumably, this is the result of a
degree of laxity on the part of Leibniz's usage of expressions such as "corporeal
substance." Indeed, this is part of Brown's interpretation. He believes that since Leibniz
attempts to somehow accommodate common sense, he will, while eliminating "corporeal
substances" and "physical causality" from his mature metaphysics, admit these
expressions as part of the traditional linguistic usages appropriate for our ordinary
description of reality. He explains this point as follows:
But it was only in strict metaphysical usage that Leibniz came to think it was
incorrect to talk of material substance. He was just as happy to talk of bodies as
'substances' in a theoretically uncommitted way as he was to talk of bodies causing
things to happen in other bodies.23
Even if somehow real, "well-founded phenomena" are not corporeal substances:
and the turn towards them is made at the expense of corporeal substances, for Brown.
What was previously considered a substance is no longer, in Brown's interpretation of
Leibniz, in itself substantial. And we must infer that since this being is metaphysically
dependent upon substances which underlie it, and since such substances cannot be
corporeal (for there are none such), they must be immaterial. We end up, in this
interpretation, with an ontology which only admits immaterial substances.
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I must concede that there is much in Leibniz's way of expressing his views which
lends itself to the interpretation Brown offers. Nonetheless, I consider it erroneous. My
contention is that a careful study of what Leibniz says in the Discourse and the
Correspondence with Arnauld allows us to see that he defends the existence of corporeal
substances, and, also, that he speaks of both "mere phenomena" and "well-founded
phenomena," in a way that does not imply that either is the metaphysical substitute of
what he consistently calls "corporeal substances." I believe too that well-founded
phenomena require corporeal substances as that which underlies them, a point Leibniz
emphatically and continuously defends. In what follows I offer my interpretation of
Leibniz's thought in the Discourse and the Correspondence . I will treat the Discourse
first, and afterwards I will separately examine the Correspondence . Of course, I
concentrate on these works because Brown derives his interpretation from them. But
also, and I will eventually defend this claim, because the ontological views that Leibniz
expresses here are very near his definitive ones.
2. My Interpretation: Leibniz's View of Corporeal Substances
a. Discourse on Metaphysics
The nature of bodies and their metaphysical status is a theme that in the DisCQUrss
Leibniz takes up after his definition of a substance as that which affords a complete
concept. His attention to substances as topic resulted from the moral question about
responsibility, which required that it be established which entities are capable of
action, and may thus be morally responsible. If, Leibniz contends, actions are modalities
of substances the question about responsibility requires that we clarify what is a
substance and what types of substances there may be. This includes the clarification of
the nature of corporeal substances, which Leibniz undertakes assuming a polemical
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approsch against what ha prasants as tha currant pravalant concaption of corporaal
substancas: that of tha Cartasians.
i. Tha Cartasians' Concaption of Corporaal Substanca
Laibniz's viaws on corporaal substancas ara, by his own account, tha rasult of a
turn towards Scholastic philosophy promptad by tha raalization that, mataphysically,
tha thasis that bodias or axtandad antitias ara substancas of tha Cartasians is not tanabla.
Laibniz traats tha Cartasian viaw as if raprasantativa of modarn philosophy, and
prasants his own thought as motivatad by his mataphysical considarations of what is a
substanca. Tha racognition of what constitutas tha assanca of substantiality has mada him
awara of tha fact that bodias, as concaivad in modarn philosophy, ara not substancas. Ha
writas:
I baliava that anyona who will maditata about tha natura of substanca as I hava
axplainad it abova will find that tha antira natura of tha body doas not consist maraly
in axtansion, that is to say, in siza, figura, and motion, but that thara must ba
nacassarily racognizad in it somathing ralatad to souls, which is commonly called a
substantial form, although this form makes no change in the phenomena, any more
than does the soul of beasts if they have one.24
Leibniz's point is that the geometrically inspired conception of corporeal
substances of Cartesianism, which equates bodies and corporeal substances, and
considers a body to be essentially an entity whose modalities of being are only figure,
number, magnitude, and motion, is not consistent with his own, and presumably correct,
conception of substance. Though he repeatedly claims that physical accounts of
phenomena obtain nothing from the metaphysical use of substantial forms, he clearly
asserts that the Cartesian conception of bodies as substances constitutes an error in
metaphysics which should be remedied, and can be, by the introduction of the substantial
forms of the Peripatetics. Leibniz explains that the basic problem is that a substance
must have unity and the body or corporeal substance of the Cartesians, being just
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extended and infinitely divisible, does not have unity. In section twelve of the Discourse .
however, Leibniz stresses the phenomenal character of bodily attributes. He says;
It can even be demonstrated that the concepts of size, figure, and motion are not so
distinct as has been imagined and that they include something imaginary and relative
to our perceptions, as do also (though to a greater extent) color, heat, and other
similar qualities which one may doubt truly are found in the nature of things outside
of ourselves. This is why qualities of this kind cannot constitute any substance. And if
there is no other principle of identity in body than those we have just mentioned, no
body can ever subsist longer than a moment.25
We can see above an extension of modern philosophy's conceptual schema whereby
a distinction is wrought between what belongs to the thing itself, the substance, and what
appears to us as the thing. Now, while figure, size and motion are primary qualities for
the Cartesians, which exist in the corporeal substance itself (color, heat and so-called
"sensible qualities," on the other hand, are not found in such substances outside
ourselves), for Leibniz the primary qualities of the Cartesians have to be considered
secondary (using Lockean terminology) insofar as they are not distinct and are relative
to our perceptions. Since not distinct, primary qualities are imaginary and not
intelligible, therefore, Leibniz believes, they are subjective and do not provide a
faithful rendering of corporeal substances as they are in themselves. And if subjective,
in the same manner of Cartesian secondary qualities, these attributes cannot account for
the identity or subsistence in time of a body as a corporeal substance, for they do not
really qualify the corporeal substance itself.
This last point is suggested by Leibniz in the last sentence of the passage quoted.
The sentence really goes beyond the claim that identity cannot be grounded upon qualities
that are just phenomenal, for it contains the suggestion that the Cartesian conception of a
body as just geometrically extended yields a static conception of substance which cannot
explain subsistence in time. This is consistent with the conception of matter as inert that
we find in Descartes, which entails the view that force is extrinsic to matter and
corporeal substances and leads in the direction of the occasionalistic account of causal
interaction between bodies. Two reasons, then, are suggested in the passage quoted above
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for discarding the view that only extensional qualities are the essential attributes of
corporeal substances.
If there are corporeal substances, Leibniz argues, they must be more than mere
extended entities. This "more" is obtained by conceiving of corporeal substances as
extended entities invested with substantial forms; a position which, Leibniz explains, he
was forced to reach even when he was initially inclined in favor of the view of the
"moderns" in which substantial forms have no explanatory role to play. Leibniz writes:
I know that I am advancing a great paradox in seeking to restore the old philosophy in
some respects and to restore these almost-banished substantial forms. But perhaps I
shall not be condemned so lightly when it is known that I have given much thought to
the modern philosophy and that I have spent much time in physical experiments and
geometric demonstrations and was for a long time convinced of the emptiness of these
beings to which I am at last compelled to return in spite of myself and as by force.26
The use of substantial forms to which Leibniz refers above purportedly enables
him to account for the unity and identity of the corporeal substance, and is indispensable
to the claim that there are such substances, for were it not that substantial unity and
identity can be explained, bodies would not be substances. Of course, the explicative
schema that Leibniz has in mind is the Aristotelian conceptual schema that serves in
Aristotle for explaining change in the world of spatio-temporal substances: it is
fundamental for comprehending the being of an entity, a substance, metaphysically
constituted by a matter invested with a substantial form.
One cannot, Leibniz is telling us, through the Cartesian characterization of bodies
as corporeal substances explain identity or unity, and this conception is defective also in
that phenomenal aspects of corporeal substances —figure, number, magnitude and
motion— are considered the essential attributes of such substances. Leibniz's own
account aims to transcend these limitations of the Cartesian view through the
introduction of the hylemorphic conceptual schema where substantial forms play a
central role. Leibniz, however, as we saw when explaining his view of mechanicism,
wants to use this schema within the limits of metaphysics strictly, and he clearly
establishes in the Discourse , his position in the following terms:
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I agree that the consideration of these forms serves no purpose in the details of
physics and that they ought not to be used to explain particular phenomena.... But this
inadequate understanding and abuse of the forms ought not to make us reject
something whose knowledge is so necessary in metaphysics that without it, I hold, we
cannot well understand the first principles or raise the spirit to the knowledge of
incorporeal natures and the wonders of God.27
The allusion to a misuse of substantial forms above, refers to the proliferation of
the use of "sympathies," "natures" and "principles" (principium frigidum, principium
maleficum, etc.) as explanatory instruments of physical occurrences, as if bodies
possessed intelligent particular principles, capable of acting in a manner that affords ad
hoc explanations of anything that occurs. These are explanations that Leibniz
emphatically rejects as unphilosophical, as we saw in the second chapter of this work.
He attributes them to the Scholastics and also to philosophers like Thomas More and
Josef Scaliger. In his own use of substantial forms these have no explanatory role with
regard to physical phenomena. Their meaning is metaphysical in the way suggested by
the last part of the passage quoted. They are significant with regard to the metaphysical
principles that appropriately explain the being of the substances that make up external
reality (hylemorphic composites), and are important with regard to immaterial
substances insofar as these are necessary for the correct account of the nature of
corporeal substances. And the elucidation of the nature of corporeal substances, as
Leibniz often explains, is indispensable to dynamics. It is for this reason that another
defect of Cartesianism, a defect in dynamics, is the object of Leibniz's attention in the
Discourse .
ii. A Defect of Descartes's Dynamics
Leibniz's critique of the Cartesian conception of bodies as corporeal substances is
furthered through another argument which occupies him in parts seventeen and eighteen
of the Discourse . The argument is based on the claim that the Cartesian account of laws of
nature is flawed; specifically, the view that "God always conserves the same quantity of
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motion in the world"28 can be shown, Leibniz believes, to be erroneous, and by doing so
the metaphysical conception upon which it is grounded is itself shown defective.
Many modern scientists and philosophers, it must be remembered, considered
substantial the entity in the external world whose only attributes are primary qualities.
For them the external world was a conglomerate of bodies in motion. This conception of
external reality entailed the view that all physical change is, or can be reduced to,
motion. It is this view of change which, according to Leibniz, is at the basis of the
Cartesian theory that states that the quantity of motion in the universe remains constant.
But a clear account of what it is that remains constant through change leads to the
discovery that force —conceived in a way that does not admit that it be be equated with
the phenomenal manifestations of motion expressed by the Cartesian equation, M x V = F
(mass times velocity equal force)— is what remains constant. From this realization we
should conclude, Leibniz contends, that the Cartesian conception of bodies as substances,
fundamentally and essentially qualified by motion, understood as a modification of
position, is inadmissible.
In section seventeen of the Discourse Leibniz explains that, for Descartes, in
physical change quantity of motion "coincides exactly with the moving force"29 and
remains constant. Quantity of motion is understood by Descartes as the product of
velocity^O times massf M x V = F ). Leibniz offers a case of a free falling body in order
to show that force does remain constant but should not be construed as quantity of motion.
He claims that a body that falls from a determinate height, should be able to rise to the
same height when impelled by the force it acquires from falling, and that height times
mass appropriately describes the force involved in changes of situation of falling or
rising bodies. Now, if force is the product of height times mass (H x M) but also, if the
Cartesians are right, it is the quantity of motion (M x V) we should get the same result
in any experiment, by any of the two formulas. This being the case, since the force
needed to lift a body of mass one to a height four is the same as that needed to lift a body of
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mass four to a height one, the mass times the velocity (the quantity of motion) of these
bodies upon falling should prove the same. But when after being lifted these bodies are
allowed to fall their force at the end of the fall measured as quantity of motion turns out
to be different. The body falling one unit will have a velocity of one, while the body
falling four units will have a velocity of two, "for as Galileo has demonstrated, the
velocity acquired by the fall CD [height, four units] is twice the velocity acquired by the
fall EF [height, one unit], though the height is four times as big."31 quantity of
motion in the case of the body falling four units of mass one will be two, while in the
other case, it will be four.
From this Leibniz concludes that force is not quantity of motion, and that quantity
of motion is not a constant in the universe. Now, since this mistake in Cartesian physics
is seen as a consequence of Descartes's metaphysical conception of corporeal substances
as essentially characterized by primary extensional attributes, the denial of the
Cartesian hypothesis in dynamics is said to entail the denial of his metaphysical views
about corporeal substances. Leibniz writes in section eighteen;
This consideration, in which force is distinguished from quantity of motion, is of
importance not only in physics and mechanics in finding the true laws of nature and
the rules of motion, and even in correcting many errors in practice which have
slipped into the writings of a number of able mathematicians, but also in
metaphysics for the better understanding of the principles. For considering only
what it means narrowly and formally, that is, a change of place, motion is not
something entirely real; when a number of bodies change their position with respect
to each other, it is impossible, merely from a consideration of these changes, to
determine to which bodies motion ought to be ascribed and which should be regarded
as at rest, as I could show geometrically if I wished to stop now to do it. But the force
or the immediate cause of these changes is something more real, and there is a
sufficient basis for ascribing it to one body rather than to another. This, therefore,
is also the way to learn to which body the motion preferably belongs. Now this force
is something different from size, figure, and motion, and from this we can conclude
that not everything which is conceived in a body consists solely in extension and its
modifications, as our moderns have persuaded themselves. Thus we are compelled to
restore also certain beings or forms which they have banished.32
We must be aware of the fact that Descartes and Leibniz share the same
metaphysical conceptual schema in the analysis of physical change, in which the
constancy of a factor points to what is substantial. In Descartes's example of the wax in
171
the second meditation (Meditations of First Philosophy ^ he had stressed that only
extendedness remained (is constant) in a process where the wax as a corporeal substance
did not lose its identity while losing its previous sensible qualities. In this manner he
was proving that the sensible qualities are not really (substantial) in the body while
extension is.^3 Analogously, Leibniz proves that in physical change that which is
constant points to what is substantial. The principle here in question is that causality is
grounded on substantiality so that an effect should be understood on the basis of the
substantial or essential features of the entities that change. In the domain of physical
entities the principle which states, that the effect obtains whatever reality the change
has brought about from its cause, suggests that the effect contains what is lost by the
cause and never more.^'^ If less than what was originally in the cause the difference
must remain in the cause. The outcome of these metaphysical conceptions is the view that
something remains constant in physical changes, and that, that is precisely what is
substantial. That this was motion followed from Descartes's metaphysical presupposition
considering motion an essential, and the most basic feature, of corporeal substance.
Leibniz proves that quantity of motion is not constant and infers that motion is not the
basic essential attribute of corporeal substance. But force, as the cause of phenomenal
change, must be.
The principle of the equivalence between cause and effect (footnote 34) is
fundamental to the recognition of the constancy of a factor in change. Leibniz frequently
emphasizes this point, and explains that were this principle not observed in nature we
would obtain perpetual motion. One of the problems entailed by the view that quantity of
motion is constant, according to Leibniz, is that it would make motion perpetual, and
would thus opposes this principle. This is the point of the passage below, where the law
of equivalence between cause and effect is affirmed in opposition to Descartes's
conception of motion as constant:
Furthermore, I have discovered that this law of nature holds instead, naniely that the
whole effect has the same power as its full cause, so that one cannot obtain perpetual
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motion, without violating the order of things through an increase of the power of the
effect beyond that of its cause ...35
The phenomenality of motion is suggested, according to Leibniz, not only by the
argument based on the constancy of a factor in change, but by the fact that motion, just
considered by itself, is relative. This is also emphasized in section eighteen of the
Discourse in the passage recently quoted where Leibniz says:
For considering only what it means narrowly and formally, that is, a change of place,
motion is not something entirely real; when a number of kx)dies change their position
with respect to each other, it is impossible, merely from a consideration of these
changes, to determine to which bodies motion ought to be ascribed and which should
be regarded as at rest, as I could show geometrically if I wished to stop now to do it.
(Supra footnote 32)
Change of location is entirely relative to the points of reference which are used to
establish whether a body is either at rest or in motion. One and the same body may be
considered at rest or in motion, according to the reference points taken. And this feature
of what Leibniz calls "phenomenal motion" must also, he claims, enable us to realize that
motion cannot be the fundamental ontological attribute of the substances that make up
external reality. What is substantial must have an absolute basis, which is why it must
be a constant throughout change. Force, conceived as a function of distance times mass, in
falling bodies, remains constant and is not handicapped by the relativity that
characterizes motion conceived as change of position; it must be considered, then, what
is substantial.
Force, we must keep in mind, is that to which Leibniz refers at the end of the
passage quoted above (footnote 32), when he says: "Thus we are compelled to restore also
certain beings or forms which they [the moderns] have banished." It, then, plays the
role of substantial form; and what must be evident, from what Leibniz claims, is that a
view of corporeal substance like the Cartesians' would not enable us to distinguish
between relative and true motion, for which distinction the concept of force is required.
A body conceived geometrically does not include force, and motion with regard to it would
only be change of position. It is only through the activity that the force makes possible
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that the corporeal substance in question may be said to posses true motion, which needs
to be distinguished from change of position, a relative or phenomenal feature. A
corporeal substance includes force as the metaphysical dimension by which it is active,
and force is substantial form. By complementing matter this substantial form makes the
corporeal substance active, but also unitary and identical, and thus a substance proper.
Descartes, according to Leibniz, by assuming, in spite of the relativity of motion,
that motion is an essential feature of matter insofar as extension is its fundamental
characteristic, was led to the mistake of considering quantity of motion constant. This
point seems quite clear in the line of thinking in the Discourse we have been explaining.
It is unequivocally stated in a passage from a work of 1695 entitle "Specimen
Dynamicum," one of Leibniz's most important statement on dynamics;
First of all, we must recognize that force is something absolutely real even in
created substances but that space, time, and motion have something akin to a mental
construction [de ente rationis ] and are not true and real per se but only insofar as
they involve the divine attributes of immensity, eternity, and activity or the force of
created substances. Hence it follows at once that ... motion apart from force (or
insofar as it involves only a consideration of the geometric concepts of magnitude,
figure, and their variations) is in fact nothing but change of situation; and thus that
motion insofar as it is phenomenal consists in a mere relationship. Descartes, too,
acknowledged this when he defined it as translation from the position of one body to
the position of another. But he forgot his definition when he deduced its consequences
and set up rules of motion as if motion were something real and absolute.36
There is an another implication for physics of the view that corporeal substances
are just extended entities to which Leibniz refers in the Discourse . He does not attribute
this "implication" to Descartes expressly, but treats it as consistent with Descartes's
views, and attempts to show that it provides additional evidence against Cartesian
metaphysics and in favor of substantial forms and the hylemorphic account of corporeal
substances. Let us proceed now to examine this aspect of Leibniz's treatment of dynamics
in relation to metaphysics.
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in. The Geometric Features of Bodies Are not Sufficient for Dynamics
The implication of the Cartesian conception of corporeal substance we will now
examine is presented by Leibniz as especially significant for showing that a purely
geometrical account of physical phenomena is not feasible. Leibniz refers to this
"implication" in the Discourse as a thesis to which he subscribed as a consequence of his
initial acceptance of the moderns’ conception of bodies, and describes it as follows:
For if there were nothing in bodies but extended mass, and nothing in motion but
change of place, and if everything should and could be deduced solely from the
definitions of these by geometric necessity, it would follow, as I have elsewhere
shown, that the smallest body, in colliding with the greatest body at rest, would
impart to it its own velocity, without losing any of this velocity itself; and it would
be necessary to accept a number of other such rules which are entirely contrary to
the formation of a system.37
As Leibniz suggests here and in many other works, the view that a small body
would be able to transmit the motion (velocity) it has, without any loss, to a much
larger body, is based on the supposition that the geometrical features of a body at rest,
conceived just in terms of figure and magnitude, include nothing which would make
resistance to motion by the body moved comprehensible. And if so the same motion of the
moving body would be aroused in the body moved without consideration of the masses or
the volumes involved. But this view is contrary to experience, for we see that big bodies
are not moved as expected when impacted by a small body. And Leibniz will explain that
metaphysical principles like that of the equivalence between the cause and the effect, and
also what he calls the principle of order,38 would be violated by such an account of
motion.
Leibniz frequently refers to his own recognition of these problems for a
geometrical account of the laws of motion as the product of youthful reflections that
brought about a change of mind. In his correspondence with De Voider, for example, we
are told:
Thus in a book written long ago when I was young, I proceeded on the assumption that
matter in itself is indifferent to motion and rest and concluded from this that the
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largest body, at rest, must be moved by any impelling body, however small, without
any weakening of the latter; from this I then derived the abstract rules of rrlotion for
the system. And such a world in which matter at rest would obey the moving body
without any resistance, could indeed be imagined as possible, but such a world would
actually be pure chaos. So the two tests upon which I always depend —success in
experiment and the principle of order— caused me later to recognize that matter has
been so created by God that there inheres in it a certain repugnance to motion and, to
put it in a word, a resistance, insofar as the body in itself withstands being moved
and thus opposes all motion if at rest, or all greater motive force applied in the same
direction if in motion, so that it weakens the force of the impelling body.39
A dynamics based on geometrical principles provides no basis for inferring the
existence of resistance in bodies. But, as Leibniz has been suggesting in the passages
recently cited, resistance is on the one hand, empirically evident, and, on the other hand,
an indispensable notion for the discovery of the correct laws of motion. It must be,
Leibniz contends, that there is something more in bodies than what their conception as
extensional entities affords. The "more" that Leibniz has in mind is substantial form
understood as force, without which we could not explain resistance.
The account of motion alluded above as implied by Cartesianism is described by
Leibniz as one where the "laws of impact depend only on the composition of motions.''^^
It appears to Leibniz as the account that would follow from the exclusive use of
geometrical principles, without any regard for metaphysical principles. The principles
of order and of the equivalence of cause and effect are metaphysical principles, and only
through their consideration can the appropriate laws of motion be discovered. The
relevance of these metaphysical principles points to the importance of God for the laws
of motion, for such laws as require these principles cannot be the outcome, Leibniz
explains, of a strictly materialistic conception of external reality (one such as the
exclusivity of the geometrical principles would warrant) and must be considered the
outcome of an action by an intelligent and moral being.
The view that metaphysical principles, which transcend geometry and need to be
acknowledge in physics, suggest the dependence of the laws of nature upon God’s wisdom
is crucial to Leibniz's interpretation of the meaning of the discovery of resistance in
bodies. In the Discourse the sentence previous to the passage where he claims that if only
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geometrical principles governed nature, "the smallest body, in colliding with the
greatest body at rest, would impart to it its own velocity, without losing any of this
velocity itself" (Supra footnote 37) suggests that God's intelligence or wisdom should be
recognized, beyond the organization of bodily functions in animals, even in the general
laws of nature. It reads:
Now, since the wisdom of God has always been recognized in the detail of the
mechanical structures of certain particular bodies, it must also be shown in the
general economy of the world and in the constitution of the laws of nature. This is so
true that one can observe the designs of this wisdom in the general laws of motion.^
^
In a work of 1890, entitled "On The Nature of Body and The Laws of Motion" this
view is treated more extensively. There, that geometrical principles and the theory of
the compositions of motions are insufficient for an account of nature, Leibniz explains,
led him to recognize the dependence of dynamics upon metaphysical principles and upon
God:
There was a time when I believed that all the phenomena of motion could be explained
on purely geometrical principles, assuming no metaphysical propositions, and that
the laws of impact depend only on the composition of motions. But through more
profound meditation I discovered that this is impossible, and I learned a truth higher
than all mechanics, namely, that everything in nature can indeed be explained
mechanically but that the principles of mechanics themselves depend on
metaphysical, and, in a sense, moral principles, that is, on the contemplation of the
most perfectly effectual [operans], efficient and final cause, namely, God, and cannot
in any way be deduced from the blind composition of motions. And thus, I learned that
it is impossible for there to be nothing in the world except matter and its variations,
as the Epicureans held.^2
We can clearly realize now that Leibniz's claim in the Discourse , that from a
strictly geometrical account of motion "it would be necessary to accept a number of
other such rules which would be entirely contrary to the formation of a system" (Supra
footnote 37), is based on the view that an interpretation of physical interaction without
resistance would be chaotic and not part of an ordered nature. Furthermore, to conceive
of nature in this way would be contrary to its conception as the creation of a wise and
omnipotent God. Such a God acts in consonance with the highest metaphysical principles
for these are expressions of wisdom. And principles like the principle of order would
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never be violated by God. The laws of motion of the Cartesians would hence imply a
conception of nature unworthy of God.
Just as we saw when we inquired into the reasons for Leibniz's rejection of
occasionalism, there are some philosophies whose basic tenets, according to Leibniz,
entail an unworthy conception of God. Descartes's and Malebranche's views of dynamics
are, insofar as they disregard final causes and assume that the extensional attributes of
bodies suffice for their physical characterization, defective in a way that will conduce to
an erroneous account of the laws of motion and to a conception of nature that includes
consequences incompatible with the true conception of God.
To conceive of creation as necessary would do away with choosing and hence with
the freedom of God, consequently it would entail also negating his wisdom; to conceive of
nature as disordered and chaotic entails that the rules of wisdom that preside over God's
actions do not exist, or that his actions are not thus principled. God would turn out not to
be wise, or else would be defective in some other fundamental way. Now, since empirical
evidence is contrary to a hypothesis grounded on the Cartesian conception of corporeal
substances, and consequences follow from it that are contrary to metaphysical principles
and to an appropriate understanding of God, we must conclude that this conception is
false.
Of course, one of the points that Leibniz wants to emphasize in this context is the
view that an account of nature, like the Cartesians', that makes no use of final causes has
no way of linking principles of wisdom, such as the principle of order, to nature, and is
thus led to very erroneous conjectures about the laws of nature. A systematic account of
reality, such as Leibniz's, by contrast, starts with an awareness of the linkage that must
hold between the different areas of cognitive concern, and regards the laws of nature in
the context of their relation to creation and to God. This approach enables Leibniz to
conceive the laws of nature as the outcome of laws of wisdom that guide God s intellect. In
this fashion the highest metaphysical principles must be considered the basis of physical
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principles. Since these metaphysical principles rule over God's intellect as guiding
principles of his actions, they turn out to be moral principles. We can now
appropriately understand Leibniz's reiterated claim suggesting that the laws of motion
ultimately respond to moral principles. These and all the laws of created reality must
accord with the principle that presides over God's decisions in general: the principle of
the best.
iv. Substantial Forms: Indispensable in Dynamics
We have seen, up to now, considerable evidence in the Discourse of Leibniz's
defense of the existence of corporeal substances, understood not as extended entities but
as composites of the sort that led Stuart Brown to suggest that his is a monistic theory
where neither bodies nor souls are substances. In the Discourse the defense of these type
of substances is based mainly, as the passages we have quoted show, on the claim that the
prevalent conception of corporeal substances, which makes no use of substantial forms,
leads to mistakes in dynamics. It would seem that what Brown characterized as a
biologically oriented conception of corporeal substances as organic unities is motivated
by considerations in dynamics primarily. It is clear too that this conception is offered as
one that solves the problems the Cartesian conception gives rise to. Within this context
the substantial form works as the principle that explains the active character of a
corporeal substance, its unity and its identity in time; it also enables us to understand
both the real nature of the entities which make up the physical world and the laws (of
motion) that govern their phenomenal manifestations. Substantial forms are introduced,
by Leibniz, in opposition to an exclusively geometrical conception of corporeal
substances, on the basis of certain metaphysical insights about the nature of substance,
which enable us to do physics correctly. We must realize, then, that though their
metaphysical significance is fundamental, there is a great emphasis in the DiSCQUrSfi on
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thGir physic3l implic3tions, in a way that makos Brown's sugQGStion —that dynamics and
physics prompt a change whereby what primarily was a biological conception of
corporeal substances had to be abandoned— unacceptable.
The emphasis that Brown places on the biological significance of the Aristotelian
hylemorphic conceptual schema has blinded him to the fact that though soul-like
substantial forms served in Aristotle mainly for explaining life, in Leibniz they play a
more basic metaphysical role with respect to all types of substances, the substances of
the physical world included. In fact the impression one gets, as our examination of the
Discourse must have suggested, is that the principle of life of Aristotle becomes, for
Leibniz, preeminently a principle of action, whose most important explanatory role
relates to physics. We will see that this impression must be somewhat modified; yet we
can say now, unhesitantly, that Brown's interpretation of substantial forms as that
which, against Descartes, is used by Leibniz to account for the essential unity of animals
—which otherwise would have to be considered machines— misses a considerable part of
what Leibniz is saying.
Once we realize what results from making figure, magnitude and motion
phenomenal attributes of corporeal substances we become aware of a shift by Leibniz
whereby the substantial in the physical realm is not being abandoned but what is truly
real in a corporeal substance is not spatial but dynamical, force. Now this may sound
closer to what Brown tells us, but we must realize that we still have for Leibniz
corporeal substances, that the essential attribute of such substances is force, from
which the substance is primarily an agent of force and activity, and has motion as its
phenomenal manifestation which, in turn, yields figure and magnitude.
We can also say, at this stage, before our examination of the Correspondence with
Arnauld . that there is a problem in Brown's interpretation that stems from a degree of
inconsistency in what he says when he attempts to make clear what is Leibniz's view of
corporeal substance. His suggestion that what prevails in the Discourse is 3 monistic
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conception of substance where bodies by themselves are not substances (Supra footnote
9) would, if he means by "bodies" "corporeal substances" (as he usually does when he
uses this term), entail the rejection of corporeal substances already. This would seem
hard to conciliate with the claim he started out with, that in the Discourse we have a
defense of corporeal substances, which is only abandoned at the end of the correspondence
with Arnauld. The problem, I believe, is the result of a poor interpretation of Leibniz
which has not brought about the realization that the terms "body" and "corporeal
substance" are not equivalent in Leibniz's metaphysics. The practice of using these terms
as interchangeable, which we find in Brown, is appropriate to Cartesian metaphysics,
but contrary to Leibniz's. The fact is that Brown seems not aware of the importance for
Leibniz's position of being very careful when using these terms so that in statements
where the term "body" appears, if Leibniz's position is being expressed, "corporeal
substance" should not be necessarily understood. Only thus can it become clear that
Leibniz can at the same time deny substantiality to bodies while affirming corporeal
substances.
We have a very important piece of evidence illustrating this carelessness in the
usage of the terms in question, on the part of Brown, in his assertions regarding
Leibniz's letter to Arnauld of 1690. His whole thesis suggesting a change in Leibniz
whereby corporeal substances are abandoned, is grounded on an interpretation of the
contents of this letter where the term "body" is handled as if it meant "corporeal
substance." The crucial sentence says:
A body is an aggregation of substances, and is not a substance, properly speaking.^3
Now, this statement would not be interpreted as a negation of corporeal substances
by anyone who takes "body" here not to mean the same as "corporeal substance." The
assertion, on the basis of what we already know from the Discourse, is entirely
compatible with Leibniz's consistent negation of the substantial character of bodies
conceived as just extended entities. A negation that we know does not entail the negation of
181
corporeal substances, otherwise understood. Indeed the sentence that follows the one just
quoted reaffirms this interpretation of Leibniz. It suggests that "bodies," which are not
for Leibniz corporeal substances but "well-founded phenomena," have true substances
underlying them. Leibniz goes on as follows:
Consequently, in all bodies must be found indivisible substances which cannot be
generated and are not corruptible, having something which corresponds to souls.^^
If in the sentence above the reference to what "must be found" in bodies is
understood as an an allusion to underlying substances from which the nature of bodies as
"aggregates" becomes metaphysically comprehensible, and if such underlying substances
are corporeal substances, we can read this statement very differently from Brown. It
would rather be the expression of a metaphysics which includes corporeal substances
and considers bodies "beings by aggregation." This is, I believe, what Leibniz means.
The terminological confusion that I attribute to Brown explains his claim
suggesting that Leibniz is willing to be lax in the use of metaphysical terms outside
strict metaphysical contexts—a laxity that Brown takes to its utmost limits as in the
statement where he speaks of a "corporeal substance" being a "phenomenom" (Supra
footnote 22). It is true that Leibniz is not totally consistent in his usage of the words
"body" and "corporeal substance," but he is trying to express the view that bodies
without a principle of action (a substantial form) are not substances, and yet that they
are substances when so endowed. This task, and expressing other aspects of the
substantiality of corporeal substances versus the phenomenality of bodies, give rise to
statements where the terms in question are dealt with in a way that could lead to
erroneous interpretations. But, with what I consider the correct interpretation of his
views we become aware of the fact that Leibniz's usage of these terms in the DisCQursfi
and the Correspondence with Arnauld is not as lax as Brown makes it out to be.
Leibniz's attempt to clarify his views before Arnauld strengthens the
interpretation I have offered. The Correspondence is indeed an excellent source of
enlightenment of this whole topic, for the question of the substantial unity of a corporeal
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substance becomes, from Arnauld's letter of September 28,1686 onward, one of the two
dominant concerns of the correspondents. These letters must now obtain our attention.
b. Correspondence with Arnauld
i. Point of Departure: Arnauld's Letter of Sept. 28, 1686
I would roughly divide the correspondence between Arnauld and Leibniz into two
parts, the last of which begins with Arnauld's letter of Sept. 28, 1686. While the first
part is mostly concerned with problems of freedom and necessity which originate from
Leibniz's conception of substance, the last deals with two topics that Arnauld identifies as
still obscure to him: Leibniz's "hypothesis of the concomitance and of the agreement of
substances among themselves,'"^^ and the following statement by Leibniz:
"In order that the body or matter should not be a simple phenomenom, like a
rainbow, nor a being brought together by accident or by an accumulation, like a pile
of stones, it must not consist merely in extension, and there must needs be something
which is called the substantial form and which corresponds in some sort to what is
called the soul."^®
Leibniz will address both topics in the letters that follow in the correspondence.
Our concern is the obscure statement. What Leibniz adds in the correspondence, in his
attempt to satisfy Arnauld's request for clarity, goes well beyond what was stated in the
Discourse : and indeed, clarifies what he means by "corporeal substance," "substantial
form," and "body." It is my view that this amplification is, however, completely
consistent with what was suggested in the Discourse . In order to emphasize what I
consider central to his elucidation of this topic and to present the passages in Leibniz s
letters that seem most important in this regard, I have divided the exposition that
follows under five tittles: "Contextual Significance of the Obscure Statement;" "The Draft
of the Letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8, 1686;" "The Letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8, 1686;" "The
Letter of April 30, 1687," and, "The Letter of October 6, 1687."
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ii. Contextual Significance of the Obscure Statement
The statement cited above (Supra footnote 46) first appears in Leibniz's letter to
Arnauld dated, July 14, 1686, where he is mainly concerned with clarifying, the
following proposition:
"That the individual concept of each person involves once for all, all that will ever
happen to him."^7
In this proposition "a person" is an instance of substance. Leibniz, as we have seen
in the previous part of this work, often expresses a general version of this statement
which is obtained from the one above by substituting "substance" for "person" in it.
What we have here then is a typical reference to the complete concept of an individual
substance.
Though Arnauld's question about the puzzling statement goes quite beyond asking
for the meaning of the statement within the context of the letter it first appears in, and
leads in the correspondence to the elucidation of the metaphysical status of bodies and
corporeal substances, I believe that it is worthwhile to clarify its contextual
significance. To achieve this we must understand the import of the proposition around
which the letter of July 14 centers. It states what could also be expressed as follows: a
complete concept includes all the predicates that may be truthfully ascertained of its
substance. Now, Leibniz, in the Discourse and the previous letters has already explained
that God possesses this concept before creation as the idea of a possible individual
substance, and that this idea is that substance's individual essence, with which the
existent or created substance must accord, and which for this reason determines its
being a priori. Since this means that created individual substances will exhibit the
attributes and modalities that their individual essences prescribe, one must conclude, as
Leibniz frequently ask us to do, that nothing that occurs to a substance is externally
caused, but originates from itself (from its complete concept). Wherefrom Leibniz says:
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Thus every individual substance or complete being is, as it were, a world apart,
independent of everything else excepting God."*®
It is this self-sufficiency, only limited by the relation a substance bears to God’s
continuous creation, that warrants that corporeal substances, appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding, do not really influence each other (interact).'^
^
Now, the statement Arnauld finds puzzling is introduced by Leibniz after a
sentence that says, "It may be surprising, perhaps, that I deny the action of one
corporeal substance upon another, when this seems so evident, but, besides the fact that
others have already done this, we must also consider that it is rather a play of the
imagination than a distinct conception."50 Leibniz is saying that interaction between
corporeal substances is something we apprehend through our imagination and not the
product of a rational or intelligible apprehension, and he presents the next statement,
the obscure one, in order to strengthen this point through adding that bodies themselves,
without substantial forms, are imaginary. He brings in his view that corporeal
substances require other essential attributes than extension to suggest that it should not
be surprising to realize that interaction is imaginary once we realize that the subjects
of interaction (bodies as understood by the Cartesians) are themselves phenomenal.
We can see, by the account above, that the statement Arnauld finds obscure just
expresses what we must consider the view about bodies and corporeal substances of the
Discourse . Arnauld finds this position hard to accept because he is a dualist. For him
bodies, understood in terms of extension exclusively, are substances, and so are minds.
But Arnauld does not consider minds substantial forms. They do not relate to bodies in a
way significant to their substantiality, as they do in Leibniz's hylemorphic conception.
iii. The Draft of the Letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8, 1686
Arnauld’s dualism, stands at the basis of several questions that he presents to
Leibniz, in his letter of Sept. 28 in order to specify the aspects and implications of the
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puzzling statement which most need clarification.
1 paraphrase or reproduce them as
follows. If the body is a substance (as Arnauld believes), why should it need a substantial
form? Is a substantial form extended and divisible or not? "Is it the substantial form of
a block of marble which makes it one?"^^ Are there many substantial forms, one for
each body, or just one for extension (formam corporeitatis) ? Are the substantial forms
"different in kind when the bodies are different in kind?"52 Are the earth, the sun and
the moon unitary? How so? Why speak of substantial forms if we have no clear ideas of
them and they contribute nothing to the explanation of particular phenomena in nature?
Leibniz addresses these questions in a draft of a letter and a letter proper dated
Nov. 28-Dec. 8 1686. In the draft we find a statement that Stuart Brown mentions as
evidence of Leibniz's practice of taking the established opinions (Scholastic) as
presumptively true. It says:
First of all, we must maintain that the bodies are substances and not merely true
phenomena like the rainbow, ...53
The "must" according to Brown points to the need of presuming that bodies are
substances, along with established opinion. I believe this is correct, but with the
qualification that this statement only expresses tentatively Leibniz's position, since it
needs to be clarified through an appropriate characterization of how it is that bodies are
substances. The statement does not express, as Brown would have it, the Scholastic
presumptively true view that Leibniz's will defend, only to surrender afterwards, but
one that he wants to show is untenable if bodies are understood in the Cartesian fashion,
while acceptable if they are considered unitary in that they have a substantial form.
We can see here again, in Brown's suggestion, the basis for his usage of the terms
"bodies" and "corporeal substances" as interchangeable, which leads him to consider
assertions where "bodies" are said to be "substances" as expressive of Leibniz's own
view, without apparently recognizing that such sentences often serve to present a
metaphysical view that Leibniz wants to modify. Brown will read, hence, statements that
assert that bodies are not substances, as if expressing Leibniz's definitive position
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against corporeal substances. It is odd that he does this while he also writes as if aware
that Leibniz is rejecting the conception of corporeal substance of the Cartesians.
Consistent with my interpretation, what follows in the draft is what we have been
accustomed to expect from the Discourse : the claim that corporeal substances cannot be
understood in terms of extension alone. Leibniz writes:
I think, that the corporeal substance consists neither in extension nor in divisibility
for it will be granted that two bodies distant from each other, for example, two
triangles are not really one substance; suppose now that they come together to
compose a square, does the mere contact make them one substance? I do not think
S0.54
The main thrust of what is contained in this draft is the view that extended entities
have only unity from "contact" and this is not substantial unity but unity "by
aggregation," or as Leibniz says elsewhere "unity through accident:"
Now, every extended mass may be considered as a composite of two or of a thousand
others, and the only extension there is, is that by contact. Consequently, we shall
never find a body of which we can say that it is really one substance; it will always
be an aggregate of several. Or rather, it will not be a real being, because the
component parts are subject to the same difficulty, and we should never reach a real
being, for the beings which result from an aggregation have only as much reality as
there is in their ingredients.^®
The passage above is important beyond asserting that bodies are not substantial. It
mentions a feature of beings by aggregation that is crucial for Leibniz's metaphysics:
such beings acquire the reality they posses from their components. This being so, if we
are to understand bodies as beings by aggregation, composed of other such bodies, it is
not only that we have not a substance in such a body, but that it will not be a real being at
all. Leibniz's point is that in order to fully understand metaphysically a being by
aggregation we must inquire about the nature of its components, and these may be either
substances or again beings by aggregation (bodies, corpuscles) about whose components
the same question must be raised. In such a reductive analysis, if a substance is not
reached we would have a process ad infinitum yielding only bodies at each reductive
stage. Without an end to the process there would not be metaphysical support for the
aggregates in question and one would need to conclude that they are not real. If reality is
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to be predicated of beings by aggregation, Leibniz contends, substantial ultimate
components must be reached. And these cannot be bodies, but rather substantial unities.
The metaphysical category "being by aggregation" requires hence substances.
The draft contains another argument against Arnauld's conception of substance,
which Leibniz presents as follows:
The general conception of individual substance, which seems to appeal to you, M.
[Arnauld], evidences the same thing, that extension is an attribute which can never
constitute a complete being; no action can ever be derived from extension, and no
change. It merely expresses a present state. Never does it express the future or the
past as the conception of a substance should.^^
This argument is linked to a point we found expressed in the Discourse (Supra
p. 167): that a substance's identity in time cannot be explained through a static
geometrical conception of substance, such as Descartes's conception of corporeal
substance. It stresses that a substance is a being capable of action, and therefore an
entity which coheres in time, a complete being not fragmented by succession in time.
Extension is not an attribute on the basis of which identity can be affirmed; activity,
however, requires an integration of past, present and future, in a way that enables one
identical substance to subsist through time.
In the context of the Correspondence, it must be remembered, the argument above
is offered with the definition of an individual substance as that which affords a complete
concept as background. The individual essence of an individual substance, we have been
told, ensures that everything that occurs to it unfolds from its own being in conformity
with its complete concept. And this, according to Leibniz, entails that substances do not
influence each other and that what occurs to one originates from its own metaphysical
spontaneity. The Cartesians (Arnauld) considered bodies inactive, obtaining all their
motion from forces extraneous to it, but Leibniz's conception of substance as spontaneous
implies that all modalities of a substance (motion in the case of a corporeal substance)
result from its own principle of action (its substantial form). Bodies as understood by
Arnauld are said to lack such principles of action, hence such bodies cannot be substances
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according to Leibniz. Identity, in Leibniz's conception, results from the agency in time of
a substance which is the outcome of its spontaneity or activity. This spontaneity projects
the being of a substance in time as prescribed by its complete concept. The complete
concept is the individual essence, but also the individual substance's substantial form,
its principle of action, and the source of its identity.
The argument above, then, restates Leibniz's views against Cartesianism. Its
emphasis, however, is different from those arguments which stress unity, for agency in
it, as a feature of substantiality which warrants identity, is uppermost and not unity.
iv. The Letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8, 1686
In the letter of Nov. 28-Dec.8 Leibniz addresses Arnauld's questions (of Sept. 28)
specifically. He starts out (with regard to the first question. Supra p. 186) by opposing
Arnauld's Cartesian claim —that bodies are substances, as are souls, and that the two are
distinct— by arguing, in the same fashion we have seen before, against the substantial
character of bodies. Leibniz also refers to a declaration of the "last Lateran council"
stating "that the soul is veritably the substantial form of our body,"^® as if consistent
with his view. Emphasis is placed here on the affinity between his position and the
hylemorphic account of corporeal substances (such as human beings) of Scholasticism.
But we must remember that, for Leibniz, this traditional account is not completely
acceptable insofar as the substantial forms play in it a role in the explanation of
physical phenomena. Evidently, Leibniz's reference to the Lateran council's position
aims at the metaphysical value of the hylemorphic conceptual schema, which, as we have
seen, has important consequences for the principles at the basis of dynamics, but does
not include the use of substantial forms in the causal explanation of phenomenal
occurrences. Evidently too, his affinity with orthodox positions of the Catholic church is
expressed in consonance with his ecumenical interests.
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Leibniz answers Arnauld's second question by saying that "every substance is
indestructible and also ingenerable."^^ An animal, he explains, is a substance, and its
death is transformation not annihilation, for the unitary substance subsists after death
though its physical appearance changes drastically.
The question about the substantial unity of a block of marble prompts as answer
the clarification of what are beings by aggregation, along the same lines followed in the
draft of the letter. Extended entities, like the block of marble, we are told, have
accidental unity (from contact). Substantial unity is far more than unity by aggregation,
as the following passage explains;
Substantial unity calls for a thoroughly indivisible being, naturally indestructible
since its concept involves all that must happen to it. This characteristic cannot be
found either in forms [shapes] or in motions, both of which involve something
imaginary as I could demonstrate. It can be found, however, in a soul or a substantial
form, such as is the one called the me.... Now, the me above mentioned or whatever
corresponds to it, in each individual substance can neither be made nor destroyed by
the bringing together or separation of the parts. Such juxtapositions are wholly
apart from the constitution of a substance.^^
This passage makes it clear that Leibniz speaks as if substantial forms were
indivisible beings, hence substances. We have seen that he consistently suggests that
bodies invested with substantial forms are individual substances, also indestructible.
The "me" which he frequently also calls the "soul," but more precisely a "spirit," when
he is interested in distinguishing the substantial form of man from that of animals
(souls) or that of corporeal substances (substantial forms), is said, in the next to the
last sentence above not to be affected "by the bringing together or separation of the
parts." I understand that Leibniz suggests here that the individual substance, which
obtains its unity from a substantial form modifying a body, maintains its unity even
when its body is still divisible and actually suffers division. In a way that is very hard to
understand for Arnauld, and also, it seems, for many commentators of Leibniz, an
individual substance may have a body but also unity from its substantial form, of a sort
that is not affected by the divisibility of its body. Leibniz seems to believe that what
cannot be attained by a merely extended entity, substantial unity and divisibility
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together, is attainable by that special being which is a body invested with a substantial
form.61 It would seem that the individual living substance, indestructible and yet
transforming itself continuously from the change of its bodily parts, is an instance of
this type of substantiality. If so a living substance and a corporeal substance would be
the same type of entity, resulting from having a body endowed with a substantial form.
The soul-like character of this form warrants that the corporeal substance thus
constituted be organic in nature.
Arnauld’s question about "formam corporeitatis" is answered by Leibniz as
follows: "I assign substantial forms to all corporeal substances that are more than
mechanically united."®^ |f the contrast between a form that explains corporeality and
ones that endows with individuality a substance is stressed, this answer suggests that a
substantial form is not a specific but an individual essence, for it is that which endows
an individual with its substantiality. It also underlines that corporeal entities which
posses a form have more than unity by contact. It is consistent with the emphasis
throughout the correspondence upon the meaning of a complete concept as a substance's
individual essence, and as that which is its source of action, identity in time, and unity.
The individual essence is the substantial form of an individual substance. And it is
clearly, as its principle of spontaneity or action, what Leibniz has called "force" in the
case of corporeal substances.
The last questions in this letter bring about answers consistent with Leibniz's
distinction between beings by aggregation and substances. The sun, the earth and the
moon need to be classified under one of these two ontological categories according to the
criterion of substantial unity. If they, or any other body, lack substantial unity, they
cannot be substances: in Leibniz's words, "if there are no corporeal substances such as I
claim, it follows that bodies are only true phenomena like the rainbow."®^
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The suggestion by Arnauld that forms have little use for they have no explanatory
role with regard to phenomena, prompts a reaction by Leibniz, where the contrast
between their metaphysical and physical significance is stressed:
With infinite subdivision the body would be doubtless imaginary and a mere
appearance, if there was only the material and its modifications. Nevertheless, it is
useless to make mention of the unity, the concept, or the substantial forms of bodies
when it is a question of explaining the particular phenomena of nature,... all the
phenomena of the body can be explained mechanically or by the corpuscular
philosophy in accordance with certain assumed mechanical principles without
troubling oneself as to whether there are souls or not. In the ultimate analysis of the
principles of physics and mechanics, however, it is found that these assumed
principles cannot be explained solely by the modifications of extension, and the very
nature of force calls for something else.®'^
As we saw when we discussed Leibniz affinity with modern physics with respect to
mechanicism, his introduction of forms must not be understood in the traditional fashion
of Scholasticism.65 jhey have only metaphysical significance. Mainly, it would seem,
they are significant in that they enable that corporeal substances be explained and
affirmed, for without substantial forms we could not speak of corporeal substances. They
are also metaphysically significant in that they afford the appropriate view of an
immaterial substance, since Leibniz speaks of a substantial form as analogous to a soul
and considers it an immaterial substance. Finally, as we have seen in the context of the
Correspondence , by providing an account of corporeal substantiality they are
instrumental in explaining the meaning of beings by aggregation.
The rejection of the view that "forms" affect phenomenal occurrences does not
mean that they have no consequences in physics, for as Leibniz constantly says, without
acknowledging that forces or substantial forms are indispensable for understanding
corporeal substance we would incline to an account of dynamics like the Cartesians'. This
would incapacitate us for recognizing inertia in bodies. It is partly because he realizes
that a substance cannot be a being without unity or identity that Leibniz is led to the
notion of force, and to that of resistance of motion, indispensable notions for the correct
account of the laws of motion, as his criticism of Descartes's dynamics shows.
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V. Leibniz's Letter of April 30, 1687
The letter of April 30 1687 answers that of Arnauld dated March 4, 1687. It first
addresses the issue of substantial unity with an argument, based on Leibniz's conception
of the reality of beings by aggregation, offered against an objection that Arnauld
presented in his letter. Arnauld suggested that Leibniz's definition of substance as
unitary is not shared by other philosophers and is rather idiosyncratic. A substance, he
argues, could rather be defined as "that which is not a modality or manner of being."®®
This definition enables Arnauld to say that bodies may have no unity, are beings by
aggregation, and yet are substances, for it does not make unity a necessary feature of
substance.
Leibniz argues against this position of Arnauld by presenting his views about the
reality of a being by aggregation, in terms such as we saw before. After stating that what
we have here is no mere dispute about words, he suggests that the claim that a substance
has unity must be recognized as a necessary metaphysical conception. Whether one wants
it or not substances, conceived as unitary, are needed in order to explain what is real. It
will not do, as Arnauld pretends, to posit the existence of bodies as substantial without
unity. The problem is that there cannot be a real being from the aggregation of
components which are not substantial, and substantial components must be unitary,
themselves no longer reducible, if the reductive breakdown of a being by aggregation is
to stop. The concept of a being by aggregation is not self-sufficient and requires the
metaphysical concept of substances understood as unitary beings. Leibniz says:
I take still higher ground and, leaving the question of terminology, I believe that
where there are only beings by aggregation, there are not even real beings, because
every being by aggregation pre-supposes beings endowed with true unity, because it
obtains its reality only from the reality of the elements of which it is composed, so
that it will have no reality at all if every being of which it is composed is again a
being by aggregation;. ..®^
One way or another, either as the unitary whole that is a corporeal substance, or as
the ultimate, no longer divisible component of a real entity, which component again must
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be unitary, real unitary beings are fundamental to an account of reality according to
Leibniz. And the source of unity is the substantial form. An ontology without unities
would lack real existents. An account of external reality without unities would lack
corporeal substances, but also "beings by aggregation;" everything in such an external
world would be phenomenal, without any basis for objectivity. Leibniz must therefore
reject Arnauld's suggestion that it may be the case that corporeal substances have no
unity:
You object, M., that it might be of the essence of bodies to have no true unity. But it
will be then the essence of bodies to be phenomena deprived of all reality as would be
an orderly dream, for phenomena, like the rainbow or like a pile of stones, will be
wholly imaginary if they are not composed of beings which have a true unity.®®
It is clear that Leibniz distinguishes between the ontological status of beings by
aggregation —which are real in that their phenomenal presentation is grounded on the
substantial unities that underlie it— and pure phenomena. The latter, exemplified by
dream contents, are strictly subjective. A rainbow is a being by aggregation, just as
matter, without a substantial form but with unities as components, is. A being by
aggregation is phenomenal inasmuch as its unity is a mind product, but it is objective
insofar as it is a mode of substantial components.®® It is what Leibniz calls "a well
founded phenomenom." A pure phenomenom is not a being by aggregation; a rainbow
without underlying unities would be like a dream and not a well founded phenomenom. We
have here, then, the contrast between a perceptual object, whose unity is mental but
whose metaphysical basis is substantial, versus an entirely subjective presentation, a
dream phantasm. The latter, for Leibniz, has no objective reality whatsoever.
Leibniz's conception of beings by aggregation includes the unity that is the outcome
of the natural process of perception, in the objects of sense which we immediately
experience, such as a color, a sound, or a tactual sensation. These are characteristically
explained by Leibniz as constituted through a synthesis of minute stimuli that are
perceived unconsciously (as "petite perceptions") and become a conscious perceptual
whole upon being integrated. The unities that are strictly the resultant of what we might
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call "an intellectual synthesis," like an army, a corporation, an organized society, and
even a machine, are also beings by aggregation, according to Leibniz. Thought, then, as
the instrument which brings about the unity of beings by aggregation works in different
ways, and creates, Leibniz tells us, different degrees of accidental unity. He writes:
I agree that there are degrees of accidental unity, that a regulated society has more
unity than a confused mob and that an organized body or indeed a machine has more
uriity than a society, that is, it is more appropriate to conceive of them as a single
thing because there is more relation between the component elements. All these
unities, however, receive their names only through thoughts and through
appearances like colors, and other phenomena that are, nevertheless, called real. The
fact that a pile of stones or a block of marble can be touched does not prove its
substantial reality anymore successfully than the visibility of the rainbow proves
its reality.^ 0
It is important to be aware of the fact that Leibniz's position disclaiming that
bodies are corporeal substances is at the same time a clarification of the nature of
corporeal substances and a clarification of the nature of bodies. Bodies, for Leibniz are
real, as mental, or more specifically, perceptual, aggregations of substances, which lack
the overall connection of a substantial form. A body is a whole, it is experienced as a
perceptual whole, but it is not a substantial unit, and yet its reality requires substances
as underlying entities. A body as a whole is a unity by contact, a mechanical unity, which
results from our mental capacity for thinking together as a whole the substances which
underlie it.
For Leibniz pluralities are beings by aggregation; numbers he frequently says are
modes, and space and time are real in this same fashion. Only individuals are
substantially real; pluralities, ordered aggregates, functional wholes, and other such
entities are modes, modes, however, of individual substances. As Leibniz says:
Being is very different from beings, but the plural presupposes the singular; and
there where there is no being, are there still less several beings. What can be
clearer? I thought, therefore, that I should be permitted to distinguish beings by
aggregation from substances, since these beings have their unity only in our minds,
and our minds repose upon the relations or the modes of real substances.^^
The constitution of the mental unity of beings by aggregation is facilitated
according to Leibniz by the linguistic function of a name as the instrument of
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dGnomination of a plurality. Unities thus constituted are what Leibniz calls compendia
loquendi. nominal beings. Both material entities that are not substances, and the more
abstract entities, such as clocks and corporations, are conceived as unities with ease
when denominated with one name. Leibniz describes this nominal function in his letter of
April 1687 as follows;
We may say of these compounds and of similar things what Democritus said very well
of them, namely esse opinione, lege. vopo). Plato had the same opinion with regard to
all that is purely material. Our mind sees or conceives of certain true substances
which have certain modes. These modes involve relations to other substances
whenever the mind finds occasion to join them in thought and to make one name stand
for the whole assembly of these things, which name shall serve as a means of
reasoning; but we must not make the mistake of thinking that they are substances or
veritably real beings.^2
It seems clear, from the metaphysical distinctions that Leibniz elucidates in his
correspondence with Arnauld, that a good deal of what appears to us as external reality
is, according to Leibniz, made up of phenomenal entities that deserve to be distinguished
from true substances. These are nevertheless real, and belong under the metaphysical
category, "being by aggregation." These entities result from the manner in which an
independent reality of existents is known through a process where it presents itself as a
multiplicity of phenomenal unities. In fact what we naturally take for real are
primarily beings of this sort; perceptual, and conceptual unities dependent for their
unity upon a function of the mind. Behind this phenomenal world stands substantial
reality for Leibniz, whose characterization requires the notion of force, and whose
apprehension is intellectual, not sensational.^^
The Platonic contrast between a domain accessible through perception, not wholly
real and yet not totally fictitious (a mixture of being and non-being), and the domain of
absolute reality, accessible only through reason, is definitely the conceptual schema that
Leibniz uses when he contrasts the being of perceptual well-founded phenomena and that
of substances. The former, the bodies which make up external reality, are the objects of
physics, wholly explainable in terms of the corpuscular theory, which we must realize,
concerns itself not with absolute reality but with what deserves to be called phenomenal
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reality," (where phenomenal motion belongs) which is not by itself substantial, but is
well founded and possesses a certain degree of reality. Individual substances, however,
are the objects of metaphysics, and not physics. Among these corporeal substances are
included. And relative to these Leibniz uses the notion of force as part of the old
hylemorphic schema, in which an active principle, a substantial form, (that is also a
force) informs a matter and constitutes a corporeal substance, active and unitary. The
corporeal substance is not the well founded phenomenom that belongs to physics, and the
substantial form of this corporeal substance is not immediately significant in the
account of the phenomenal dynamical relations that may be discovered in the phenomenal
realm of bodies.
There is one last point, which we may bring up relative to this letter, that is
important for our elucidation of Leibniz's views of corporeal substances and matter. It
has to do with the question, What kind of substances are the components of matter? We
have seen Leibniz defend the view that both the substantial form and the hylemorphic
composite, which he calls "a corporeal substance" or "a living being," are substances. If
so they must be unitary, and it would seem that both qualify for the role of matter's
ultimate components. Which one is it that plays this role? Can either of them play it? Of
course this topic is crucial to our questions about Leibniz's ontology. To answer that only
substantial forms, i.e., immaterial substances, are the ultimate components of bodies
certainly lends itself to the view that all that is substantial are such ultimate
components, and, hence, can easily be accommodated with idealism. An answer suggesting
that the ultimate components are corporeal substances would confirm the view that these
seem necessary in Leibniz's ontology, not only for an intelligible characterization of the
individuals of external substantial reality, but also for an understanding of external
phenomenal reality. Since it is clearly incontestable that Leibniz affirms the existence
of immaterial substances, this last answer would confirm dualism.
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I believe that there are several passages, in Leibniz's letter of April 30, that
suggest an answer to our question. The two that follow, once we underline that a living
being is a corporeal substance, would seem favorable to the view that corporeal
substances are the unities under matter as a well-founded phenomenom;
Every living thing contains a world of diversity in a real unity. Our experience is in
favor of this great number of living things; we find that there is a prodigious
quantity of them in a drop of water tinctured with powder and with one blow millions
of them can be killed
I grant that bodies by themselves without the soul have only a unity of aggregation,
but the reality which inheres in them comes from the parts which compose them and
which retain their substantial unity through the living bodies that are included in
them without number.^5
There are passages, however, throughout Leibniz's works where Leibniz speaks of
souls or "simple substances" as if these were the constituents of matter. Undoubtedly
such passages have been stressed by commentators, like Stuart Brown, who have favored
the view that immaterial substance underlie matter. In the letter we are examining one
passage speaks ambiguously of either "animated parts" or "souls" as the constituents of
body (matter). It says:
Nevertheless, although it is possible that a soul have a body made up of animated
parts or of separate souls, the soul or the form of the whole is not, therefore,
composed of souls or forms of parts.^®
It is clear that the main point in the passage above is that a soul is unitary, not an
aggregate, and remains so even when informing a body which is divisible. The reference
to the parts of a body suggests that these are either animated parts, corporeal substances
I take it, or souls. But, can they be either? What is Leibniz's definitive position on this
point?
In Leibniz letter of October 6, the last in the correspondence that will claim close
attention, we have important evidence for the alternative that considers corporeal
substances the constituents of matter. Let us then proceed to the examination of this
letter, with this topic preeminently in mind.
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Vi. The Letter of October 6, 1687
The letter that will now occupy us adds little to what we know already of Leibniz's
ontology with regard to substances in general, corporeal substances, beings by
aggregation, and phenomena. It contains, however, some very interesting passages,
which leave no doubt as to how Leibniz wants us to interpret his position. It specifically
addresses a series of questions from Arnauld in a letter of August 28, 1687, where the
French philosopher reacts to the exposition Leibniz has presented in the letter we
analyzed above. I will concentrate my attention on those passages that add to what we
know already about Leibniz's thought, but will also refer to some that are so clear and
crucial with respect to the line of interpretation we have been suggesting that they
certainly deserve our attention.
Among the several issues which Arnauld identifies as in need of clarification,
three seem to me most important for our concern. The first turns around a topic that
surely must be puzzling for one upholding the conception of corporeal substance of the
Cartesians. Arnauld expresses it as follows: "that a body which has no motion can give
itself motion."^^ The second has to do with Leibniz's fundamental contention that
corporeal substances acquire their unity from a substantial form; against this view,
Arnauld reiterates the claim that it might be feasible, even for Leibniz, to admit that
there are substances without unity, "plura entia” without "unum er?s." This issue is
linked to the following question by Arnauld: "how this substantial form could make it [a
body] cease being a plura entia and should make it a unum ens by an intrinsic
property."^® The third issue, very close to the second one, is incidental to what are
really two questions: whether substantial forms are indestructible, and whether
corporeal (animated) substances are indestructible.
The first issue, of course, will be answered by Leibniz by restating his view on
substantial spontaneity wherefrom even corporeal substances must be acknowledge to be
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such that they are intrinsically active and not interactive. This is a point we discussed in
the context of showing that it suggests a dualistic interpretation of Leibniz, for it clearly
places "bodies" ("corporeal substances," though Leibniz will at times speak of "bodies")
at the same level as active minds (Supra chapter III, subsection: "Substantial Activity").
Motion, hence will be considered by Leibniz an intrinsic modality of being of corporeal
substance, at least in the form of the force (real motion versus phenomenal motion)
which is its substantial form. It is not, therefore, externally caused. Leibniz reacts to
Arnauld's request for clarity concerning this issue with the following explanation:
I now think that you will see, M., what I mean, when I say that a corporeal substance
gives to itself its own motion, or rather, whatever there is of reality in the motion at
each moment, that is, the derivative force, of which it is a consequence; for every
preceding state of a substance is a consequence of its preceding state. It is true that a
body which has no motion cannot give itself motion; but I hold that there are no such
bodies.^9
A corporeal substance gives to itself its "derivative force" of which motion is a
consequence. In this manner motion is the product of a corporeal substance’s
spontaneity, which we know follows from the fact that every substance is the
actualization in time of a complete concept.
The term "body," in the last sentence of the passage quoted above, is used by
Leibniz as by Arnauld to refer to the corporeal substance. He had started out speaking of
corporeal substance, and the point he wants to make is that "bodies, that is, corporeal
substances, do have motion intrinsically. The use of the expressions "body" and
"corporeal substance" above suggests the problem of ambiguity that results from a
dialogue where the term "body" means for one of the parts "corporeal substance"
(Arnauld) and can be accepted to mean the same by the other, if it is acknowledge that the
body in question has a substantial form.
The second issue brings about reflections by Leibniz relative to the nature of
beings by aggregation that we have seen already, but it is especially interesting because
this topic is treated in this letter in a way that makes it very clear that corporeal or
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animated substances are the components of matter and that matter should not be confused
with corporeal substance.
There is a line of thinking, which includes several passages, where Leibniz
attempts to clarify his position to Arnauld, that are pertinent to the point we want now to
clarify. Leibniz begins by reminding Arnauld of his basic position: "there are not several
beings where there is not even one which may be truly a being, and I hold that every
multitude presupposes unity;"®^ He indicates that Arnauld has not met his position with
his objections, and that the latest shows that he has not understood Leibniz correctly. (Of
course, Leibniz is delicate enough to suggest that he has not explained himself
sufficiently.) The core of the misunderstanding turns around an objection by Arnauld
where he claims that to suggest, as Leibniz does, that all plura entia require that there
be unum ens, would leave Leibniz in an untenable position, for he only admits
(relatively) few animated substances ("which do not form one hundred thousand
thousandth part of the universe"®^) and, therefore, there would hardly be sufficient
unitary beings to account for the existence of the very many plura entia. On this basis,
Arnauld contends that it would seem feasible to conclude, from Leibniz's own position
that, "it is, therefore, not impossible that there should be plura entia even when there
is properly no unum ens."^^
Leibniz’s rejoinder is based on the claim that animated substances are not few
(relatively) in number, but infinitely numerous. It clearly shows that he considers
animated bodies or corporeal substances the constituents of all matter, and that since
matter is infinitely divisible, the number of animated substances is infinite, for the
innumerable parts of matter are all made up of animated substances. And besides,
corporeal substances all have a material body, divisible ad infinitum, all of whose parts
are made up of corporeal substances. So, far from saying that animated substances are
few in number, on the basis of his explanation of how matter is composed of corporeal
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substances and how corporeal substances are made up of matter and form, Leibniz can
defend the view that corporeal substances are infinite in number. He writes:
I am far from saying that animated bodies constitute a small proportion of the bodies
in the world; for, I think rather that everything is full of animated bodies, and in my
opinion there are incomparably more souls than M. Cordemoy has atoms. His atoms
are finite in number, while I hold that the number of souls, or at least of forms, is
wholly infinite, and that matter being divisible without end, no portion can be
obtained so small that there are not in it animated bodies, or at least such as are
endowed with a primitive entelechy, and (if you will permit me to use the word life
so generally), with the vital principle, that is to say, with corporeal substances, of
all of which it may be said in general that they are alive.®^
Leibniz frequently speaks of an infinite number of souls, and an infinite number
of animated substances ("animated bodies"). Of course what makes the number of souls
infinite is the fact that, "matter being divisible without end, no portion can be obtained
so small that there are not in it animated bodies, or at least such as are endowed with a
primitive entelechy,..." Each corporeal substance requires an entelechy, matter is made
up of an infinite number of corporeal substance, hence there are an infinite number of
souls or "entelechies."
It is interesting that Leibniz is not asserting above that souls are infinite merely
from the fact that a perfect God would create no less than such a number of souls. Though
in other works he will defend this view, on the basis of what he calls the "plenitude of
forms," here, the basis for his claim is the relation forms have to matter, in the
constitution of animated substances, which are the constituents of matter.
Arnauld's next concern: "if a particle of matter is not a unum ens but plura entia"
how can a substantial form, "which being really distinguished from it, could only give it
an extrinsic property," "make it cease being a plura entia and should make it a unun ens
by an intrinsic property,"®^ brings forth an answer that shows that what is unitary is
the corporeal substance and not matter. The problem should not be presented, Leibniz
argues, as Arnauld does, with the suggestion that matter relates extrinsically to a soul
since they are different substances, and cannot hence receive intrinsic unity from it. And
one should not speak of matter being unitary but rather, as Leibniz explains, of the
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animated substance" as the unitary being that results from the metaphysical reunion of
matter and soul. Leibniz writes:
As regard this other difficulty which you made, M., namely that the soul joined to
matter does not make the latter truly one, since the matter is not really one in itself,
and since the soul, as you think, gives it only an extrinsic character I reply that it is
the animated substance to which this matter belongs that is really a being, and the
matter which is understood as the mass in itself is only a pure phenomenom or
appearance, as well founded, however, as is space and time. It has not even those
precise and determined qualities which can enable it to pass as a determined being,
as I have already indicated in what precedes, because figure itself, which is the
essence of a limited extended mass, is never, strictly speaking, perfectly determined
in the state of nature because of the actually infinite division of the parts of
matter:. ..85
Matter is not a substance, it is not made unitary as matter; the corporeal
substance is material insofar as it has a material dimension along with an entelechy or
substantial form, as two dimensions of its metaphysical nature. But the corporeal
substance is not matter nor the body of the Cartesians. It is a living being, unitary and
substantial, whose material body however has parts which change continuously, for as
Leibniz says here and reiterates throughout his works:
It is true that the whole, which has a real unity may continue as the same individual
in the strictest sense even when it looses or gains parts as our experience shows
us.88
In the context of establishing that matter is made up of corporeal substances, and
also that it is the hylemorphic complement of form in the constitution of a corporeal
substance, Leibniz refers frequently to man as an instance of corporeal substance. It
would seem that while one may speak of one's own soul in a way that affords its
characterization as a substantial form which is an immaterial substance, when one is to
speak of oneself as a human being, a man, the entity in question is of the nature of the
hylemorphic composite. Though the dualism that is represented by Arnauld maintains a
radical distinction between the corporeal and the immaterial substances, and makes no
use of the hylemorphic conceptual schema, we find in Leibniz's writings the suggestion
that Descartes himself accepted the hylemorphic schema in the case of man, for whom
the soul played a role of substantial form relative to matter. I referred to this view in
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footnote 65, where Leibniz, in a writing entitled, "Considerations on Vital Principles
And Plastic Natures, by the Author of the System of Pre-established Harmony,"
contrasts his own use of substantial forms or vital principles to that of the Scholastics
and the Hylarchic Philosophers. In opposition to these, he stresses his affinity with
Descartes by saying:
These vital principles or souls have perception and appetite. When I am asked if they
are substantial forms, I reply with a distinction. For if this term is taken to mean
what Descartes meant in maintaining against Regis that the rational soul is the
substantial form of man I agree, (footnote 65, at the end of this chapter)
In his letter of October 6 Leibniz presents this conception to Arnauld in an attempt
to strengthen his position through implying that it should be easy to understand and to
accept for a Cartesian since it is a position Descartes himself accepted. All that he is
adding to Descartes, then, is just the suggestion that hylemorphic composites include
other entities besides man: animals and living beings, that is, which must be considered
corporeo-animated substances. In order to ease Arnauld's comprehension of this point,
and of the view that plura entia are made unitary by substantial forms, Leibniz
explains:
I reply that supposing there is soul or entelechy in beasts or in other corporeal
substances, we must reason in regard to them as we all reason regarding man, who is
a being endowed with a real unity; his soul gives him this unity although the mass of
his body is divided into organs, ducts, humors, spirits, and that the parts are
doubtless full of an infinity of other corporeal substances endowed with their own
entelechies.®^
Under the supposition that to conceive of man as a hylemorphic composite should
not be difficult for a Cartesian, Leibniz stresses that this is the conception that must be
used to understand the metaphysical nature of living beings as corporeal substances, and
that just as man is made unitary by his soul, a corporeal substance is made unitary by
its substantial form. This unity is not incompatible with the existence of ducts and parts
in the body of man, as it is not incompatible in the case of a corporeal substance with the
fact that it has divisible matter as the complement of substantial form.
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Leibniz’s clear distinction between matter and corporeal substance enables him to
emphasize, in this context, that there are many features which disqualify matter as a
substance, among which he underlines that a body is never determinate in the fashion
required of substances. But beyond restating his position against an interpretation of
Cartesian bodies as substantial and establishing that the unitary being he refers to as a
corporeal substance is the composite substance which includes body and soul, Leibniz
offers no other explanation of how a plura entia is made unitary by a substantial form.
Clearly, it comes down to the hylemorphic metaphysical relation of Aristotle and the
Scholastics, which now is conceived more in the manner of the soul-body relation of De
Anima than in the sense of the relation between substantial form and matter that enables
Aristotle to explain change in the inanimate world.
The last topic we are interested in, in this letter, is presented by Leibniz as his
attempt "to satisfy the difficulties" raised by Arnauld "against the indestructibility of
the substantial forms."®® One would expect that this issue, if considered strictly with
regard to substantial forms, were straightforwardly answered in the Platonic fashion
that stresses that immaterial substances are not subject to disintegration and death.
There are many instances in other works where Leibniz treats the issue of the
immortality of the soul separately in this fashion. Characteristically, he explains that
souls do not naturally perish as the result of some kind of physical process, as bodies do.
The passage below is a good example:
It is true that our bodies are subject to the impacts of other bodies and hence to
dissolution. But the soul is a substance entirely different from matter and space and
hence cannot be destroyed.®®
In his letter of October 6, 1687, Leibniz does not proceed in this manner. Instead
of addressing the issue of the indestructibility of substantial forms exclusively he mixes
two topics, which he sometimes distinguishes: the indestructibility of forms and the
imperishability of animals. Undoubtedly this manner of approaching the topic is fostered
by Arnauld's own presentation of it, because Arnauld, when requesting that the whole
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issue be clarified, speaks of both "substantial forms" and of "animals," since he wants to
know what happens to souls at the death of the animal.
In any case, Leibniz's explanation permits us to understand that beyond the
explanation of immortality which is strictly pertinent to substantial forms or
immaterial substances, the question subsists. How is it that animals may be considered
imperishable? In order to answer it Leibniz turns to an account whose central concept is
his notion of "transformation." Animals or corporeal substances, Leibniz tells us, are
substantial forms conjoined with bodies, in a way that enables us to conceive that a form
will always attach to its particular body in spite of this body's constant change; the
animal hence has always been and will always be alive. What we call "death," just as
what we call "birth," is simply the product of a change in the body of the animal in
question much more abrupt than those changes which we habitually observe through
what we consider its normal course of life. But strictly speaking there is no death. And
no birth either.
Leibniz claims that M. Leewenhoeck's investigations, showing that there is
microscopic life in matter, and his views with regard to the origins of life, are
empirical evidence of the truth of his own views. "I have recently learned." he tells us,
"that M. Leewenhoeck holds opinions quite like mine, in that he maintains that the
largest animals are born by a kind of transformation. Swamerdam, Leibniz explains,
also inclines towards this view as a result of his research. That death too is
transformation, Leibniz argues, is substantiated by the research of both thinkers:
For there is nothing so natural as to think that what does not begin does not perish
either, and when it is acknowledged that all births are only growths or developments
of an animal already formed, it is easy to be persuaded that decay or death is nothing
else than the diminution or the decrease of an animal, which, nevertheless, continues
to exist and to be living and organized.
Transformation is not metempsychosis: a soul is permanently linked to its
particular body in Leibniz's account, and has been linked to it from the moment of
creation onwards. A corporeal substance suffers changes continuously in its body
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throughout its existence, and the suddenness of some phases bring about the distinctions
called "birth" and "death." But the truth is that animated substances are not born and are
imperishable, for though in principle one may think that it is feasible that a soul be
separated from its body, this never naturally takes place according to Leibniz;
My position is that in the state of nature there are no souls without animated bodies
and no animated bodies without organs.^2
An organic body and a soul coexist in a substantial unity, and do so in spite of the
fact that the soul by itself is a substance, for they naturally concur metaphysically in
the composite that is a corporeal substance. Substantial unity prevails even when the
body of this corporeal substance is continuously changing. Human beings, it must be
remembered, are, for Leibniz, entities of this sort. Their immortality is dependent on
the nature of their substantial form; it is, however, the immortality of an animated
substance with body and mind, a substance that will not cease to exist except through an
act of annihilation by God, because it is naturally and sempiternally tied to its
everchanging body, and it perennially expresses it and, through it, the universe.
c. Conclusions
From our study of the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with
Arnauld . I believe we have presented a clear characterization of Leibniz’s conceptions of
corporeal substances and of bodies which enables us to assert that the two are not the
same and that we have a consistent unvarying account in both works which posits the
existence of both types of realities. A body, like every real being by aggregation, is a
well-founded phenomenon. Mere phenomena, however, are strictly subjective mental
contents and have no reality. Substances are what is truly and basically real in Leibniz,
and we have seen that he proclaims the existence of an external to consciousness,
metaphysically independent, realm, made up of individual corporeal substances. These
are unitary composites of matter and form, whose substantial unity results from its
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form performing the role of principle of unity. It is also its principle of action, and of
identity in time. Spatiality, paradoxical as it may sound, is not, for Leibniz, the
essential attribute of corporeal substances. Force, in a way that makes a substance a
subject of action, is.
Leibniz's characterization of bodies, we saw, pointed to an inescapable need of
substances, as their source of modal reality. Such underlying substances, in an
interpretation like Brown's could not be but immaterial. But if we realize that Leibniz is
far from abandoning corporeal substances we have no need of rejecting something for
which there is ample evidence in the works we have studied: the conclusion that the
substances that underlie matter and body as beings by aggregation are corporeal. We
even saw passages that clearly point to the infinite number of corporeal or animated
substances, as the constituents of matter, wherefrom Leibniz consistently claims that
life abounds everywhere. Animated substances need be infinite, for matter is infinitely
divisible, and actually divided into parts that are made up of living substances, unitary,
determinate, a portion of matter actualized into a corporeal substance by the reifying
function of a substantial form.
The recognition of the meaning of corporeal substances, as hylemorphic
composites was never accepted by Arnauld, who actually used the same argument Stuart
Brown presents as basic to Leibniz's alleged rejection of corporeal substances: that
animated substances since spatial (for they have a body) are infinitely divisible, and
cannot be made unitary by a substantial form. But if we stress that, according to Leibniz,
the hylemorphic composite is unitary and that it affords an appropriate
conceptualization of a substance that is corporeal (even though its body is still
divisible), and now examine the passage of the letter of March 23, 1690, which served
Brown for his interpretation, we find that, once Leibniz's terminology and basic
conceptions are understood, it shows rather that bodies are aggregates of corporeal
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substances and underlines the difference between the two types of entities. The passage
says:
A body is an aggregation of substances, and is not a substance properly speaking.
Consecjuently, in all bodies must be found indivisible substances which cannot be
generated and are not corruptible, having something which corresponds to souls.93
Leibniz does not say that the indivisible substances are souls, but substances that
have "something which corresponds to souls." These are composite beings that have
substantial forms, "which correspond to souls" or play a role in animated substances
analogous to that of souls in human beings. Substantial form is the generic name for what
Leibniz calls "spirit" in relation to the composite substance a man is, and calls "soul" in
relation to the substance an animal is, and calls "force" or "substantial form" in relation
to a corporeal or living substance. "Corporeal substance" itself is treated by Leibniz as a
generic term which includes under it living substances in a restricted sense and also
animals and men.
Leibniz's conception of corporeal substances, as composites of form and matter, is
clearly conceived in the manner of the Aristotelian tradition. But it is not the composite
of matter and form which serves Aristotle to account for the substantial character of
inert bodies, and for their subsistence through change in terms of the notions, "potentia"
and "act." Rather, as Brown himself saw (though he believed that this was not Leibniz's
mature position), this is the organic composite which results from that special
substantial form that is a soul for Aristotle, which acts as what he called in De Anima
"the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it,"^^ i.e., that
which imparts life to it. Leibniz, however, has universalized the role of the soul in the
Aristotelian schema that explains life in order to explain substantiality in the external
world. The type of substantial unity entailed by his conception of substance requires
soul-like substantial forms as the unity endowing complement of matter by which a
corporeal substance may be constituted. Leibnizian corporeal substances, therefore, are
at the same time organic unities and material substances. They need to be organic for
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their unity and identity obtains from a soul-like principle. They are material, for what
is endowed with unity is a substance whose metaphysical substrate relative to form is
matter.
Animated bodies are corporeal substances. Each of them has a substantial form.
Matter is an aggregate of many such substances, not itself an animated substance but
having an infinite number of animated substances in it. But matter too is that which
serves as complement to form in the constitution of the hylemorphic composite that is a
corporeo-animated substance. The composite has a body, according to Leibniz, and yet
has substantial unity, from which the divisibility of its body and the change in its parts
in no way affects its unity.
In the Discourse most references to corporeal substances arose in a context where
dynamics was a central concern, but were part of an effort aimed at ultimately
clarifying true metaphysics, through explanations that concurrently showed the correct
hypotheses in dynamics and the true principles of metaphysics. This is part of a concern
of Leibniz which we have seen expressed consistently in different contexts, which
includes the view that higher metaphysical principles are significant for the execution
of God's will and must be taken into consideration for the appropriate understanding of
the laws of motion. Within this context, an elucidation also had to be furnished of the
metaphysical status and nature of bodies versus that of corporeal substances, for
dynamics cannot, according to Leibniz, be made intelligible without a consideration of
these metaphysical topics. The notion of "force" plays in the Discourse a central role in
this regard, as the substantial form of a corporeal substance which is the source of its
unity and its principle of action. As such, it stands at the basis of the phenomenal
manifestations of motion which are the subject of dynamics. Dynamics is in this manner
linked to metaphysics, in a way, however, that affords a clear distinction between
metaphysical elucidations and physical explanations of phenomenal occurrences.
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In the Correspondence, pressed by Arnauld's questions, Leibniz gives more
attention to the metaphysical significance of corporeality and to the contrast between the
nature of beings by aggregation and true corporeal substances than to dynamics. He
provides through it what I consider a very detailed account of matter as a well-founded
phenomenom, dependent on the mind for its being, which is not subjective entirely while
yet not substantial. The nature of corporeal substance as hylemorphic composites that
are different from matter, conceived as an aggregate of these very composites, is clearly
presented in opposition to Cartesian metaphysics. And the significance of these
metaphysical conceptions for understanding our nature as human beings is stressed with
the suggestion that we are naturally immortal unitary substances in spite of the
perishable or changing character of our bodies.
If we remember now Leibniz's basic rejection of materialism, as was expressed in
his opposition to occasionalism and Spinozism, it seems pertinent that we stress that the
metaphysical and physical considerations we have examined, from the Discourse and the
Correspondence with Arnauld . are clearly an attack against materialism, understood in
either the tradition of Cartesian mechanicism or in that of physical atomism.
Leibniz accords with Descartes's conception of a physical plenum and with his
view of a corpuscular philosophy as instrumental in explaining physical phenomena, but
he recognizes, with the Atomists, that an ultimate unitary component of bodies must be
provided. The Atomists make use of a conceptual schema where matter is conceived as an
aggregate whose true character can be elucidated through a clarification of the nature of
its ultimate constituents. Leibniz considers this conceptual schema metaphysically
inevitable and stresses that without ultimate constituents a conception of matter like the
Cartesians' is incomplete. Since he treats the question about the ultimate constituents of
matter as metaphysical, he believes that a serious defect of metaphysics lies at the basis
of the Cartesian conception, and that it will exhibit defective consequences in physics. It
is clear also, for Leibniz, that since unity is not required of the constituents of matter
by the Cartesians, they have no need of substantial forms, and may indulge in the view
that geometry suffices for a thorough physical understanding of bodies considered as
substances. Disregard for the ultimate constituents of matter affords a view of matter
where the notion of force is not required, and where, hence, resistance in bodies cannot
be appropriately considered in the correct account of the laws of motion.
The Atomists' conception of material substances, however, is not much better off
than the Cartesians'. For, according to Leibniz, they uphold a self-contradictory view:
that something is extended and indivisible. They place atoms at the basis of matter in the
role of its substantial ultimate components. But such a view of corporeal substances and
matter is defective, not only because it is simply contradictory, but because it conceives
of atoms in terms of geometrical features exclusively, in a way that allows no room for
the unitary, the active, and the identical nature of such substances. Just as in the case of
Cartesian corporeal substance, an atom has nothing in it that may enable us to explain
unity and identity in time. And, as Leibniz explains frequently in other works, they are
also contrary to the principle of indiscernibles, that of sufficient reason, and the
principle of continuity.
It seems clear that a corporeal substance inherently invested with force
(substantial form) is the conceptual instrument by which these defects of Cartesianism
and atomism can be surmounted, according to Leibniz. This is the corporeal substance
that is the individual substance of external reality, and is also the substratum of
phenomenal reality, insofar as matter must be construed as an aggregate of such
substances. And in the conceptual schema which posits the existence of corporeal
substances, as the metaphysical entities through which the problems raised by physical
atomism and Cartesian corpuscularism obtain an answer, the substantial form is
indispensable. It is, we have learned, the complete concept of an individual substance,
i.e., its individual essence, turned into its principle of action and unity through God's
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creative decree. It is the complement of matter as the soul that invests the body of an
animated substance with life and being.
The contrast between Cartesianism and atomism, on the one hand, and Leibniz’s
conception of physics and metaphysics (regarding corporeal substances), on the other,
obtains from the significance of substantial forms in Leibniz's metaphysics. Force is a
factor that is not present in either the Cartesian or the Atomist conceptions of corporeal
substance. These are, then, materialistic accounts of nature where external reality, and
even human bodies in it, may be explained solely in terms of geometrical attributes and
relations. In such accounts no use is made of immaterial entities, and no reference to God
is suggested through the bearing of principles which may work as final causes. And
causal relations in external reality are exclusively explained in terms of efficient
causality. Neither forms nor final causes have any role to play, metaphysical or
otherwise, in these explanations.
The substantial form is an immaterial substance for Leibniz, whose
indispensability in a metaphysics concerned with corporeal substances evinces that
materialism is not feasible. Evidence of the need of substantial form is found in the role
it plays in the constitution of active and unitary corporeal substances such as are needed
to explain the presence of inertia and action in the bodies of the external world. Evidence
of the need of substantial forms is also provided by what is required of a correct
metaphysical account of matter, for only through the hylemorphic composite in which a
substantial form is the source of unity are we able to find an ultimate component of
divisible matter. And, since Leibniz identifies materialism with a mechanical account of
nature strictly and exclusively based on geometrical notions and principles, the
insufficiency of such an account shows for him that principles of wisdom playing the
role of final causes relative to God's understanding, must be acknowledge as
metaphysically fundamental to the appropriate mechanical explanation of nature.
Mechanicism based on metaphysics is correct, as mechanicism based solely on geometry
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is not. And while the former is not only compatible with theism, but provides evidence
for this position, the latter is basic to the inclinations towards atheism that Leibniz
decries as far too popular in the seventeenth century.
We might say that before the opposition matter versus mind, characteristic of
Materialist versus Idealists, Leibniz adopts, as before many other opposing dichotomies,
a middle way, where he neither rejects matter (in the manner of idealism) nor adopts
materialism. The middle way here is based on the notion of the hylemorphic composite,
which is crucial to an account of matter, and enables that a substance different from
immaterial substances be affirmed: a corporeal substance, in which, however, an
immaterial substance plays a crucial role which warrants that there cannot be material
substances if there are not immaterial ones. Leibniz does not need to reject corporeal
substances to defend the significance of immaterial substances as part of a metaphysics
that shows that materialism is not the correct ontological position. And he need not
incline towards phenomenalism, as Stuart Brown suggests, in order to resolve the
problem of unity of corporeal substances. Unity of form and divisibility of body are two
features pertinent to the ontological status of corporeal substances, whose unity belongs
to its substantial character and whose divisibility is phenomenal, the first is the product
of its form, the second, the product of its matter.
This interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy is based mainly on the Discourse and
the Correspondence with Arnauld . We have provided a significant number of passages
from these writings to substantiate it. Many more, confirmatory of our views, could be
cited from the same sources. And we have cited also passages from other writings that
are clearly tuned to the subject in the Discourse and the Correspondence in a manner
that enables us to understand better the message Leibniz is already asserting in these
writings of 1686-90. Our interpretation certainly accords with what was expounded
before, concerning preestablished harmony and Leibniz's opposition to occasionalism. It
evinces what we were forced to emphasize in those other contexts: that Leibniz
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continuously and consistently attacks all manifestations of philosophy akin to
materialism, and believes that an unbiased philosophical reflection on the nature of
reality in general, and external reality in particular, affords evidence for the view that
materialism is untenable while mechanicism is the appropriate account of phenomenal
nature. In the context of the works just examined, Leibniz's attack against materialism
is not founded on idealism, as it is not ever. In his typical manner Leibniz is not
confrontational. Though he is mainly concerned with the threat materialism poses to
traditional (Christian) metaphysics, rather than suggesting the non-existence of
corporeal substances, he affirms their existence in a way that entails the existence of
immaterial substances. This is consonant with the spirit of what Leibniz says against the
Hylarchic Philosophers and those who seek to defend Christianism by denying the new
science of nature its basic concepts and achievements; it is clear that he believes that a
much stronger position against materialism can be obtained by acknowledging the
existence of corporeal substances and granting reality and importance to the domain of
bodies while basing the ontology whereby this is attained on immaterial substances.
Leibniz's ontology is not monistic idealism. It is not dualism of the sort that has
been defended by Antoine Arnauld, where immaterial souls, conceived in Platonic fashion
(as substances whose modalities of being are manifestations of thinking or intellection),
are opposed to corporeal substances, entirely conceived as geometrical subjects of
spatial attributes. It is a dualism, however; one based on the Aristotelian conceptual
schema of a hylemorphic composite, but with a modification that results from having the
substantial form play a dual role, as the formal complement of matter and itself a
substance. The schema, thus modified, enables Leibniz to assert the existence of
immaterial and corporeal substances, and to bind the two together metaphysically in a
manner that precludes materialism. It also enables him to distance himself from what he
considers excesses in the application of mathematics to metaphysics.
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Leibniz believes that mathematics is important for physics, though as we have
seen, it does not suffice for the elucidation of dynamics. With respect to metaphysics, the
tendency to make it its conceptual basis, he claims, breeds confusion and error. The
domain of substantial reality is concrete, and not fully conceptualizable through the
abstract notions of mathematics.^^ For Leibniz, the conception of a substance in terms
of matter and substantial form is that of a qualitative entity, for it is not that of an entity
exclusively characterizable in geometrico-mathematical terms (quantitative terms).
The notions of mathematics, Leibniz claims, are only sufficient for thinking abstractions
but incapable of providing an adequate conception of concrete individual substances. An
incursion into metaphysics, clearly conceived as a conceptual domain that requires
notions which do not belong to mathematics, is necessary for the elucidation of the being
of the substances in external reality and of substantiality in general.
Neither the matter or corporeal substance of mathematicians (Descartes,
Gassendi), nor the immaterial world of thinking substances of Idealists (Berkeley),
seem to satisfy Leibniz. Neither, that is, the two together in the way of the radical
dualism of the res extensa and the res cogitans (the Cartesians), nor separately in the
manner of either Idealists or Materialists. And here, as in everything else in his
philosophy, the recognition of the insufficiency of the alternatives available moves him
in the direction of a new conception that will amount to a reconciliation of the different
alternatives. It is this characteristic feature of Leibniz's thought that brings about the
reunion of opposing and apparently irreconcilable tendencies in his philosophy. His
conceptual efforts are characteristically aimed at finding a middle way, where that
which is valuable in the different extant theories is harmonized. But his attempt to
achieve harmony and reconciliation typically meets with reaction and at least
misunderstanding, as it usually does in human affairs. His philosophy, I believe, has
been the object of serious misinterpretations, like the one I attribute to Stuart Brown
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(which is not exclusively his however), which result from the difficulties his efforts at
synthesis and harmony both confront and arouse.
Let us conclude our examination of Leibniz’s conception of corporeal substances in
the QlsCQurse and the Correspondence with Arnauld by reaffirming that these worlds
basically contain Leibniz's mature ontology, and a good deal of his philosophy. His views
are not, however, here expressed in all their details and refinements, and a study of his
writings beyond 1690 is necessary to provide a more complete picture of his
philosophy. The ambitious and systematic character of Leibniz’s thought, combined with
the fragmentary nature of its exposition makes it a difficult, and at times a very
puzzling, subject of study. Nevertheless, I believe that the evidence the rest of his
writings afford on the subjects we have been concerned with is entirely consistent with
our interpretation.
There are still two objectives that we shall pursue in this work. First, briefly,
and as a section within this fourth chapter, we will consider, in general, other writings
where Leibniz’s views of corporeal substances and bodies are expounded, in order to
establish how definitive his position in the works we have examined seems. Our second
objective will constitute the last (fifth) chapter of this work; we will attempt to bring
together the different aspects that have already been explored in our examination of
Leibniz’s philosophy into a systematic account of his thought. Of course, the central
topics in this endeavour will be preestablished harmony and Leibniz’s conception of
corporeal substance. We will also present at the end of this chapter a critical appraisal
of Leibniz’s thinking. Let us continue then but not before anticipating the titles of our
next section and of the last chapter of this work; "Corporeal Substances; Other
Writings;" "The System."
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B. Corporeal Substances: Other Writings
We cannot approach other writings of Leibniz in the detailed fashion we have
treated the Discourse and the Correspondence . The treatment of our subject will hence
follow the method we used in the first two chapters of this work. This approach would
enable us to present many passages in writings up to the correspondence with Clarke
confirmatory of our interpretation of Leibniz's views on the nature of substance in
general, corporeal substances, beings by aggregation and substantial forms. It is the case
that we read throughout the rest of Leibniz's writings presentations of the same views
we have explained and stressed up to now; but it would be too tedious and too extense to
address passages that provide confirmation of the points we have already established
with the purpose of just doing that. We will not therefore proceed in this manner.
Rather, in an effort to produce additional information on Leibniz's positions we will
present new passages of his writings that will enlighten and improve our interpretation
of Leibniz but will also serve to confirm what we have claimed to be Leibniz's views.
There are two themes central to Leibniz's consideration of corporeal substances.
The first is the role of corporeal substances in physics, which we have seen is
indissolubly tied up with metaphysical considerations. Leibniz, in his works specifically
addressing the topic of dynamics, presents a much more refined conception of force and
of matter that we need to understand, and he explains the relation of dynamics to
metaphysics in a way that better details the significance of substantial form and matter
in the constitution of external reality. An examination of passages treating these subjects
will advance our understanding of Leibniz's definitive views.
The second theme turns around Leibniz's reflections on transubstantiation. We
referred to transubstantiation a long while back when we established that according to
Stuart Brown Leibniz "believed that the Christian ritual of the Eucharist required
substantial forms to be explained." (Supra p. 159) It is the case that Leibniz believes
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that the notion of substantial form as the complement of matter in the constitution of
corporeal substances is philosophically important for theological reasons. And he
consistently defends a view that he expresses as early as 1671 as follows:
There is another important thing in my philosophy which will give it access to the
Jesuits and other theologians. This is my restoration of substantial forms, which the
Atomists and Cartesians claim to have exterminated. It is certain that without these
forms and the distinctions that exist between them and real accidents, it is
impossible to explain our mysteries. For if the nature of body consists in extension,
as Descartes claims, it involves a contradiction, beyond all doubt, to maintain that a
body may exist at many places at once.^®
Leibniz's efforts at elucidating the metaphysical significance of the Eucharist
contain important suggestions about his definitive views on bodies, corporeal
substances, and substantial forms.
We shall develop our inquiry by distinguishing two subsections: first, "Dynamics
and the Corporeal Substance," which may further be subdivided into three parts:
"Forces: Active and Passive," "Secondary Matter," and "Concluding Remarks"; and
second, "Transubstantiation," with three parts: "Interpretation of Scriptures," "The
Cartesian Problem and the way Out of It," and "The Leibniz-Pellison Correspondence."
Our examination of Leibniz's conception of force may further be differentiated into
the following topics: "The Metaphysical Basis of Dynamics," "The Laws of Motion," and
"Leibniz's Argument from Dynamics against Descartes's View of Corporeal Substance."
1 . Dynamics and the Corporeal Substance
a. Forces: Active and Passive
i. The Metaphysical Basis of Dynamics
Our concern with Leibnizian dynamics will be limited to what is significant for
our topic, corporeal substance. It cannot be our purpose to go into a profound
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examination and elucidation of Leibniz's dynamics per se. The types of reflections of
Leibniz that interests us are found in his writings on physics, but also in some works
where metaphysics is linked to dynamics or is treated within a context which requires
the elucidation of the nature of force or substantial form and of its bearing upon our
conception of external reality. In such works Leibniz presents as his mature and detailed
conception of force one built over two distinctions: the distinction between active and
passive force; and the distinction between primitive and derivative force. These
distinctions are paralleled by another between primitive and derivative matter, or
rather, as Leibniz usually puts it, a distinction between primary and secondary matter.
We must understand these topics.
In "Specimen Dynamicum," a writing of 1695, Leibniz begins his account of
forces by explaining active force. He says:
Active force, which may well be called power, as it is by some, is of two kinds. The
first is primitive force, which is in all corporeal substance as such, since 1 believe
that a body entirely at rest is contrary to the nature of things. The second is
derivative force, which is exercised in various ways through a limitation of
primitive force resulting from the conflict of bodies with each other. Primitive
force, which is nothing but the first entelechy, corresponds to the soul or substantial
form, but for this very reason it relates only to general causes which cannot suffice
to explain phenomena.97
Primitive and derivative forces relate, as suggested by their names, so that the
second type of force is a modification (an accident or limitation) of the first
(primitive), which is absolute and hence substantial. We can appreciate this point in the
passage quoted above in the sentence that says: "The second is derivative force, which is
exercised in various ways through a limitation of primitive force resulting from the
conflict of bodies with each other." It is also explained in a passage, where Leibniz is
referring to active force in a letter to Bernoulli, where the term "primary" is
equivalent to "primitive" and the term "secondary" means "derivative." We read:
For the rest, if we conceive of soul or form as the primary activity, from whose
modifications the secondary forces arise as figures arise from the modifications of
extension, I believe we shall have satisfied the demands of understanding.^®
220
Th© sdm© characterization of derivative force relative to primitive force appears
in Leibniz's correspondence with De Voider. Leibniz explains it here as a relation
analogous to that obtaining between a figure and the extension it modifies. He writes;
I should prefer to consider derivative forces in relation to their foundations, as a
figure in relation to extension, that is, as a modification.99
And he adds:
Everything accidental or changeable must be a modification of something essential or
perpetual and can contain nothing more positive than that which it modifies, since
every modification is only a limitation —a figure of that which is varied and a
derivative force of that which varies. '•00
It is clear that the conceptual schema Leibniz uses for the elucidation of the
relation derivative force bears to active force is metaphysical. It is the relation between
what is accidental and what is substantial. The accidental is a modification. It inheres in
the substantial underlying it; also it changes while that underlying it remains the same.
The passage from "Specimen Dynamicum" above (Supra footnote 97) is followed
by a line of thought where Leibniz develops the point he makes in the last sentence in
this passage: that the substantial form, or the primitive active force, has no value for
the explanation of physical phenomena. Leibniz indicates that the "proper function" of
substantial forms is "revealing the source of things to us," for, "a knowledge of forms is
necessary,... for philosophizing rightly, and no one can claim to have grasped the nature
of body adequately unless he has paid some attention to such things and has come to
understand that the crude concept of a corporeal substance which depends only on
sensory imagery and has recently been carelessly introduced by an abuse of the
corpuscular philosophy (which is excellent and most true in itself) is imperfect, not to
say false."^9^
Of course, the reference to corpuscular philosophy above concerns the point we
have seen Leibniz present so many times, which here again is offered in opposition to
Cartesianism. Cartesian corpuscular philosophy, Leibniz is suggesting, is excellent in
that it is mechanicism, but it is false because its concept of body is grounded "on sensory
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imagery" and makes no use of substantial form; and a corporeal substance, conceived as
just extended without the notion of force, "does not exclude cessation or rest from matter
and cannot provide reasons for the laws of nature which apply to derivative force."^
The Cartesian conception of body, we are told again, considers matter and bodies inert,
thus it cannot understand correctly the laws of motion.
Of passive force Leibniz writes:
Passive force is likewise of two kinds —primitive and derivative. The primitive
force of suffering or of resisting constitutes the very thing which the Scholastics
call materia prima, if rightly interpreted. It brings it about, namely, that one body
is not penetrated by another but opposes an obstacle to it and is at the same time
possessed of a kind of laziness, so to speak, or a repugnance to motion, and so does not
allow itself to be set in motion without somewhat breaking the force of the body
acting upon it. Hence the derivative force of suffering thereafter shows itself in
various ways in secondary matter. 1 03
Materia prima was matter conceived as absolutely without qualifications in the
Aristotelian hylemorphic conceptual schema. This was the ultimate substratum relative
to form one had to conceive in order to understand the metaphysical function a
substantial form performs, by which a substance is constituted. If form constitutes an
individual substance by informing matter and thus endowing it with its essential
qualifications, one may envisage the possibility (as an abstraction) of matter completely
devoid of form, the absolutely naked complement of form. Such is primary matter for
Aristotle. And as such it was an abstract metaphysical principle and not a substance.
Leibniz also claims that primary matter is an abstraction."' In his philosophy,
it serves as the metaphysical basis for explaining attributes of bodies that pertain to
them insofar as material. These attributes, as suggested in the passage above, are
impenetrability (antitypy) and inertia. They result from a force, for materia prima in
the context of explaining the metaphysical basis of dynamics deserves the name
"primitive passive force." And they manifest themselves as antitypy and inertia in a
derivative force that accounts for the actions of bodies and the laws of motion in
phenomenal reality.
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In order to understand the last point above better, it is important that we stress
what has already been suggested through the contrast between primitive and derivative
forces: that Leibniz conceives of derivative force as the immediate cause of the local
motion of bodies. Derivative force is a modification of primitive force and the immediate
source or cause of phenomenal actions. Leibniz characterizes it in "Specimen
Dynamicum," as follows:
Here, therefore, we understand by derivative force, or the force by which bodies
actually act and are acted upon by each other, only that force which is connected with
motion (local motion, that is) and which in turn tends to produce further local
motion. For we admit that all other material phenomena can be explained through
local motion.105
According to Leibniz, dynamics as an account of nature is fundamentally interested
in derivative forces and the motions which are caused by these. Primitive forces are
more basic than derivative forces: they belong in a metaphysical setting where they
relate to derivative forces as their substantial basis but are not pertinent directly to an
account of physical occurrences. Leibniz therefore distinguishes between the "general
considerations" that pertain to metaphysics and primitive forces (and are necessary "for
philosophizing rightly"), and the considerations, appropriate to physics, of derivative
forces. He already suggests this distinction in the first passage we examined when he
identifies "primitive (active) force" with "first entelechy" and explains that it
"corresponds to the soul or substantial form, but for this very reason it relates only to
general causes which cannot suffice to explain phenomena." In the same spirit he adds,
after his initial remarks on primitive active and passive forces, the following:
But setting aside these general and primary considerations, and having established
the fact that every body acts by virtue of its form and suffers or resist by virtue of
its matter, we must now proceed to the doctrine of derivative forces and resistances
and discuss the question of how bodies prevail over or resist each other in various
ways by their varied impulses. For to these derivative forces apply the laws of
action, which are not only known by reason but also verified by sense itself through
phenomena.105
It is interesting, in the passage above, that the first reference to "body" should be
understood as a reference to corporeal substance, which is the hylemorphic composite of
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which we must say that it "acts by virtue of its form and suffers or resist by virtue of
its matter." The forces in question here are primitive. And Leibniz is suggesting that this
topic, primitive forces as the hylemorphic components of corporeal substance, has
already been dealt with. Now, the reference to "bodies" thereafter is a reference to the
bodies that belong in phenomenal reality, whose motion can be explained in terms of
mechanico-geometrical relations (impacts which bring about changes in relations of
distance and changes of acceleration), and should be understood, according to Leibniz, as
having their immediate cause in derivative forces. The passage is instrumental in leading
to the next topic after the metaphysical reflection on primitive forces; derivative forces
and phenomenal laws of motion.
We must realize that the first and basic notion that Leibniz formulates in the
context of explaining dynamics through an elucidation of its metaphysical basis is that of
force conceived generally, which he sometimes calls "power" and also "to dynamicon”
This notion, however, can be understood more precisely in terms of the distinction
between active and passive forces, each of which, in turn, admits a further subdivision
into the primitive and the derivative. The passage below, not from "Specimen
Dynamicum," clearly illustrates this approach to the notion of force. It accords with the
characterization of active and passive forces we have examined, and it stresses the
meaning of matter as passive force, the source of antitypy and resistance in bodies;
Furthermore the dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and
active. Properly speaking passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa],
and active force constitutes entelechy or form. Passive force is resistance itself, by
means of which a body resists not only penetration, but also motion, and through
which it happens that another body cannot advance into its place unless the body
withdraws from it, which it will not do without somewhat slowing the motion of the
impelling body.... And so, there are two resistances or masses in body, first
antitypya, as it is called, or impenetrability, and second, resistance, or what Kepler
calls the natural inertia of bodies...^
Leibniz's distinctions relative to the notion of force provide a basis for
understanding the phenomenal or accidental character of the forces in the realm of
nature as modifications of what is substantial, while the substantial is conceived in
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terms of the conjunction of primitive active and primitive passive forces. Metaphysical
notions, therefore, are important for the elucidation of the derivative forces which must
be taken into consideration in the explanation of physical occurrences. Physics is
different from metaphysics in that it is concerned with derivative forces, bodies, and
motion, all of which are aspects of phenomenal reality, a domain available through
perceptual experience. Metaphysics treats of substances, but their relation to the
phenomenal realm ensures that physics cannot fully be developed in complete
independence of metaphysics. That the actual laws of motion can be understood correctly
partly from the elucidation of the metaphysical basis of derivative forces is evinced by
the fact that inertia is not recognized by a corpuscularism not interested in questions
about the nature of corporeal substance, or what amounts to the same, it is not part of
the laws of motion in an account of nature that incurs in the mistake of uncritically
accepting the view that the essence of corporeal substances is extension.
The dichotomy primitive active force-primitive passive force is equivalent to the
relation substantial iorm- materia prima. And the latter, we know, is a metaphysical
conception. It is the hylemorphic conceptual schema that served Aristotle to explain in
its most general sense the nature of substance and the occurrence of substantial change
in reality. Leibniz, too is using this schema as the most basic metaphysical manner of
conceiving the being of unitary substances in external reality, corporeal substances. But
now by expressing it in terms of forces, which are said to be equivalent to the traditional
notions of first entelechy and materia prima, he can explain the nature of the corporeal
substance in a way that permits a clear characterization of its significance for the
subjects of phenomenal reality, bodies. Bodies are the subjects of action having
derivative forces as causes, which themselves are modifications or accidents of
primitive forces. Derivative forces, thus understood, must account for the incessant
motion of bodies, and can do so out of the essential activity which qualifies every
substance.
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In the contexts we are now examining, the treatment of the notion of force centers
around physical considerations in a way that could suggest that neither derivative forces
nor primitive forces relate to living substances; but we must remember that even in
these contexts, and in spite of the fact that the dynamical relations being explained are
characterizable in mechanical terms, the active primary forces in question are, for
Leibniz, of the nature of entelechies of the sort Aristotle used for explaining life. We
must realize that derivative forces should be construed as the immediate cause of local
motion in a way that makes feasible the mechanical explanation of phenomena; but the
displacement from the domain of phenomenal dynamical relations to that which underlies
it and is primitive, one must recognize, includes the notion of entelechies in the sense of
unity and action endowing principles, indispensable to the nature of corporeal
substances, and soul-like in nature. They invest the individual substance with a
spontaneity modelled after that which living substances possess, or rather, modelled
after that which a living-thinking substance possesses.
It is clear, in the context of the explanations which show how primary forces
underlie the efficient causality in the domain of phenomenal effects, that there is,
according to Leibniz, a substantial domain at the basis of the realm of bodies. Corporeal
substances, understood as hylemorphic entities make up a realm ontologically
independent of the mind (a non-phenomenal substantial realm) relative to which is the
being of well-founded phenomenal reality. The "entities" in the latter realm exist in
time and in space, are continuously changing, and have a derivative being founded on
what is substantial, which is not substantial itself. The suggestion in the Discourse, that
bodies are not substances accords with the emphasis in the works on dynamics upon their
modal and mutable nature. But that the domain of bodies is not substantial does not
detract from the recognition that bodies are real in a derivative manner, as accidental
and phenomenal manifestations of substantial reality. They are, then, metaphysically
derivative in two senses: insofar as their being is dependent on the substances which
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underlie them, corporeal substances: and insofar as their phenomenal unity, from which
their being by aggregation results, depends on the substances that perceive them,
immaterial thinking substances.
The domain of bodies is ordered and regular, and it is the object of the science of
dynamics. It is a domain where phenomena can be shown to be coherent in terms of
mechanical relations ruled by laws, the laws of motion. Leibniz's treatment of the laws
of motion in his mature dynamics confirms his position in the Discourse , the
Correspondence with Arnauld . and many other writings, suggesting that metaphysics
must be considered in order to elucidate some principles that are basic to dynamics. In
the works where dynamics is the preeminent concern, Leibniz’s account of the pitfalls
that should be avoided when establishing the correct laws of motion leaves no doubt
about the fact that he believes he can defend mechanicism in a way that shows that it need
not involve materialism. Let us take up this topic as our next subject of inquiry, in
order to elucidate more fully how metaphysics and physics relate according to Leibniz.
Let us advance it under the heading, "The Laws of Motion."
ii. The Laws of Motion
Primitive active force and primitive passive force underlie what Leibniz calls
"motive force" or the derivative force that explains the motion of bodies where the
passive and the active come together. Leibniz affirms the existence of impenetrability
and inertia as features originating from primary matter that condition the exercise of
active force in the realm of phenomenal reality. These attributes manifest themselves in
bodies in conjunction with derivative active force in a way that affords a conception of
action in bodies where magnitude and motion can be related, as they must be in the
appropriate account of the laws of motion. This point is suggested by Leibniz frequently
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when he explains how primitive powers or forces are the means by which speed is
adjusted to magnitude in bodies, as in passages like the one below:
But when I considered how, in general, we could explain what we experience
everywhere, that speed is dimished through an increase in bulk [moles] as, for
example, when the same boat carried downstream goes more slowly the more it is
loaded down, I stopped, and all my attempts having been in vain, I discovered that
this, so to speak, inertia of bodies cannot be deduced from the initially assumed
notion of matter and motion, where matter is understood as that which is extended or
fills space and motion is understood as change of space or place. But rather, over and
above that which is deduced from extension and its variation or modification alone,
we must add and recognize in bodies certain notions or forms that are immaterial, so
to speak, or independent of extension, which you can call powers [potentia ], by
means of which speed is adjusted to magnitude."'
The relation between speed and magnitude which includes resistance and leads to
the correct formulation of the laws of motion, is based on the recognition of the nature of
corporeal substance, as that which includes both active and passive forces. The active
dimension is crucial for Leibniz, for as the passage above suggests: it is "forms" which
bring about a change in the prevalent conception of matter as inert mass and the
recognition that the view that magnitude need not be considered in an account of local
motion is untenable.
The activity that is empirically evident in bodies is modal in its nature and points
to an underlying substantial basis which must include an active principle. This is a basic
point of Leibniz, grounded on the distinction between what is modal (a limitation) and
what is substantial, and on the view that a modification can never possess a degree of
reality that cannot be explained through the relation it bears to the substance it
modifies. Or as Leibniz says: [A modification] "can contain nothing more positive than
that it it modifies" (Supra footnote 100). The point is also expresed in the passage
below:
Furthermore we must consider derivative force (and action) as something modal,
since it admits of change. But every mode consists of a certain modification of
something that persists, that is of something more absolute. And just as shape is a
certain limitation or modification of passive force or extended mass, so derivative
force (and motive action) [actio motrix] is a modification, not of something merely
passive (otherwise the modification or limitation would involve more reality than
that which is limited), but of something active, that is, of a primitive entelechy.
Therefore, derivative and accidental or changeable force will be a certain
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modification of the primitive power [virtus] that is essential and that endures in
each and every corporeal substance."* 09
It is clear, from passages like the one above, that the action of bodies requires an
active principle to be understood, and that the correct laws of motion cannot be
formulated, as Leibniz so frequently claims, if matter is not construed in terms of
primitive passive force and derivative forces are not conceived in relation to primitive
active force and primitive passive force. These make up the "primitive power" which
essentially qualifies, or rather constitutes, a corporeal substance, whose meaning as the
substantial basis of accidental manifestations in the domain of bodies is elucidated by
Leibniz, in order to provides a thorough comprehension of how principles of
metaphysics relate to physics.
This same emphasis on the relation between the substantial and its modifications
is suggested by the two passages below, from Leibniz's correspondence with De Voider.
They are interesting, not only because Leibniz explains through them the manner in
which motion relates to magnitude in bodies but because he clearly suggests that
secondary matter is phenomenal matter or bodies, where active and passive derivative
forces are co-present;
Since matter in itself therefore resists motion by a general passive force of
resistance but is set in motion by a special force of action, or entelechy, it follows
that inertia also constantly resists the entelechy or motive force during its
motion."* "* 0
And Leibniz explains;
Thus the resistance of matter contains two factors; impenetrability or antitypy, and
resistance or inertia. And since these two factors are everywhere equal in a body or
are proportional to its extension, it is in them that I locate the nature of the passive
principle or of matter, even as I recognize, in the active force which exerts itself in
various ways through motion, the primitive entelechy or in a word, something
analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain perpetual law of the same
series of changes through which it runs unhindered. We cannot dispense with this
active principle or ground of activity, for accidental or changing active forces and
their motions are themselves certain modifications of some substantial thing, but
forces and actions cannot be modifications of a merely passive thing such as matter.
It follows, therefore, that there is a primary active or substantial being which is
modified by an added disposition of matter or of passivity. Hence, secondary or
motive forces and motion itself must be ascribed to a secondary matter or to the
complete body which results from the active and the passive together.^
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The conjunction of the passive and the active brings about motive force, which is
immediately pertinent to the manifestation of motion in bodies. The subject of this
motive force is "secondary matter," which must be the body in phenomenal reality, for
it, as suggested above, is the subject of derivative forces, "the complete body," that is,
"which results from the active and the passive together." The "active" and the "passive"
here, we need to stress, are derivative forces; not the active and the passive as
primitive active force and primitive passive force, which pertain to the corporeal
substance, at the basis of the phenomenal manifestations which have bodies as subjects.
And, it is clear now that the adjustment between speed and magnitude in bodies, to which
Leibniz usually refers when explaining the significance of inertia for the laws of motion,
and through which only can the correct laws of motion be formulated, results from the
meaning the fundamental attributes of bodies, originating in primary matter (inertia
more than impenetrability) have for the exercise of active derivative forces, themselves
also grounded on something primary or substantially fundamental, primitive force, that
is, the entelechy or substantial form.
What we have seen up to now, enables us to understand, in a more precise fashion,
what is it that Leibniz meant when he claimed that he defends mechanicism while
rejecting the view that physics can do without final causes and substantial forms.
Derivative forces pertain to physics, and may be described in terms of their effects
conceived as changes in relations of distance or of motion. Laws of motion, hence, may be
discovered which can be expressed through mathematical equations concerned with
notions such as distance, time, velocity, acceleration and force. But it must be
acknowledged that derivative forces are grounded on something absolute, primitive
forces. And this relation is explained as analogous to the relation between a substance and
its accidents. Metaphysics, understood by Leibniz as mostly concerned with the concept
of substance, the complementary concept of accident, and the relation of cause and effect,
by which some substances relate to each other, must be acknowledge valuable for the
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comprehension of phenomenal occurrences. And such a metaphysis proves, according to
Leibniz, as his account of motion shows, enlightening of the relation bodies have to each
other.
The substantial form which is the primitive active force in this explanation
enables Leibniz to defend a midway position between materialistic mechanicism and the
use of forms and natures which immediately causally explain natural occurrences. It is
not the case that mathematical relations by themselves appropriately explain dynamical
phenomena, for they do not include any reference to a substantial principle of action, and
this is indispensable to the correct formulation of the laws of motion. But it is not the
case either that this metaphysical principle (primitive active force) plays the role of an
immediate cause affecting the occurrences in the domain of bodies. It, the substantial
form, has no bearing upon physical reality comparable to that of the Scholastics'
"forms" or the "natures" of the Hylarchic Philosophers. Its significance is metaphysical,
relative to the true substances that underlie physical phenomenal manifestations, in the
manner explained in the Discourse on Metaphysics . It is, as we have seen Leibniz claim
so many times, the instrument whereby the substantiality of the entities of external
reality, the corporeal substances, can be warranted and appropriatley understood: and in
this fashion it is also an indispensable source of elucidation of the true laws of motion.
This is confirmed in the context of dynamics, we are now examining, within a somewhat
different conceptual schema which expresses the old hylemorphic relation of form and
matter, by which the nature of a corporeal substance must be understood according to
Leibniz, in terms of primitive active and primitive passive force. Force is the
fundamental notion in this new account as that from which the "mutations" in
phenomenal reality "flow," but it is also that which performs as the principle of action
and unity in a corporeal substance. As such, and precisely in these terms,^^^ it is
claimed to be intelligible by Leibniz, in a way that is basic to the integration of
metaphysics and dynamics into one philosophical explanation where mechanicism and
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hylemorphism are brought together in a complementary fashion, as part of one unitary
philosophical account.
The topic, the laws of motion, belong within Leibniz's criticism of Descartes's
conception of corporeal substance, and was central to the Discourse , as it is central to
Leibniz's thinking in general. In the works on dynamic, as one would expect, it is one of
his most important concerns. In 1686 in a small writing entitled "A Brief
Demonstration of a Notable Error of Descartes and Others Concerning a Natural Law,"
Leibniz treats exclusively this issue, and explains how "motive force" is conserved in
the universe, but not as quantity of motion. He offers the same argument that he later
presents in the Discourse against Descartes's account of motion, by which the true
estimation of force, conceived in terms of height times mass in two falling bodies, is
evinced to be different from quantity of motion (M x V). And here as in the Discourse
this argument against Descartes's position originates from dynamics, through the
recognition of the true laws of motion, but it purports to show that a defect of Cartesian
metaphysics must lie at its basis.
An examination of the arguments used by Leibniz, in most of his works concerned
with dynamics, against Descartes's position on what remains constant in nature, that is,
his conception of how force should be construed in nature, along with his criticism of
Descartes's conception of corporeal substance, not only shows that these accord with his
position in the Discourse but contributes to our comprehension of the linkage he
establishes between physics and metaphysics. The explanations in the works on dynamics
in terms of forces, primitive and derivative, once translated into the metaphysical
traditional expressions, through the notions of substance and accidents, accord with the
accounts where metaphysics is uppermost. But we can further advance the elucidation of
this topic by examining Leibniz's arguments against Descartes as developed in the
writings where dynamics is the preponderant issue. Let us do so.
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iii. Leibniz's Argument from Dynamics against Descartes's View of Corporeal Substance
The claim we have seen emphasized in the last few passages cited in the last part
above, that active derivative force must be a modification of something active and
substantial, is the basis of Leibniz's characteristic argument, in the works where he
treats dynamics and metaphysics together, against the Cartesian conception of corporeal
substance. Of course, Leibniz's argument is that motive force, or the derivative force we
need to attribute to bodies in order to explain their motion has an active dimension
wherefrom an active principle must be its substantial basis, and this makes a
geometrical corpuscular philosophy untenable. The passive inert matter of a such a
philosophy does not suffice for explaining the motions in bodies, or as Leibniz puts it
now in terms of forces: it cannot be that active derivative force is a modification of a
"passive force or extended mass." This topic was akin, in the Discourse , to the arguments
which showed that without substantial form we would be led to the erroneous view that
quantity of motion is constant in the universe, a view grounded on the supposition that
the attributes of inert matter (geometrical matter that is) are the attributes of
corporeal substance.
In "Specimen Dynamicum," we find a line of thinking similar to the one in the
Discourse regarding this issue. It is appropriate that we delve into it now that Leibniz's
terminology of forces is better understood, for we have, I believe, evidence here of how
close Leibniz's mature dynamics stand to his reflections in the Discourse and the
Correspondence with Arnauld .
Leibniz explains, in "Specimen Dynamicum," that his initial inclination to
consider matter devoid of resistance, which led him to conceive of motion in terms of the
composition of velocities or conatuses (he defines here a conatus as velocity with
direction), simply did not accord with experience. It was not compatible either with
several metaphysical principles. Awareness of this made him retract from this position.
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and the acknowledged defect in dynamics provoked a reconsideration of his metaphysical
presuppositions. Thus he writes;
Later, however, after I had examined everything more thoroughly, I saw wherein the
systematic explanation of things consists and discovered that my earlier hypothesis
about the definition of a body was incomplete. In this very fact, along with other
arguments, I found a proof that something more than magnitude and impenetrability
must be assumed, from which an interpretation of forces may arise. By adding the
metaphysical laws of this factor to the laws of extension, there arises those rules of
motion which I should call systematic —namely, that all change occurs gradually,
that every action involves a reaction, that no new force is produced without
diminishing the earlier force, so that a body which carries another body with it is
retarded by the body carried away, and that there is neither more nor less power in
the effect than in the cause. ^ ^ 3
On the basis of these "rules of motion" Descartes's account of the laws of motion
can be shown incorrect, and Leibniz will eventually in "Specimen Dynamicum" address
this task. Just as we claimed, in our interpretation of the Discourse, these
considerations evinced the defects of Cartesian dynamics and suggested to Leibniz that the
metaphysics uderlying it is flawed. And in the work we are now examining, as in the
Discourse, the "more than magnitude and impenetrability" required to provide a correct
metaphysical account of body is force; thus Leibniz continues the passage above by
saying;
Since this law is not derived from the concept of mass, it must follow from something
else which is in bodies, namely, from force itself, which always preserves the same
quantity even though it is used by different bodies. I concluded, therefore, that
besides purely mathematical principles subject to the imagination, there must be
admitted certain metaphysical principles perceptible only by the mind and that a
certain higher and so to speak, formal principle must be added to that of material
mass, since all the truths about corporeal things cannot be derived from logical and
geometrical axioms alone, namely, those of great and small, whole and part, figure
and situation, but that there must be added those of cause and effect, action and
passion, in order to give a reasonable account of the order of things. Whether we call
this principle form, entelechy, or force does not matter provided that we remember
that it can be explained intelligibly only through the concept of forces.^ ^ ^
Leibniz distinguishes above the principles that pertain to geometry from those
that belong to metaphysics straightforwardly and clearly. His argument against
materialism can, on the basis of the explicit manner used here to contrast these two
conceptual domains, be thoroughly understood. Since the former principles and notions
(which are conceived with the aid of imagination) do not suffice for the correct
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construction of dynamics
—insofar as they afford a conception of matter where nothing
suggests resistance to motion— while the metaphysical principles (knowable through
reason) show themselves to be indispensable for true dynamics, a materialistic
treatment of physics is thereby proved inappropriate.
Of course, as we have indicated several times, when Leibniz speaks of materialism
he is thinking of either a corpuscularism like Descartes’s, whose programme in physics
is exclusively grounded upon geometry, as is his conception of corporeal substance, or a
corpuscularism like the Atomists', which has a similar conception of material substance.
Both theories view corporeal substances as invested with extension and impenetrability,
but lacking force. The notion of force, along with the notion of cause and effect, belongs to
metaphysics: it is according to Leibniz, intelligible in this fashion, and the fact that it is
required for an appropriate comprehension of motion evinces that the hylemorphic
schema in which force is substantial form, is the correct way of conceiving corporeal
substance. This schema involves the use of an immaterial substance, for the substantial
form is not only the metaphysical complement of matter but a substance, immaterial,
itself. To conceive of corporeal substance as just an extended being would be defective
metaphysically, for neither its unity nor its identity could be explained, and it would be
defective physically, for neither inertia nor the permanent action of bodies could be
asserted. The hylemorphic conception in which an immaterial substance is a substantial
form corrects the defects of material mechanicism and shows unquestionably, for
Leibniz, that immaterial substances are required for two reasons: in order to do
philosophy or metaphysics correctly, that is, in order to correctly elucidate the nature
of the entities in external reality (both substantial and phenomenal): and in order to
provide the appropriate account of the dynamics in external reality (phenomenal).
That this is Leibniz's definitive view can be established by the frequency of this
line of thinking in his writings. The attack upon a conception of matter as only extended
on the basis of its consequences for dynamics is reiterated dozens of times, along with the
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suggestion that through the notion of force an account can be provided in accordance with
the true laws of motion. A good example of this is the passage below;
So it must be admitted that extension, or the geometric nature of a body, taken alone
contains nothing from which action and motion can arise. Indeed, matter rather
resists being moved by its own natural inertia, as Kepler has fittingly named it, and
is thus not indifferent to rest and motion as it is popularly interpreted to be, but
strives to its motion with an active force proportional to its magnitude. Hence it is in
this passive force of resistance, which involves impenetrability but something
more, that I locate the concept of primary matter or mass [molis], which is
everywhere proportional in a body to its magnitude. And hence I show that far
different laws of motion follow from it than would be the case if the body, or matter
itself, possessed only impenetrability with extension. "IS
This conception of external reality (Leibniz's) is tied up with the view that
ultimately the metaphysical principles pertinent to an appropriate characterization of
the laws of motion are expressions of the wisdom of God, for they act as rules for his
decrees relative to the constitution and ordering of external reality. And this is the basis
for the relevance of final causes in physics. Just as was suggested in the Discourse and
the Correspondence with Arnauld. in Leibniz's dynamical writings we are told that
metaphysical principles become moral principles out of the relation God's understanding
has to his will and the relation the world has to God as its efficient cause or creator.
Since metaphysical principles are the conditions of order and of compliance with what is
essential and rational, and since in the perfect spirit an intellect ruled by what is
rational conditions the volitions of a will principled by what is best, the actual laws of
motion obtain contingently (though they are morally determined) from the metaphysical
principles that determine God's creative will. In the passage below this point is clearly
presented in the context of showing the insufficiency of a geometrical approach to
dynamics. In it Leibniz explains that the metaphysical principles of cause and effect and
action and reaction do not obtain in nature as the result of geometrical determinations
whose consequences are necessary laws of nature. They obtain rather from the fact that
the world was ordered in conformity with final causes that determined God's creative
will (a will that is free in the highest degree because it cannot fail to incline towards the
best): and just as we learned in the previous works, these are metaphysical, and at the
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same time, moral, principles, which in conformity with God’s wisdom and goodness, and
without necessity, bring about the actual set of laws governing nature:
The supreme wisdom of God has made him choose especially those laws of motion
which are best adjusted and most fitted to abstract or metaphysical reasons. There is
conserved the same quantity of total and absolute force or of action, also the same
quantity of relative force or of reaction, and finally the same quantity of directive
force. Furthermore, action is equal to reaction, and the entire effect is equal to its
full cause. It is surprising that no reason can be given for the laws of motion which
have been discovered in our own time, and part of which I myself have discovered by
a consideration of efficient causes or of matter alone. For I have found that we must
have recourse to final causes and that these laws do not depend upon the principle of
necessity, as do the truths of logic, arithmetic, and geometry but upon the principle
of fitness, that is to say, upon the choice of wisdom.^
We have seen, in our characterization of Leibniz's view of forces, how Aristotle's
hylemorphic schema can be expressed in terms of primitive forces. These include
"primary matter" as a primitive passive force that relative to dynamics plays a
fundamental role. "Secondary matter" has also been mentioned and we suggested that it is
the subject of derivative forces. The concept of secondary matter, however, deserves
more attention, for it is significant not only for explaining the derivative nature of the
forces with which physics is concerned, but also for establishing the nature of matter as
a being by aggregation. This second point is crucial to the question concerning the
ultimate constituents of matter. It deserves now our attention.
b. Secondary Matter: An Aggregation of Corporeal Substances
We saw a reference to secondary matter in at least two passages above where
Leibniz speaks of it in a way that suggests that it is the subject of derivative forces (the
body of phenomenal reality). In the first of these he says, "Hence the derivative force of
suffering thereafter shows itself in various ways in secondary matter,” (Supra, footnote
103) and in the other passage he explains that "secondary or motive forces and motion
itself must be ascribed to a secondary matter or to the complete body which results from
the active and the passive together" (Supra, footnote 111). As the subject of derivative
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forces it seems that secondary matter should be construed as the body of physical
reality, the entity which Leibniz distinguishes from corporeal substance and qualifies
metaphysically as a being by aggregation.
The notion of secondary matter appears frequently in Leibniz's dynamical
writings. It is characterized in opposition to primary matter in a way that accords with
the interpretation we are suggesting, in passages like the one below, where Leibniz
starts out by claiming that matter is real, not a substance however, but an aggregate:
Matter really exists, but it is not a substance, since it is an aggregate or the
resultant of substances. I speak of matter insofar as it is secondary matter or
extended mass, something that is hardly a homogeneous body. But that which we
conceive of as homogeneous and call primary matter is something incomplete since it
exist merely in potency. On the other hand, a substance is a something complete and
active.^ ^ ^
That primary matter is "homogeneous" indicates its abstract nature, just as its
non-actual and "incomplete" character suggest it. Primary matter is just an abstract
metaphysical principle, not a real being by itself. Indeed, the last sentence of the passage
above, that comments on the nature of substance, is offered in order to stress that
neither primary nor secondary matter are substances. Now, secondary matter is not an
abstraction and it should be clear, from what is suggested here, that it is the matter to
which Leibniz was referring in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld . a
being by aggregation made up of substances, that was also there characterized as a well-
founded phenomenom. As such we know that it has some degree of reality.
The passage that follows provides additional insights about the opposition
primary-secondary matter. It certainly confirms many of the features of our
interpretation of the meaning corporeal substances have for Leibniz. It says:
In bodies I distinguish corporeal substance from matter, and I distinguish primary
from secondary matter. Secondary matter is an aggregate or composite of several
corporeal substances, as a flock is composed of several animals. But each animal and
each plant is also a corporeal substance, having in itself a principle of unity which
makes it truly a substance and not an aggregate. And this principle of unity is that
which one calls soul, or it is something analogous to soul. But, besides its principle
of unity, corporeal substance has its mass, or secondary matter, which is, again an
aggregate of other smaller corporeal substances —and that goes to infinity. However,
primitive matter, or matter taken in itself is what we conceive in bodies when we set
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aside all the principles of unity, that is, it is what is passive, from which arise two
qualities: resistance, and tardiness or inertia [resistentia et resistantia vel inertia].
That is to say, a body gives way to another rather than allowing itself to be
penetrated, but it does not give way without difficulty and without weakening the
total motion of the body pushing it. Thus one can say that matter in itself, besides
extension, contains a primitive, passive power.l
8
That the mass or secondary matter of a corporeal substance is made up of
corporeal substances is here suggested unequivocally, as is also the distinction between
matter and corporeal substance which we first saw in a passage from the correspondence
with Arnauld (Supra footnote 85). It is clear too, in the passage above, that the source of
unity of secondary matter whereby it is constituted into a corporeal substance is
substantial form. And this explanation confirms what we just said, that the matter in
Leibniz's accounts of the hylemorphic relation in the correspondence with Arnauld and
the Discourse is what is now called secondary matter.
The concept of primary matter concerns the relation between "first entelechy" and
matter. This is for Leibniz, the most basic of ail hylemorphic relations, just as in
Aristotle's philosophy. But it is evident that this basic hylemorphic schema of first
entelechy-primary matter is not the only one in Leibniz's system where the notion of
matter is important. The basic schema, which is an abstraction, that accounts for the
general or metaphysical conception of substantiality, now expressed in terms of
primitive forces, is complemented by a second schema that explains the constitution of
the individual corporeal substances which make up nature. In this schema secondary
matter is metaphysically conjoined with a soul (which however again must be construed
as primitive active force) in the constitution of a corporeal substance. And the secondary
matter in question is an aggregate of corporeal substances, each of which in turn has
secondary matter or a body as that which obtains substantial unity from the function the
soul performs. This is clearly suggested in the passage above in the sentence that says:
"But, besides its principle of unity, corporeal substance has its mass, or secondary
matter, which is, again an aggregate of other smaller corporeal substances..."
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Just as we had in Aristotle the concept of a primary matter, wholly destitute of
qualifications (an abstraction for not possessed of substantial form), and besides it the
concept of a secondary matter belonging in the domain of reality, informed but capable of
playing the role of matter in relation to a different essence, or substantial form, in
Leibniz we have secondary matter as something concrete, belonging to phenomenal
reality but liable of being modified by a substantial form, in a way that makes of it an
individual substance, unitary and identical. Leibniz then, characteristically uses the
hylemorphic relation in two ways where the notion of primitive active force is
pertinent, in one case, relative to primitive matter, and in the other, relative to
secondary matter. The first schema suggests the bearing of metaphysical notions for a
general abstract understanding of the nature of a corporeal substance. The emphasis lies
in the opposition between an active and a passive principle, which as metaphysically
complementary explain the constitution of a created substantial being, active and
passive. In the second schema, matter, no longer an abstraction, plays a dual role. It is
by itself a type of reality (a being by aggregation) in the spatio-temporal world, and
also the material dimension of the hylemorphic composites that make up substantial
external reality, corporeal substances. The emphasis in the second role lies on the
function whereby that which is not by itself unitary, and is just a being by aggregation
(secondary matter), obtains substantial unity from a substantial form.
Leibniz’s characterization of secondary matter and of its relation to bodies and to
corporeal substances stands closer to what he said in the Correspondence with Arnauld
and the Discourse than his reflections on primitive forces, considered isolatedly. The
latter topic introduces some novelties over what was stated in the works first studied.
But these accord with, though they enhance, what was said in the previous works. They
contribute to a more refined view of force, which includes the notion of secondary matter
as an instrument by which to conceive of bodies in relation to derivative forces, and uses
the contrast between primitive and derivative forces in order to both explain the
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hylemorphic relation by which a corporeal substance is constituted, and the substantial
foundation of the derivative forces that cause physical occurrences. Clearly, then,
Leibniz's assertions on forces and secondary matter amount to confirmations of the
interpretation we have been defending about the meaning of corporeal substance, bodies,
matter and substantial form in his philosophy.
Additional confirmation of our interpretation of the meaning of corporeal
substance for Leibniz, as the hylemorphic composite of substantial form (or primitive
active force) and matter is clearly found in the passage that follows. It is not only
explicit in establishing that a corporeal substance is the metaphysical conjunction of
matter and substantial form, in the terminology of forces, but it stresses that such an
entity is unitary, hence substantial, and should not be confused with a being by
aggregation. It also points to the fact that the substantial form is the source of unity of
what otherwise would be an aggregate. Since this passage belongs in an article of 1710,
we may certainly look upon it as an expression of Leibniz mature and definitive view:
Furthermore, active force is twofold, primitive and derivative, that is, either
substantial or accidental. Primitive active force, which Aristotle calls first
entelechy and one commonly calls the form of a substance is another natural
principle which, together with matter or passive force completes a corporeal
substance. This substance, of course, is one perse, and not a mere aggregate of many
substances, for there is a great difference between an animal, for example, and a
flock. And further, this entelechy is either a soul or something analogous to a soul,
and always naturally activates [actuo] some organic body, which taken separately,
indeed, set apart or removed from soul, is not one substance but an aggregate of
many, in a word, a machine of nature.119
It is clear that a corporeal substance is constituted through the conjunction of
matter and form and that thus constituted it is claimed by Leibniz to be unitary, "one per
se," an animal, or an animal-like entity, that must be distinguished from a being by
aggregation. That the body of an animal —which as such should be called an organic
entity— viewed independently of the substantial form that imparts unity to the corporeal
substance, should, insofar as a body, be considered a being by aggregation and not a
substance, is also clearly explained above. Leibniz affirms the existence of corporeal
substances, and does so by defending its unitary nature, which cannot be claimed for its
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body, but is appropriately affirmed of the hylemorphic composite. The composite
substance an animal is, is not identical to its substantial form, but it is not the body that
serves the role of secondary matter. The hylemorphic schema affords the conception of a
being, neither a body nor an immaterial substance, which has unity, is substantial, and
has a body, material and divisible. Having a body is not being a body, nor being just
related to a body through the concomitance that a relation like preestablished harmony
warrants. Though concomitance is indeed the manner in which the phenomenal
manifestations of a body and a soul relate, the basic relation they have to each other is
that of being the matter and form of one and the same substance, which Leibniz
frequently calls a suppositum. Body and mind cannot interact, they have no physical
communication, as the passage below suggests: but as is also suggested in this passage of
the Theodicy, they communicate metaphysically through the sheer fact that they make up
hylemorphically one substance, one suppositum, that in the case of human substances is
also a person:
The Scholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physical influence
between body and soul: but since it has been recognized that thought and dimensional
mass have no mutual connexion, and that they are creatures differing toto genere,
many moderns have acknowledged that there is no physical communication between
soul and body, despite the metaphysical communication always subsisting, which
causes soul and body to compose one and the same suppositum, or what is called a
person. 1 20
What we have seen of Leibniz's thinking in writings concerned with dynamics
accords with the interpretation of the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld
advanced previously. Substantial form, conceivable as primitive active force, plays a
fundamental role in the account of the nature of corporeal substance and is the basis of
phenomenal change in the domain we usually call "nature." The fact that primitive active
force is indispensable for the account of the motions in bodies again underlines a trait of
Leibniz's thinking which we considered central in the works first examined: that the
appropriate metaphysical account of corporeal substances evinces the existence of
immaterial substances in a way that precludes the possibility of materialism, while not
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at odds with mechanicism. But there are additional aspects in Leibniz's treatment of
forces and secondary matter agreeable to the interpretation of his ontology we have been
suggesting. We will now explore these in the concluding remarks of this section,
c. Concluding Remarks
In Leibniz’s writings on dynamics the hylemorphic schema of Aristotle has become
modern in the sense of admitting an expression in terms of forces. But while Aristotle
did not differentiate between metaphysics and physics as treating two different
ontological domains, Leibniz will make use of the primitive character of the opposition
between passive and active forces, to explain what belongs strictly to metaphysics, the
substantial, and will conceive of derivative forces to account for what should not be
considered in itself substantial, the domain of bodies as well-founded phenomena. This
distinction permits an accommodation of metaphysics and mechanicism.
The domain of metaphysics is concerned with true existents, substances, among
which are included substantial forms. Substances are to be understood in terms of
permanent primitive forces that underlie the phenomenal manifestation with which
dynamics is concerned, but do not themselves belong within the phenomenal realm. The
domain of dynamics is concerned with phenomenal existents, well founded however and
not fictitious, which belong in time and space and continuously undergo change. This is
the domain that admits an immediate characterization in terms of the extensional
qualities of bodies, and the relations of distances between bodies, all of which must be
considered the effects of derivative forces that are the results or modifications of
substances. From this relation the phenomenal domain obtains the degree of reality it
possesses.
From an epistemological perspective, the relation between a phenomenal and a
substantial realm is paralleled in Leibniz by the contrast between what is knowable
through the senses and the imagination versus what is knowable through pure reason.
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Substances as substances are known by reason as that which is permanent and underlies
the being of phenomenal manifestations that belong to one identical and unitary existent.
The unitary existent is a corporeal substance whose phenomenal manifestations are
extension, magnitude, figure, and number, and also sensible qualities such as color and
warmth. The object of reason, the underlying substance, rather than being conceived in
terms of qualities, is, for Leibniz, the agent, the substantial principle that underlies all
phenomenal attributes and modifications. It is not so much the cause of these
manifestations, as their source of reality and also their source of intelligibility. It is,
out of both senses, what may be called their substantial basis.
It seems evident from our study of forces that the relation between metaphysics
and dynamics suggested in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld is a
permanent and important aspect of Leibniz's thinking, which turns around the
metaphysical distinction between bodies (as beings by aggregation) and corporeal
substance (conceived hylemorphically), and results from Leibniz's rejection of the view
that extension exclusively can serve to conceive the nature of corporeal substance. It is
clear that, as we learned in the Discourse , the hylemorphic schema is considered by
Leibniz the conceptual instrument through which the nature of corporeal substances may
be appropriately understood. But from the works on dynamics we realize that the
hylemorphic schema is instrumental also in affording an appropriate conceptualization
of the relation the substantial or primitive domain of forces has to a derivative domain of
forces immediately significant for the description of dynamical relations in phenomenal
reality.
Since in the hylemorphic schema the substantial forms plays a most important
role whereby the nature of the corporeal substance, that of the immaterial substance,
and even the nature of the bodies in the phenomenal domain obtain metaphysical lucidity,
the view that Leibniz's ontology is a form of dualism that posits the existence of
corporeal and immaterial substances, and admits a degree of reality for bodies, is
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clearly confirmed by the examination of the topic recently treated. In conformity with
our previous readings, it is clear that Leibniz is not interested in rejecting the existence
of corporeal substances and does not incline towards a phenomenalistic conception of
bodies at the expense of corporeal substances, and instead does characterize bodies as
phenomena (well founded) but only in order to contrast the being of true corporeal
substances to theirs, and to provide an elucidation of dynamics through the metaphysical
elucidation of the relation well-founded phenomena have to underlying corporeal
substances or primitive forces.
The role of the substantial form in the hylemorphic schema, which already in the
PiSCQurS6 was identified with that of a principle of action, a force, but also a principle of
life, a soul, is in the context of dynamics explained in terms of the notion "primitive
active force," in a manner that suggests no discontinuity or antagonism between what is
preeminent in this context and what was emphasized in the Discourse and the
Correspondence with Arnauld . The metaphysics which attempts the appropriate
elucidation of the nature of corporeal substance and that of bodies, and the dynamics
which includes as part of its foundational issues an elucidation of all the forces
significant for understanding the laws of motion, are part of one unitary system of
philosophy, where an immaterial substance is the substantial form of a corporeal
substance in a way that requires that affirming the existence of corporeal substances
warrants the existence of immaterial substances, as was clearly suggested in Leibniz's
previous works.
The metaphysical notions of corporeal substance, substantial form, matter and
body have basically the same meaning, in the works on dynamics we have seen, that they
had in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld . They are, however, expressed
in terms of forces in the writings on dynamics, but in a way that clearly stresses that
the primary domain of forces should not be construed as efficient causes relative to
derivative forces as effects. The relation is metaphysical, and turns around the
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conceptual schema which clarifies how substances relate to their accidents and modes.
What we have studied then, though it provides a more precise and enlightening
explanation of forces whereby the relation between dynamics and metaphysics is
elucidated, may certainly be considered a confirmation of the views of the two works
treated before.
It has also been confirmed that, for Leibniz, considerations in metaphysics and
physics independent of theology, at the basis of a correct interpretation of the laws of
nature, accord with theological views relative to the existence of a creator of the world,
intelligent and willful, who guides his actions by objective values and rules of wisdom.
Leibniz's account of dynamics is part of a system of philosophy in which nature is
understood as something that results from the combination of metaphysical principles
and the principles of geometry into an order whose rules, the laws of motion, best
satisfy the moral ends of the creator and thus are part of the best possible world.
There is one last point that we must mention to conclude this part. There are
passages in Leibniz's writings that appear to suggest that only immaterial substances
exist. Among these, there are some which serve to support the view that "simple
substances" or "monads," as Leibniz calls them after 1690, are the constituents of
matter, wherefrom it is inferred, through identifying "simple" and "immaterial"
substances, that immaterial substances are the only substances in the universe. Texts
that lend themselves to this interpretation have obtained the attention of perhaps the
majority of Leibniz's commentators, in a manner that makes it necessary that we
examine them. However, it is appropriate that we postpone the consideration of this
topic until the fifth chapter of our work, in order to conclude this chapter by obtaining
additional information about the meaning of corporeal substances in the context of
Leibniz's treatment of transubstantiation.
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2. Transubstantiation
a. Interpretatio n of Scrioturfis
Leibniz's account of transubstantiation does not aim to explain everything that is
involved in the mystery of the Eucharist, for a mystery, he believes, is not completely
amenable to a rational explication. His account, however, attempts to provide a
conceptual basis that will enable us to comprehend the significance of transubstantiation
in a general way, and in a manner compatible with the true principles of metaphysics. It
is, Leibniz claims, an account free of defects as gross as those of Cartesianism, and
should hence be considered an advance over that position.
The main virtue of Leibniz's explanation, as he sees it, is that it avoids the
contradictory view of a corporeal substance which has extension as essence and yet is
capable of being present in several places at the same time. Descartes, according to
Leibniz, by making extension the essence of corporeal substance (or "body" as Descartes
would say) and admitting the Eucharist incurs in a contradiction, and by suggesting that
problems such as these cannot be philosophically elucidated cuts the Gordian knot and
addresses the whole issue in a very unphilosophical manner. The task of philosophy, as
we suggested when explaining Leibniz's rejection of occasionalism, is to untie the knot,
not to cut it. This means advancing a philosophical clarification of the subject as far as it
is possible.
Leibniz's position on the sacrament of the Eucharist begins with the view that the
Holy Scriptures should be interpreted as close to the letter as possible. Though he
concedes that sometimes it is unavoidable that we interpret passages metaphorically, he
rejects this approach as a standard procedure. He believes that to take a great license in
the interpretation of the texts entails great risks. Surely he decries this possibility
247
because it opens the door to practically any interpretation. The passage below expresses
his view:
There are certainly passages where there is no objection to abandoning the literal
sense —for instance, where Scripture gives God hands, or attributes to him anger,
repentance and other human affects. Otherwise we would have to side with the
Anthropomorphites, or with certain English fanatics who believed that when Jesus
called Herod a fox he was actually turned into one. This is where the rules of
interpretation come into play; but if they provide nothing which goes against the
literal sense in deference to the philosophical maxim [the principle of
contradiction], and if furthermore the literal sense contains nothing imputing some
imperfection to God or involving a threat to pious observances, it is safer and indeed
more reasonable to keep to the letter.^^l
The principle of contradiction is fundamental to the nature of truth for Leibniz,
and statements in the Bible that seem contradictory should be explained away through
interpretations that must depart from the literal sense of the statements in question.
This is the case too with anthropomorphic statements which may be contrary to the
essence of God. For, according to Leibniz, it amounts to a contradiction to affirm
something opposite to what is essential, as we have seen so many times. Any statement
that is incompatible with the essence of God cannot be considered true; moreover, by
distorting the nature of God, such a statement would most probably contain "a threat to
pious observances." But when contradiction is not at issue, Leibniz recommends sticking
as close to the text as possible. Otherwise it would seem that there is little that may be
objectively defended as truth in the Scriptures.
Leibniz's essentialism, we saw, was fundamental in his criticism of
occasionalism, inasmuch as the specific nature of corporeal and immaterial substances
could not be disregarded in any attempt to characterize their modifications and the
relation they bear to each other. In the same fashion essentialism is basic to Leibniz's
reflections on the Eucharist. It manifest itself in this context in the concern regarding
the nature of corporeal substance. Christ's reference to his body as the bread in the
sacrament, must not involve or entail anything contrary to the essence of body,
understood as a corporeal substance. The appropriate understanding of a mystery cannot
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involve overruling the principle of contradiction, nor the necessary or essential truths
that are solely dependent on it.
Now, while necessary truths cannot be contradicted by theological claims and
mysteries cannot be explained on the basis of rejecting the principle of contradiction,
the rules of nature may be accommodated to the claims of faith. The laws of nature are
not necessary truths but the outcome of God's decrees based on wisdom, and therefore can
be excepted by God; of course, when higher rules of wisdom and ultimately, the principle
of the best, demand it. Thus Leibniz writes:
Musaeus agreed that principles of reason which are necessary because they have
logical necessity —i.e. ones whose negations imply contradictions— should and can be
safely employed in theology. But he had grounds for his denial that anything which is
necessary merely through physical necessity (i.e. necessity founded on induction
from what takes place in nature, or on natural laws which result from divine
institution, so to speak) is sufficient to rule out belief in a mystery or a miracle,
since God is free to change the ordinary course of things. Thus, going by the order of
nature one can be confident that the same person cannot be at once a mother and a
virgin, and that a human body cannot be inaccessible to the senses; though the
contrary of each of them is possible for God."' 22
A virginal conception, and a transubstantiation by which a piece of bread becomes
the body of Christ while maintaining its breadly appearance (so that the body of Christ
itself is "inaccessible to the senses"), are both contrary to natural laws, and therefore
miracles. They cannot be explained by human beings, whose knowledge of nature, we
know, is limited to what belongs within natural laws; but it is understandable that God
may act so as to actualize these occurrences, for they do not contradict necessary truths
and it is within possibility that they may occur, even though they are unnatural. We
must remember that God's power, according to Leibniz, moves within the limits of the
possible, and that only that which is contrary to necessary truths is impossible.
Moreover, the laws of nature are not necessary truths; their "necessity" is moral or
hypothetical, for it originates, as Leibniz so frequently explains, from the fact that they
belong in the best possible world, a world that God is morally obliged to create. But along
with them in the best possible world there may also be miracles.
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b. The Cartesian Problem and the Wav Out nf it
To conceive of the body substance involved in transubstantiation in a way that
contradicts its specific essence is not possible. Thus, Leibniz's criticism of Descartes is
clearly and frequently expressed in terms like the following:
For if the nature of body consists in extension, as Descartes claims, it involves a
contradiction, beyond all doubt, to maintain that a body may exist at many places at
once. ^23
In order to correct the defect in Descartes's position on this issue, the notion of
substantial form again becomes indispensable, within the same conceptual schema that
served to address the problems in dynamics resulting from the inertness of corporeal
substances conceived as merely extended. And just as the problems in dynamics prompted
the realization, by Leibniz, that matter cannot be understood without the notion of force
(substantial form), in this different context the same recognition takes place, because
the correct account of transubstantiation involves the distinction between the
phenomenal and the substantial that results from the recognition that forces are absolute
and permanent (and hence substantial) while motion (conceived as change of place),
figure and all extensional qualities are phenomenal.
If a corporeal substance is conceived as a hylemorphic composite, one may
contemplate the possibility of having a substantial form informing a determinate
secondary matter different from the one it naturally informs in order to explain how the
bread is changed into the body of Christ. The substantial form of the body of Christ could
complement the bread, if the latter is construed as secondary matter, and in that manner
one may say that all the pieces of bread in the different instantiations of the sacrament at
different places make up the body of Christ. The form endows with unity and
substantiality a matter that thereby becomes a corporeal substance, the body of Christ,
in spite of the fact that the matter in question is a being made out parts (a being by
aggregation) and remains so. The body of Christ as corporeal substance is unitary, but as
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a well founded phenomenom it will lack phenomenal unity, for the parts are not in
contact and cannot through perception either be seen or touched as a whole. It will not
hence be a body as a perceptual unity, and yet it will have substantial unity, for the
latter depends on the unity endowing function of a substantial form, which is not
inhibited by not having the parts in contact. This conception, then, according to Leibniz,
would afford a noncontradictory basis for understanding the Eucharist insofar as the
substantial form or force is not extended and it is conceivable that it be in many places at
the same time. It may relate as a principle of unity to many bodies (or parts) while
constituting one identical corporeal substance.
Of course, as Leibniz has explained in many contexts, what is natural to a
substantial form is to be the form of a secondary matter in a way that yields continuity
in the process of change of the constituents or parts of its body. This feature is linked to
the expressive nature of the substance a soul is and to the preestablished harmony which
binds it to its body as the object it first and best expresses. Since the form, as an
immaterial substance, always expresses its particular body, the coherence of the
sequence of its expressions is tied up with the continuity of the change of its body. The
change involved in transubstantiation breaks this continuity, hence, it is unnatural,
miraculous, and yet it is compatible with the nature of corporeal substance understood
hylemorphically. It accords with the possibility of having one substantial form express
parts of secondary matter it has not been led to express from its antecedents stages.
I believe that the clearest and most detailed discussion of this subject takes place
in a correspondence between Leibniz and Pellison of the years 1691-92.
Transubstantiation is explained here in terms of the concepts that originated in Leibniz's
mature treatment of dynamics. It is, for this reason, quite enlightening, and we gain by
approaching it after our previous discussion of Leibniz's treatment of corporeal
substance in the context of dynamics. This correspondence is the basis of the explanation
we have just presented.
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C. The Leibniz-Pellison Correspondencfi
i. The Same Conceptual Schema in a Different Context
It is worthwhile to begin our examination of the correspondence with Pellison
with a passage from a letter dated 1691, where Leibniz refers to two of the points we
have mentioned as important with regard to transubstantiation: the significance of the
principle of contradiction for theological meditations, and the claims that his rejection
of the view that the essence of body is extension resulted from "natural reasons" and that
this ontological position has very important theological consequences. Leibniz reference
to the "natural reasons" at the basis of his rejection of the Cartesian conception of
corporeal substance, of course, means that it resulted from his consideration of the
problems in dynamics, which prompted an explanation of motion on the basis of the
notion of force. But that his position on the essence of corporeal substance ("body") is
even more valuable for its consequences in the field of theology for the accommodation of
faith is his most important point here:
I acknowledge that were I to hold with others that the essence of matter consist in
extension, I would be forced to utilize the figure, for essences are immutable; and to
attribute to things that which is contrary to their essence is a contradiction. Now, it
is the principle of principles (as you have well remarked at the beginning of your
second section) that a real contradiction should not be admitted. It is true that
without having regard for theology I have always believed for natural reasons that
the essence of a body consists in something other than extension. But since I see that
this is even more important in order to sustain what I consider true in matters of
faith, I have been led even more to think in such terms. ^ 24
In the letters that follow, in order to prepare Pellison for his explanation of
transubstantiation, Leibniz emphasizes his conception of corporeal substance in
opposition to Descartes's, and we find again the arguments relative to dynamics where
the phenomenal character of extended bodies is contrasted to the substantial character of
a corporeal substance conceived in terms of force. Leibniz writes:
I say that in the nature of body, besides magnitude, and the change of magnitude and of
situation, that is, other than the notions of pure geometry, one must include a
superior notion, which is that of the force through which bodies are able to act and to
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resist. The notion of force is as clear as that of action and of passion, because it is
that from which action follows when nothing impedes it: the effort, conatus", and
while movement is a successive thing, which therefore never exists, no more than
time, because all its parts never exist together, force or effort exists completely
(wholly) at every moment, and must be something true and real. And since nature
pays nnore attention to what is true than to what does not exist wholly except in our
spirit, it is found (in accordance with what I have demonstrated) that it is the same
quantity of force and not the same quantity of movement (as Descartes had believed)
that is conserved in nature.^ 25
The phenomenality of extended bodies and their substantial insufficiency is
stressed above in terms that are very familiar to us. The argument, however, whereby it
is claimed that movement is phenomenal for it is successive is one of the latest Leibniz
introduces in order to contrast what is phenomenal to the substantial. But the basic
conception is the same that was explained in the Discourse and the Correspondence with
Arnauld through arguments which stress the opposition between substantial unity and
permanence versus the mutable nature of what is phenomenal. The rejection of
Descartes's account of quantity of motion as constant is accompanied by the view that
Cartesian metaphysics is flawed and that the error in both dynamics and metaphysics can
be avoided with the introduction of the notion of force. Of course, the conclusion
suggested is that the geometrical conception of a corporeal substance as a merely
essentially extended entity is untenable.
The value of Leibniz's conception of corporeal substance for transubstantiation
appears clearly in the passage below, where Leibniz contrasts his views to the
Cartesians'. In it, the intelligibility of force as a metaphysical notion that affords an
explanation of the extended as phenomenal, without it itself being extended, is
emphasized as the instrument by which one may say that a corporeal substance is at
different places at the same time. The Cartesians, by making bodies inert, not only reject
the true conception of substance, but through lacking the distinction between the
substantial form and the body cannot assert a substantial principle, not extended, at the
basis of extension, which may be at different places at once. From this deficiency
Descartes must incur in a contradiction when he accepts the Eucharist. Leibniz, by
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contrast, through making the substantial form the principle of action and substantiality
of a corporeal substance can distinguish between the inert body, phenomenal secondary
matter, and "the body's substance", its substantial form. This permits that it be
conceived that the form "applies" at different places at the same time, or in Leibniz
words: "This is the way one may know the distinction between a body's substance and its
extension, and that nothing impedes that the substance of one and the same body be
applied in different places." The whole passage says:
Now, of all the different notions of extension and its modifications, I find that of force
the most intelligible and the most appropriate for an explanation of the nature of
body. It seems that the corporeal substance has two forces, namely, the passive
force, that is, resistance, with respect to its matter, which is common to all
(because impenetrability is nothing else than the general resistance of matter), and
besides active force, with respect to its specific form, which varies according to
species. For one must acknowledge that every body makes an effort to act externally,
and would act noticeably if the contrary efforts surrounding it would not impede it.
This is what our moderns have not sufficiently contemplated. They imagine that a
body could be in perfect repose without any effort, out of not having understood what
a corporeal substance is. For 1 believe that a substance cannot be without action (at
least naturally). This is the way one may know the distinction between a body's
substance and its extension, and that nothing impedes that the substance of one and
the same body be applied in different places. But if the substance of bodies were not
anything different than extension with its modifications or figures it appears that
there would be as many bodies as there are places or extensions they occupy. But I do
not accuse the Cartesians of opposing that which is of faith."* 26
It is clear that the usefulness of the hylemorphic schema for transubstantiation
turns around Leibniz's claim that his own conception of corporeal substance avoids the
mistake of conceiving of bodies in a way incompatible with having the identical body of
Christ at many places at once. Leibniz's position on this topic, however, does not add
anything new to his explanations on the nature of corporeal substance we have explored
before. It is very important, nevertheless, because it confirms, in a different context,
our interpretation of his views on corporeal substances. It reaffirms the
indispensability of the hylemorphic schema, before the issue of transubstantiation, in
the same terms which served to establish that bodies are beings by aggregation, while
true corporeal substances are more than extended and have force as a principle of unity
and substantiality that complements matter.
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ii. A Question bv Pellison
Leibniz explanation up to this point emphasizes the significance of the substantial
form as that which imparts substantiality to a corporeal substance, but also as that
which may "apply" at different places at the same time. This feature and the separation
of the bodily parts upon which the form operates present some difficulties to Pellison
which bring about the statements that follow;
I fear a little that the manner in which you ultimately explain the substance by a
sort of force that may be applied at different places may enable someone to say that
you are not really of the Augsbourg confession concerning the Eucharist, because you
do not assert a true, real, presence, but a presence of force and virtue (power). It
may be said that in order to elude that dogma, so difficult to believe, you have changed
the substance into force instead of regarding the force as a sequel and an accident of
the substance.... On my regard, I conceive of the force as an ordinary and almost
necessary sequel of the substance, but not as the substance itself, and this is why you
would oblige me were you to give me all the instruction on this topic you can. '•27
Pellison's query turns around the distinction between force, as an accident of
substance, and a concrete substance, the subject of modes and accidents. He implies that a
real presence in the sacrament must have the concrete substance as subject, and that a
presence through force is only virtual, not a true presence. To say, then, that through
transubstantiation the bread becomes the body of Christ would not literally mean that the
corporeal substance in question is at different places.
In Leibniz's response it will first be established that there are two ways of using
the term "substance": for referring to the essence of an individual substance, in a
manner analogous to Aristotle's notion of a secondary substance: and for referring to the
concrete substance itself (what Aristotle called "primary substance"). In the former use
what is in question is the substantial form or primitive active force, the hylemorphic
composite's principle of action and unity. Now since the principle of action is not the
hylemorphic concrete entity, Leibniz explains that in this sense the notion is somewhat
abstract. But it is this principle of action or primitive force that is the source of
the
accidental manifestations of motion, as we learned in the context of the works in
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dynamics, and as the force from which phenomenal manifestations originate it is not
extended but the source of extension and such that it may manifest itself at different
places at the same time. It is not an accident of substance but one of the metaphysical
principles by which a substance is constituted. As such Leibniz Leibniz treats it as what
is present in its manifestations immediately and truly.
In order to further the elucidation of his position, Leibniz provides an explanation
of the distinction between a real and a virtual presence of a substance on the basis of the
contrast between the presence of a force which operates immediately on the object it
affects, and the presence of a force that operates at a distance. In the latter case, he
claims, we cannot say that the subject of the force is truly present. Ex hypothesis the
force is not in this case at the place it operates. Leibniz treats Pellison's question as if it
entailed a misinterpretation of his position amounting to attributing to him the view that
the primitive force that explains the multipresence of the body of Christ in the
sacrament performs as does a force that operates at a distance. He explains that in his
case, the primitive force is not in space at a distance from the object in which an effect
is aroused. Rather, it sustains or substantiates a series of corporeal manifestations
which metaphysically immediately relate to it. This is an immediate presence, a real
presence obtaining from having a direct substantiating relation between a primitive
force and derivative forces with phenomenal manifestations. There is no distance or
anything else mediating between the substrate and its manifestations. Clearly, as was
emphasized in Leibniz's works on dynamics and metaphysics, the relation between
primitive forces and derivative forces (which are immediately pertinent to the surgence
of phenomenal manifestations) should not be interpreted as a physical relation, and
much less as one comparable to that which obtains between a force, as a cause, and its
effects at a distance. The relation in question is metaphysical. It is not set in space. It is
rather the basis for the appearance of corporeal entities as modifications of what is
substantial. It is immediate in this sense.
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The line of thinking explained above is suggested in the passage below, which
contains what is most important in Leibniz's letter to Pellison of 1692;
The word substance is taken in two senses, for the subject itself and for the essence
of the subject; for the subject itself when one says that the body or the bread is a
substance; for the essence of the subject when one says, the substance of the body or
the substance of the bread. And then it is something (somewhat) abstract. Therefore,
when, it is said that the primitive force is the substance of the body one understands'
its nature or essence. In that way, Aristotle said that the nature is the principle of
movement and rest, and that the primitive force is nothing other than that principle
in every body, from which all action and passions arise (are born). I consider
matter the first interior principle of passion and resistance, and this is why bodies
are naturally impenetrable, and the substantial form is nothing other than the first
interior principle of action, evxeXexeia r\ Tcpwni, I am also persuaded that, following
the laws of nature, the body is always trying to act, and that a matter without any
action or effort is as chimerical as a place without body, a thing which has not been
sufficiently known by our moderns, who conceive the body as purely passive, and
often without action and without effect. Therefore no one may take offense if one takes
the substance in abstracto for the primitive force, which also remains always the
same in the same body, and makes accidental forces and particular actions arise
successively, which are nothing other than the consequence of the nature or the
primitive or subsisting force applied to other things. And those which accept that the
same body may be at several places at the same time, are forced to acknowledge that
that should not and cannot be explained through the attribute of extension, nor by
that of impenetrability; for it is then that the laws of extension and impenetrability
cease, according to which every body occupies by itself a certain place of a
determinate magnitude; it only remains to have recourse to a higher principle of
action and of resistance, from which the extended and impenetrability emanate when
God does not impede it on account of a superior order. It is therefore by the
application to several places of that principle, which is nothing else than the
primitive force of which I have spoken, or (to speak plainly) the particular nature
of the thing, that the multipresence of a body should be explained. It is true however
that the substance in concreto is different from the force, for it is the subject taken
with that force. In that manner it is present and its presence is real, because it
emanates from its immediate essence, in conformity with God's determination of its
application to a place. A virtual presence opposed to a real presence must be without
that immediate application of the essence or the primitive form, and does not take
place except through actions at a distance or through mediate operations while there
is no distance whatever here."' 28
It is clear in the passage above that for Leibniz the presence of a corporeal
substance that results from its force applying at certain places is the ordinary way of
corporeal substances being present in a place. They are not, we must stress, extended,
and the linkage they exhibit with an extended domain must be understood in terms of the
metaphysical relation by which an essentially active corporeal substance has an extended
body as its phenomenal manifestation.
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It is the case always that corporeal substances are present in space through the
extension they constitute, that is, on account of corporeal manifestations which they
metaphysically support. A corporeal substance is not from it essential feature (force )
extended; it has extensional manifestations that should be construed as something that
relates to the substance as its accidents, and more specifically as something that results
from the primitive forces which make up a corporeal substance, and manifest
themselves in the manner of derivative forces which are significant with regard to the
magnitude and impenetrability of bodies. Thus Leibniz writes;
I would say furthermore, that it is not only in the Eucharist but everywhere that
bodies are present through this application of primitive force to a place, but,
naturally, that is not [realized] except in accordance with a certain extension or
magnitude and figure, and with regard to a certain place, of which other bodies are
excluded.^ 29
The notion of presence by operation if construed in the sense of action at a distance
does not characterize according to Leibniz the relation that through a substantial form
obtains relative to the corporeal manifestations of a corporeal substance. The substantial
form, or principle of action and substantiality, is itself immediately present with a
presence of immediate operation, which is not operation at a distance. The accidental
manifestations of a corporeal substances are its modes of being, and as such through
them the substance in question has "a real presence" the presence "of its essence," of its
substantiai form, one that Leibniz explains "should not be considered distant from the
individual that operates, since it is a manner (mode) of being of it," as the passage below
suggests:
You ask if it is the principle itself of the action of bodies that is in various places in
the Eucharist, or if it is nothing but a presence of operation, so that that principle is
not itself in various places, but only operates there. I answer that all that which
operates immediately in several places is also in various places through a real
presence of its essence, and that the immediate operation should not be considered
distant from the individual that operates, since it is a manner of being of it.^
20
Leibniz's definitive position which includes underlining the limited character of
his explanation (which avoids the defects of the Cartesians but is not a complete account
of what is involved in transubstantiation) is clearly presented below. The crux of his
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argument turns around the metaphysical distinction between the nature of force and the
nature of extension. Since the two are metaphysically different and such that a
multiplication of one need not be accompanied by a multiplication of the other, the
predicament that in the Cartesians leads to contradiction need not be faced by Leibniz.
The advantage that I believe to have found with respect to that mystery in my
explanation of the substance of the body by the force or by the principle of action and
of passion over that other explanation which places the nature of body in extension,
consists in this : that it it implies a contradiction that one and the same body be at
several places if the body consists in extension, insofar as as a place is itself an
extendedness like that of body. But one sees no contradiction, that the same force be
raised, by the omnipotence of God, to being at several places at the same time, and to
act there immediately and with presence, because the force and the place or
extension, being of a different genus, the multiplication of one does not entail that of
the other, and consequently if the essence of the body consist in the primitive force,
the contradiction ceases, and that is all one may demand to save the mysteries."' 31
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is sought or in their results must of necessity also be diminished or become less than
any given quantity whatever. Or to put it more commonly, when two instances or data
approach each other continuously, so that one at last passes into the other, it is
necessary for their consequences or results (or the unknown) to do so also. This depends
on a more general principle: that, as the data are ordered, so the unknowns are ordered
also. " [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers, p. 351
.]
39Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 516.
40Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 245.
Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 316.
^2We quoted this passage before (Supra chapter II, footnote 42) as it clearly
shows how Leibniz admits mechanicism without accepting materialism, and also shows
(our point now) that he rejects the view that a geometrical characterization of nature
suffices for understanding its phenomenal manifestations. [Leibniz, Philosophical
Essays, p. 245.]
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G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics. Correspondence with ArnanlH
Monadology
,
translated by George Montgomery (Illinois: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1988.), p. 244.
^^Leibniz, Discourse, p, 244. '^^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 143.
^^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 145. 47|_eibniz, Discourse
, p. 120.
‘^^Leibniz, Discourse
.
p. 133.
"In the rigorous sense of metaphysical truth there is no external cause
which acts upon us except God alone, and he alone communicates himself to us
immediately by virtue of our continual dependence upon him." [Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers
, p. 321.]
5*^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 135. Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 146.
^^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 147. 53|_0ibniz, Discourse
, p. 154.
^'^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 154. 55i_eibniz, Discourse
, p. 189.
S^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 154. 57beibniz, Discourse , p. 155.
^^Leibniz, Discourse
.
p.159. ^^Leibniz, Discourse
.
p.159.
SOLeibniz, Discourse
, p. 161.
®^"lt is true that the whole, which has a real unity, may continue as the same
individual in the strictest sense even when it loses or gains parts as our experience
shows us." [Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 223.]
The statement quoted evinces the problems involved in the use of the terms
"body" and "corporeal substance" for Leibniz. Neither is appropriate in it. There are
no corporeal substances that are less than mechanically united, nor any bodies that
are more than mechanically united. [Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 162.]
63Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 162. 64beibniz, Discourse , p. 163.
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SSLeibniz consistently and emphatically stresses throughout his works that his
use of substantial forms should not be confused with that of the Scholastics. As we saw
in the part that shows why he rejects occasionalism, the use of forms by the
Scholastics is similar to the use of "sympathies" and "natures" by the Hylarchic
philosophers. Leibniz’s own use of forms is different as he claims in the passage
below, in an effort to avoid a misinterpretation of his position: "These vital principles
or souls have perception and appetite . When I am asked if they are substantial forms,
I reply with a distinction. For if this term is taken to mean what Descartes meant in
maintaining against Regis that the rational soul is the substantial form of man I agree.
But I say 'No' to anyone who takes the term in the sense of those who imagine that
there is a substantial form in a piece of stone or in any other inorganic body....
My opinion on vital principles, however is in certain respects different from
what has previously been taught. One of these respects is that it has always been thought
that vital principles change the course of motion in bodies, or at least that they provide
God with the occasion for changing it. My system, instead, holds that this course is not at
all changed within the order of nature, God having pre-established it as it should be. The
Peripatetics believed that souls have an influence upon bodies and that according to their
will or appetite they give certain impressions to the body. The celebrated authors who by
their vital principles and plastic natures have occasioned the present controversy have
been of the same opinion, although they are not Peripatetics. One can say the same thing
about those who have made use of an archeus or a hylarchic principle, or other
immaterial principles with other names." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 586.]
^^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 175. ^^Leibniz, Discourse , p. 189.
S^Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 191.
®9"lt seems also that what constitutes the essence of a being by aggregation
consists solely in the mode of the being of its component elements.... This mode of being
pressuposes, accordingly a substance of which the essence is not a mode of being of a
substance.... and there is no plurality without true unities;..." [Leibniz, Discourse ,
p. 190.]
70[_eibniz, Discourse
, p. 196. Leibniz, Discourse , p. 191.
Leibniz, Discourse
, pp. 196-197.
^^"rhis inherent force can indeed be understood distinctly, though it cannot be
explained by sense perception. It is no more to be thus explained than is the nature of the
soul, for this force belongs among those things which are grasped not by the imagination
but by the understanding." [Leibniz, Philosophical Pacers, p. 501.]
74Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 194. 75Leibniz, Discourse , p. 195.
^^Leibniz, Discourse , p. 195. ^^Leibniz, Discourse, p. 20.
78Leibniz, Discourse , p. 205. ^OLeibniz, Piscoori^. P- 217.
SOteibniz, Discourse
, p. 220. Leibniz, Piscourg^. P- 205.
8^Leibniz, Discourse , p. 205. ®^Leibniz, PigCOUrgS,. P- 221.
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Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 205. 85[_0ibnj2^ Discourse
, pp, 221-222.
®6 Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 224. 87 Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 224.
88Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 226. 89 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers p. 218.
80Leibniz, Discourse
, pp. 227-228. S'! Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 228.
82Leibniz, Discourse
, p. 230. 88Leibniz, Discourse , p. 244.
Q^Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle , edited and with an introduction by
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House Publishing Company, 1941), p. 55.
85|n the "Correspondence with De Voider" Leibniz writes: "Things which are
different must differ in something or must have within themselves some diversity that
can be noted. It is strange that men have not applied this most obvious axiom, along with
so many others. But people are generally content to satisfy their imaginations and do not
worry about reasons; hence so many monstrosities introduced to the injury of the true
philosophy. Thus they commonly use incomplete and abstract concepts, which thought
supports but which nature does not know in their bare form; such notions as that of
time, also of space or of what is extended only mathematically, of merely passive mass,
of motion considered mathematically, etc." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 501.]
88Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 261.
S^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 436.
98Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 512.
S^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 537.
"•OOLeibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 537.
1 0'! Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 436.
"•O^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 437.
lOSLeibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 437.
•04 Leibniz places primary matter with other abstractions which are contrary to
the principle of indiscernibles: "On this ground [the principle of indiscernibles] (as
well as on other considerations) I once also concluded that there are no atoms, that space
is not a substance, and that primary matter itself, or matter separate from all activity,
cannot be included among substances." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers. P- 524.]
105Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 437.
lOSLeibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 437.
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O^Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 252.
I 08 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 249-250.
•OSLeibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 254.
"’OLeibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 517.
1
1 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 517.
^Leibniz continuously stresses that all we need to know about force —and this
is what makes it fully intelligible— is that it is that which is at the basis of
modifications, and that from which ultimately the mutations in the phenomenal world
follow. When De Voider shows insatisfaction with Leibniz's explanation and says, "this
foundation which was to be in the thing may perhaps be the same as what you call
primitive forces, from which the derivative forces flow." ..." But I perceive nothing of
these —so feeble is the force of my understanding— except that you assert that all the
remaining mutations flow from them,..." Leibniz reacts by asserting; "But you do
yourself an injury through your excessive modesty, for you understand the matter as far
as its nature allows. Would you seek to sense things which can only be understood ...?"
[Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 537.]
1 13Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, pp. 440-441.
'''^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 441.
‘•SLeibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 503.
"I
"'^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , pp. 639-640.
^Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
,
p. 274.
*'*8Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
,
p. 289.
••^Leibniz, Philosophical Essays , p. 252.
1 20q.w. Lebniz, Theodicy , edited with an introduction by Austin Farrer (La Salle,
Illinois; Open Court Publishing Company, 1985.), p. 155.
1 21 Lebniz, Theodicy
, p. 87. 1 22Leibniz New Essays , p. 499.
123Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 261.
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'24My translation. "J'avoue cependant, que si je tenois avec quelques-uns, que
1 6ssenc0 dG la rnatidre cx)nsiste dans I'^tendue, je serois oblige de recx)urir ^ la figure,
car les essences sont immuables; et d'attribuer aux choses ce qui repugne k leur essence,
c'est une contradiction. Or c'est le principe de principes (comme vous avez bien
remarqu6. Monsieur, au commencement de vostre seconde section) qu'une v Writable
contradiction ne doit pas estre admise. II est vray que san avoir aucun 6gard k la
th6ologie, j'ay toujours ]ug6 par des raisons naturelles que I’essence du corps consists
dans quelque autre chose que l'6tendue. Mais comme Je vois que cela importe encore
beaucoup pour soutenir ce que je tiens veritable en mati6re de toy, j'ay est6 d’autant
plus pot16 despuis long-temp k m6diter l^-dessus." [G.W. Leibniz, OeuvrfiR. Tome I,
publi6es pour la premiere fois d'apr6s les manuscrits originaux avec notes et
introduction par Louis Alexandre Foucher de Careil (Hildesheim, New York: George Olms
Verlag, 1969), p. 228.]
‘’25My translation. "Je remarque que dans la nature des corps, outre la grandeur,
et le changement de la grandeur et de la situation, c'est-a-dire outre les notions de la
pure g6om6trie, il faut mettre une notion superieure, qui est celle de la force par
laquelle les corps peuvent agir et r6sister. La notion de la force est aussi claire que celle
dei'action et de la passion, car c’est ce dont Taction s'ensuit lorsque rien ne Tempesche:
Teffort, conatus; et au lieu que le mouvement est une chose succesive, laquelle par
consequent n'existe jamais, non plus que le temps, parce que toutes ses parties n'existent
jamais ensemble: au lieu de cela, dis-je, la force ou Teffort existe tout entier k cheque
moment, et doit estre quelque chose de veritable et de reel. Et comme la nature a plustost
egard au veritable qu'e ce qui n’existe entierement que dans nostre esprit, il s’est trouve
(suivant ce qui j’ay demontre) que c’est aussi la mesme quantite de la force, et non pas la
mesme quantite du mouvement (comme Descartes avoit cru) qui se conserve dans la
nature." [Leibniz, Oeuvres
, p. 229.]
126fyiy translation. "Or, de toutes les notions differentes de Tetendeue et de ses
modifications, je trouve celle de la force la plus intelligible et la plus propre k
expliquer la nature du corps. II semble que la substance corporelle a deux forces,
sgavoir la force passive, c'est-^-dire la resistance k Tegard de sa matiere, qui est
commune k tous (car Timpenetrabilite n’est autre chose que la resistance generale de la
matiere), et puis la force active k Tegard de sa forme specifique, qui est variable selon
les especes. Car il faut sgavoir que tout corps fait effort d’agir au dehors, et agiroit
notablement, si les efforts contraires des ambians ne Ten empeschoient. C’est ce que nos
modernes n’ont pas assez conceu. Ils s’imaginent qu’un corps pourroit estre dans un
parfait repos sans aucun effort, faute d’avoir entendeu ce que la substance corporelle;
car a mon advis (au moins naturellement) la substance ne sgauroit estre sans action, ce
qui destruit encor Tinaction que les Sociniens attribuent aux §mes s6par6es. C’est par ce
moyen qu’on connoist la distinction de la substance du corps d’avec son 6tendeue, et que
rien n’empesche que la substance d’un mesme corps ne puisse estr appliqu6e k plusieurs
lieux . Mais si la substance du corps n’estoit autre chose qu Tetendeue avec ses
modifications ou figures, il semble qu’il y auroit autant de corps qu’il y a de lieux ou
d’etendeues qu’il occupe. Cependant je n’ay garde d'accuser messieurs les Cart6siens
d’estre contraires k ce qui est de la foy,..." [Leibniz, Qeuvres. P- 280.]
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My translation. "Je crains un peu que la manifere dont vous expliqu6s en
dernier lieu la substance pour une esp6ce de force qui se peut appliquer en diverses
lieux, ne donne sujet ^ quelqu'un de dire que vous n'est pas v6ritablement de la
confession d’Augsbourg sur I'Eucharistie, parce que vous ne croy6s pas une veritable
presence r6elle, mais une pr6sence de force et de vertu ... On dira done peut-estre que,
pour 61uder ce dogme si difficile k croire, vous av6s chang6 la substance en force au lieu
de regarder la force comme une suite et un accident de la substance.... En mon
particulier, je congoy bien la force comme une suite ordinaire et presque n6cessaire de
la substance, mais non pas comme estant la substance mesme, et e'est sur quoy vous
m'obliger6s de me donner toute instruction que vouz pourrez." [Leibniz, Oeuvres
p. 291.]
1 28My translation. "Le mot de substance se prend de deux fagons, pour le sujet
mesme et pour I'essence du sujet: pour le sujet mesme, lorsqu’on dit que le corps ou le
pain est une substance: pour I'essence du sujet, lorsqu'on dit la substance du corp ou la
substance du pain. Et alors e'est quelque chose d'abstrait. Lors done qu'on dit que la force
primitive fait la substance des corps, on entend leur nature ou essence. Aussy, Aristote
dit que la nature est le principe du mouvement et du repos, et la force primitive n'est
autre chose que ce principe dans chaque corps dont naissent toutes ses actions et
passions. Je consid^re la mati^re comme le premier principe interieur de la passion et
de la resistance, et e'est par la que les corps sont naturellement imp6n6trables et la
forme substantielle n'est autre chose que le premier principe int6rieur de Taction,
evxeXexeia ti npcoxTi. Aussy suis-je persuade que, suivant les loix de la nature, le corps
fait toujours des efforts pour agir et qu'une mati6re sans aucune action ou effort est
aussy chim6rique qu'un lieu sans corps, ce qui n'a pas est6 assez conneu de nos modernes,
qui congoivent le corps comme purement passif, et souvent sans action et sans effect.
Ainsy personne ne se pourra formaliser si Ton prend la substance in abstracto pour la
force primitive, laquelle aussy demeure toujours la mesme dans le mesme corps et fait
naistre successivement des forces accidentelles et des actions particuli^res, lesquelles
ne sont toutes qu'un suite de la nature ou de la force primitive et subsistante appliqu^e k
d'autres choses. Et ce qui demeurent d'accord qu'un mesme corps peut en mesme temps
estre en plusieurs lieux, sont oblig6z d'advouer que cela ne se doit ny peut expliquer par
Tattribut de T6tendeue, ny par celuy de Timp6n6trabilit6; puisque e'est alors que les
loix de T6tendeue et de Timp6n6trabilit§ cessent, suivant lesquelles chaque corps occupe
luy seul un certain lieu d'une grandeur determin6e: il ne reste done que d'avoir recours k
un principe plus haut de Taction et de la resistance, duquel T6tendeue et
Timp6n6trabilite 6manent lorsque Dieu ne Tempesche par un ordre sup6rieur. C'est done
par Tapplication k plusieur lieux de ce principe, qui n'est autre chose que la force
primitive dont j'ay parl6 ou (pour parler e Tordinaire) la nature particuliere de la
chose, qu'on doit expliquer la multipr6sence d'un corps. 11 est vray cependant que la
substance in concreto est autre chose que la force, car e'est le sujet pris avec cette
force. Ainsy, le sujet mesme est present et sa presence est r6elle parce qu'elle eemane
immediatement de son essence, selon que Dieu en determine Tapplication aux lieux. Une
presence virtuelle oppos6e k une presence r6elle doit estre sans cette application
immediate de I'essence ou de la forme primitive, et ne se fait que par des actions k
distances ou par des operations mediates, au lieu qu'il n y a point de distance icy."
[Leibniz, Oeuvres
, p. 312.)
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'•29My translation. "Je diray mesme que ce n'est pas seulement dans
I'Eucharistie, mais partout ailleurs, que les corps ne sont pr6sens que par cette
application de la force primitive a lieu; mais, naturellement, ce n'est que suivant une
certaine 6tendue ou grandeur, et figure, et a I’egard d'un certain lieu dont les autres
corps sont excleus." [Leibniz, Oeuvres
, pp.313-314.]
130(y|y translation. "Vous demandes si c'est le principe meme de Taction du
corps qui est en plusieurs lieux dans I'Eucharistie, ou si c'est ne qu'une presence
d'op6ration, en sorte que ce principe ne soit pas proprement luy-mesme en plusieurs
lieux, mais y op^re seulement. Je reponds que tout ce qui op6re imm6diatement en
plusieurs lieux est aussi en plusieurs lieux par un veritable presence de son essence,
et que Toperation immediate ne sgauroit estree jugee eloign6e de Tindividu qui opere
puisqu'elle en est une fagon d'estre. [Leibniz, Oeuvres
, p. 336.]
^31 My translation. "L'avantage que je croys trouver k T6gard de ce myst§re
dans mon explication de la substance du corps par la force ou par le principe de
Taction et de la passion, sur cette autre explication qui met la nature du corps dans
T6tendue, consiste en cecy; qu'il implique contradiction qu'une meme corps soit en
plusieurs lieux, si le corps consiste dans Tetendue, d'autant que le lieu est luy-mesme
un 6tendue conforme k celle du corps. Mais on ne voit pas qu'il implique contradiction
que la meme force soit 6levee, par la toute-puissance de Dieu, k estre en plusieurs
lieux en meme temps, et a y agir immediatement et avec presence, parce que, la force
et le lieu ou Tetendue estant d'un genre different, la multiplication de Tun n'inffere pas
celle de Tautre, et, par consequent, si Tessence du corps consiste dans la force
primitive, la contradiction cesse, et c'est tout qu'on peut demander pour sauver les
mysteres. [Leibniz, Oeuvres
, p. 337.]
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CHAPTER V
THE SYSTEM
A. Introduction
There are two aspects that stand out in our interpretation of Leibniz; the first is
central to our reflections in chapters two and three, the second is the dominant topic in
chapter four. Both aspects evince that Leibniz is at odds with the philosophical trends that
are considered most innovative, and by some, most valuable, of modern philosophy. I am
referring to his conception of philosophy as essentialism; and to hylemorphism, as his
central conceptual schema relative to substance. It is appropriate that we delve further
into the meaning of these aspects of Leibniz's philosophy in order to establish better its
systematic character, and the relation preestablished harmony has to corporeal substance
within the system. This will enable us to reconsider some of the questions in the previous
parts of this work. A critical appraisal of Leibniz's thinking will follow at the stage
where the most important aspects of his philosophy having to do with preestablished
harmony and corporeal substance have been elucidated.
This last chapter will contain the following sections: "Essentialism":
"Hylemorphism": "Problems and Conceptual Schemas": "Reasons Why Commentators
Have Considered Leibniz an Idealist": and finally, "An Appraisal of the Shortcomings of
Leibniz's Thought." Our first topic, "Essentialism," will include subsections: "An Answer
to the Question, What Is Philosophy?" "The Principle of Sufficient Reason": and "The
Axiomatico-Deductive Method."
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Our reflections in this last chapter will rely heavily upon what has already been
explained in the previous chapters. Reference to additional passages from Leibniz will be
included only in relation to new topics, or with regard to lines of interpretation that were
not emphasized before. The view that problems and the conceptual schemas used in the
resolution of problems by Leibniz are the clue to the systematic meaning of his
philosophy, understood as an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of
reality, will serve at the end of this work to guide our critical appraisal of his thought.
B. Essentialism
1. An Answer to the Question, What Is Philosophy?
By "essentialism" I mean Leibniz’s conception of philosophy as grounded on the
elucidation of the natures or essences of the subjects being studied. It was clear to us that
Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism, his rejection of a significant part of Descartes’s
thought, and his arguments against, "attraction at a distance," Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s
conceptions of God, and the Hylarchic Philosophers’ account of phenomenal occurrences in
the external world were conceived as part of a philosophy basically concerned with the
nature of substances (individual and specific essences) and also the natures or essences of
subjects like "truth," "extension," "necessity," "possibility," "will," "intellect,"
"matter" and even "substantiality" in general. Leibniz’s fundamental methodological
stance with respect to philosophy obtains from the conviction that philosophy’s point of
departure must be the consideration of essences. Philosophical inquiry, he believes, must
have a basis upon which to rest and from which to start and without essences there would
be no such basis, and nothing to contain philosophical speculation within the limits of
what is truly reasonable.
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Essentialism is, according to Leibniz, not only indispensable for the correct
appreciation of those features which qualify definitely and universally the being of an
existent but also instrumental in the account of phenomenal occurrences, under the view
that phenomenal manifestations are modifications or limitations of the essential
attributes of substances. The powers and the modalities of being of substances must
ultimately bear a relation to their essences, and one cannot legitimately offer a
characterization of powers which in some manner opposes essential features. Moreover,
to speak of powers without regarding essences, even when no opposition to these is
entailed, is, according to Leibniz, defective insofar as powers thus conceived and
explained have no metaphysical foundation. The lack of such a foundation would make this
type of characterization of powers unwarranted, that is, unintelligible, unphilosophical.
Intelligibility, for Leibniz, is a feature of explanations that are grounded on
essences. Philosophers which disregard essences, and go about explaining phenomena
without any reference to essences he considers arbitrary and incapable of addressing
rationally the topics they purport to elucidate. It is in this sense that philosophical
activity like Malebranche’s, Descartes's, Newton's and Spinoza's were denounced as
unacceptable by Leibniz. They basically involved a distortion of philosophy originating
either in the inclination towards explanations where the notion of essence is secondary or
irrelevant, or in the practice of explaining phenomenal occurrences in a manner
inconsistent with the essential characterization of the substances being treated.
One might envisage a domain of knowledge where descriptions and explanations,
having no relation to questions about essences, may be significant: but it is clear that
knowledge thus conceived would not be for Leibniz philosophical knowledge. This is the
case because all throughout Leibniz's writings the question. What is philosophy? is
treated, if not explicitly, implicitly, under the assumption that philosophy is a knowledge
about essences and of what may be obtained from essential knowledge. One can, therefore,
say that those who engage in philosophy without basing their reflections on questions
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about essences incur, according to Leibniz, in a contradiction, they do not accord with
what is essential to philosophizing.
Leibniz's essentialism requires that the question. What is philosophy? be answered
by providing the essence of philosophizing, and this approach to the question by itself
entails the answer, which must be, as is certainly the case for Leibniz: philosophy is a
search for knowledge of essences.
2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
Leibniz's essentialism lies behind the preeminence he grants to the principle of
contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason in his metaphysics. We know that he
considers these the two basic principles of metaphysical speculation, for, as was
explained (Supra chapter II, pp. 74-76), the first is the clue to his accounts of
modalities of being at the basis of his reflection on creation —which includes a
clarification of the relation between a domain of possibles and a domain of existents— and
the second is frequently claimed to be the conceptual instrument by which the being of
individual substances may be understood. In this last respect the principle of sufficient
reason is presented by Leibniz as warranting the intelligibility of the contingent being of
created substances, out of the fact that each such substance has a complete concept which
affords a reason by which to explain all that happens to it, that is, every determination
which may be predicated of it.
In accordance with the tradition of essentialism, Leibniz's makes the principle of
contradiction the criterion by which to understand the meaning of specific essences, of
which he claims that, by providing that which is necessary to the being of an individual
insofar as a member of a species, anything contrary to it would be contradictory. It is not
only the negation of a tautology that is a contradiction for Leibniz, but also the negation of
a proposition grounded on a specific essence. Essential knowledge is hence definitive, for
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necessary. And Leibniz envisages a good deal of metaphysics as definitive knowledge in
this fashion.
The principle of sufficient reason is characterized by Leibniz as a sort of principle
of contradiction that obtains in relation to the individual essences of contingent
substances. 1 mean "a sort of principle of contradiction" for what Leibniz has in mind is
the pertinence of "sufficient reason" for existent substances as resulting from the nature
of truth, which we know warrants that even contingent predicates, if true, be construed
as contained in the concept of the subject of predication. Now, this entails, and Leibniz is
very explicit and clear on this point, that all true contingent predicates of a substance,
conceived as a subject of predication thinkable through its complete concept, belong to
this substance in a way that makes its attribution to it infallible; in a way, that is, that
makes it "sort of contradictory" to negate what is asserted on the basis of the principle of
sufficient reason.
It is "sort of contradictory" to say that what can infallibly be asserted of a subject
of predication is false. But it is not contradictory because the infallibility of a true
contingent statement obtains from the linkage between predicate and subject an individual
essence warrants, and this is not a linkage based solely on the principle of contradiction,
as is the linkage between a predicate and a subject warranted by a specific essence. The
contingent predicates contained in an individual essence are not such that their opposite is
contradictory: they are not hence necessary.
The bearing of the principle of sufficient reason over the being of existent
substances is the result in Leibniz's philosophy of the relation truth has to existence. In
the tradition of essentialism, definitive truths are conceived by Leibniz as timeless. And
specific and individual essences he considers definitive truths. The individual essences of
the individual substances in our world are envisaged by Leibniz as affording truths of the
sort future contingents are. And he believes that future contingents have a definitive
truth value that ensures that a future occurrence must accord with the true statement
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which affirms it. True contingent statements about the future thereby make
foreknowledge possible. 1 Such a statement, of course, is true before the occurrence takes
place. One may say, therefore, that the occurrence, in that it must accord with a true
future contingent statement about it, is determined. And this determination ensures
infallibility and providential knowledge by an omniscient mind, but it is not a
determination that obtains from the fact that it was contradictory for the occurrence not
to take place. Determination, thus conceived, is called by Leibniz "hypothetical
necessity," and is claimed to be compatible with freedom, as only absolute or logical
necessity precludes freedom.
Future contingents obtain Leibniz's attention as part of his efforts at elucidating
God's omniscience in order to understand the relation God's intellect bears to his will in
the act of creation. This is a topic that is also crucial for understanding divine
providential knowledge, which in turn must be elucidated by Leibniz in order to
understand the meaning of human freedom. Providential knowledge in Leibniz is basically
the knowledge of future contingents by an omniscient mind. In fact, omniscience for
Leibniz requires that future contingents have a truth value. Now, since, from the nature
of truth, all that may be predicated of an individual substance belongs in its complete
concept or individual essence —by which it may be conceived previous to its existence and
is determined— there is a sufficient reason for all that occurs to this substance as an
existent, which reason is found in its individual essence. The principle of sufficient
reason is clearly equivalent to having an individual essence. And being determined by the
principle of sufficient reason in this context means something quite similar to what in
Aristotle's version of essentialism was expressed through the notion of a formal cause.
The individual essence of Leibniz is very much the formal cause by which the existential
features of a substance are determined and hence made intelligible. It is in this sense of a
formal cause that we need to understand Leibniz's frequent assertions establishing that
"sufficient reason" is a "corollary" of his conception of truth.
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The principle of sufficient reason has two other connotations in Leibniz different
from the one we have explained as resulting from the nature of truth. The one just
explained is an expression of essentialism as extended to the domain of individual
existents through the notion of individual essence, which as a formal cause warrants that
there be a reason for each and every particular determination of a substance. But Leibniz
speaks of the principle of sufficient reason as that by which a reason is required for the
existence of a substance. In this context, that substances must have a cause for existing
holds preeminence over the issue that there must be a reason for the determinations of a
substance. What is here uppermost is the contrast between necessary and contingent
existence. These two modalities of being are opposed as correlatives in a conceptual
schema that results from the distinction between that which is ontologically dependent
and that which is ontologically self-sufficient. In the tradition of St. Anselm's ontological
argument self-sufficiency is attributed to a necessary being, which is thus conceived out
of the fact that its essence includes existence. By contrast any existent whose essence does
not include the note "existence" is considered contingent, and contingency is ontological
dependency, which requires ontological support, that, of course, may not be obtained
from a contingent being and calls for a necessary being.
The conceptual schema by which the ontological argument is wrougth is based on
the supposition that existence may be explained essentially or extrinsically, but in any
case a reason is required for it. And this is precisely the basis for Leibniz's claim that the
principle of sufficient reason presides over existence. Either the reason is intrinsic or
essential, as in the case of God, or it is extrinsic and such that it points to the necessary
being, as in the case of contingent substances.
Now, everyone recognizes the elements of the argument from contingency for the
existence of God in the opposition between contingent and necessary existence. And it is
worthwhile to point out that the conceptual schema used here leads in the direction of
conceiving substances as possessed of individual essences, for the necessary being (God)
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can only be one existent, and even though the consideration of the essence of "a being
greater than whom none can be conceived " starts out as a reflection on a specific essence
it turns out that the essence in question has only one instantiation, wherefrom it is the
essence of an individual substance and ultimately an individual essence. The fact that
existence is a note by which an individual is conceptually constituted, insofar as only
individual substances exist, leads too in the direction of envisaging as individual the
essences about which it is inquired if they include or not the note existence.
In the context of the opposition between contingent and necessary existence God has
the role of sufficient reason not because he is the essence of individual substances,
wherefrom their particular determinations become comprehensible. He is a sufficient
reason as that which accounts for the origin and existence of created substances. He is
therefore a sufficient reason in the manner of the efficient cause of the created world.
Leibniz also explains this role of God, where being a sufficient reason is being an
efficient cause, in terms of God's being that which includes all the requisites for the
existence of the created world. Of course, since Leibniz believes that, if all the requisites
for the existence of something are given the something in question must exist or be
brought into being, he considers this significance of the principle of sufficient reason
relative to God and created existents as explicatory of God's role as creator. The basic
metaphysical relation between God and the world is grounded on the necessity-contingence
relation by which it is evinced that God, the necessary being, must exist. But this relation
entails, in the very demonstration of God's existence, that he is the creator of contingent
existents as their efficient cause and sufficient reason.
The necessity-contingency opposition results from essentialism through a
modification introduced by Christian metaphysics into the Platonic dichotomy, essences-
sensible things. While in Plato essences were the highest type of existents (out of their
immutability), which related to a lower changing type of existents (things) and
substantiated their being through "participation," in the tradition that St. Agustine
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initiates, and Leibniz follows, essences become the contents of God’s intellect and lose
thereby their ontological sufficiency. They are not any longer a higher type of existent
relative to created substances, but will condition the being of substances in that they
delimit the domain of possibility. Leibniz, along with most of the medieval philosophers,
accepts the definition of the possible as the non-contradictory, and is thus led towards his
views of individual essences as the conceptual means by which substances may be thought
as possible. But essences are not ontologically superior to substances and cannot perform
as that which substantiates the being of existents through "participation." In fact theirs
is a diminished form of being, out of, first, being inferior to existence, and, besides,
being immediately relative to God, in the form of his intellectual contents, which are
still, for Leibniz, eternal truths but not eternal existents. Essences, in Leibniz's
ontology, do not exist; they are not substances. They "are," nonetheless, as objects of
God's intellection (See Supra chapter II, footnote 96).
"Participation" is not entirely done away with in Leibniz's metaphysics, for though
essences cannot by themselves substantiate the being of created substances, these
substances still require, out of their contingency, to be substantiated. And God performs
this role because contingent substances must obtain the degree of being they possess from
the necessary existent. Since the crux of the relation is ontological dependency, what we
have here is something quite similar to Plato's conception of participation. Contingent
existents participate in the being of the necessary being continuously and obtain
therefrom the degree of being of their changing contingent existence. This relation
between created substances and God must be recognized as that which Leibniz usually calls
"continuous creation."
The act of creation is characteristically explained by Leibniz as an instance of
efficient causality, no doubt from the fact that with the creative decree the being of
contingent substances originates. But it includes also "continuous creation, as a
dimension of creation whereby ontological support is given to contingent entities
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throughout their temporal existence. The emphasis here is placed on the relation between
the necessary being and that which is ontologically supported by it in a way that basically
signifies "participation." It is God now, in Leibniz, and not independent essences which
substantiates the being of the domain of existents. In this relation, however, since
individual essences act as the formal causes of the determinations individual substances
have and the totality of these determinations qualify the substance as an existent, we may
still look upon the relation of eternal truths to existents as somewhat similar to that
conceived as "participation," but individual essences are consubstantial or "coeternal"
with God, (not ontologically independent substances) as contents of his intellect, and
ultimately the metaphysical supporting function is intersubstantial and such that it
requires the necessary substance.
Once it is understood that, for Leibniz, individual essences cannot by themselves
perform the role which obtains from God's continuous creation, it is easy to see that
while future contingents determine, according to Leibniz, the being of existents —in the
logical sense of warranting that existents be as conceived through their complete
concepts— they do not originate nor substantiate the existence of substances. The role of
eternal contingent truths is an essentialistic role, which does not, independently of God,
have an ontological function. In Leibniz's philosophy, individual essences account for the
being, not for the existence of substances, and do so only insofar as the creator or
efficient cause of created substances is a personal entity which creates in conformity
with the alternatives his intellect presents to him.
Everything that concerns existence must, according to Leibniz, be mediated by
God's act of creation which requires the collaboration of his intellect and his will. The
essential features of a substance, specific and individual, obtain, from this substance's
complete concept as that which affords its characterization as possible, as contained in
God's intellect independently of his will, but still in a way that must be characterized as
God dependent. Moreover, the existence of a substance, in conformity with its individual
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essence, obtains from God's willful creative decree as conditioned by his
omnibenevolence. The world, hence, does not exist as it does, for Leibniz, simply because
it is determined by all the eternal contingent truths that enable God to think it as
possible. Without the intervention of God's creative will the world would not have been
brought into existence, as the relation substances bear to essences cannot be the reason
for their existence. Only God as the necessary substance can play this role. Therefore, one
cannot claim that for Leibniz's contingent existence is derived from the role individual
essences and future contingents play in his philosophy, as some commentators have done.
For Leibniz God's act of creation makes him the efficient cause of substances,
insofar as he originates their existence. But it must be realized that he is also the final
cause of created existents, insofar as he is to himself, as intellect, the source of his
motivations. The individual essences of the best possible world, whose being is being in
God's intellect, perform as final causes relative to God's will in bringing about the
creative decree. In this sense too one must understand the principle of sufficient reason,
according to Leibniz. There must be a reason, he consistently tells us, for every act or
will of a spirit. Individual essences are consubstantial with God; they are eternal out of
their being relative to God's intellect, and out of the fact that they do not come into being,
nor change, nor go out of being, as do the created existents which originate from God's
willful creative act. And they are, Leibniz believes, in their essential nature invested
with worth, wherefrom they motivate God. Essences are formal causes and as such the
sufficient reason of the determinations of substances, but this role obtains from that of
being the sufficient reasons for God's creative decree as his final causes.
The conjunction of sufficient reason relative to willing and God's omnibenevolence
determines God morally to create the best. And, infallibility follows from this
determination, as it did before from the bearing of the nature of truth upon God's
omniscience. "Moral necessity" is the name Leibniz gives to the determination that rules
over the world as a result of the manner God was obliged to choose, out of his wisdom and
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omnibenevolence. The phrase "hypothetical necessity" is sometimes used to speak of
moral necessity by Leibniz, but more strictly it is the phrase used to designate the
determination over existence that results from the nature of truth. The moral and
hypothetical necessity of our world coincides as that which results from God's
omniscience ruling his decrees, and being such that it includes among the essential notes
of an individual existent that by which it is selectively discriminated, its worth.
We have seen three different senses of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz.
These turn around the role of individual essences as formal causes and thereby the
sufficient reason of a substance's determinations: and around the role of God as necessary
being relative to the contingent created world, wherefrom he is its efficient cause and
metaphysical support: and around the significance individual essences have as final
causes for God's decretory will, which ensures that the world be the best and most
intelligible. In all of these respects "sufficient reason" is part of Leibniz's conception of
philosophy as grounded on essentialism. But this is not essentialism in the sense of Plato
only. For it is clear that what we have here is the conjunction of formal, efficient and
final causes of Aristotle. The extent of the significance of sufficient reason entails that in
all of these three ways we need to account for the being of individual substances.
There is one last issue relative to the principle of sufficient reason that we must
pay attention to. Leibniz sometimes speaks of "the principle of reason" in contexts where
many commentators seem to interpret that he is referring to what he habitually calls
"the principle of sufficient reason." But a careful exegesis of what he says suggests that
he either would welcome the distinction between these two principles, or is actually
suggesting it. Leibniz speaks of a principle of reason as the principle wherefrom we may
claim that in all true statements the predicate is contained in the subject.^ Moreover, in
this context he usually explains that a true statement is warranted either by the relation
the predicate has to the subject out of being part of a specific essence, or out of being part
of an individual essence. In the first case, we know, the predicate belongs necessarily to
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the subject, in the second case it belongs to it contingently and yet infallibly. The
principle of reason is meaningful with regard to the general nature of truth, but it must
be added that it has as subordinate principles, the principle of contradiction and the
principle of sufficient reason. These explain two specific ways in which a predicate may
be claimed to be part of the subject of predication. The general principle, hence, is
understood more precisely out of its articulation through the two subordinate principles.
And though one may say that all truth is analytic for Leibniz, meaning that in every true
statement the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept, one must add the
distinction, in accordance with this usage, between analytical necessary statements and
analytical contingent statements, as an indispensable distinction further qualifying the
nature of truth, according to Leibniz, in a way that affords his distinction between
necessity and infallibility.
Our characterization of Leibniz's conception of philosophy shows that he is
basically a metaphysician in the tradition of Platonism. We know that this tradition
progressed historically in the direction of Aristotle and his account of reality in terms of
the four causes, a conception that includes hylemorphism. And Leibniz is a metaphysician
in this tradition also, as has been evinced already. Now, while metaphysics is the main
concern of Leibniz's philosophy, and should be construed on the basis of essentialism,
physics, understood as primarily concerned with descriptions and explications of
phenomenal occurrences, is not for Leibniz, immediately, part of philosophy. It rather
bears a relation to philosophy out of the dependence the knowledge of phenomenal
manifestations has upon the knowledge of the substances underlying such manifestations.
And since modalities of being are intelligible from the relation they have to substances,
essential knowledge is crucial to the knowledge of phenomenal manifestation of substances
understood as modalities of being of such substances. It is in this fashion that though an
explication of phenomenal occurrences relies, according to Leibniz, on perceptual
information and also upon the conceptual relations mathematics afford, intelligibility of
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those phenomena ultimately requires essential knowledge. This is the view at the basis of
Leibniz s recognition that Descartes's conception of corporeal substance is not tenable, as
the essence of a corporeal substance conceived in terms of extension cannot explain
resistance and inertia in bodies, and leads to a distorted conception of the laws of motion
based on the view that quantity of motion is constant.
Leibniz s metaphysics is deeply influenced by Scholasticism, and by the mixture of
Platonism and Aristotelianism that results from the historical development of medieval
philosophy and is already present in Scholasticism itself. The essentialism which
determines Leibniz's methodological stance certainly accords with the Platonic influence
over medieval thought, and, as our account of "sufficient reason" suggested, it includes a
good deal of Aristotelianism. There is moreover an aspect of Aristotle's thought intimately
bound with essentialism which is also central to Leibniz's conception of philosophy. This
is the Aristotelian conception of knowledge as axiomatico-deductive. Let us make it now a
topic of discussion, that will enable us to conclude this reflection on the significance of
"essentialism" in Leibniz's conception of philosophy.
3. The Axiomatico-Deductive Method
It is the case that Leibniz considers metaphysical knowledge necessary, universal
and definitive out of its essential basis. But metaphysic for Leibniz is not simply the
discovery of essences as the outcome of some process ultimately yielding intellectual
intuitions. It also involves the construction of a body of a priori knowledge obtainable
from demonstrations, which must have as point of departure indemonstrable first
principles, that is, definitions. Leibniz maintains the Aristotelian conception of deductive
knowledge that requires that a deductive series be supported by first principles, which,
of course, in order to be definitive must be essential knowledge, a priori and necessary,
as will be everything that is deduced from it on the basis of necessary rules of inference.
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Mathematics, we know, are exemplary in this regard for Leibniz, and his reiterated
suggestion that they are wholly the product of the principle of contradiction should be
construed in the tradition of axiomatico-deductive knowledge.
Rules of logic —logical principles and rules of inference— are considered by
Leibniz indemonstrable, and we have seen that none is as important in this regard as the
principle of contradiction. But definitions, we need to emphasize, he must also consider
first principles, for rules of logic and tautologies, like those the principle of identity
immediately warrants, do not yield knowledge. And Leibniz frequently suggests that
demonstration obtains from the substitution of concepts by its definiens, wherefrom only
with the introduction of definitions can the process of demonstration be articulated.^
These must be real definitions which establish the being of the subjects in question, not
stipulative definitions whose value depends on conventional practices or usage.
Leibniz's view of metaphysics is traditional. This must certainly be evident from
our characterization of his metaphysics as methodologically grounded on essentialism and
the axiomatico-deductive method. His assertions suggesting that all knowledge should be
demonstrated, which is expressed with regard to the "axioms" of geometry, should not be
construed in an absolute fashion as if it entailed the rejection of the traditional outlook
where indemonstrable truths are ultimately necessary in order to avoid an infinite
regress in the justification of a deductive process. What Leibniz has in mind is obviously
the suggestion that many of our axioms, in disciplines like geometry, may be amenable to
demonstration, wherefrom we may suspect that the number of first principles and
definitions is much less than what is suggested by established geometry. A reduction of an
axiomatico-deductive science to its minimal principles would improve it
epistemologically for it would make it simpler, and were we to question the authority of
such principles, out of finding it difficult to establish their origin and indemonstrable
nature, we could treat those "axioms" as postulates or assumptions, as Leibniz asks us to
do in such cases. Indeed, he considers Euclides's own treatment of axioms and postulates as
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unconcerned with the question about the ultimate justification of first principles in a way
that enables it to advance. Leibniz points to this position as praiseworthy as evinced by
the progress of geometry, which, if Euclides had attempted to establish the truth of all
first principles in it, would not have progressed at all.^
An axiomatico-deductive science, which may not be immediately secured on first
principles whose truth could be unquestionably warranted, would be sound and fruitful,
Leibniz explains, were it to start out with the lowest number of suppositions possible.
Though the question about its ultimate justification would still remain, if the deductive
process has been appropriately developed, all that is left to do is to obtain a justification
of the postulates that were assumed as first principles. This, Leibniz argues, is an
advancement in any a priori domain of inquiry, that should not be underestimated.
It should be clear that a deductive system based on suppositions is not necessary
knowledge, and to suggests that Leibniz has accepted this alternative as the definitive
conception of metaphysics would entail renouncing a feature which he consistently
stresses as indispensable, not only to metaphysics but to ethics, jurisprudence, and
mathematics:^ that they be necessary knowledge. His suggestion of an interpretation of
geometry as if based on suppositions, belongs in the context of his criticism of what he
considers an extreme position of Descartes, the pretension of establishing metaphysics as
an apodictic knowledge that proceeds from a first certainty deductively onwards without
in the least becoming speculative or hypothetical. This seems not attainable to Leibniz,
or, at least, so far removed from attainability that he feels that the Cartesian pretension
must turn out to be self-defeating. The probable failure of anyone who starts out with a
desideratum like Descartes's can only, Leibniz believes, benefit the sceptics. By contrast,
the recognition of the fact that metaphysics may be very difficult to attain, precisely
because it is a necessary axiomatico-deductive knowledge, should promote the recognition
that it may be cultivated speculatively in its first stages in order to advance
hypothetically as far as possible in a way similar to that attributed to Euclidean
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geometry. Hypotheses could in this manner be accepted, at least conditionally, and a
philosophical construction could be appraised with regard to its truth value on the basis
of its simplicity, coherence, and consistency: also, as Leibniz frequently suggests,
empirical criteria should be recognized as pertinent to such a theoretical construction,
since the bearing of essential knowledge over phenomenal occurrences entails that the
realm of such occurrences and the realm of metaphysics cannot be understood in complete
independence of each other.
It is this conception of metaphysics as a systematic body of knowledge, whose
definitive axioms we may not be able to absolutely warrant, which seems acceptable to
Leibniz, out of a realistic turn that involves contrasting true metaphysics —conceived in
the essentialistic-axiomatico-deductive fashion of tradition— to attainable metaphysics.®
But it must be clear that true metaphysics, necessary and definitive, still serves to
establish the essence of metaphysical knowledge according to Leibniz, and that, therefore,
it remains the objective that ultimately must be pursued.
One gets the impression from Leibniz's writings that he clearly recognizes, in
Platonic fashion, that the desired metaphysics is almost impossible to attain in this life.
And the mystical aspects of the Platonic outlook are also present in Leibniz, as the
ultimate mysteries that surround the theological topic "God" cannot be elucidated in a
definitive manner by us mortals. This accords with Leibniz's characterization of the
primitive concepts at the basis of definitions as practically unattainable by human
thinkers, for our intellect lacks the intuitive strength of God's intellect and moves in the
domain of conceptual relations far more that in the domain of conceptual intuitions.^
(Primitive concepts, it must be stressed, are for Leibniz those which cannot be thought
through other concepts: their knowledge hence must be intuitive: most —if not all— of
these, he says, are not accessible to finite intellects.) In accordance with this view,
hypotheses and speculations are not to be surrendered as perhaps the only way of
obtaining a modicum of metaphysics. Of course this is not, on the part of Leibniz, to favor
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gratuitous speculation, and essentialism is the clue, he explains, to establishing the
parameters that must contain philosophical inquiry within acceptable limits. Were it
otherwise, were we to surrender essentialism, speculation, Leibniz contends, would run
asunder, as it does in the case of the Hylarchic Philosophers, in "attraction at a distance,"
and in the miraculous explanation of the mind-body relation of Malebranche.
We have then two conceptions of metaphysics in Leibniz. And a great deal of
confusion among commentators has arisen from the manner Leibniz shifts from one to the
other. But the two are completely harmonizable in the manner I have explained above; and
their conjunction entails, in typical Leibnizian fashion, a middle way between those who
would only accept metaphysics in the terms of its utmost possibilities (absolute
metaphysics) and those that renounce through scepticism any effort at discovering
metaphysics. The modicum of metaphysics attainable by Leibniz's realistic turn involves
an epistemological reorientation, for though it does not foster the rejection of absolute
metaphysics as its ideal, it makes consistency, coherence, simplicity, systematicity, and
compatibility with experience additional criteria for establishing the soundness of
metaphysical speculation. Of course this reorientation is still grounded on essentialism.
Rationalism in general, and Leibniz's philosophy in particular, must face the
question how are first principles obtained. It is a question that Leibniz treats somewhat
hesitantly, motivated perhaps by Locke's attack upon innate knowledge and the awareness
that very dubious assertions have been defended as innate truths. Leibniz is definitively
clear, however, about the axiomatic nature of the principle of contradiction, and
frequently treats the principle of sufficient reason in the same fashion. But first
definitions must be ultimately intellectually intuited, and principles, like the principle
of order and the principle of continuity, are either intuitive or demonstrable in a way
that requires the use of indemonstrable definitions. Indeed, that a fundamental rule is
either indemonstrable or demonstrable through the use of indemonstrable definitions is
evinced by Leibniz treatment of the principle of sufficient reason, which is either
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claimed to be axiomatic, or demonstrated, as in The Profession of Faith of thp Phiiosnphpr
(Supra P. 76).
There is no doubt that Leibniz defends innate ideas against Locke, on the basis, of
the importance of first principles and definitions for his conception of necessary a priori
knowledge. His characterization of innate ideas suggests that the knowledge of real
definitions or essences is the result of some process and method whereby what is
potentially in the mind may be actualized. Only if it is in the mind in some fashion,
independently of experience, may it be claimed, Leibniz often tells us, that this knowledge
is necessary. But its being in the mind is not explicit and Leibniz is willing to
acknowledge before Locke that it is something analogous to an instinct, in the sense of an
internal disposition and not an actual ideal content. It is, however, an intellectual
disposition that ensures that the definition thus discovered is conceptual and
indemonstrable.^
The blend of mysticism and rationalism that we find in Leibniz's philosophy gives
it a somewhat perplexing epistemological tone, where we are at the same time moved to
the recognition that metaphysical knowledge cannot be fully attained in this life, and yet
asked not to renounce it. For Leibniz, metaphysics may be the object of progressive
cultivation that, if guided by the correct criteria, may yield continuous —asymptotic-
progress, and ultimately as much knowledge as we may need to address life in a rational
and morally enlightened manner. It is important that we stress that in this respect
Leibniz's philosophizing is close to the Platonico-Socratic tradition. Philosophy or
metaphysics is the source of a reflective rational life, one that for Socrates represents
the human life par excellence. In Leibniz we find the same conception, united to the
conviction that the true doctrinal contents of Christianity, as warranted by revelation and
by rational reflection, are the basis for man's comprehension of the meaning of his own
life. Rational reflection is the instrument, for Leibniz, by which even revealed doctrine
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obtains lucidity, and by which human life may attain it realization in the context of
pursuing an elucidation of Christian doctrine.
We have emphasized essentialism as a fundamental aspect of Leibniz's thinking,
wherefrom we have interpreted his antagonism to other currents of thought,
preeminently those which he himself calls "modern," as the result of claiming that these
are not sound insofar as they do not provide consistent and intelligible explanations. We
have seen that essentialism is the distinguishing feature of Leibniz's conception of
philosophy, and that it originates in Plato but includes Aristotle's version of
essentialism, first, in Leibniz's conception of the principle of sufficient reason as
explicative of the being and existence of substances along the lines of formal, efficient and
final causes: and, second, in Leibniz's conception of metaphysical knowledge as
axiomatico-deductive. We are now ready for the second topic that we identified at the
beginning of this part as one of the two foremost discoveries in our exegesis of Leibniz's
work, hylemorphism. It is a conceptual schema originated by Aristotle that plays a
central part in his version of essentialism and metaphysics. In Leibniz, we have seen: it
has decisive ontological importance; it bears upon his conception of physics and
dynamics; and is central to his treatment of transubstantiation. We can now elucidate its
meaning further in order to understand better the distinctive features of Leibniz's
thinking against the prevalent philosophical currents of his time and to emphasize the
central role of this conceptual schema within Leibniz's philosophical system.
C. Hylemorphism
1. A Special Type of Dualism
Our examination of Leibniz's writings in the third part of this work has yielded an
interpretation where the hylemorphic conception of a substance stands out as this
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philosophy's most important ontological conceptual schema. We have seen that: 1.)
Leibniz's account of corporeal substances depends on it; 2.) his explanation of
transubstantiation is grounded on his conception of corporeal substance, as it affords the
possibility of an existent which underlies the being of extended bodies and yet is not
spatial: and 3.) his conception of immaterial substances, such as are the souls of men, is
linked to the hylemorphic account of corporeal substance, for a soul is an immaterial
substance but also the unity endowing principle by whose function the composite
substance a corporeal substance is, is constituted. It has been shown too that, 4.) even
bodies, as aggregates of corporeal substances, are dependent on the hylemorphic
conceptual schema.
Hylemorphism enables Leibniz to defend an ontology that asserts the existence of
immaterial and corporeal substances, wherefrom we can definitively assert that he may
be called a dualist. It is a dualism, however, which need not encounter the difficulties
involved in Cartesian dualism. For the hylemorphic conception of a corporeal substance
entails that a soul that is an immaterial substance is also the substantial form that
complements secondary matter in a way that brings about the constitution of a corporeal
substance, and through this relation an immaterial substance and a corporeal substance
are bound together so intimately that one cannot speak of any of the two as an existent
whose being is totally independent of the other. Though immaterial substances, such as
souls and minds, are claimed to be immortal by Leibniz out of their simple substantial
nature in a way that suggests that this is an entity like Descartes's immaterial thinking
substance —a being whose substantiality and existence is independent of everything else
except God— Leibniz conditions this metaphysical independence by suggesting that it is
natural to a mind that it be accompanied by a body, meaning, that in the created world a
mind always relates to a body hylemorphically (Supra chapter IV, footnote 93)
There cannot be a corporeal substance without an immaterial substance, its
metaphysical companion as substantial form. And there cannot be a substantial composite
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without matter, itself made up of corporeal substances or substantial composites of which
matter and substantial form are the metaphysical constituents. In order for there to be
matter, hence, there must be corporeal substances, and for corporeal substances to be,
matter and substantial forms (souls) that are immaterial substances are necessary. This
is an ontology where neither matter nor corporeal substances can be affirmed by
themselves in the manner of Materialists. Nor can corporeal substances and immaterial
substances be understood independently of each other. All the metaphysical categories in
Leibniz’s ontology are intertwined in a way that requires that affirming one type of
existent entails affirming all the others. Wherefrom it should be clear that Leibniz’s
dualism is quite distant from Descartes’s.
A little reflection on Leibniz’s metaphysics shows that he has the crucial notions of
his ontology playing several roles. Matter, for example, as a well founded phenomenom
(as secondary matter, that is) —an existent that while not substantial deserves to be
recognized as ontologically important for Leibniz— depends metaphysically on corporeal
substances as its ultimate constituents, but also conditions the being of corporeal
substances in that secondary matter is the complement of substantial form (soul) in the
constitution of a corporeal substance. Substantial form, in turn has like matter a dual
role in Leibniz’s ontology: it is an immaterial substance and the formal complement of
secondary matter by which a corporeal substance is constituted. Corporeal substance
itself is the metaphysical composite which obtains from the conjunction of matter and
form, but a manifold of corporeal substances are the constituents of matter, without
which matter would not have the reality of a being by aggregation.
Hylemorphism and the atomist’s corpuscularism (actualized in the seventeenth
century by Gassendi, Galileo, Locke, and Newton) are the two basic conceptual schemas
which are reunited by Leibniz in his ontology. The conjunction of the two explicatory
schemas brings about the interrelation of the ontological categories, corporeal substance,
immaterial substance, and matter by which Leibniz explains the totality of reality. They
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are the product of the confluence in Leibniz's thinking of various metaphysical traditions
which are brought together into one unitary and presumably harmonious whole in order
to attempt, if not a definitive, at least a probable solution to sundry of philosophy's most
important problems.
What has been explained of Leibniz's ontology evinces that his is not a metaphysics
where the being of material and immaterial substances is construed independently of each
other and affirmed in a way that leads to establishing the existence of only two
fundamental kinds of substances having no modalities of being in common. And,
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not a metaphysics for which an
introspective discovery of oneself as a thinking substance ensures that the being of such a
substance be affirmed with complete disregard for the existence of matter and corporeal
substance. Leibniz does not treat the soul as exclusively a thinking substance in the
manner of Descartes, wherefrom the French philosopher contrasted the modalities of
being of a thinking substance (himself, a soul) to those of a body. Even though Leibniz
will use the traditional argument where a soul or mind is characterized in Platonic
fashion as an immaterial, simple and indivisible substance, in order to conclude that it is
naturally immortal, this does not lead him to establish that the sole essential function of a
thinking substance is that relative to its thinking modalities of being. Those modalities of
being that obtain from the peripatetic conceptual schema are, for Leibniz, as natural to a
soul as those which appertain to it from its Platonic role as a thinking simple substance.
A soul is for him as much a substantial form as it is an immaterial substance.
2. Leibniz and Descartes on the Soul
The conjunction of the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the soul that we find
in Leibniz's philosophy belongs in the Scholastic tradition and contrasts with Descartes's
conception of the soul as discovered through his subjectivistic philosophical orientation.
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Descartes, having positioned himself in consciousness, after denying the existence of the
external world, his own body included, answers the question about his own essence in a
way that affirms the soul's thinking functions exclusively. His argument leading to this
answer is that the "I" or "soul" he has introspectively discovered (as existing) cannot
have any function pertaining to his body, for it has been discovered in spite of having
established that it is false that he has a body; wherefrom his essence must only be
thinking. This argument, by which Descartes explicitly rejects the functions which in
Aristotle's hylemorphism are attributed to the soul with respect to the organic body
(nutrition, reproduction, sensation),"' ^ is part of a line of thinking that contrasts
dramatically with Leibniz's reflections on the soul. Leibniz's thinking never take place
against the idealist predicament of facing solipsism. He does not accept the Cartesian line
of thinking which leads to what we may call, following Edmund Husserl, Descartes's
"transcendental reduction.""' ^ In fact Leibniz claims that not only Descartes's doubt is
hyperbolic to a point that if accepted it can never overcome scepticism,"' 2 he also
presents a criticism of Descartes's reduction suggesting that it is spurious because it is
based on an unwarranted move from the conclusion that his beliefs are questionable to the
conclusion that all his beliefs are false. There is nothing in Descartes's arguments,
Leibniz contends, by which this move is legitimized.^ ^
Leibniz's own philosophizing does not take place from transcendental consciousness
as point of departure, and thus he is not led to affirm his existence as a "transcendental
subject" or pure mind, nor to posit the problem of the existence of corporeal substances
and the world in a manner similar to Descartes: in terms of the reliability of sense
representations as instruments for knowing corporeal substances. Leibniz, in a much
more traditional fashion, simply inquires about the essences and existence of substances
taking as his point of departure the traditional metaphysical outlook that assumes that
there are existents and proceeds on to the task of elucidating their nature. From this
traditional outlook he will posit the existence of corporeal substances, without engaging
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as a fundamental issue the problem of justifying this existential claim, and will
concentrate thereafter in elucidating their nature, which calls forth hylemorphism.
There is introspection in Leibniz’s philosophizing, and he even suggests that one's
own existence is fundamentally evinced introspectively, for introspective evidence of
oneself is most immediate and infallible. But this is the introspection of a thinking man,
not a "reduction" like Descartes by which a thinking substance, absolutely devoid of other
modalities of being than thinking and willing, is discovered. Leibniz's introspection yields
a considerable amount of metaphysical knowledge, for as he frequently tells us, notions
like, "being," "substance", "action," "succession," "perception," and "unity" are initially
conceived in reflection about one's own inner life,^^ In fact for Leibniz the paradigmatic
substance is oneself, especially as evinced in the recognition of the modalities of being
,
perception and appetition. And yet, introspective evidence of one's own existence does not
entail, for Leibniz, that all one may claim to be as a substance is a thinking substance.
And the questions about the existence and nature of substances, such as oneself, is treated
by Leibniz outside the situation a reduction to transcendental consciousness involves. His
approach to this topic takes place on the basis of metaphysical principles and questions.
The issue is not primarily one with a subjectivistic point of departure nor one that starts
out with the assertion of oneself as solely a thinking substance.
The conjunction of Plato's and Aristotle’s conceptions of the soul in Leibniz's
philosophy is one of the factors that has aroused confusion among commentators
concerning the ultimate meaning of his ontology. The view that a soul or mind is a simple
substance and as such immortal (predicated by Leibniz) has inclined most commentators
to disregard or underestimate the fact that such a substance is also a substantial form for
Leibniz. The supposition prevails that a characterization of a soul as simple and
substantial entails a conception like Descartes's, where spirits (minds or souls) are
opposed metaphysically to bodies. When this view is joined to the claim that bodies are
not substances, only one kind of substance presumably remains and idealism as
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conclusion follows. But, as I have explained above, Leibniz's did not assume the basic
point of departure and metaphysical perspective of Descartes, which brings about the
radical distinction of his dualism. Instead, his thinking with respect to corporeal
substances and souls is close to Aquinas's, for his appreciation of the substances of the
natural world is hylemorphic in a way that does not lead to envisaging the role of the soul
as thoroughly independent of that of the body. As in Aquinas, however, the soul that
performs as substantial form relative to a body in the constitution of an entity, such as a
human being, is an immaterial substance and may exist independently of the relation it
bears to its body, even when this is not its "natural" way of being in the created world.
The immateriality and simplicity of the soul are the features by which Leibniz
customarily explains the soul's immortality. But a soul conceived as simple and
immaterial need not dispense with its functions relative to its body by which the
metaphysical unity of a corporeal substance must be explained. It seems natural to
Leibniz that an immaterial substance be a substantial form. He does not write as if he
faced the predicament of either accepting the Platonic conception of soul or accepting
Aristotle's. In the typical manner of Scholasticism he blends the two and never treats
them as fundamentally incompatible. And we even find writings where Leibniz explains
the immortality of a soul on the basis of the imperishability or sempiternal
"transformation" of the animal. In the case I have in mind, Leibniz attention is directed to
the threat of Averroism, and to the Cartesian emphasis upon the soul's independence of the
body as something that is ultimately detrimental to the claim that individual souls
transcend death. He argues that the Cartesian position promotes the view that only an
"universal spirit" subsists, since, "those who rejected this separate state and
independence [of the soul] as contrary to experience and to reason were thereby driven
all the more to believe in the extinction of the individual soul and the conservation of the
single universal spirit."^ ^ In order to oppose the Averroism induced by Cartesianism,
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Leibniz argues as if the immortality of a soul were warranted by its hylemorphic
relation to its body. He explains his conception of transformation in this context and adds;
These considerations all show that not only particular souls but animals themselves
subsist and that there is no reason for believing in a complete extinction of souls or
even a complete destruction of the animal. As a result, therefore, there is no need to
have recourse to a single universal spirit and to rob nature of its own particular and
subsisting perfections: thus also failing in fact adequately to recognize its order and
harmony. 1 ^
Berkeley's idealism is the natural development of the Cartesian conception of ideas
or mind representations as the intermediaries between external existents and the
thinking subject. But the fact that Leibniz does not accept the Cartesian subjectivistic
point of departure keeps him away from the tendency towards making ideas (or we may
call them sense-data) the only means by which to gain knowledge of corporeal substances
and affirm the existence of entities in the external world. This inoculates him against the
view that matter or corporeal substances are sense-data constructs. The existents in the
external world are basically assumed by Leibniz, and when he does presents a question
relative to the claim that they exist, the main issue is. How many substances exist in the
created world? This is not outright a question motivated by the type of uncertainty
concerning the existence of mind-independent corporeal substances that results from the
risk of solipsism entailed by the subjectivistic point of departure of Descartes. And the
argument Leibniz uses to answer this question is metaphysical and does not depend on an
elucidation of the value of sense representations for knowledge of external reality. The
argument in question shows that God must have created many substances, for there is no
reason for him having created one, or few, or less than the maximum number of
compossible substances. The perfection of God calls for the maximum of creation with a
minimum of expenditure and effort. This principiG ensures, for Leibniz, that there be in
any possible world as many compossible substances as possible, among which, in the best
possible world, many corporeal substances are included.
We do find in Leibniz's philosophy epistemological questions about the reliability
of representations as evidence for the existence of an external world, but, since
his
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claims about the existence of the external world are basically metaphysical, he does not
rely on a justification of the value of perception to this effect. While Descartes needs to
guarantee the trustworthiness of sense representations to justify the belief in an
external world, and does so through establishing that God is truthful, Leibniz contends
that we have no absolute way of establishing the trustworthiness of sense
representations, for it is ever possible that our perceptual life be a dream."* ^ His
reflection on the existence of corporeal substances is metaphysical; it characteristically
depends on the view that reason can provide definitive insights regarding the existence of
substances, a topic that cannot be thoroughly elucidated, Leibniz believes, on the basis of
perception alone. The traditional misgivings of rationalistic metaphysicians relative to
the senses is present in Leibniz in a manner that keeps him away from the
phenomenological approach to the question about the existence of substances in the
external world.
Leibniz's conception of phenomena is also different from Descartes's. The latter
subjectivistic orientation leads to a conception of phenomena as appearances in the mind
or mind representations. As such they are considered modalities of the mind. In this
context, where a mind is a thinking substance exclusively, the being of representations is
entirely relative to the mind which thinks them. The question. How can such
mind-contents be instrumental in affording knowledge of external substances? needs to
be posed by Descartes, and it is answered by making some mind-contents effects of an
efficient causality which originates in external substances. This conception, as we
explained in the second chapter of this work, will attract Malebranche's criticism.
For Leibniz, pure phenomena are modalities of the thinking subject and are, as
such, totally fictitious: but the phenomenal character of bodies is not that of pure
phenomena, and does not result from the fact that representations are the effects in
consciousness of things themselves, wherefrom they must be considered the means by
which bodies may be known and asserted to exist. Leibniz characterizes bodies as
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well-founded phenomena in the context of elucidating their nature. This is a metaphysical
issue. Bodies are existents as the accidents or modifications of substances. A body is a
modification of the corporeal substance we say it is the body of. It plays this role,
according to Leibniz, as a phenomenom that obtains phenomenal unity from the mind of
this corporeal substance. But this same body is a mode or accident as an aggregate of the
corporeal substances that are its ultimate constituents. A body's phenomenal dimension
is, according to Leibniz, indissolubly linked to its metaphysical status as a being by
aggregation. For it is in this sense that it is a well-founded phenomenom. It is an entity
whose being is relative to the substances that underlie it, but also relative to the mind
that thinks it and invests it with perceptual unity.
The phenomenal character of a body, for Leibniz does not originate in the fact that
it is perceptually apprehended as an aggregate of ideas; it is true that the perception of a
body involves the integration of "petite" perceptions (perceptions under the threshold of
consciousness), but its nature as a being by aggregation entails the aggregation of
substances, not the aggregation of ideas; and its phenomenal character is a metaphysical
feature, by which its diminished type of existence (as a being by aggregation and not a
substance) can be appropriately understood. This is not a conception that originates in the
subjectivistic outlook that Descartes initiates in modern philosophy, and without which
neither Locke's conception of ideas nor Berkeley's attack on matter could be understood.
3. The Value of Hylemorphism for an Explanation of the Mind-Body Relation
The clue to understanding Leibniz's eclectic conception of a soul is his handling of
hylemorphism as a conceptual schema. While in Aristotle it was the basic instrument by
which to comprehend the nature of things, and by which to explain the origination and
extinction of substances, in Leibniz its most important function is explaining the linkage
between an immaterial substance and its body. While the suggestion that a body may be
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affected or influenced by a mind (and viceversa) is gratuitous and unintelligible
according to Leibniz —when the first is considered an immaterial substance and a body is
considered an entity all of whose attributes are extensional— that it may be modified by a
mind performing as substantial form, in a way that brings about the constitution of a
corporeal substance, is natural and intelligible. A mind-substance does not, for Leibniz,
naturally interact with a body (there is nothing in the modalities of being natural to one
and the other by which such interaction could be made intelligible). It, however, relates
naturally to it as its substantial form. Since the substantial form is a substance (a mind,
a soul), the mind in question relates to its body hylemorphically, not as a cause relative
to any effect in the body, but as the source of unity and substantiality of the corporeal
substance whose body the body modified by the mind-form is. And the mind-substance
endows the corporeal substance it constitutes through its function as substantial form
with many of its essential attributes. A human being, in Leibniz's account, is, therefore,
a thinking substance, capable of perception and appetition, as is this human being's
mind.^® Leibniz's universal characterization of substances as endowed with the
modalities of being, perception and appetition, results from this relation between an
immaterial substance and the corporeal substance it informs. Of both the simple
immaterial substance that acts as form (the soul) and the composite substance it
constitutes, it is said, that they perceive and will.
The function of the soul over the body is conceived by Leibniz after the Aristotelian
biological model where the substantial form is a "psyche," because the identity of the
corporeal substance it warrants is conceived as analogous to that by which a living entity
remains the same while its material parts may change. The composite substance is hence
conceived as that which in opposition to material entities is not an aggregation of parts;
i.e., not something whose unity by contact is merely accidental, but something identical in
a way that is not diminished by the fact that its body is material. A corporeo-animated
substance is for Leibniz something that changes in a manner that maintains continuity and
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identity throughout change, and in spite of the divisibility of its body. Its unity is the
result of the unity of the soul or mind that is its substantial form. The soul (mind)
endows the corporeal substance with unity, identity and activity, attributes it itself, as
an immaterial substance, has and is able to invest a corporeal substance with, out of
being its substantial form. Hylemorphism, Leibniz contends, provides the natural way
for a mind-substance to relate to a body and to the corporeal substance whose existence it
brings about.
The Aristotelian use of substantial form as "psyche" is a modification of Aristotle's
basic hylemorphic conception in which the substantial form in question is clearly
individual in the sense of being relative to the individual substance endowed with life it
helps constitute. Leibniz's own use of the hylemorphic schema follows this conception. It
is universalized, however, in order to explain the nature of all the substances in the
external world. Leibniz, considering himself the paradigm of all substances, because the
features that enable him to understand substantiality are introspectively discovered
relative to his own being, first emphasizes his own substantial character as an active
perceiving and willing substance, but the supposition that there are corporeal substances
and the awareness that identity and unity is required of all substances bring about the
recognition that hylemorphism is indispensable to the account of the nature of corporeal
substances. Since his body is one among the physical bodies in the external world, but is
also the body by which he, a living being, exists, Leibniz explains his existence as a
hylemorphic composite in terms of Aristotle's biological conceptions. The substantial
form is a soul; its unity endowing functions are those which explain the life of an
animated substance. Substantial unity, identity and activity of composite substances are
as exemplarized by living beings. A human being, myself for example, is a corporeo-
animated substance; my body is the accidental expression of myself the corporeal
substance, as it is a phenomenom to my mind and also the aggregate of the innumerable
corporeal substances that are the constituents of its infinite number of parts.
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4. My Body versus Myself, the Corporeal Substance
Leibniz's use of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptual schemas clearly evince his
eclectic inclinations. But, as we explained when reflecting on Leibnizian dynamics, these
include beyond Plato and Aristotle some conceptions of modern philosophers. In fact, as
we have seen, the impression that Leibniz wants to do away with the Cartesian conception
of body is erroneous, and what rather is at issue is the claim by the Cartesians that a body
is a substance. Leibniz is interested in keeping the Cartesian conception of body while
disallowing its substantial character. His eclecticism on this point entails holding on to
several of the functions the body plays in Cartesianism while accommodating its role to
other functions that obtain from hylemorphism and lead to positing the existence of
corporeal substances. Basic to this conception is an ontological position that affirms
corporeal substance and the "existence" (in a diminished sense) of bodies as beings by
aggregation. This position enables the distinction between metaphysics and physics we
have explained so many times.
Leibniz's arguments for the existence of corporeal substances are grounded on the
rejection of Descartes's conception of bodies as substances. Now, bodies endowed with
substantial forms are corporeal substances, but bodies not thus endowed are still part of
Leibniz's ontology. The main objective of the line of thinking by which bodies and
corporeal substances are distinguished —which is linked to what Leibniz defends as the
correct account of dynamics— is establishing the truth of the claim that there are
corporeal substances. And the rejection by Leibniz of Descartes's conception of bodies
involves two aspects; bodies are not substances for they are aggregates: and aggregates
must have ultimate substantial constituents. The clarification of the nature of bodies
serves to enhance the understanding of the nature of corporeal substances through the
contrast between these two types of entities. Moreover, because Leibniz's philosophy is a
system in which different aspects are confirmatory of each other, the elucidation of the
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nature of bodies serves to affirm the existence of corporeal substances and the existence
of immaterial substances, for the ultimate constituents of body must be corporeal
substances, whose own metaphysical resolution yields immaterial substances as
substantial forms, and secondary matter.
The use of the notion of body by Leibniz is ambiguous because it has various roles
to play in his philosophy. A body is "secondary matter" as the metaphysical complement
of substantial form. In this regard it is derivative passive force, which must be
understood in terms of something more fundamental and abstract: primitive passive force
or primary matter (the materia prima that as a metaphysical principle is complemented
by substantial form or entelechy). The essential passive features of a body, resistance
and inertia, are based on the primary matter. The derivative nature of body thus becomes
intelligible as an accident of what is substantial. As secondary matter a body is also "a
phenomenom" as an accident of the corporeal substance that thinks it and an aggregate (a
"well-founded phenomenom") of corporeal substances that are its constituents.
My body is not for Leibniz a modality of my mind, nor an aggregate of ideas of the
mind, nor an external substance known through my representations, whose being is
independent of consciousness. It is the body of a corporeal substance as a modality of being
or an accident of this thinking corporeal substance, and at the same time it is a mode of
the manifold corporeal substances that underlie all the parts of this body as their
constituents. These two aspect of the being of a body are complementary for Leibniz. The
unity endowing function that psychologically (not to be confused with the unity endowing
function of the mind over matter as substantial form) brings about a phenomenal unit,
such as a body is, requires underlying constituents, which metaphysically must be
substantial. Aggregates requires substantial units as ultimate constituents even when the
function by which the aggregate obtains unity is mental. It is clear that this conception
enables Leibniz to integrate into the metaphysical characterization of a body an objective
and a subjective dimension and thereby to avoid a radical distinction between objectivity
301
and subjectivity in the appreciation of the metaphysical status of bodies. Leibniz's
ontology includes mind-independent substances (the classical notion of a true existent)
but also accidents as mind-dependent features which can be appreciated as pseudo-
realities partly objective and phenomenally unitary (beings by aggregation). The latter
type of "existents" are the accidental manifestations of true substances as appreciated by
our perceptual capacity.
Now, the distinctive character of the conceptual schema by which the nature of a
body is elucidated is metaphysical and not phenomenological. The issue is not how
representations lead to a world transcending consciousness, but rather. What is the
nature of bodies? The answer to this question requires the notion "accident" as a modality
of being which though objective is relative to a function of consciousness. An accident is
not construed by Leibniz as that which inheres in a substance independently of being
thought. Rather, and in a way that reminds us of Hobbes's view of "accident,"”' ^ Leibniz
speaks of an accident as the phenomenal expression of a substance: that is, as something
which inheres in a substance and concomitantly affords its knowledge by a thinking
subject. The being of a substance includes its appearance as its accidental dimension.
A substance, for Leibniz, is one insofar as it has accidents. These qualify it as an
individual, and afford an explanation of what change entails in substances, as the accidents
of a substance may change while it subsists. Now, accidents had traditionally been
associated with perceptual presentations which admitted a dual consideration: they were
either qualities in things or representations in the mind. In Leibniz's conception of the
correlation substance-accident both considerations have been fusioned into one. Accidents
are accidents of a substance as that which qualifies a substance individually and
distinguishes it from every other substance. But an accident is the manifestation of the
plurality of a substance's particularities as thought by a thinking subject. We cannot
anymore in Leibniz's conception of accidents distinguish the attributes through which a
substance is known from others that presumably may qualify it as a thing itself and not
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be known. The notion of accident is now at the same time that which metaphysically
qualifies the substance and that by which it is phenomenally known. The thing itself is
not, for Leibniz, independent of its appearances, but while the latter are known through
perception the substantial identity of the thing itself is the object of reason.
Leibniz’s use of the hylemorphic conceptual schema in his account of the nature of
human beings suggests that mind phenomena (the modalities of being of the mind) and the
body as a phenomenom should be construed as two concomitant manifestations of one
unitary corporeal substance. The accidents of a corporeal substance would hence be its
body and its mind contents. Whence the question that is truly basic to Leibniz's
consideration of the mind-body relation would be. How do these different phenomenal
manifestations relate? And Leibniz does sometimes pose this question explicitly and in
these exact terms. He, however, as we have seen (Supra p. 35), often speaks in a way
that suggests that body and mind are substances, wherefrom the question is not so much.
How phenomena relate? as. How two different substances relate? The distinction between
these two ways of presenting the mind-body relation are crucial to understanding what I
consider the most important shortcomings of Leibniz's philosophy.
5. The Substantial Form-Immaterial Substance of a Corporeal Substance
A corporeal substance is not a body. It has a body, according to Leibniz, in the dual
sense of its secondary matter and its phenomenal manifestation. However, it is clear that
for Leibniz the relation which a corporeal substance has to the immaterial substance that
is its substantial form is more important than the relation it has to its body. The
corporeal substance obtains from the immaterial substance that functions as its form,
unity, substantiality and the modalities of being which characterize the form as an
immaterial substance. These generally understood are perception and appetition. It is not
only my soul that wills and perceives, it is me the human being in question. I am not for
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Leibniz, as most commentators have believed, preeminently a mind or thinking
substance, I am rather a human being, a hylemorphic composite, many of whose
attributes result from the function its mind-substantial form performs relative to it.
Now, there are two substances here, wherefrom it may be claimed that I am my soul, just
as much as I am myself, the human being or corporeal substance. But since these two are
one, out of the hylemorphic relation which makes the substantial form the principle of
unity and individuality of the corporeal substance, and they remain one in the natural life
of the corporeal substance, there is no dualism of independent substances existing
separately in the domain of nature. Leibniz's dualism becomes in this fashion virtual, for
all the substances in the created world are basically composites and one may not speak of
mind or soul substances as naturally existing independently in the ordinary way of being
of our world. To speak of an independent immaterial substance, a mind, for example,
would entail that it is no longer, insofar as independent, a substantial form. So we cannot
have at the same time the immaterial substance as an independent existent and the
corporeal substance it may constitute when performing as substantial form over a body.
I must add that Leibniz does not consistently expresses himself in accordance with
his conception of human beings as fundamentally corporeo-animated substances whose
minds do not exist naturally as independent substances. Though this is his reiterated
position in contexts where the hylemorphic schema explains the nature of living
substances, and is the only position that accords with his characterization of human
beings as imperishable in a way that makes birth and death just transformations, Leibniz
frequently gives the impression that we may think of ourselves as minds or spirits, and
speaks as if one's own existence were fundamentally the existence of a spirit. We shall get
back to this point soon, as it must be addressed in order to understand why so many
commentators have been led to believe that Leibniz is an Idealist. At this moment,
however, let us emphasize that Leibniz's basic conception of the substances in the created
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world is hylemorphic, and such that a human being may only be claimed to be a soul
inasmuch as his soul is a dimension of his composite nature.
In his characteristic fashion Leibniz evades the problems contained in the
dichotomy dualism-monism by discovering a middle way. He avoids materialism and
idealism through positing the existence of immaterial and corporeal substances. He also
avoids the classical conception of dualism through distinguishing between what is actual
and what is virtual. He distinguishes the natural composite way of being of substances in
our world —which has the immaterial substance in the role of substantial form— from
the independent dualistic existence of souls and corporeal substances. There are
immaterial substances, according to Leibniz, but these never are in the world without a
hylemorphic material complement, wherefrom they exist as immaterial substances that
are also substantial forms in the metaphysical juncture which explains the existence and
nature of corporeal substances. But since a corporeal substance is a unitary substance,
the immaterial substance that is its substantial form does not have complete substantial
independence relative to the corporeal substance it constitutes.
The Aristotelian schema has prevailed in the overall conception of the substantial
nature of created substances, and yet, in the case of human beings one finds an inclination
by Leibniz never to abandon fully the Platonic conception of the soul as it provides the
ultimate justification for the soul's immortality. And even though "resurrection" may
best be accommodated to hylemorphism, one finds passages where Leibniz leaves open the
possibility of a life of total independence of the soul beyond what is natural in the created
world. He argues that this is not impossible (it does not involve a contradiction) and may
be part of what belongs in the inscrutable aspects of the divine plans.^O
It is through the prevalence of the Aristotelian conception of substance that
Leibniz's ensures that the whole animal (the whole human being), and not only the soul as
immaterial substance, be considered imperishable. Transformation is a notion in Leibniz
that results from the importance of hylemorphism, and makes no sense without it. It
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entails that human beings, and all animals, exist from the origin of creation as
composites, at times imperceptible, but always with a body and a soul hylemorphically
complementing each other. The sempiternal duration of a created immaterial substance is
for Leibniz warranted by its simplicity, and entails that the substance in question cannot
arise or perish except through creation or annihilation. In the case of a composite
substance we are not before a being by aggregation which may naturally disintegrate and
perish, or come into being through the integration of its parts. Nonetheless, the
traditional metaphysical resolution that served Aristotle to explain substantial genesis
and death, though in principle feasible, does not, according to Leibniz, ever naturally
occur, for a soul never loses its body though the latter may change all its parts and
diminish radically, becoming insensible. It has always been the case, according to
Leibniz, that the composite substance is the metaphysical conjunction of a soul and a
body, and it will ever be the case. The sempiternal existence of these substances,
however, does not make the sempiternal existence of their souls superfluous, for that of
the animal depends on that of its soul, from which it obtains its unity, identity and
activity.
Let us finish this subsection by pointing out that there is an asymmetry in the
relation Leibniz predicates between body and mind as metaphysical constituents of
corporeal substance. It arises from the difference between a substantial form that is a
substance and a matter that is ontologically both the complement of form and a well
founded phenomenom. The "me" dimension that obtains from my soul is substantial. The
"me" dimension that obtains from my body is both substantial and phenomenal. The
substantial connotation of my body results from the meaning passivity has in the
constitution of a corporeal substance. I am a substance, active on account of my soul,
passive on account of my body, and activity and passivity are the two fundamental
essential features of my being. The phenomenal connotation of my body means that I
"have" a body, and that this body is my accidental dimension —an accident of myself the
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substanc6, thG corporGal substancG, that is. As an accidGnt my body is an appaarancG, wgII
foundGd, not fictitious, but an appoarancG nonGtholGSS. It doGS not havG virtual ontological
indGpGndancG, and is tharaforG ontologically infarior to my mind. Its baing is always
ralativG to my roprosantations and to tha parcaptual function which breads unity into the
domain of phenomena. This asymmetry between my body and my mind as constituents of
myself, the unitary corporeal substance, can be read, I believe, in the contrast between
Leibniz's expressions: "I am a spirit" versus, "I have a body."
6. Actual Infinity
Commentators have been puzzled by the fact that Leibniz denies that there is an
infinite number though he asserts an actual infinity. The clue to an actual infinity seems
to me hylemorphism. This consideration, then, must be counted among the aspects in
Leibniz's philosophy that depend on his use of the hylemorphic conceptual schema. A body,
we know, since extended, is, according to Leibniz, divisible ad infinitum; but each of its
parts is made up of corporeal substances which have bodies (as they have a substantial
form) that are themselves divisible ad infinitum and made up of corporeal substances.
Any one body entails hence an actual infinity of corporeal substance as constituents, for a
body has corporeal substances that are actualities as constituents, each of which has a
body which has corporeal substances as constituents, and so on ad infinitum. This
warrants that there be —not as a result of a never ending process of division, but as the
result of the nature of body as an aggregate of corporeal substances that are the
metaphysical conjunction of body and form— an infinite actuality of constituents of a
body, and of matter in general.
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D. Eroblems and Conceptual Schemas
1. Two Different Domains of Problems
There are basically two domains of problems in Leibniz's philosophy: one
intimately bound with the new insights of natural science and their relation to
metaphysics: and a second domain of problems linked to the traditional concerns of
natural theology, in which the role of God relative to humankind is a central concern.
These two types of problems come together in Leibniz's philosophy under the supposition
that reality is unitary, so that the different conceptual schemas that serve to explain it
must be complementary. As a system, Leibniz's philosophy, hence, centers around the
task of recognizing the totality of the problems that must be identified and answered in
order to provide a coherent and comprehensive characterization of reality. It depends also
on the different conceptual schemas it introduces as appropriate to the solution of these
problems and the linkage these must exhibit. In order to appreciate the meaning of
Leibniz's efforts at building a system we need to focus our attention on the meaning of
problems and conceptual schemas in the two different contexts of problems we have
identified.
It is interesting to note that our treatment of essentialism and hylemorphism as the
two most distinctive aspects of Leibniz's philosophy to a great extent parallels the
distinction between problems which relate to natural theology and those more concerned
with the modern account of external reality. This is the case because Leibniz's
essentialism originates in the traditional metaphysical outlook of medieval philosophy
which was mainly concerned with problems having to do with the nature of God, his
existence, and creation, and serves Leibniz's preeminently to address the same type of
theological problems; while hylemorphism is used by Leibnizs in his account of the
nature of corporeal substances and bodies, the two metaphysical categories by which the
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external world is to be understood, relative to which physics must construct its own
scientific appraisal of phenomenal reality.
The differentiation between problems linked to natural theology and those which
relate to modern science that we consider fundamental to Leibniz's philosophy is also
suggested by the way the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence develops. These letters also
indicate the distinction between these two domains of problems. The first part of the
correspondence deals with topics having to do with the nature of God, creation, necessity
versus freedom, God's justice, and providential knowledge. The last part of the
correspondence has as its main concern corporeal substance, in the context of its
significance for nature —its relation to dynamics, its metaphysical status and nature, as
well as the nature and status of bodies are some of the topics this last part includes.
The distinction between these two fundamental series of problems points to a
feature of Leibniz's philosophy, which is not uniquely his but somewhat common in the
seventeenth century. Leibniz is concerned with bringing together traditional metaphysics
and the new discoveries of the science of nature. Of course, the confluence of these two
concerns results from the view that metaphysics and natural science are two valuable
domains of knowledge which should not be renounced and need not be considered
unreconcilable. In fact, the task which is found most interesting and challenging to many
thinkers in the seventeenth century is precisely attempting a synthesis of these two
currents of thought, under the supposition that such a synthesis should prove to be a
fertile source of philosophical knowledge.
The recognition of the confluence of modern thought and traditional metaphysics in
Leibniz's philosophy can suggest to us the nature and the origin of the different particular
problems he is out to solve. Since, Leibniz, like most philosophers, considers
philosophical knowledge systematic, the confluence of these two currents of thought can
alert us to those aspect of his thinking which may be the most difficult to harmonize
within a system. Indeed, the degree of success or lack of it which we may attribute to him
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in this regard can place us in a position where criticism may ensue. Let us proceed under
this perspective and in what follows attempt to identify the problems that stood at the
center of Leibniz's attention and also the conceptual schemas he used for the resolution of
these problems in order to establish how compatible they seem. Let us do so under the
headings: "Theological problems;" and, "The Challenge of Natural Science." After dealing
with these two subsections we can finish our reflection on preestablished harmony and
corporeal substances with the consideration of two final topics: "Why Have Idealistic
Interpretations of Leibniz Prevailed Among Commentators": and "An Appraisal of The
Shortcomings of Leibniz's Thought."
2. Theological Problems
Leibniz's philosophy, from its earliest stages, is directed to the two general types
of problems we have identified. His concern with these problems is comprehensive, as
our discussion in the previous sections and parts has attested. There is, however, one
basic issue relative to each of these types of problems, around which Leibniz's interest
turns. In the case of natural theology nothing seems more basic than the question about
God's justice, which is first treated by Leibniz in The Profession of Faith of the
Philosopher , and, of course, is the topic of the only work he published during his
lifetime, the Theodicy , and also a topic in a considerable part of his correspondence. This
fundamental problem can guide our examination of theological issues in Leibniz's
thinking, as most of his other theological considerations are treated in the context of
elucidating God's justice.
Around the problem of God's justice turn Leibniz's reflections on the nature of
truth and many of the topics we included under the heading "essentialism." In fact,
Leibniz's elucidation of the nature of truth, of future contingents, and of the connotation
of the principle of sufficient reason which warrants that there be a reason for every
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particular determination of an existent, is undertaken in order to elucidate the bearing of
God's wisdom upon his creative decree, with a basic concern in mind: the problem of
explaining the presence of evil in the world without attributing its responsibility to God.
Leibniz acknowledges that there is evil in the created world in the form of metaphysical
imperfection, physical suffering, and sin. He contends also that God is the efficient cause
(as creator) of everything in the existent world, wherefrom the problem arises that it
may be claimed that he must be responsible for the evil it contains. That this is not the
case is purportedly shown by Leibniz through distinguishing between God's role as
efficient cause and his performance as a moral agent. The crucial point here is the claim
that it is compatible that God be the cause of the world as a totality while not the moral
author of evil in it.
The basis for Leibniz's account of creation, in conformity with the view that God is
just, lies in the distinction between the functions God's intellect and will perform
relative to the creative decree. The intellect delimits the domains of the possibles on the
basis of what is knowable through the principle of contradiction but also in terms of the
existential attributes that qualify a substance as possible in an exhaustive fashion. This
knowledge of a substance as possible results from the nature of truth, from the fact that
all true predication is based on the complete conceptual knowledge of the subject of
predication. God's omniscience involves knowing all truth, i.e., knowing all the complete
concepts or the individual essences of all possible substances.
The individual essences of possible substances are, according to Leibniz, sorted out
in God's intellect into sets of compossible substances which make up possible worlds,
among which, one best is included. This sorting out, of course, results simply from the
extent of God's wisdom, which involves the appreciation of substances and their relations
on the basis of logical criteria and also on the basis of their worth. Compossibility has an
essential role in the process of creation for a multiplicity of substances can be part of one
world only if they are logically compatible with each other. And God's inclination towards
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the best, along with his other perfections, ensures, that a maximum and best world, with
the greatest amount of substances in the most economical arrangement, be created.
God's creative decree produces existence, and while, according to Leibniz, he is
responsible for his willing, he is not responsible for the contents of his intellect, which
are, independently of his will. To believe otherwise would be to defend the voluntarism we
have seen Leibniz reject so earnestly with regard to the nature of truth, necessary and
contingent, and with regard to the worth of possible substances. God's omniscience, let us
remember, entails that he knows all necessary concepts and also all contingent complete
concepts or individual essences before actual willing: his knowledge is coeternal with his
existence and independent of his will. Thus, one cannot claim that he is responsible for
what is possible, though he is indeed the "reason" of what is possible as the intellect
where all the concepts of possible substances exist.
Now, God's omnipotence moves within the realm of possibility as understood
omnisciently through individual essences. While God's power cannot go beyond the
possible worlds, and does not determine the contents of the best possible world, the
existent world is willfully selected. God is responsible for creation, but there is nothing,
according to Leibniz, that we may recriminate him in this regard, for it is not a moral
defect to choose the best, even when the best possible world contains evil. God, Leibniz
explains, wants all that is good; he does not want evil. He does not will that anything evil
exist, but permits the existence of evil insofar as it is an unavoidable content in the best
possible world. The Leibnizian God does not will or chooses the evil parts or
"discordances" contained in the best possible world. He chooses this world, which is the
best option, as a totality, since his will must regard all the sets of compossible
substances as wholes, for creation is a choice among possible worlds, not a choice among
possible substances. Furthermore, the evil in the best possible world is essential to it,
since without it it would not be the possible world in question but another; not the best
possible world hence. And evil, one must realize according to Leibniz, must be
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instrumental in making it the best possible world, as all its constituents must be, for
without any of them it would not be the world it is.
It is clear that Leibniz believes that only through the consideration of the "nature
of truth" he may appropriately comprehend what belongs in God's intellect, or what
amounts to the same, what pertains to the wisdom of a perfect spirit. This consideration
affords a conception of eternal truths that parallels that of Plato, though these truths do
not have the status of absolute existents. But, just as definitive knowledge was made
available in Plato by the independence and eternality of essences relative to sensible
changing things, in Leibniz the eternality of all conceptual knowledge in God's intellect
affords a view of the possibles as a domain not affected by change and independent of God's
will. That possibles are not the responsibility of God exculpates him of all the evil they
may contain. That God's willing is essentially exercised as influenced by his intellect and
his natural perfect benevolence ensures that morally he be irreprehensible. And that the
relation between the possibles and the existents must be mediated by God's omniscience
entails providential knowledge, which in turn entails predetermination out of God's moral
obligation to do the best.
The conjunction of the meaning of the nature of truth with the essential
characteristics of a spirit as a moral agent motivated by his intellectual appreciation of
what is best, conditions the act of creation, according to Leibniz, and leads to the
determination of the being of every contingent substance as conceived through its
complete concept. And this, in turn, leads to the notion of "spontaneity," as an essential
characteristic of substances, wherefrom everything that occurs to each substance
unfolds from its own being without any influence from any other contingent substance.
The elucidation of the nature of God's will is undertaken by Leibniz motivated by
the same desire that promotes the elucidation of the nature of God's intellect. It involves
the rejection of indifference of equipoise and necessity, and also the claim that choosing is
essential to freedom. Willing as a spiritual faculty is not, according to Leibniz, exercized
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as willing to will but as willing that which appears to be best. Choosing, therefore, only
makes sense in the context of exercising the will as motivated by many objective worth-
invested alternatives. In the case of creation, the best among options morally obligates
God and thereby ensures that freedom and determination qualify the creative act.
Necessitarism relative to creation would do away with the moral nature of God, for
choosing could not be attributed to him (nor responsibility). By the same token he would
not deserve admiration or love, and the paternal relation he has to human beings would
lose its meaning. Evil in the world would be necessary, but one could not relate it to a
personal moral God, as there would be none; and creation, rather than an act of a spirit,
would become the consequence of metaphysico-logical antecedents that could only be
interpreted, according to Leibniz, as sheer power (Spinozism).
Voluntarism (indifference of equipoise) would mean that even the possibles are
God's responsibility, wherefrom evil would already before creation be of his account.
Leibniz's distinction between intellect and will makes freedom of the will and objectivity
feasible: the first as a dimension of a will motivated objectively and capable of choosing,
and the second as a dimension of truth and worth warranted by their independence from
that which makes God an author, his will. The conceptual schema by which in true
propositions the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept is the basis of
epistemic objectivity for Leibniz, as it is the basis of providential knowledge by an
omniscient God. And since worth is treated by Leibniz as an aspect of individual essences
its objectivity also is warranted by the nature of truth. God's wisdom, as construed
through the elucidation of the consequences of the nature of truth, and God's will, as
essentially dependent on his intellect and the principle of the best, provide the basis for
the exculpation of God in Leibniz's philosophy, in terms of an account of the meaning of
his freedom that precludes that creation be considered a necessity and ensures that God is
a moral agent infallibly and freely motivated by the best.
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The nature of truth is also fundamental to the contrast between the necessary being
(whose essence includes existence) and created contingent existents. And, the contingence
of substances is the basis for the claim that God's act of creation requires intelligence and
will, since out of contingence substances requires a necessary cause for their existence,
which must have chosen them; for, were no choice involved creation and created
substance themselves would be necessary. This cause must, therefore, be a spirit, which,
since perfect (as must be the necessary being, according to Leibniz) is perfectly free
insofar as determined intellectually and morally, and must be morally perfect insofar as
freely and infallibly inclined towards the best.
This summary, and our previous elucidation, of the significance theological
problems have for Leibniz show that "essentialism" plays a crucial role in the treatment
of this topic. This is the case because in the philosophical perspective entailed by
essentialism natural theology centers around the task of elucidating the nature of creation
through the elucidation of God's nature, which in turn requires the elucidation of the
nature of truth and the nature of willing. We have seen that these topics relate to the
problem of necessity versus determination, in the context of the meaning divine
providential knowledge has for metaphysics. It has become clear that determination is not
necessity and must qualify the development of the existent world as this world must
accord with the domain of possibility which provides meaning to the exercise of God's
decretory will. The rejection of necessity relative to creation has been shown essential to
the recognition that the necessary being is a spiritual entity whose acts are free but
morally determined, and whose products must be imperfect, insofar as contingent, and
yet determined morally to be the best. It is clear, therefore, that Leibniz's monadic
conception of substances, as unitary self sufficient existents, whose being unfolds
spontaneously as prescribed by their individual essences, is intimately bound with his
account of creation and its central problem, the problem of evil. Our question in chapter
three relative to the bearing of the nature of truth upon the self-sufficient character of
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substances must be answered by emphasizing that the act of creation turns an individual
essence into the force which imparts to a substance its existential drive. Essence, hence,
warrants determination which ensures substantial spontaneity and self-sufficiency. With
substantial spontaneity interaction between substances becomes unintelligible. The
problem of incommunication between body and mind in Leibniz's philosophy is the
outcome of his account of creations and the nature of substances, as the product of the
manner God knows and creates them.
Transubstantiation is another theological issue which presents a challenge to
Leibniz. It is a marginal consideration, which does not immediately relates to his main
reflections on the nature of creation and the justice of God. It is, important, however, in
that it requires that Leibniz's conception of corporeal substance and a facet of his
theological considerations be directly related.
Having shown the relation between theological problems and Leibniz's concern with
the nature of God, the act of creation, and the nature of truth, we are now ready to
examine his treatment of the problems that originated out of the influence of modern
natural science upon metaphysics.
3. The Challenge of Natural Science
Leibniz's main concern with regard to problems resulting from the influence of the
new natural science is the relation between metaphysics and phenomenal occurrences in
nature. This concern is linked to a question about the sufficiency of explanations of
natural phenomena in terms of laws of motion and efficient causality. What is at issue
here is the metaphysical characterization of a corporeal substance in terms of spatial
qualities and impenetrability, wherefrom relations of distance and the changes in these
relations suffice for the explanation of all occurrences in external reality. Materialism
is linked to this conception for it affirms that only corporeal substances, thus
conceived.
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exist, and, leaves out immaterial substances and substantial forms in its account of
reality. Cartesian dualism accepts a mechanistic account of corporeal substances and
interaction in the world of the sort proposed by materialism, and seems to Leibniz
antimetaphysical in the same fashion of materialism since it has no place for final causes
and substantial forms in its elucidation of external reality.
While Hobbes is for Leibniz the best example of a materialist philosopher for
whom explanations of nature in terms of laws of motion and efficient causality should
suffice for a philosophical account of reality as a whole, Descartes is Leibniz's main
concern, in that his conceptions appear to him as those which have aroused the problems
that have most attracted the attention of seventeenth century philosophers. In Descartes's
ontology the existence of immaterial substances is affirmed, but the characterization of
external reality, as metaphysically independent of immaterial substance and as
thoroughly accountable in mechanical terms, is based on a total separation of physics and
metaphysics that Leibniz fears is just as menacing to religion as is materialism. Of
course, both Hobbes's and Descartes's conceptions of external reality result from the
influence exercised by modern physics over seventeenth century philosophy: and this
includes the metaphysical consequences presumably entailed by the new science's
conception of knowledge, which emphasizes empiricism and mathematicism.
Leibniz's fascination with Descartes seems to be motivated by the ascendancy of
Descartes's doctrines during his lifetime compounded by the view (Leibniz's) that it is a
philosophy that promises much more than it can deliver, and is therefore ultimately
detrimental to the theistic interests it pretends to defend. The student of Leibniz must be
impressed by his consistent and reiterated objections to Descartes's philosophy and the
suggestion that it raises more problems than it solves. In fact, as representative of the
moderns, Descartes appears to Leibniz as overestimating mathematics as the conceptual
instrument by which to understand reality as a whole, and external reality in particular,
at the expense of metaphysics. Indeed, the Cartesian conception of external reality is
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considered by Leibniz an outgrowth of the confidence Galilean physics had placed on the
mathematical conceptualization of nature, which included the abandonment of discredited
explicatory schemas, like hylemorphism, in the account of phenomenal occurrences. This
same confidence is attributed by Leibniz to several among the moderns, along with an
overestimation of the cognitive value of empiricism, which manifests itself in several
ways which include the new prestige of atomism and the positivistic inclinations of
thinkers like Hobbes.
Leibniz has shown himself completely aware of the traditional philosophers'
"abuses" of "forms" and "final causes," but it is clear that he believes that an
antimetaphysical direction has been imparted to philosophy by Hobbes, Descartes and
those which in general he calls "the moderns," that is itself philosophically problematic.
The inclination by modern philosophers away from traditional philosophy has, in
Leibniz's appreciation, become excessive to the point of distorting their view of reality.
It is, he contends, grounded on an erroneous appreciation of the meaning of traditional
views which entails underestimating them, and losing sight of their relevance for issues
having to do with the nature of human beings, living substances, and external reality in
general. The moderns' treatment of these issues is defective because mathematical
mechanicism cannot suffice to account for all of reality, as it cannot even explain
appropriately the nature of external existents and phenomenal occurrences. Cartesian
dualism is exemplary in this regard; it is for Leibniz an instance of the erroneous
tendencies prevailing among the moderns in its conception of dynamics as solely based on
a mechanico-mathematical appreciation of corporeal substance. It errs also in its account
of immaterial substances as if metaphysically totally independent of corporeal
substances.
The prevailing currents of thought among the moderns leave out, Leibniz believes,
those metaphysical principles and explanatory conceptual schemas which had provided a
means of linkage between the domain of minds and the physical domain of external reality.
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And in this fashion modern conceptions have inclined philosophers, such as Descartes and
Malebranche, towards explanations of the relation between physical existents and minds
outside traditional philosophy: explanations which we have seen Leibniz denounce as
unphilosophical for unintelligible. It should be clear that Leibniz considers these
explanations devoid of metaphysical basis and in this respect as gratuitous as
superstitions. Against these alternatives Leibniz envisages his own philosophy as a
wholesome philosophical attempt to avoid both, the abuses he recognizes in traditional
metaphysics and the extreme views of the moderns. And, as is usual in these cases, it is an
eclectic philosophy that rejects the extant alternatives while attempting to salvage what
it considers valuable in the opposing currents of thought.
Hylemorphism is the crucial conceptual schema which serves Leibniz to address
the problems aroused by the excesses of the moderns. Essentialism qualifies his basic
philosophical outlook and determines the method and objective of Leibniz’s
philosophizing. Corpuscularism, he treats as a respectable part of modern philosophy,
when construed in atomistic fashion minus atoms, but hylemorphism is the central
conceptual instrument by which the nature of the substances in external reality must be
understood. That hylemorphism may be conjoined with the Platonic appreciation of a soul
as an immaterial substance, just shows that Leibniz believes that one need not renounce
the traditional view of the soul as simple, immaterial, indivisible and incorruptible
while reintroducing hylemorphism and divorcing it from the abuses of traditional
metaphysics. That the characterization it affords of corporeal substance can serve to
account for the being of bodies further attests to its ontological value relative to the
external world. And that its reintroduction need not reproduce the mistakes of the
Scholastics' account of phenomenal occurrences ensures that mechanicism and
hylemorphism be made compatible and complementary, insofar as what is valuable in
each explicatory schema may be integrated into the appropriate metaphysico-dynamical
account of the external world.
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There are a significant number of problems in what Leibniz considers the
conception of external reality of the "moderns." We have referred to them in previous
parts of this work, especially when explaining Leibniz’s conception of corporeal
substance. It is, however, appropriate that these be all summarized now as the problems
which Leibniz considered inherent to the view of external reality which was gaining the
highest respectability in the seventeenth century. We can approach these problems also
as those which prompted Leibniz's reintroduction of hylemorphism into philosophy as the
crucial explicatory schema by which their solution is proposed. These problems are: 1.)
that of the unitary nature of a human being, that has a body and a soul but is an
individual: 2.) the question of the nature of living substance against the Cartesian view
that animals are machines: 3.) that of the inertness of bodies understood as corporeal
substances against a conception of substance as active: 4.) the infinite divisibility of a
body substance against the claim that a substance is unitary: 5.) the view that a being by
aggregation must have unities as its components versus Cartesian corpuscularism
—which does not assert the existence of ultimate unities as constituents of bodies— and
versus atomism, which has corpuscles of the same kind as bodies playing the role of
bodies’ ultimate constituents: 6.) the inability to explain transubstantiation by a
philosophy which conceives corporeal substance as definable in terms of extensional
attributes: 7.) the metaphysical incommensurability of material and immaterial
substances which lies at the basis of the problem of unity of a human individual and leads
to the incommunication of body and mind.
At the basis of most of these problems lies Descartes’s dualism, in which the
characterization of the two substances which make up all of created reality involves no
metaphysical function or feature by which one may be related to the other. This is a
dualism whose conception of corporeal substance as extended makes transubstantiation
unintelligible. Its characterization of a human being as individual is not compatible with
the view that two radically different substances make up a human being, and, of course.
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the incommensurability of body and mind leaves no room for interaction or
communication. Animals for Descartes do not have souls, are not alive, they are no
different from a clock, wherefrom relative to these creatures the work of God is no better
than that of a mechanical artisan. For Leibniz, experience shows us the affinity between
our own way of being and that of animals which obviously contrasts with the being of
bodies. And creation, he explains, is a much finer piece of work when animals are
considered living machines (corporeo-animated substances), whose own bodies are made
up of living machines, different in kind from all the mechanical creations human artisans
can achieve.
Cartesian corpuscularism is also defective, as atomism is not, according to Leibniz,
for the latter contains the correct metaphysical view that a being by aggregation requires
units as constituents. But the atomists' characterization of matter's ultimate constituents
is, as Leibniz frequently emphasizes, untenable, for extended entities, such as atoms are
claimed to be, cannot be indivisible. This defect of atomism is tied to the supposition it
shares with Cartesianism, that bodies are substantial; entities, that is, that in the
context of the created world have ontological independence and sufficiency, only limited
by their relation to God.
It is important to stress that Leibniz's reflection on the problems Cartesianism
gives rise to includes the consideration of those aspects of modern philosophy that must
be accounted positive according to most modern philosophers and Leibniz himself.
Attention to both the philosophical problems and the constructive features of modern
philosophy explains the role of the different entities and conceptual schemas in Leibniz's
ontology. It is only through his inclusion of bodies as beings by aggregation in his ontology
that Leibniz can establish the distinction between bodies and corporeal substances by
which the substantial nature of corporeal substance is saved (through answering the
challenge divisibility and activity pose) along with the existence of entities
characterizable in the terms of the external spatial relations physics is concerned with.
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And the move by which the solution to the Cartesian problems relative to corporeal
substances is attained results from restricting the domain of corporeal substances to
what is not spatial, and making the spatial domain metaphysically derivative as the
accidental dimension of corporeal substances, and such that it cannot be appropriately
understood without the function immaterial substances perform in the constitution of
corporeal substances.
That bodies are not substances but accidents means that perceptual experience
yields immediately knowledge of phenomenal existents. But since this phenomenal realm,
where our own bodies are included, is ontologically meaningful, it is clear that in
Leibniz's metaphysics we must see ourselves as corporeal substances fundamentally, but
also as immaterial substances with bodies. The "with" in question is metaphysical, as
grounded on hylemorphism, and such that it does not entail the metaphysical breach of
Cartesian dualism. Hylemorphism, according to Leibniz, allows that each human
individual understand himself as an immaterial substance, out of being a corporeal
substance whose substantial form is an immaterial substance; and we have also a body,
not as an addendum with no intelligible relation to our being as a substance, but as the
matter which is complemented by our substantial form, that is also the
body-phenomenom we experience ourselves to be, the accidental manifestation, that is, of
our substantial being.
It must already be completely clear to the reader that when Leibniz claims he was
forced to reintroduce hylemorphism he is pointing to perhaps the most distinctive feature
of his philosophy, and also indicating that the problems he was out to resolve made this
move necessary. Indeed, as our explanations must have suggested, this is a philosophy
that turns around hylemorphism in a way that makes all interpretations claiming that
Leibniz is an Idealist —that he conceives of bodies as phenomena and of souls as
immaterial substances, other than which there are none in his ontology— very defective.
Each and every one of the problems enumerated above obtains its solution from
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hyiGmorphism, as this concGptual schGma affords thG following viGws; that a human boing
is unitary as a hylomorphic compositG; that animals havG souls, which account for their
living nature as part of their hylemorphic character, which makes them corporeo-
animated substances: that bodies are not substances, they are neither active nor unitary
and do suffer infinite divisibility, they are real, however, as being by aggregations whose
ultimate constituents are corporeal substances: that transubstantiation is based on the
possibility of having Christ as a corporeal substance at many places at once, a possibility
that arises out of the distinction between the corporeal substance and its body, which as
its accidental manifestation may be multiple and spatially dispersed while the corporeal
substance in question is unitary: that a body and a mind relate as the substantial form and
the matter of one and the same corporeal substance, whose body is also a phenomenom as a
being by aggregation.
To the reflections above we must add Leibniz's consideration of the problems raised
by the possibility of metempsychosis or the independent existences of souls in nature,
which he confronts when reflecting on the meaning of the death and birth of animals and
human beings. These problems arise from the view that such creatures have body and
soul: and are solved through making hylemorphism the continuous and everlasting basis
of the relation between a body and its soul in living entities. Hylemorphism enables
Leibniz to explain death and birth as part of the continuous changes which qualify the
sempiternal existence of the same unitary corporeo-animated substance.
At this stage in our exposition of Leibniz's thought, the reader might be inclined to
ask himself. Why have so many commentators considered Leibniz an Idealist? The value
of hylemorphism is so extended and multidimensional in Leibniz's philosophy, and the
textual evidence supporting the claim that hylemorphic corporeal substances exist is so
definitive, that one is puzzled by the preponderance of idealistic interpretations. This
puzzle deserves our attention.
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E. Bfiasons Why Commentators Have Considered Leibniz an ldPali<;t
1. Subjectivism
When explaining, a while back, the significance of hylemorphism in Leibniz’s
philosophy, I mentioned one of the reasons that has inclined commentators towards an
idealistic interpretation of his ontology. I explained that a common misinterpretation of
Leibniz's thinking results from envisaging his conception of the soul on the model of
Descartes's, as a thinking substance relative to which "corporeal substance" is
understood as "body." The dualism of independent and incommensurable metaphysical
domains entailed in this opposition is considered by many commentators the background
against which Leibniz recognizes that bodies do not meet the conditions of substantiality
and only simple indivisible substances —souls, minds or spirits, that is— do so. This
conception includes the view that Leibniz's idealism entails a phenomenalistic account of
bodies based on the recognition that sense phenomena are not representations of body-
substances but rather the source of their phenomenal constitution. That Leibniz's bodies
are aggregates of substances does not in the least modifies the emphasis, in this
interpretation, upon the view that bodies are sense-data constructs.
I explained before, somewhat extensively, how the supposition that Leibniz's
philosophic point of departure is subjective, in the manner of Descartes, lies at the basis
of this misinterpretation, as it was appropriate that this topic be elucidated in order to
establish the significance of hylemorphism in Leibniz's philosophy. There is little, then,
that we need to add to what was previously said. Nevertheless, the relevance of
misinterpreting Leibniz on the issue of subjectivism and introspection for the claim that
he is an Idealist can be illustrated through the following passage of Benson Mates:
There are many other texts, however, in which Leibniz gives, or hints at, a quite
different definition, one reflecting his view that the only individual substances are
minds and other mindlike beings. In an illuminating, quasi-autobiographical passage
he explains that when reflecting on the notion of substance, he begins with himself, as
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a pyadigm case: "And since I conceive that there are other beings who also have the
right to say I, or for whom this can be said, it is by this that I conceive what is
called substance in general." He adds that it is the consideration of himself that alsoprovides him with other concepts in metaphysics, such as those of cause, effect,
action, similarity, and even with those of logic and ethics. In terms of Wallace
Matson’s aptly characterized distinction of the "inside-out" and "outside-in"
approaches to metaphysics, Leibniz is clearly an inside-outer.21
The first sentence above contrasts Leibniz’s definition of a substance as "that which
affords a complete concept" in chapter eight of the Discourse with definitions that
presumably suggest Leibniz’s idealism. The example provided by Mates illustrates how
the claim by Leibniz that the notion of substance is evinced introspectively is considered
evidence of a subjectivistic point of departure —an "inside-out" approach to
metaphysics in which one’s own substantiality is presented paradigmatically as the
model by which to understand all other substances. That the ’I’ in question is the Cartesian
thinking substance is never contested by readers like Mates, for whom the emphasis on
perception and appetition included in the introspective discovery of one’s own
substantiality by Leibniz is construed unhesitantly in Cartesian fashion. That Leibniz
may also consider himself a thinking substance that performs as a substantial form in the
constitution of a corporeal substance is hardly contemplated by Mates, who interprets
Leibniz’s characterization of bodies as beings by aggregation as involving the rejection of
corporeal substances. This last point, and its dependence on the supposition that "matter,"
"body" and "corporeal substance" are practically synonymous terms, can be appreciated
in the passage below, where Mates explains the heterogeneous relation "monads," as
ultimate constituents, have to matter:
But Leibniz’s considered view is that "strictly speaking, matter is not composed of
monads but results from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a
phenomenom, like the rainbow or parhelia." Monads are not truly ingredients of
corporeal substances, he says, but are only "requisites."22
The supposition that Leibniz is a "subjectivist" (an "inside-outer") inclines
towards idealism in two ways: 1
.) it fosters the views that minds, whose distinctive
features are perception and appetition, are Leibniz’s paradigmatic substances: 2.) it
facilitates the recognition of bodies as phenomenal objects, which leads to the claim that
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ontologically they should be recognized as phenomenal constructs. An essential ingredient
of this interpretation is the belief that Leibniz attempts to defend dualism (Cartesian
style) only to surrender it with the realization that there are no corporeal substances.
We must stress, therefore, that all the aspects of Leibniz's philosophy examined in the
third chapter of this work as favorable to a dualistic interpretation of his ontology should
be included among the features that promote an idealistic interpretation, insofar as this
is considered a first stage in Leibniz's thinking which will naturally evolve into monistic
idealism and a phenomenalistic conception of bodies.
There are two other factors in Leibniz's philosophy, which in conjunction with the
supposition that he is an "inside-outer" promote idealistic interpretations of his
ontology. These are: his position on the ultimate constituents of matter or body, and, the
hypothesis of preestablished harmony. They are our next topics.
2. The Ultimate Constituents of Bodies
In chapter four, we established that Leibniz's considers corporeal substances the
ultimate constituents of matter, but we also indicated that there is textual evidence for
the claim that bodies's ultimate constituents are immaterial substances. The
commentators which have favored an idealistic interpretation of Leibniz have, no doubt,
placed their attention on passages like the two that follow;
And I do in fact regard souls, or rather monads, as the atoms of substance, since there
are no material atoms in nature according to my view, and the smallest particle of
matter still has parts.23
You doubt whether a single simple thing is subject to changes. But since only simple
things are true things, and the rest are beings by aggregation and therefore
phenomena, existing as Democritus put it, by convention but not by nature [vo|ico not
(])'ua£i], it is obvious that unless there is change in the simple things, there will be no
change in things at all.24
In the first of these passages the term "monad" signifies simple substance of the
sort an immaterial substance is. It appears to be synonymous with "soul." It is suggested
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here that monads are the ultimate constituents of matter, as such constituents cannot be
material. In the second passage, the opposition between "simple" "true" things and beings
by aggregation points to the dichotomy "bodies-immaterial substances." This dichotomy,
it appears, is offered as ontologically exhaustive. The terms "monads, "atoms of
substance", "simple things," all suggest the view that matter's ultimate constituents are
immaterial substances, for indivisibility and simplicity seem to be emphasized to a point
that composite corporeal substances may not be able to satisfy. This is also what the
passage below appears to assert:
Compounds or bodies, are pluralities, and simple substances —lives, souls and
spirits— are unities. There must of necessity be simple substances everywhere, for
without simple substances there would be no compounds.^S
The Leibnizian claim that there must be units if there are aggregates is expressed
above in terms of the opposition "simple substances-compound." It is the same conceptual
schema we have seen many times, whereby Leibniz interprets corpuscularism in the
manner of atomism with the additional claim that the unitary nature of matter's ultimate
constituents requires that these be substances. Now, the reference to simple substances
above, since exemplified by "spirits" and "souls," suggests clearly that the constituents
in question are immaterial substances. This certainly contrasts with the many texts
previously examined where corporeal substances play unequivocally the role of a body’s
ultimate constituents.
Puzzling as it may seem, in the same work ("The Principles of Nature and of Grace,
Based on Reason") the last quotation is found, Leibniz explains the being of a "living
substance" in the very same terms we are familiar with by which the nature of a
hylemorphic composite is characterized. He says:
Together with a particular body, each monad makes a living substance. Thus not only
is there life everywhere, joined to members or organs, but there are also infinite
degrees of it in the monads, some of which dominate more or less over other. But when
the monads has organs so adjusted that by means of them the impressions which are
received, and consequently also the perceptions which represent these impressions,
are heightened and distinguished (as, for example, when rays of light are concentrated
by means of the shape of the humors of the eye and act with greater force), then this
may amount to sentiment, that is to say, to a perception accompanied by memory —a
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perception of which there remains a kind of echo for a long time, which makes itself
heard on occasion. Such a living being is called an animal, as its monad is called a soul.
When this soul is raised to the level of reason, it is something more sublime and is
counted among the spirits, as will be explained presently.26
Of course, the animal here must be the corporeal substance, and the "organs" of the
monad are those of its body, as the reference to the "eye" suggests. A monad is a soul, it is
the substantial form of an animal; moreover, souls that have reason are spirits. A spirit
is the monad of a hylemorphic composite, a corporeal substance of the type, rational
animal.
There is no doubt that the article which starts out with the assertions that suggest
the ontological dichotomy, being by aggregation-monads, which has fostered the view that
the ultimate constituents of bodies are immaterial substances, includes the hylemorphic
characterization of animals as corporeal substances, and is not consistent with the
idealism the dichotomy in question suggests to many commentators. Indeed, the article
goes on to explain several topics in Leibniz's philosophy in accordance with the meaning
of hylemorphism we have stressed. Among these, the imperishable nature of animals
which obtains from sempiternal transformation is included, as are the functions of
corporeal substances that result from having a soul or a mind, to which the passage below
refers:
But reasoning in the true sense depends on necessary or eternal truths, as are those of
logic, number and geometry, which make the connection of ideas indubitable and their
conclusions infallible. Animals in which such consequences cannot be observed are
called beast, but those who know these necessary truths are the ones properly called
rational animals, and their souls are called spirits. These souls are capable of
performing acts of reflection and of considering what is called T, 'substance', 'soul',
'spirit' —in a word, things and truths which are immaterial.27
The last two sentences above show that Leibniz will indistinctly attribute the
thought functions of a corporeal substance to either the animal or the soul of the animal. A
rational animal performs acts of reflection as does his spirit, in the manner that results
from the hylemorphic function by which a substantial form that is an immaterial
substance endows the corporeo-animated substance it constitutes with the very essential
attributes it has.
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Commentators, one may think, can select from the available textual evidence and
defend any of the two interpretations about the ultimate constituents of bodies that we
have identified. But it must be stressed that evidence for the view that immaterial
substances are matter's ultimate constituents characteristically appears in texts which
affirm also the existence of corporeal substances and many of the features linked to
hylemorphism in Leibniz’s metaphysical explanations. Even when it could be argued that
such texts establish that the ultimate constituents of bodies are souls or soul-like
immaterial substances, the relevance in them of corporeal substances makes the claim
that Leibniz is an Idealist (for there are only bodies and their immaterial constituents)
untenable. The tendency to see the "aggregate-immaterial substances" dichotomy as
suggestive of idealism is based upon the view that it affirms an exhaustive ontological
dichotomy —which it need not do— and on the practice of selecting passages confirmatory
of this dichotomy from texts where other passages are clearly inconsistent with an
idealistic interpretation of Leibniz.
Now, whatever the ultimate constituents of bodies may be for Leibniz, it is
incontestable that he asserts the existence of corporeal substances in contexts relative to
the nature of animals and human beings, with respect to transubstantiation, and in regard
to dynamics. Besides, the number of passages supporting the view that corporeal
substances are matter's ultimate constituents decisively prevail over antagonistic textual
evidence. And we even find texts where Leibniz explicitly disavows the position that souls
or immaterial substances are the constituents of bodies. None seems to me more
important in this respect than one in an article entitled "Comments on Michel Angelo
Fardella" which addresses an objection by Fardella to the view he attributes to Leibniz,
that bodies are aggregates of souls. Fardella writes:
When dealing with a multitude of stones ABC, either stone A or B or C must be
understood first. But it is not the same with a soul which, with other souls, does riot
constitute body. And it seems that there is some difficulty in the argument that, given
that there are bodies composed of substances in the world, there must necessary be
something which is a single indivisible substance. Now, this can legitimately be
inferred if the unity, as a part of the same sort, intrinsically composed the aggregate.
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But the substantial unity in question does not intrinsically constitute the aggreoate
and IS not a portion of it, but is understood to be essentially altogether different from
it. How, then, is it required in order for this aggregate to subsist?28
The main problem presented by Fardella is inherent to the manner in which the
issue about matter's ultimate components is stated by Leibniz. It must be that they are not
material or corpuscular for otherwise they would be divisible. They are hence
substantial, and not units (phenomenal, physical) of the sort which as parts constitute
the aggregate. Leibniz is quite aware of this and he frequently emphasizes that the
aggregate "results" from its ultimate constituents rather than is "made up" of them (See
footnote 22 above). It is made up of parts, as it is physically divisible, but its ultimate
constituents cannot be physical parts for they cannot be units of the same sort the
aggregate as a whole is. Fardella's objection is obviously based on the supposition that the
correlation "aggregate-constitutive units" must be homogeneous to be meaningful, as in
the case of physical aggregates. Leibniz, by contrast, believes that the correlation has a
metaphysical significance which, paradoxical as it may sound, requires that an aggregate
have ultimate units essentially different from it; for only through such ultimate units
can we supersede the question about constituents which needs to be asked of the aggregate
and its physical parts.
As one would expect, Leibniz's answer to Fardella is that the constituents of bodies
are substances, but he makes it clear that these are not souls —which certainly must
come as a surprise to Fardella, as to most commentators of Leibniz. His account seems
conceived in terms of hylemorphism, for he stresses the role of the soul as substantial
form and reiterates the claim that entities other than bodies (substances, that is) must
exist in order to affirm the existence of bodies as beings by aggregation:
I do not say that the body is composed of souls, nor that body is constituted by an
aggregate of souls, but that it is constituted by an aggregate of substances. Moreover,
the soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form,
or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty.
Moreover, the force of the argument consists in this, that body is not a substance, but
substances or an aggregate of substances.
Therefore either there is no substance, and therefore there are no substances, or,
there is something other than body.^9
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Substances that have souls as substantial forms are corporeal substances; hence,
such must be the ultimate constituents of bodies Leibniz is referring to here. A simple
argument, implicit above, also attest to this fact: the constituents of bodies are
substances, either corporeal or immaterial. But they are not immaterial substances
(souls).
We must be puzzled by Leibniz's contention above that the soul is not a substance
but a substantial form. It can be explained by emphasizing that in its role of substantial
form the soul is not an immaterial substance, wherefrom its substantial independent
nature is only virtual and does not occur naturally in the ordinary state of affairs of this
world. Substantial forms let us reiterate, always accompany matter according to Leibniz.
Now, ultimate constituents (corporeal substances) are not of the same sort
ontologically as bodies; therefore, Leibniz must advert Fardella against considering them
parts, and meets his objection by suggesting that the relation ultimate constituents have
to aggregates is analogous to that between points and lines. Leibniz writes:
Further, although the aggregate of these substances constitutes body, they do not
constitute it as parts, just as points are not parts of lines, since a part is always of
the same sort as the whole.^O
In the passages that follow this one, Leibniz explains that the bodies of the
corporeal substances that are the ultimate constituents of matter may be considered
"parts" of matter but that the souls of these corporeal substances are not parts of matter,
as are not the corporeal substances themselves. He also explains that, since a corporeal
substance is a metaphysical composite of secondary matter (body) and form, a body has
substances-with-bodies as constituents ad infinitum. Leibniz refers to these features of
his conception of matter in the text we have been quoting from by adding:
However, the organic bodies of substances included in any mass of matter are parts of
that mass. So in a fish pond there are many fishes and the liquid in each fish is, in
turn, a certain kind of fish pond which contains, as it were, other fishes or animals of
their own kinds; and so on to infinity. And therefore there are substances everywhere
in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. And just as there is no portion of a
line in which there are not an infinite number of points, there is no portion of matter
which does not contain an infinite number of substances. But just as a point is not a
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part of a line, but a line in which there is a point is such a part, so also a soul is not a
part of matter, but a body in which there is a soul is such a part of matter 31
We can now understand better Leibniz's notion of "an actual infinity." Before, we
stressed that an actual infinity originates from having corporeal substances in the role of
a body's ultimate constituents, inasmuch as immediate constituents (corporeal
substances) have bodies that have corporeal-substances-with-bodies as constituents
without end. But this must mean that all the physical parts of a body are modified
hylemorphically by a substantial form, for only thus each is actualized into a corporeal
substance which has this part of a body as its body. Physical parts of a body are
hylemorphically modified by a soul in a way that makes all the infinite parts of a body the
bodies of corporeal substances. The conception by which constituents of bodies have bodies
which have constituents ad infinitum of the same sort (corporeal substances) includes
the infinitely reiterated condition of parts of bodies actualized by substantial forms into
corporeal substances ad infinitum. And this is an actual infinity.
In this account, the souls of the corporeal substances that are the constituents of a
body may only be considered "constituents" of this body themselves in that they are the
substantial forms which complement the bodies (parts of the body whose aggregate nature
is being explained) of the corporeal substances that are the constituents of the body in
question. This is what the sentence that follows, from the passage above, suggests; "But
just as a point is not a part of a line, but a line in which there is a point is such a part, so
also a soul is not a part of matter, but a body in which there is a soul is such a part of
matter." Now, since the souls of the corporeal substances from which a body as an
aggregate "results" are this body's "constituents" in the way just explained, one might
speak of a resolution of a body that will ultimately yield these kind of "constituents." And,
since these substantial forms may be considered substances, Leibniz does, in certain
passages, extend his resolution of matter to a point that entails that matter's ultimate
substantial constituents are immaterial substances. This is the source of the confusion at
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the basis of the query whether corporeal or immaterial substances are matter’s ultimate
constituents.
In order to understand better this issue it is appropriate that we stress the
distinction between the "physical" and the "metaphysical" resolutions involved in
Leibniz s account of the nature of bodies. That a body may be divided into parts makes it
physically resolvable: that it needs ultimate constituents that cannot be of the same kind
as the aggregate and must be substantial involves what I believe can appropriately be
called a metaphysical resolution" (first type). There is, however, another situation for
which I have used the phrase "metaphysical resolution": the resolution of a corporeal
substance into its metaphysical constitutive principles, matter and form. In this second
type of metaphysical resolution what is resolved is not an aggregate but a composite
substance.
The question which started out with regard to the resolvable nature of bodies has a
first stage of physical resolution which requires to be metaphysically complemented with
the recognition that aggregates have ultimate constituents. In a strict sense the resolution
called for by the nature of bodies ends with corporeal substances. I mean: it is intrinsic to
this issue, as Leibniz conceives it, to refer both to the physical resolution (parts) and to
the metaphysical resolution which has corporeal substances as ultimate units. The many
texts which establish that corporeal substances are matter's ultimate constituents accord
with this interpretation. That corporeal substances suffice in the quest for matter's
ultimate constituents is evident once the nature of the resolution relative to the condition
"aggregate" is emphasized. Ultimate constituents in this context must simply be non-
aggregational, a condition corporeal substances unquestionably satisfy. The metaphysical
resolution of the second kind, however, introduces something new; it goes beyond what
concerns in a strict sense the nature of aggregates, for it has to do with the resolution of
corporeal substances.
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Leibniz extends the resolution issue by inquiring, in some texts, into the
metaphysical composition of corporeal substances, and he brings this up in some passages
as if directly a continuation of what began as a resolution of matter or body. He does not
keep the distinction between the two types of metaphysical resolutions I have pointed out
clear, and promotes in this fashion the confusion about matter's ultimate constituents.
The passage below is, I believe, Leibniz's clearest expression of this line of thinking. It
explains how "in the end there are simple substances alone":
Further, all creatures are either substantial or accidental. Those which are
substantial are either substances or substantiated. I give the name 'substantiated' to
aggregates of substances, such as an army of men, or a flock of sheep; and all bodies
are such aggregates. A substance is either simple, such as a soul, which has no parts,
or it is composite, such as an animal, which consists of a soul and an organic body. But
an organic body, like every other body, is merely an aggregate of animals or other
things which are living and therefore organic, or finally of small objects or masses:
but these also are finally resolved into living things, from which it is evident that all
bodies are finally resolved into living things, and that what, in the analysis of
substances, exists ultimately are simple substances —namely, souls, or, if you
prefer a more general term, monads, which are without parts. For even though every
simple substance has an organic body which corresponds to it —otherwise it would not
have any kind of orderly relation to other things in the universe, nor would it act or
be acted upon in an orderly way
—
yet by itself it is without parts. And because an
organic body, or any other body whatsoever, can again be resolved into substances
endowed with organic bodies, it is evident that in the end there are simple substances
alone, and that in them are the sources of all things and of the modifications that come
to things.32
Form and matter are the metaphysical constituents (in the second sense) of
corporeal substances which are the metaphysical constituents of matter in the first
sense. But of the two constituents of a corporeal substance, matter is metaphysically
resolvable (in the first sense) into corporeal substances, again each metaphysically
resolvable (in the second sense) into matter and form, wherefrom it becomes clear that
only form is not subject to further resolution. And form is immaterial substance. Whence
it can be claimed that the ultimate constituents of matter are immaterial substances.
Immaterial substances become in this fashion, in the context of Leibniz's atomistic
account of matter, the fundamental substances. And this is exactly, in opposition to
materialism, what Leibniz wants to emphasize most.
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In the context of hylemorphism the immaterial substance that is a soul is Leibniz's
most important ontological notion. This is a substance that through its role as substantial
form explains the nature and substantiality of a corporeal substance. The being of a
corporeal substance is in this manner derivative relative to the being of its soul-
immaterial substance. Materialism is not tenable as immaterial substances are basic to
the being of corporeal substances. Just as Descartes used the epistemological role of the
soul to emphasize that external reality depends upon the substance that knows, without
whom there would be no known external reality, Leibniz uses hylemorphism to show that
metaphysically no substance is as fundamental as a soul (a thinking substance). And
beyond this he turns his atomism into evidence of the same sort, by having the resolution
of matter show that in the end all comes down to immaterial substances. This is not
idealism. It entails, nonetheless, an ontological ranking in which immaterial substances
are placed in a privileged position, relative to which corporeal substances and matter
have a derivative ontological status. It is hard to imagine an ontology, short of idealism,
that better refutes materialism.
It is worthwhile, to conclude this subsection, to note two instances of
interpretation which are decisively moved towards idealism on the basis of the dichotomy
"aggregate-simple substances." Russell, to begin with, unhesitantly, interprets the two
first paragraphs of the Monadologv as presenting an exhaustive dichotomy, which
opposes simple substances to beings by aggregation, thereby to defend idealism. The
strength of this evidence keeps him away from an interpretation of Leibniz as admitting
corporeal substances, even when he accepts that there is textual evidence favorable to
that position.33 |n the case of C. D. Broad, that only idealism is compatible with the
"aggregate-ultimate units" dichotomy is argued on the basis of the claim that only
immaterial entities are substantial and, hence, can satisfy the conditions "ultimate units"
have to meet. Broad writes:
Therefore, if any volume, however small, be completely filled with corporeal
substance, the substances which fill it must be an aggregate composed of the smallest
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bits of corporeal substance which respectively fill the smaller volumes which
together make up this volume without overlapping. But, for precisely the same
reason, each of these smaller bits of corporeal substance would in turn be an
of smaller bits, and so on without end. Therefore a continuous extended
substance would be an aggregate of aggregates of aggregates ... without end. This is an
impossible condition and therefore there cannot be any extended substances.^^
Broad has obviously interpreted Leibniz's argument against atomism as
instrumental for the rejection of corporeal substances. Like Stuart Brown, he interprets
Leibniz as initially admitting corporeal substances, but sees the dichotomy by which
Leibniz rejects the view that corpuscles may be matter's ultimate constituents as an
attack upon corporeal substances. He simply misses Leibniz's distinction between bodies
and corporeal substances, and is led to the view that, ultimately, for Leibniz, there are
only immaterial substances. He, therefore, appraises the argument by which Leibniz
rejects atomism as follows:
This argument seems to me to be important for the following reasons (1) It is a
purely ontological argument against the reality of corporeal substance, and not a
merely epistemological argument like Berkeley's. (2) It is quite independent of
whether the ostensibly extended objects are animated organisms or not. Let them be as
animated and as organic as they will, if their organisms are held to be extended, they
are open to this objection.35
3. Preestablished Harmony
The main reason why preestablished harmony suggests idealism is that it has no
relation to hylemorphism. Though as Benson Mates claimed, it is an hypothesis that seems
discordant with a phenomenalistic account of bodies, it does not fit either a hylemorphic
characterization of corporeal substance. To most commentators it seems an account of how
all created substances relate to each other; it seems pertinent also to the mind-body
relation conceived as an intersubstantial relation. But, with the recognition that bodies
are not substances for Leibniz, it is considered by many an explanation of how the states
of a particular mind-substance and a particular series of physical phenomena exhibit
ordered concomitance. In neither of these roles is preestablished harmony a relation
bearing upon hylemorphism. It does not complement a characterization of created
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substances built over the function a substantial form has relative to matter in the
constitution of a corporeal substance. Therefore, since hylemorphism is central to the
recognition of the role corporeal substances have in Leibniz’s ontology, preestablished
harmony radical disconnection from hylemorphism, when conjoined with other features
of Leibniz's thinking, favors an idealistic interpretation.
Preestablished harmony has two different connotations in Leibniz's philosophy.
These are not kept separate, for the hypothesis is treated by Leibniz as if basically
homogeneous in meaning. I believe that Leibniz incurs in a confusion on this point with
consequences that must be considered a definitive defect of his philosophy. We shall treat
this topic in the next subsection as the most important shortcoming in Leibniz's thinking.
Now, our attention will be placed on the dual meaning of preestablished harmony as one of
the factors that promotes idealistic interpretations of his ontology.
The first connotation of preestablished harmony is intersubstantial in a general
way. The hypothesis, in this sense, is required by the view that all created substances are
metaphysically self-sufficient. It consist in the account of the relation substances, that
perform as automata, have to each other. That substances have been created so their
existence unfolds in the manner of an automaton which relates to other such entities by
mirroring or expressing them without interaction or influence, is here the central tenet.
Mirroring is a reciprocal relation that obtains from God's cognitive consideration of all
substances individually (complete concepts) and collectively (possible worlds) before
creation. Since this consideration, as part of God's omniscience, conditions his creative
decree and is further qualified by his omnibenevolence, the end result is harmony in the
created world. This, of course, is the harmony among possible substances contained in
God's intellect in the form of the set of all compossible substance which is best. Relative
to the created world, it is a preestablished harmony insofar as determined by the moral
obligation which makes God do what is possible and best.
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Preestablished harmony, thus conceived, is part of Leibniz’s theoretical
construction explaining creation. In this context, the substantial spontaneity wherefrom
all created substances are automata is a consequence of the nature of truth independently
of dualism. Spontaneity call forth preestablished harmony to explain communication
between substances, and the additional insight, that Leibniz's considers himself
—the
substance he discovers introspectively— the paradigm of all substances, leads to the
conclusion that his is a world of soul-like self-sufficient immaterial substances. This is,
of course, idealism.
The other connotation of preestablished harmony bears upon the relation between a
body and a mind. In this respect, there are two interpretative tendencies. First, an
interpretation of Leibniz as if asserting that body and mind are two substances incapable
of communication —fostered, no doubt, by his many statements suggesting that two
substances are here in question— whose states exhibit ordered concomitance
preestablished by God. This interpretation includes an appreciation of Leibniz's position
as very close to Malebranche's, in that it addresses a problem aroused by dualism. It,
therefore, does not take into consideration Leibniz's characterization of a body as a being
by aggregation. Preestablished harmony, thus construed, is not an explanation relevant to
hylemorphism. It would simply have Leibniz in the same position of the Cartesians,
wherefrom nothing would induce the recognition that he introduces hylemorphism as the
conceptual instrument by which the defects of the Cartesian ontology are to be solved. It
cannot be claimed that this interpretative current is idealistic, but with the modification
that results from believing that Leibniz will reject corporeal substances, it paves the
way towards idealism.
Once Leibniz is placed in the position of Cartesian-style dualism the belief that he
will modify this position by rejecting corporeal substances leads directly to idealism.
Since the significance of hylemorphism had not been understood by those who considered
Leibniz a dualist a la Descartes, the change by which corporeal substances are
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presumably dropped is seen as a simple collapse into idealism. Preestablished harmony,
now understood as an account of concomitant manifestations of a mind-substance and a
phenomenom, appears, as completely consistent with idealism.
Commentators which believe that corporeal substances are rejected by Leibniz and
acknowledge that preestablished harmony has to do with the mind-body relation, incline
towards the view that the subsisting usage in Leibniz's writings of the phrase "corporeal
substance" results from his non-adversarial style (by which he would rather accept
established usage than antagonize it unnecessarily). They contend that preestablished
harmony explains how a body that is not a substance for Leibniz relates to a mind which
is an immaterial substance, and that there is no ambiguity on the part of Leibniz on this
point. For them, the mind-substance in question is the Cartesian thinking substance with
no function in the role of substantial form; and the body counterpart is a sense-data
construct, with no relation to a corporeal substance, for there are none such. Of course,
hylemorphism has no role to play in this conception. This is the prevalent interpretation
of preestablished harmony among Idealists.
In all the type of interpretations we have examined, preestablished harmony seems
appropriate because it is claimed that there is no linkage between body and mind grounded
on their nature by which concomitance may be explained. When this view is united to
Leibniz's presumed subjectivism, or to the belief that perception and appetition qualify
all substances but are distinctive attributes of immaterial substances, or to the
supposition that the dichotomy "aggregate-immaterial substances" exhausts Leibniz's
ontology, preestablished harmony is made part of an idealist interpretation of Leibniz.
F. Shortcomings
As I suggested in the introduction of this work, the task of providing a definitive
interpretation of Leibniz is still in the making. My work has for this reason been mostly
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an attempt to establish what I consider the correct interpretation of his ontology against
the prevailing tendency which makes him an Idealist. The relation Leibniz's ontology has
to preestablished harmony has also been my concern, but the final conclusions on this
issue I have not yet formulated, for I believe that I can best now present them along with
the elucidation of some shortcomings of Leibniz's thinking. There are various aspect in
Leibniz's philosophy which I consider problematic, but first and foremost is a defect
relative to the role preestablished harmony plays in Leibniz's philosophy. Let this be,
then, our first topic. It can now be elucidated against the previous consideration of the
way preestablished harmony contributes to an idealistic interpretation of Leibniz.
1. Preestablished Harmony: A Defect
Preestablished harmony accords with Leibniz's emphasis on substantial
spontaneity and self-sufficiency as originating from the complete concepts of possible
substances in the best possible world. It results from the meaning of the principle of
sufficient reason as a corollary of truth which, when united to the significance the
principle of the best has for God's willing, brings about the determination of the
individual being of every created substance. It is an hypothesis conceived with regard to
the general character of substances as created existents and does not require the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances. It flows out of the dichotomy
"possible substance-existent substance" which explains the act of creation as the mean by
which certain individual essences as possibles obtain actuality. It is part of Leibniz's
treatment of "the justice of God." It belongs among the aspects of Leibniz's essentialism,
mostly derived from the influence of Platonism, that are instrumental in his account of
creation. And, since prompted by theological considerations, preestablished harmony is
not the immediate product of the metaphysical reflections by which Leibniz attempts to
understand external reality in conformity with both mechanicism and hylemorphism.
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There is an account of the mind-body relation in Leibniz that is different from
preestablished harmony. Of course, it is the account that has the mind in the role of the
substantial form which complements a body hylemorphically in the constitution of a
corporeal substance. Body and mind relate here as hylemorphic complements, and this by
itself is a mind-body relation. Moreover, Leibnizian hylemorphism makes the body an
accident of the corporeal substance, and has the mind in the role of this same corporeal
substance's source of many of its essential features. Hylemorphism, then, links a body
and a mind, through the bearing each has on the nature of a corporeal substance.
Through hylemorphism mind and body do not influence each other, nor do they exist
in total independence of each other. They make up one substance, whose thinking functions
obtain from its mind-substantial form, while its body is the hylemorphic matter, but
also an accident of the corporeal substance and a phenomenom to this same substance as a
thinking being. The latter features add to the relation body and mind have in Leibniz's
account beyond what is strictly contained in the basic hylemorphic relation. Insofar as
the body dimension of a corporeal substance is its accidental serial expression it seems
naturally a correlate of its mind dimension, wherefrom the relation between the
phenomenal manifestation of a body and its mind in Leibniz's philosophy is, or should
have been, psycho-physical parallelism. I mean by this, a parallelism between bodily
occurrences, phenomenal in nature, and the mind's modalities of being, which also qualify
the being of a corporeal substance whose body the body in question is. This is not the same
as preestablished harmony. It accords with preestablished harmony by having the
physical changes of the body agree with the modalities of being of the mind, which is, of
course, the notion of concomitance, already central to the meaning of occasionalism. But,
just as occasionalism is different from preestablished harmony, what I call here
"psycho-physical parallelism" is a different account of concomitance, as it immediately
refers to the corporeal substance as the basis of the linkage between body and mind, and
not to God or creation.
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Just as Mates suggested, we can now realize that preestablished harmony is
uncalled for in Leibniz's philosophy, at least with regard to the issue of the concomitant
mind-body occurrences. Psycho-physical parallelism naturally provides an answer.
Through it, Leibniz could have avoided the confusion that prompts an interpretation of his
dualism along Cartesian lines by stressing that though there are corporeal substances the
relation between the mind and its body is different from the relation between a mind and
the corporeal substance it constitutes when performing as substantial form. He could
have, on the basis of this clarification, avoided the ambiguity in his usage of the words,
"bodies" and "corporeal substances," and the tendency to speak of bodies as if substances
in the mind-body relation. And while psycho-physical parallelism would have served to
account for the relation a series of phenomena manifesting a being by aggregation has to
the thinking functions of a mind, preestablished harmony was the appropriate account of
the intersubstantial relation among windowless self-sufficient created substances. That
these substances are all conceived by Leibniz as hylemorphic composites, even though
virtually there may be immaterial substances, enables us to realize that these are the
uniform type of created existents whose linkage obtains from the manner they essentially
express each other through expressing their creator.
Leibniz has, whether he realizes it or not, two conceptions explaining the mind-
body relation, neither of which is preestablished harmony. The first is simply the
relation between substantial form and secondary matter. These are soul and body in the
constitution of one hylemorphic substance. The second mind-body relation is based on this
first one. It explains the concomitance between a series of phenomena that make up a
well-founded phenomenom and the modifications of a mind as the product of the manner
these two dimensions of being coincide in one hylemorphic substance. This is psycho-
physical parallelism. It is not an intersubstantial account; but rather, the natural mind-
body relation in a characterization of corporeal substance based on hylemorphism.
Preestablished harmony, by contrast, is intersubstantial. It explains how all created
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substances relate, as the offshoot of a conception of creation originating in the elucidation
of God s cognition of possible substances through complete concepts. That substances are
self-sufficient and that they, nonetheless, relate to each other results from three stages
in the cognitive aspect of the creative process: first God's individual consideration of
possible substances under the criterion of conceivability; second his sorting out of
possible worlds through the criterion of compossibility, and third, his consideration of
sets of compossible substances under the criterion of worth. These criteria ensure
spontaneity and intersubstantial harmony, as the outcome of conceptual sufficiency,
logical compatibility and the ruling of the principle of the best.
That Leibniz did not distinguish between psycho-physical parallelism and
preestablished harmony in the manner I am suggesting and had the latter hypothesis
playing the role that belongs to psycho-physical parallelism is a mistake produced by his
inability to sort out clearly the consequences entailed in his consideration of theological
topics versus those involved in his elucidation of the nature of external reality. Motivated
fundamentally by his theological reflections on God's justice, he readily, and early in his
thinking, accepted the implications of the nature of truth for a deterministic conception
of the universe. Herefrom preestablished harmony followed. But its role, which naturally
explains how individual created substances relate to each other, was extended to the
relation between a mind-substance and a being by aggregation. This was a move required
by Leibniz's conception of corporeal substance, in which a body is a being by aggregation.
It is a spurious move, however, as the relation is not intersubstantial. The metaphysical
independence which may be claimed for substances relative to each other does not fit the
relation the body of a corporeal substance has to the mind-substantial form of this same
substance: the basic preestablished intersubstantial agreement grounded on the natures of
individual substances is not pertinent to the relation a body has to a mind in
hylemorphism.
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No doubt. Leibniz's desire to avoid the Scholastic defect of having substantial forms
explain causally occurrences in the physical domain played a part in his use of
preestablished harmony to account for the mind-body relation. Motivated by the desire to
limit the use of substantial form to its metaphysical significance, Leibniz did not include
in Its meaning anything relative to the phenomenal or physical dimension of the being of a
corporeal substance. Since "influence" was out of the question, the relata, body and mind,
seemed basically independent of each other, and thus conceived, Leibniz envisaged his own
position as similar to Malebranche's. At this point an account of concomitance was called
for, as if no metaphysical basis intrinsic to the nature of bodies and minds could serve
this purpose. Obviously, Leibniz forgot that, if not the nature of mind (as a thinking
substance) nor the nature of body (a well-founded phenomenom) could help here, the
nature of corporeal substance provided an answer.
By stressing the independence of body and mind Leibniz's presentation of the
problem of concomitance approached Cartesian dualism in a way inconsistent with his
own conception of external reality. He even deceived himself to the point of accepting
Malebranche's characterization of the mind-body incommunication as if originating from
the metaphysical incommensurability between body and mind. Probably seduced by this
manner of presenting the problem, which does not fit his own ontological characterization
of body, he did not realize that psyco-physical parallelism is a natural metaphysical
complement of hylemorphism. Neither was it evident to Leibniz that this account
supersedes the difficulties involved in Scholasticism, for it explains concomitance
without causal interaction or influence of any sort by the mind over the body. That,
besides, it does not risk the dualistic interpretation suggested by his own way of
presenting the mind-body problem and preestablished harmony, and is therefore a better
account, he missed completely.
Leibniz's essentialism underlies preestablished harmony, as it qualifies the most
important features of his account of creation. Its development to the point of
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inconsistency with other parts of his thinking results from the conjunction in his
philosophy of Platonic and Aristotelian ingredients. For we must see the conceptions at
the basis of preestablished harmony (the nature of truth and its metaphysical
consequence, "substantial spontaneity") as preeminently Platonic in origin while
hylemorphism is Aristotelian. The problem I have identified above is, therefore, a
manifestation of a more general problem based on the confluence of Platonic essentialism
and hylemorphism in Leibniz's philosophy. This can now become our topic of discussion
as it relates to additional features, which I consider problematic, in Leibniz's thinking.
2. The Confluence of Platonic and Aristotelian Influences
We have seen how the nature of truth led to Leibniz's conception of creation as a
process of actualization of individual essences. The determination of existents involved in
this suggests a one to one relation between a possible substance (an individual essence)
and a created substance. This conception is difficult to accommodate with a hylemorphic
characterization of a created substance. The one to one relation between a possible and an
existent fits idealism and Cartesian dualism better than hylemorphism. It must be
counted among the factors that promote an idealistic interpretation of Leibniz. We treat it
now, however, as it points to some problems involved in the contrast between those
features of Leibniz's thinking which originate in theological considerations versus those
which are part of his reflections on the metaphysical and physical characteristics of the
external world.
For Leibniz, an individual essence differs with respect to the existent that
actualizes it only in that it lacks the attribute "existence." All the metaphysical
determinations of the substance are found in the concept of the substance as possible, and
existence simply entails the actualization of the possible by which the additional attribute
"existence" is made part of the concept of the existent substance. The relation "possible-
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existent" suggests a degree of coincidence between essence and substance that seems
appropriate to the relation between the essence of an immaterial substance and the
immaterial substance itself. It would also fit the relation the individual essence of a
Cartesian body-substance has to the existent body. But with respect to hylemorphism no
such coincidence between essence and existent seems to hold. In hylemorphism the
individual essence's performance over matter precludes that this be the case. Its meaning
as a partial factor in the constitution of a corporeal substance suggests that beyond the
features in a corporeal substance immediately derived from the role of essence there are
others which result from the role of matter.
One may claim, however, that for Leibniz an individual essence is not a partial
factor in the constitution of any substance, since, as the principle of individuation of a
substance it must contains all its determinations. But this position, which certainly
seems Leibniz's, arouses other problems. If a substance is as exhaustively determined by
its essence, it would seem that, in the case of a corporeal substance its material features
must be part of its individual essence. But, then, matter and form, are in some fashion
part of the individual essence, which does not hence perform as substantial form over a
matter in some respect different from it, capable therefore of playing the role of its
hylemorphic complement. Moreover, the relation of an individual essence that is also the
substantial form (and potentially an immaterial substance) to a corporeal substance
prompts the following question. Is the individual essence the possible immaterial
substance or is it the possible corporeal substance constituted by its function as form? To
put this differently. Is the essence, whose modalities of being as possible make up a
series of predicates conceivable through a complete concept, the essence of an immaterial
substance or that of a corporeal substance? It would seem that it cannot be both, but if it
exhaustively contains the determinations of the corporeal substance. What is it that
distinguishes this substance from the immaterial substance whose complete concept is
this same individual essence?
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We are puzzled by the questions above, as they arise out of the discordances
between two different conceptual schemas which Leibniz attempts to reunite
unsuccessfully: the conceptual schema, "essence-existent" and hylemorphism. The
former makes individual essences the clue to the being of substances as part of a
conceptual construction in which eternal truths a priori condition creation; the latter
issues from an account of external reality which warrants the existence of corporeal
substances and explains the dynamics in the domain of bodies in terms of a foundational
force that is also the metaphysical principle of unity and substantiality of entities of the
like of a human being. The two different accounts do not blend naturally into a consistent
synthesis. The essentialism that underlies the dichotomy "possible-existent" is modelled
after the Platonic relation (participation) between archetypes (essences) and things
where a one to one relation obtains. Hylemorphism is quite different. It is a conceptual
schema where two metaphysical principles, neither of which relates in a one to one
manner to an existent, jointly explain the nature of a substance. That the constitutive
principles are two makes it impossible to translate the transit from possibility to
actuality into the conjunction of matter and form in the constitution of one created
substance.
Akin to the problems we have mentioned there are others which relate to the
metaphysical opposition pofenf/a-actuality presumably entailed by the opposition
matter-form. It would seem that an individual essence, in the role of an eternal truth,
has a potentia significance relative to the existent domain. The transit from possibility to
existence is frequently characterized by Leibniz in terms that suggest the opposition
pofenf/a-actuality. The complete concepts are possibles insofar as they may be actualized
since not contradictory: they are potential existents which become actual through the
actualizing-energizing creative decree. If the distinction between form and matter
(potentia) were to be established with regard to the conceptual dichotomy "possible-
existent" the individual essence as pure possible would have to play the part of matter.
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For matter is potentia. But in the hylemorphic schema that accounts for the being of a
corporeal substance the individual essence is a principle of action. It is not matter but the
complement of matter. We have, then, that the same individual essence would be the
principle of actuality, in the hylemorphic account of a created existent, and the principle
of potentia relative to this same existent in the Platonically-influenced essentialistic
characterization of the transit from possibility to existence. Leibniz must integrate the
two conceptions, and speaks as if this were feasible. That it is not is attested by the
problems we are examining.
The multiplicity of roles Leibniz gives to his crucial metaphysical notions in his
account of external reality is also problematic. For one, we may be surprised by the
manner a substantial form is also a potential substance. Substantial form, a metaphysical
principle, in Aristotelian hylemorphism, becomes in Leibniz a substance in its own
right, though, as we made clear, virtual and such that it does not perform as substantial
form when independently substantial. Leibniz wants corporeal substances in his ontology,
and needs substantial forms (that will also play the role of force in dynamics) to account
for the unitary nature of the animal-like existents of the world. His own brand of
hylemorphism, however, does not start out from the corporeal substance, for it places
the immaterial substance that will perform as form relative to matter in a foundational
position, conceived after the significance of one's own substantiality as a thinking
substance in the tradition of Plato and Descartes. While Aristotle began with substances
in the spatio-temporal world, whose changing nature required matter and form as
explanatory principles, Leibniz affirms the immaterial substance first, and additionally
makes it perform as substantial form in a way that makes the corporeal substance it
constitutes metaphysically derivative. We have seen that the attributes of the thinking
substance become those of the corporeal substance through the hylemorphic function the
thinking substance performs over it. And yet, once the substantial identity of the
corporeal substance is established and its continuous linkage to an accompanying mind is
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explained, the true protagonist of created existence seems the composite substance to a
point that makes created immaterial substances somewhat superfluous.
Leibniz's emphasis on the importance of the composite substance and it
sempiternity through transformation makes the independence of the immaterial
substance unnecessary. In fact, corporeal substances, understood in closer proximity to
Aristotle by Leibniz, would have sufficed to explain the nature of created existents.
Human beings, as animals invested with spiritual functions would be moral entities,
whose personal nature could have been linked to memory, as Leibniz wants, and whose
immortality would have been appropriately explained through the hylemorphic
sempiternity. To a great extent Leibniz asserts this position. His hylemorphism strongly
inclines him in this direction, as some of the passages we have examined evince. But, on
the other hand, his deference for the importance of "immaterial substance" in the account
of God's nature, along with the traditional characterization of human beings as entities in
the image of God, whose immortality results from their substantial immateriality,
reinstates him continuously in the Platonic tradition.
The conjunction of the role of immaterial substance and substantial form in
Leibniz's metaphysics expresses this dual tendency, Platonic and Aristotelian, and brings
about the identification of the substantial attributes of a mind-substance with those of the
corporeal substance it informs. In this manner we are led to the confusion regarding our
ultimate nature and to the oscillation by Leibniz between men as the protagonist of the
psychic and moral attributes which essentially qualify human beings versus souls or
thinking substances. This confusion, of course has an immense influence over the
propensity towards idealism that we have denounced as an erroneous interpretative
inclination. Now, it must be stressed that the identity hylemorphism entails between a
thinking substance and the corporeal substance it constitutes hylemorphically makes
Leibniz's ambiguity on this issue unacceptable. Even though we could grant him that,
conceptually, immaterial substances play a central role in his metaphysics, both with
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regard to hylemorphism and relative to his characterization of the ultimately ultimate
constituents of matter, we are forced to emphasize that by his own account, ontologically,
composite substances have the upperhand. Their sempiternal duration warrants that
their substantial form will never have independent identity. Had Leibniz clearly
maintained a characterization of the subjects of created reality as animo-corporeal
substances, capable of thinking and reasoning, the tendency to conceive of substances as if
exclusively immaterial would have been avoided; and with it most of the defects of
interpretation his own exposition has fostered.
Leibniz's multiplication of roles for notions that are crucial to his different
metaphysical conceptual schemas is also problematic in the case of matter. In the role of
the complement of form, secondary matter is Aristotelian, and performs as a principle
that hylemorphically helps explain the existence and nature of a corporeal substance. But
in the role of body, as a being by aggregation, secondary matter is a different and much
more modern notion. In the latter sense it is influenced by the geometrical
corpuscularism that considers matter extended and infinitely divisible. As such, it must
play, for Leibniz, the role of an accident of a substance which is at the same time a
phenomenom, something whose being is relative to the subject which apprehends it.
Phenomenality is therefore, both conceived, in opposition to substantiality, with regard
to the nature of a being that is infinitely divisible, and, as a mind presentation, with
respect to a being whose perceptual unity obtains from the mind in which it is presented.
We have, then, that for Leibniz a matter that is the hylemorphic complement of a
substantial form is also the accident of the corporeal substance which comes about from
the hylemorphic conjunction of this matter and form. Secondary matter, therefore, has a
metaphysical role that seems conceptually fundamental to the being of a corporeal
substance and yet it also plays a derivative role in relation to this same corporeal
substance as its accidental manifestation. But this is still made more complex and
puzzling by having the secondary matter in the role of a phenomenom that obtain its
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phenomenal unity from the perceptual functions this corporeal substance is able to
perform insofar as constituted by the function of a thinking substance (as substantial
form) over this same matter.
Leibnizian secondary matter is hylemorphically fundamental to itself as an
accidental expression of a corporeal substance. It is at the same time fundamental to the
constitution of a corporeal substance and derived from this same substance as its
accidental expression, its body. Moreover, it is the body of this substance as that which
obtains perceptual unity from this same substance psychic functions. That these psychic
functions result from the manner the substantial form that is a thinking substance works
over secondary matter in the constitution of the corporeal substance must make the
secondary matter that complements the form different from the secondary matter that is
the body. And yet Leibniz consistently speaks as if they were the same. In more than one
sense, therefore, secondary matter is both fundamental and derivative relative to itself in
Leibniz's metaphysical blending of hylemorphism, corpuscularism and his own version of
phenomenalism. This is certainly stretching the meaning and function of metaphysical
factors beyond what seems conceptually acceptable.
3. Concluding Remarks
Leibniz's philosophy is a growing and continuous effort at system-building based
on an inclination towards syncretism which expresses this philosopher's profoundly
conciliatory nature. He constantly proposes syntheses —by which that which to most
philosophers seems antagonistic and even unreconcilable may come together into a middle
way explanation— under the conviction that reality, though complex and challenging
beyond what most intellects find acceptable, is unitary and fully intelligible. For Leibniz
the mission of a philosopher is not hopeless though asymptotic, inasmuch as God is
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infinite in an ontological sense, and created reality is, insofar as material, quantitatively
infinite.
Historically, Leibniz begins with a conception of external reality decisively
influenced by Cartesian corpuscularism, and, therefore, the product also of the influence
modern science was exerting over the cultural milieu. At the earliest stage of his
philosophical development he is also in possession of an account of transubstantiation
grounded on hylemorphism^G and he yet proclaims a conception of his own human
condition modelled after the Platonico-Augustinian treatment of a human being as an
immaterial soul, thus immortal.^^ Early in his development, these views are
complemented by reflections on the justice of God, that will be a central concern
throughout his life, which as we have seen depend basically upon an essentialistic
conception of knowledge that is metaphysically fundamental to his account of creation and
methodologically basic to his conception of philosophy.
The dynamics of Leibniz's conceptual development results from the manner these
different factors must be accommodated into a coherent synthesis. They do not readily
come together. What we attest in his development is an effort at building a system in
which the crucial notions included in hylemorphism progressively gain ascendancy. His
initial corpuscularism yields to hylemorphism with the recognition that the view that
material bodies are substances is untenable on account of reasons relative to dynamics,
and reasons having to do with transubstantiation and the nature of a being by aggregation.
Hylemorphism influences Leibniz's conception of substances, to the point of making his
appraisal of himself progressively distant from his initial Platonic inclination. He will
even explain the nature of an immaterial substance in terms of the metaphysical
hylemorphic conjunction of passivity and activity,^^ an account which is different,
however, from that of the hylemorphic constitution of a corporeal substance. But
hylemorphism does not prevail completely, as the same motives that promote Leibniz's
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hylemorphic conception of corporeal substance lie behind his defense of immaterial
substances.
Hylemorphism is valuable for Leibniz as an account of external reality where God
is not an irrelevant hypothesis. It is also metaphysically reputable insofar as it fits
within the essentialistic philosophical tradition, that Leibniz treats as indispensable to
metaphysics. But Leibniz also cherishes the mystic aspects present in the Platonic
conception of immaterial substances, so appropriate to the conceptualization of God and so
full of possibilities for the being of men beyond this life. The philosophical difficulties
already present in the manner the Christian metaphysical tradition had reunited Plato
and Aristotle in its attempt to elucidate its basic doctrinal contents are present in
Leibniz's in a definitive and binding way. His philosophical problems have to do with the
accommodation of modern scientific thought and metaphysics, since hylemorphism in his
philosophy answers to a great extent conceptual needs that relate to the view of nature of
the new science. But in a more fundamental way, the problems Leibniz faces simply
reflect the difficulties involved in the medieval attempt to construct a metaphysics on the
basis of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. Leibniz, like many before him, fails in
achieving a completely harmonious synthesis of these currents of thought. The ambiguity
inherent in a treatment of substance that makes the immaterial substance the paradigm of
substantiality while contending at the same time that the true substances of the created
world are hylemorphic composites is basic to the difficulties of interpretation that have
made Leibniz's a very puzzling subject of study, and have yielded idealistic and dualistic
interpretations of his ontology. This ambiguity is also symptomatic of a philosophical
style which, Leibniz's essentialism notwithstanding, has no clear criterion by which
speculation may be contained. Metaphysics, understood as an a priori construction of
conceptual schemas that attempt to resolve problems originating within an ever-growing
system based on suppositions and doctrinal inclinations has no sound basis for
establishing a definitive criterion of truth.
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NOTES
^"It is agreed that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate:
truth is foreseen because it is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it
is foreseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not also in the
knowledge of the past or of the present." [G.W. Lebniz, Theodicy , edited with an
introduction by Austin Farrer (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1985.), p. 144.]
2"The fundamental principle of reasoning is that there is nothing without a reason;
or, to explain the matter more distinctly, that there is no truth for which a reason does
not subsist. The reason for a truth consist in the connexion of the predicate with the
subject, that is, that the predicate is in the subject. This is either manifest, as in the case
of identical propositions —for example, 'A man is a man', or 'A white man is white'— or it
is concealed, but concealed in such a way that the connexion can be shown by the analysis
of notions..." [G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Writings . Edited by G.H.R. Parkinson (London
and Melbourne: Everyman's Library, 1984), P. 172.]
3"A11 propositions, however, whose truth must be shown by further analyzing and
understanding their terms are demonstrable by such analysis, that is, by definitions. So
it is clear that demonstration is a chain of definitions. For in the demonstration of any
proposition, nothing is used but definitions, axioms (with which 1 here include
postulates), theorems which have been demonstrated previously, and observations. Since
the theorems again must themselves be demonstrated and axioms, except for identities,
can also be demonstrated, it follows that all truths can be resolved into definitions,
identical propositions and observations —though purely intelligible truths do not need
observations. After the analysis has been completed, it will become manifest that the
chain of demonstrations begins with identical propositions or observations and ends in a
conclusion but that the beginning is connected with the conclusion through intervening
definitions. In this sense I said that a demonstration is a chain of definitions." [Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters , translated and edited by Leroy
Loemker (Dordrecht-Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: Reidel Publishing Company, 1976), p.
187.]
"But the principles of all demonstrations are expressed by significations of terms
(i.e. definitions) together with axiomatic identities:..." [G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on
Human Understanding , translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett
(London-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 432.]
354
"I should not blame him [Descartes] for being satisfied so often with
verisimilitude, if he himself had not aroused expectations with so strong a profession of
exactness. I blame Euclid much less for assuming certain things without proof, for he at
least established the fact that if we assume a few hypotheses, we can be sure that what
follows is equal in certainty, at least, to the hypotheses themselves. If Descartes or other
philosophers had done something similar to this, we should not be in difficulty.
Moreover, the skeptics, who despise the sciences on the pretext that they sometimes use
undemonstrated principles, ought to regard this as said also to them. I hold, in contrast,
that the geometricians should be praised because thay have pinned down science with such
pegs, as it were, and have discovered an art of advancing and of deriving so many things
from a few. If they had tried to put off the discovery of theorems and problems until all
the axioms and postulates had been proved, we should perhaps have no geometry today."
[Leibniz, Philosophical Papers, p. 384.]
^The passage that follows, though mostly concerned with "Right," establishes the
extent of demonstrative a priori knowledge, for Leibniz, and its dependence upon
definitionds; "If it ['justice'] is a fixed term with determinate meaning —in a word, if it
is not a simple sound without sense, like blitiri — the term or word justice will have
some definition or intelligible meaning. And, by using the incontestable rules of logic, one
can draw definite consequences from every definition. This is precisely what we do in
building the necessary and demonstrative sciences which do not depend at all on facts but
solely on reason; such are logic, metaphysics, arithmetic, geometry, the science of
motion, and the science of Right [droit ] as well, which are not at all based on experience
or facts but serve rather to give reasons for facts and to control them in advance."
[Leibniz, Philosophical Papers, pp. 563-564.]
^In his correspondence with De Voider, where metaphysics and dynamics is
Leibniz's main concern he writes: "Finally, granted that the a priori demonstration such
as you desire for everything cannot be given, will this make my hypothesis accord any
less with the facts? If you allow that it can be proved a posteriori, it will also be more
valid than a hypothesis. And is any reason that can be adduced more valid against your
concept of substance than the one which you yoursel now acknowledge —that on the basis
of it no modification and change can arise? Granted therefore that its impossibility is not
to be demonstrated, it would suffice to build our concepts so that they agree with
experience and practice, and to resolve our difficulties so that the road to higher reasons
is opened." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers, p. 527.]
^Cf. "The Platonists were not far wrong in recognizing four kinds of cognition in
the mind —sense, opinion, knowledge (scientia), and understanding, or in other words,
experience, conjecture, demonstration, and pure intellection, which looks into the
connections of truth by a single act of the mind; this belongs to God in all things but is
given to us in simple matters only." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers, p. 593.]
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Q'The mind is capable not merely of knowing them [necessary truths], but also of
finding them within itself. If all it had were the mere capacity to receive those items of
knowledge
—a passive power to do so, as indeterminate as the power of wax to receive
shapes or of a blank page to receive words— it would not be the source of necessary
truths, as I have just shown that its is. For it cannot be denied that the senses are
inadequate to show their necessity, and that therefore the mind has a disposition (as much
active and passive) to draw them from its own depths: though the senses are necessary to
give the mind the opportunity and the attention for this, and to direct it towards certain
necessary truths rather than others.... The fundamental proof of necessary truths comes
from the understanding alone, and other truths come from experience or from
observations of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing truths of boths sorts, but it is
the source of the former; and however often one experienced instances of a universal
truth, one could never know inductively that it would always hold unless one knew
through reason that it was necessary." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 79.] .
"So it [the mind] is not a bare faculty, consisting in a mere possibility of
understannding those truths [innate]: it is rather a disposition, an aptitude, a
preformation, which determines our soul and brings about that they are derivable from
it." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 81.]
^"Every finite spirit is always joined to an organic body, and represents other
bodies to itself by their relation to its own body." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 155.]
"I believe that beasts have imperishable souls and that no soul —human or
otherwise— is ever without some body. I hold that God alone is entirely exempt from this
because he is pure act. [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 14.]
lORene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy ,
translated by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1984), p. 62.
"I The discovery of consciousness as the point of departure of all knowledge; its
discovery as the domain of representations understood as objects of thought, which need
not be considered representations of external existents.
‘•2"For the rest, God seems to be called in here merely as a kind of display or
showpiece, not to mention that strange fiction or doubt as to whether we are not led to err
even in the most evident things, which should convince no one because the nature of
evidence prevents it and the experiences and successes of the whole of life witness against
it. And if this doubt could once be justly raised, it would be straightaway insuperable;..."
[Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
,
p. 385.]
•Sin "Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes,"
Leibniz writes; "Furthermore, I do not see what good it does to consider what is doubtful
as false. This would be not to lay aside prejudices but to change them." and he adds later:
"But Descartes provided an opening for this fallacy above in Article 2 by taking the
license of rejecting what is doubtful as false, so that it becomes possible to assume that
there are no corporeal beings because we can doubt that they exist, a point which cannot
be granted him." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , pp. 384-385.]
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^ reflection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses do
not give us what we carry with us already. In view of this, can it be denied that there is a
great deal that is innate in our minds, since we are innate to ourselves, so to speak, and
since we include Being, Unity, Substance, Duration, Change, Action, Perception,
Pleasure, and a host of other objects of our intellectual ideas? [Leibniz. New Essav<;
p. 51.]
"It is my opinion that reflection enables us to find the idea of substance within
ourselves, who are substances." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 105.]
"'^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 556.
"•^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 558.
^^"We must admit it to be true that the criteria for real phenomena thus far
offered [vivid, complex and internally coherent], even when taken together, are not
demonstrative, even though they have the greatest probability: or to speak popularly,
that they provide a moral certainty but do not establish a metaphysical certainty, so that
to affirm the contrary would involve a contradiction. Thus by no argument can it de
demonstrated absolutely that bodies exist, nor is there anything to prevent certain well-
ordered dreams from being the objects of our mind, which we judge to be true and which,
because of their accord with each other, are equivalent to truth so far as practice is
concerned." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 364.]
"Being itself and truth are not understood completely through the senses. Eor it
would not at all be impossible for a created being to have long and orderly dreams which
resemble our lives, such that everything that it thought it perceiced through the senses
would be nothing but mere appearances. Something is thus needed beyond the senses, by
which to distinguish the true from the apparent." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers ,
p. 549.]
"About sensible things we can know nothing more, nor ought we to desire to know
more, than that they are consistent with each other as well as with rational principles
that cannot be doubted, and hence that future events can to some extent be foreseen from
past. To seek any other truth or reality than what this contains is vain, and skeptics ought
not to demand any other, nor dogmatist promise it." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers ,
p. 384.].
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the Essays , Locke says, through his mouthpiece: "They who tell us, that the
soul always think, do never, that I remember, [tell us] 'that a man always think
Leibniz's mouthpiece rejoins: "I suppose that that is because they are talking about the
separated soul too, and that they would readily admit that the man always thinks while his
soul and body are united. As for my own views: since I have reason to hold that the soul is
never completely separated from all body, I think it can be said without qualification that
the man does and will always think." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p.pp. Il7-ii8.j
In an article entitled "On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter" the point is
explicitly made that matter by itself cannot think, while matter with form (corporeal
substance) can: "Heretofore matter has been understood to mean that which includes only
purely passive and indifferent concepts, such as extension and impenetrability, which
need to be given determinate form or activity by something else. Thus when it is said that
there are immaterial substances, one means by this that there are substances which
include other concepts, namely, perception and the principle of action or of change, which
cannot be explained either by extension or by impenetrability. When these beings have
feeling, they are called souls, and when they are capable of reason, they are called
spirits. Hence if anyone says that force and perception are essential to matter, he is
taking matter for the complete corporeal substance which includes form and matter, or
the soul along with the organs." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 551
.]
That the metaphysical linkage between matter and an immaterial substance (a
soul) provides an intelligible way by which to account for perception and thinking in a
material entity is the point of the passage that follows: "But if someone said that God could
at least join the faculty of thought to a machine which was made ready [for it], I should
reply that if that were done, and if God added this faculty to matter without at the same
time infusing into it a substance in which this same faculty inhered (which is how I
conceive it) —that is without joining an immaterial soul to it— the matter would have had
to be miraculously exalted in order to receive a power of which is not naturally
capable.... Suffice it to say that that we cannot maintain that matter thinks unless we put
into it either an imperishable soul or a miracle;..." [Leibniz, New Essays
, p. 67.]
19"They answer best that define an accident to be the manner by which any body is
conceived;'' and, "wherefore, I define an accident to be the manner of our conception of
body.
"
[Thomas Hobbes, Body. Man, and Citizen. Selections From Thomas Hobbes , edited
by Richard S. Peters (New York, N.Y.: Collier Books, 1980), p. 102.]
20The final destiny of the soul and the human individual beyond the ontological
domain constituted by creation is a topic that transcends natural occurrences. As such it
is not amenable to a full understanding by finite intellects, according to Leibniz. He
tipically vacillates between the options of renouncing all knowledge about the issue or
else suggesting either of two options: a continuation of the hylemorphic bond in a manner
that accords with the idea of resurrection or a completely independent non-material
existence of the soul. The passages that follow are indicative of Leibniz's position: "I do
not venture an assertion with regard to the pre-existence, however, or with regard to the
details of the future state of human souls, since God is able to use extraordinary methods
in these matters within the realm of grace. Nevertheless the ways favored by the natural
reason are to be preferred, at least so far as revelation does not teach the contrary.
[Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 590.] "Now we are destined to live someday a spiritual
life, where substances separated from matter will occupy us much more than do bodies."
[G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics. Correspondence With Arnauld. MonadolQqy.
translated by George Montgomery (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1988.),
p. 170.]
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21 Benson Mates, The Philpsophy of Leibniz (New York, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 194. ^
22Mates, The Philosophy of Leihni? p. 204.
23Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 579.
24Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 531.
25Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 636.
26Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 637.
^^Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 638.
23g.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays , edited and translated by Roger Ariew and
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 104
29Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 105.
30Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 105.
21 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays
, p. 105.
22Leibniz, Philosophical Writings
, pp. 174-175
23Bertrand Russell. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964) p. 100
24c. D. Broad, Leibniz
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 91.
25Broad, Leibniz
, p. 91.
26|n part III of "Theological Writings Related to the Catholic Demonstrations"
(1668) on the issue of transubstantiation Leibniz begins by defining a substance as a
''suppositum,'' a being that "has a principle of action within itself." He explains
transubstantiation as "change of substantial form" and contrast the phenomenal character
of a body (an "appearance") "deprived of substantial form" to that of a suppositum.
[Leibniz. Philosophical Papers, pp. 115-117.]
27(n part II of "Theological Writings Related to the Catholic Demonstrations"
Leibniz explains the immortality of the human mind on the basis of its defining attribute,
thinking. Its action is not, hence, motion. It is not hence a substance with parts. It is
hence incorruptible: hence, immortal. [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers , p. 113.]
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38|n his correspondence with De Voider Leibniz explains that a monad, a simple
substance, has a passive and an active dimension, wherefrom it is constituted by an
entelechy and a primitive passive force. It is, then, a hylemorphic composite. But we
must not confuse it with the corporeal substance. Of course, Leibniz needs hylemorphism
to distinguish created immaterial substances from God, for God only is pure act (See
footnote 9 above). To De Voider Leibniz writes: "For the rest, 1 arrange in the monad or
the simple substance, complete with an entelechy, only one primitive passive force which
is related to the whole mass of the organic body. The other subordinate monads placed in
the organs do not make up a part of it, though they are immediately required by it and
they combine with the primary monad to make the organic corporeal substance, or the
animal or plant. 1 therefore distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2)
primary matter or primitive passive force; (3) the complete monad formed by these
two; (4) mass or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which innumerable
subordinate monads concur; and (5) the animal or corporeal substance which the
dominating monad makes into one machine." [Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
, p. 530.)
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